5. Discovering General Smuts through the lens of World War I in Africa

A bibliographical exploration

David Katz
Stellenbosch University

Introduction

Contemporary historians of the military Smuts have yet to identify the essence of the man, his loadstar or driving force. Many remain confused by the capricious political nature that saw him jump Rhodes's ship to join the Republican Boer cause, only once again to become one of the Empire's staunchest proponents. One can better comprehend the enigma of Smuts at the strategic level of war once one places his overriding objective of territorial expansion as the cornerstone of his 50-year career. He subsumed all else in his desire to unite South Africa, expand its borders northward, and fulfil Rhodes's dream of a contiguous British territory from Cape to Cairo. His quest for a 'Greater South Africa' began to unravel almost immediately after the Union of South Africa's formation in 1910, where he failed to incorporate the High Commission Territories and later Rhodesia into the Union. The military Smuts, who achieved much at the operational level of war in conquering German South West Africa (GSWA) in 1915 and 90% of German East Africa (GEA) in 1916, could not permanently annex the former nor swap the latter for the Portuguese territory of Delagoa Bay. Ironically, a byproduct of Smuts's sub-Imperialism was the formation of the Union Defence Force in 1912 and his gift of a South African manoeuvre doctrine, which has endured through to the South

African Defence Force and the current South African National Defence Force. In seeking Smuts's legacy, his biographers have tended to ignore or denigrate his career's military aspects.

Having accumulated a wealth of military experience by the time he took charge of the Allied campaign in GEA in 1916, Smuts remained accused in many circles of inexperience and being somewhat less than a gifted amateur. His experiences in the Second Ango Boer War (1899-1902), the first phase of the GSWA campaign in 1914, the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government and the second phase of the GSWA campaign in 1915 allowed him to forge his skills at the operational level of war. Yet the GSWA campaign, especially the first phase of which Smuts played a leading role in its planning and execution, has been forgotten. His role as the operational brains behind suppressing the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government is ignored or underestimated. Smuts, leading the Southern Force in GSWA in 1915, unlocked the German defences, which allowed Louis Botha to restore mobility to the Northern Force and eventually defeat the Germans at Otavifontein 1915. Historians have relegated Smuts's role in the second phase of the GSWA campaign to a 'symbolic role'. However, his performance in GEA has attracted the most vitriolic attention. Richard Meinertzhagen (1960), who served under Smuts in GEA, led the charge. Harold Courtney Armstrong wrote a scathing analysis of Smuts (Armstrong. 1937) questioning his abilities as a general. Contemporary Smuts biographers have almost exclusively drawn upon these two works for decades, fuelling a skewed assessment of Smuts's generalship. Without a balanced synthesis of secondary and primary sources, an unhealthy academic cross-citation culture persists, which has stymied research on the military Smuts.

Smuts enjoyed much public acclaim and interest directly after both World Wars. Most of the attention given by historians of these times took the form of biography and followed the format of Thomas Carlyle's Great Man (Schapiro, 1945:101, 102). Similarly, 85% of popular, published material relating to Smuts's World War I service appeared during the periods immediately after the World Wars. After that, a long

hiatus followed, and until recently, the subject has received scant attention. The turn of the twenty-first century has witnessed an uptake in interest, with books of varying quality appearing in time for the 100th anniversary of World War I. Contemporary works concerning World War I in Africa attempt to elevate Africa from its long relegation as a mere sideshow. These books follow Spencer's approach and examine the social impact of the war (Spencer, 1896:31). Smuts garners a modicum of attention in some of them. Few books have devoted much space to evaluating Smuts in terms of his military career and performance as a general.

This overview comprehensively examines the historiography surrounding Smuts's military career. It includes an assessment of secondary and primary sources and identifies how certain publications have achieved primacy amongst historians, influencing their assessment of Smuts's generalship. Other publications of those who fought against him or under his command highlight his competency differently. It has also been challenging for Smuts to emerge from beneath the light of his opponent in GEA, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, whose exploits have attracted rapturous fervour in certain quarters. Popular historians have misrepresented von Lettow-Vorbeck's remarkable survival against great odds in GEA as 'guerilla warfare', and his achievements at evading annihilation have been grossly exaggerated. Smuts's noteworthy campaign often takes a back seat with the USA's Army and War Colleges, who prefer the German over the South African versions. This study highlights other avenues of historiography that researchers may profitably mine to render a more equitable assessment of Smuts as general.

Creating Context: General Histories of Empire, South Africa, and the South African Military

Smuts's World War I took place within the context of empire and expansionism, pursuits that were two sides of the same coin. Smuts was a product and keen proponent of the British

Empire and an avid expansionist. He ceaselessly sought opportunities to move South Africa's borders inexorably northwards. His Imperial / expansionist desires were his prime motivation, which lends context to his modus operandi, political decisions and, importantly, his military strategy. Unravelling the essence of the military Smuts requires a keen understanding of his Imperial role and expansionist policies. There are excellent books that uncover the mysteries of British Imperialism.

Edward Said produced an impressive work, *Orientalism* (Said, 1979), which analysed the general patronising Western attitude towards Middle Eastern, Asian, and African societies. These prejudiced Western attitudes shaped the cultural attitudes of European Imperialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The West viewed these nations as static, underdeveloped, decadent, lazy, illogical, and even savage, whereas the West was viewed as flexible, developed, and superior. The driving force behind colonisation was often the notion of a 'civilising mission' and bringing enlightenment to 'inferior nations.' Imperialism was the force behind colonisation, and the ideology of Orientalism facilitated and justified the occupation and subjugation of foreign countries and nations. Smuts fully subscribed to the notion that black culture was underdeveloped, and reading Said's work goes a long way to explaining the thought processes that inhabited the minds of the leaders of that period.

David Cannadine published *Ornamentalism* (Cannadine, 2001), a counterargument to Said. Whereas Said saw empire based on racial prejudice and the superiority of one race over another, Cannadine argues that class, rank and status were the backbone of the British system of empire. The British sought to transplant their hierarchical social system within the colonies. The British recognised hierarchies and structures in their subject societies in much the same way as in British society. Cannadine admits that the British regarded the great mass of subject colonial populations with disdain, but this was also true regarding their attitude to Britain's urban and rural poor. The British thought of their subjects individually rather

than collectively, being more concerned with rank than race. A person's skin colour was less important than their position in the local social hierarchy.

In *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, Saul Dubow identified Smuts's departure from Ornamentalism to Orientalism. He sees Smuts as having an impulse to defer the 'native' issue to the future (Dubow, 2012:32,33). Together, these opposing points of view on the meaning of empire provide valuable insights into the philosophy of men such as Botha and Smuts and their vision, or lack thereof, surrounding the political aspirations of South African black people. Imperialism and colonialism are sensitive topics in the modern post-colonial world, and contemporary authors are apt to use these anachronisms as a stick to beat leaders of that era—Smuts being no exception.

Overwhelmingly, the more general histories of South Africa tend to concentrate on the Second Anglo Boer War and the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government, excluding World War I. A general history of South Africa that creates a context but is relatively thin on South Africa and World War I is the *Oxford History of South Africa* (Wilson & Thompson, 1975). It focuses on Afrikaner and African nationalism and South Africa's growing isolation after World War II. *A History of Southern Africa* by Eric Walker (1972) deals with World War I concisely and again indicates the scant attention given by historians to World War I in South African history. A more modern book, *a History of South Africa* by Frank Welsh, follows the general pattern and dedicates a few pages to World War I (Welsh, 2000). Thomas Pakenham's *The Scramble for Africa* inexplicably ignores the bloodiest and most protracted scramble for Africa—World War I in Africa (Pakenham, 1997).

Offering a concise but thorough treatment of South Africa in World War I is *South Africa in the Twentieth Century* (Liebenberg & Spies, 1994). It provides an overview of the reasons for South Africa's entry into the war, opposition to the war, the treatment of black people in the military, the conduct of the campaigns and the situation on the home front,

and the critical implications of the peace process following the war. Ian van der Waag's *A Military History of Modern South Africa* (Van der Waag, 2015) and Timothy Stapleton's *A Military History of South Africa* are more substantial military offerings (Stapleton, 2010). Van Der Waag offers a unique perspective when he proposes that all of South Africa's wars before 1994 amounted to 'Wars of South African Unification'. Stapleton's work spans from 1652 to the advent of a modern democratic South Africa. World War I receives succinct treatment within a concise chapter combining the World Wars. Stapleton acknowledges the paucity of information surrounding the development of the South African military from 1910 onward. Like Van der Waag, Stapleton traces the development of the South African military over centuries through the various military conflicts, eventually culminating in the modern-day South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Smuts, the founder of the UDF in 1912, forms an essential part of the nexus for both authors.

South African Expansionism and Sub-Imperialism: *Causus Belli*?

Expansionism is central to Smuts and his political and military conduct in World War I. Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw pioneered the study of South African expansionism and have done much to inform on the question. They have built on the work of authors such as Katzenellenbogen and Chanock. Expansionism before 1900 is dealt with in N.G. Garson's thesis on the Boer Republics' designs on Swaziland. It demonstrates the depth, breadth and enormous timespan for which expansionism has coursed through South African veins (Garson, 1955). Hyam and Henshaw's efforts focus on the reasons for the failure of South African expansionism rather than expansionism as a prime motivator for South Africa's foreign policy and its ultimate aim when entering the World Wars (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003; Hyam, 1972; Henshaw, 2009). *The Lion and the Springbok* contains a perceptive chapter dedicated to 'Greater South Africa', which concentrates on South Africa's desire to incorporate the High Commission

Territories (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland) (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003). Hyam's other offering, *The Failure of South African Expansion*, has a broader sweep and ventures into why South Africa's denial of black political aspirations thwarted South Africa's expansionist desires (Hyam, 1972). Henshaw, in an article titled *South African Territorial Expansion and the International Reaction to South African Racial Policies, 1939 to 1948* (Henshaw, 2009:65-76), deals, in a similar vein, with how South African expansionism was foiled rather than how expansionism was the primary motive behind South African entry into both World Wars.

Simon Katzenellenbogen has produced outstanding work on South Africa and its economic and political relations with Mozambique from the 1880s to 1928 (Katzenellenbogen, 1982). The author offers valuable observations into South African and British attempts to acquire the strategic territory of Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique. Delagoa Bay was the gateway to the outside world for the landlocked and isolated Boer Republics. While the Boer Republics existed, the British sought to deny them access to Delagoa Bay. Later, the Union looked jealously at the territory to remove the last vestiges of European influence and round off South Africa's territory. Smuts went to great lengths to lay his hand on Delagoa Bay during and after World War I via the conquest of German East Africa. A lacuna exists in historiography for this period.

Anne Samson has synthesised primary and secondary sources to develop expansionism as a motivator for South Africa's participation in World War I (Samson, 2006). The young Union's intervention in German East Africa in 1916 allowed South Africa to 'come of age' and pursue her Imperial interests as an exercise in nationhood. Although the United Kingdom and South Africa harboured different objectives regarding GSWA and GEA, both ultimately desired the conquest of the territory. Smuts skilfully coordinated and integrated Imperial and sub-Imperial aims to achieve both simultaneously. He took political risks in the war, including sending South African troops to GEA in 1916. Besides an obligation of loyalty to the United Kingdom, his primary aim

was nothing less than uniting English and Afrikaners through the acquisition of territory for South Africa and building the prestige of South Africa within the Empire.

Smuts as Defender of the Empire: The Conspiracy Theorists

Smuts was a keen proponent of Empire and an even keener sub-Imperialist with an intense passion for territorial acquisition. His passion for the British Empire remained unbroken except for a brief hiatus from the Jameson Raid (1895) to the end of the Second Anglo Boer War. His quest for a Greater South Africa within the Empire resumed soon after the close of the Second Anglo Boer War. He worked tirelessly with the members of Milner's Kindergarten to bring about the Union of South Africa in 1910. His close association with Rhodes, and later Milner's Kindergarten, has given rise to suggestions that he may have been an inner member of the Kindergarten, especially after the departure of the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Alfred Milner (1854 to 1925) in 1905. Carroll Quigley, a professor at Georgetown University and an author of books on social history, asserted that the Kindergarten and its various successors played a significant role in recent world history (Quigley, 1981), Some write Quigley off as a mere conspiracy theorist - he has a solid following amongst members of that movement - although he dismisses them and their wild assumptions. Another more recent book making similar assertions and placing Smuts firmly within the inner circle of the Kindergarten is Robin Brown's *The Secret Society* (Brown, 2015). Brown relies heavily on Quigley when asserting Smuts's links with the Kindergarten.

It is debatable as to how much influence the Round Table or The Royal Institute of International Affairs exerted on the role-players of the day or whether Smuts's policy of expansionism owed its origins and sustenance to this 'Rhodesian-Milnerite secret society' (Quigley, 1981). Quigley asserts that Smuts was very much a part of the inner circle of this influential society and, as such, harboured many of its

aims when it came to the Empire. This group frequently used him to enunciate its policies in public, two examples of which were speeches delivered by Smuts in May 1917 and November 1934 (Quigley, 1981:48, 77, 322; Brown, 2015:240). One may speculate on how Rhodes, Milner and the Round Table influenced Smuts, but it is evident that many of the broader aims of Smuts and the Kindergarten were closely aligned. Although similarities existed in these different expansionist streams, there were nuanced and less subtle differences - Smuts came the closest in coordinating these different aims.

The Smuts Biographies

The overwhelming Nationalist fervour that South Africa experienced after 1948 dissuaded Afrikaner authors from Smuts as a topic. Nationalists perceived Smuts as a traitor - a man who preferred the international stage over the liberation and independence of his people, the handmaiden of the British Empire. His pro-British, pro-Empire stance ensured his near disappearance from history in a Nationalist South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Post-apartheid South African democracy has failed to claim him and consigned his role in consolidating the territory of what has become modern South Africa to national amnesia.

Kobus Du Pisani produced an impressive historiographical assessment of published Smuts biographies, which preceded the release of an Afrikaner collaboration (Du Pisani, Kriek & De Jager, 2017), in which he was the editor (Du Pisani, 2016). Du Pisani aimed to assess the historiographical contribution of published Smuts biographies by selecting 19 out of 30 possible biographies. Since 1995, historians have produced merely 65 pages of biographical material of Smuts and his role in World War I. The dearth of contemporary work on Smuts demonstrates the yawning historiographical lacuna relating to his general military contribution during World War I, particularly his World War I in Africa.

The first biography of Smuts belonged to N. Levi. It took the reader from Smuts's birth to the beginnings of

the GEA campaign in 1916. Levi was of Dutch descent and worked as a journalist in South Africa. Smuts was mildly apprehensive about the publication and hoped his would-be biographer would fail in finding a publisher and that the whole enterprise would come to nought (Hancock & van der Poel, 1966:367). Smuts preferred not to read the manuscript even though Levi offered him the opportunity. Levi preferred that Smuts would not influence the text. He was concerned not to damage the image of Smuts's political party (Hancock & van der Poel, 1966:381), Smuts showed little confidence in Levi's enterprise, as by Levi's admittance, he was a rank beginner as a biographer. Smuts suggested that Engelenburg, a South African journalist, newspaper editor, and a close associate, review the manuscript (Hancock & van der Poel, 1966:398, 434). The book's value lies in the fact that Smuts did not influence the final result, representing the opinions of those sympathetic to Smuts living during World War I.

Sarah Millin published a biography of Smuts in 1936, steeped in primary sources and covering his life up to 1917 (Millin, 2001). Millin evolved from a cautious Liberal in 1920 into a fervent supporter of Verwoerd in the 1960s. Millin was a writer and novelist of considerable achievements, but she has fallen out of favour due to her treatment of race, rendering much of her work morally offensive. Her legacy, tainted by her race theories, suffered a similar fate as her biographical subjects, Smuts and Rhodes. J.M. Coetzee notes that her views on race were not out of kilter with the times that she lived in and merely a reflection of respectable scientific and historical thought of that period (Coetzee, 1980:42). Smuts being alive when her biography of him was published somewhat diminished the work, but it still offers an insight into how he was viewed in his times by a biographer of his times.

She gained unprecedented access to his documents through her friendship with Smuts and his family. Millin establishes Smuts's relationship with Rhodes early in the book and reveals that Rhodes's idea of a Greater South Africa was central to Smuts and endured beyond the Jameson Raid and the end of their friendship. The Rhodes-Smuts theme

is present within her book. Considering that '[The] book [was] revised—as to its facts, but not in its opinions—by General Smuts,' one can assume that both men shared similar expansionist visions. Her book comes the closest to revealing Smuts's views on the white and black races and reflects the paternalism, vagueness, and relegation of importance he ascribed to the 'native' question. He took this ambiguity to the grave. Although concise and relatively uncritical, her chapters on Smuts and his World War I provide insights that only her proximity to Smuts could deliver.

Grey Steel, authored by Harold Courtney Armstrong and published in 1937, offers an adverse opinion on Smuts's supposed lack of generalship (Armstrong, 1937). The book's subtitle, *A Study in Arrogance*, reveals the author's adopted position in building his biography of Smuts generally, but more specifically, in assessing his conduct of the GEA campaign. Armstrong served as a junior officer with the Sixth UK Army Division when the Turks captured him during the siege of Kut (1915 to 1916). He languished in captivity until he managed to escape just before the end of the war. After the war, he was posted back to Turkey for some years, where Armstrong remained in constant touch with the Turks, including Mustafa Kemal, and watched the rise of Atatürk's New Turkey. He also wrote *Turkey in Travail* (1925), *Turkey and Syria Reborn* (1930), *Unending Battle* (1934) and *Grey Wolf*, *Lord of Arabia* (1932) (Engelbrecht, 2015). The importance of his Smuts book lies not in its depth of research - for there is little evidence of this - but in the fact that many historians, including renowned ones, have come to rely on Armstrong and his views of Smuts as a general.

It seems peculiar that Armstrong, who had busied himself with Turkish matters for two decades, would turn his subsequent work over to South African politics. A clue to Armstrong's motivation lies in his own words, '[…] there remain untouched by the fury of the iconoclasts only four men – T.E. Lawrence of Arabia, Marshall Foch, Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, and the Jan Christiaan Smuts'. Armstrong took on removing much of the 'flabby nonsense' which historians had

written about Smuts up to that date (Armstrong, 1941:10). Therefore, Armstrong sets about his evangelical task, attacking the cherished beliefs held about Smuts, not least his abilities as a general.

Armstrong fires destructive shots across Smuts's bows and accuses him of being a theoretician in contrast to Botha, a general who considered the human aspects applicable to warfare. He thought Smuts's intellect was a driver for his arrogance, which made him aloof, disdainful, and overly sensitive to criticism (Armstrong, 1941:362). 'Smuts had seen the fight as a chess game on a board. He had not considered personalities; he had not realised how they counted: an army was to him a machine [...]' (Armstrong, 1941:243). Armstrong builds a case for Smuts's impetuosity, amateurishness and inexperience in commanding large forces in the field. His conduct of the campaigns in GSWA and GEA come in for much criticism, and the author does not baulk in describing unflattering incidents involving Smuts for which he offers not a jot of evidence. Historians should have dismissed Armstrong's book as a poorly researched opinion piece. Authors such as Anderson (2004) and Strachan (2004) - they are not alone - have profited from *Grey Steel* by replicating much of its sentiment surrounding Smuts's poor generalship, often using much of the same language.

E.S. Crafford has the honour of being the first Afrikaans-speaking writer to attempt a biography of Smuts (Crafford, 1943). The author claims objectivity by discarding the influences of slanderers and sycophants. He published the book in the same election month in 1943 when Smuts's United Party registered a comfortable win. The book is somewhat concise, and Crafford could not consult Smuts's private papers. He uses the execution of Jopie Fourie (1879 to 1914) and the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government to highlight Smuts's aloofness and callousness, especially when compared to Botha. He devotes a brief chapter to World War I, but few primary sources adorn the book or buttress its scaffolding. Nevertheless, it provides a valuable insight into how an Afrikaner contemporary of Smuts viewed him. Similarly, *Old*

Master by Rene Kraus, gives a narrative in more detail but lacks critical analysis (Kraus, 1944).

Smuts's son, Jannie Smuts, approaches hagiography in accounting for his father's life (Smuts, 1952). It is a mistake to write off all accounts such as these as a one-sided eulogy seeking Smuts's vindication (Du Pisani, 2016:458). Its value lies not so much in its uncritical approach but in the provision of rare glimpses into the personal life of a very private man. The author speaks of the lasting effects of malaria his father contracted in GEA and the terrible blow of losing the election in 1948. The chapters on World War I are more extensive than most and deliver some rare glimpses of the impact of the war on Smuts's personal life. The book contains many primary sources, such as Smuts's speeches and military dispatches. Their place in the narrative gives them context otherwise lacking when encountered in the archive. His proximity to his father may have clouded his objectivity somewhat when dealing with the harsher aspects of his father's career. Still, the same familial ties have given him a vantage point to deliver a unique perspective.

An Australian, Keith Hancock, wrote the best biography to date on Smuts. The book is a product of a massive scholarly exercise to establish the Smuts archive after Smuts died in 1950. Hancock's unreserved admiration of Smuts gives the book a sympathetic tone but is not entirely uncritical of the statesman. In his own words, '[He] has tried not to write about Smuts *and* his times, but to write about [Smuts] *in* his times' (Hancock & van der Poel, 1966:xii). This methodology places Smuts firmly within the context of his times, a skill that has eluded many Smuts biographers. Hancock's work is one of only a few based on an in-depth utilisation and analysis of the personal papers of Smuts housed at the South African National Archives in Pretoria. From this point of view, few works surpass it. Extensive reliance on deep archival sources and comprehensive coverage of Smuts's career renders it *locus classicus*. Hancock's fervent wish that future historical endeavour would produce an excellent new biography of Smuts has not come to fruition (Hancock, 1962, 1968). However, it

does have flaws, especially when dealing with Smuts and his 'native policy' or lack of one. De Kiewiet said, 'Smuts made no creative contribution to the native question' (De Kiewiet, 1956:18). Furthermore, Hancock's reliance on Smuts's copious correspondence has marginalised role-players with whom Smuts did not keep up correspondence, such as Botha, Denys Reitz, and Jan Hofmeyr.

In 1999, Albert Grundlingh predicted a 'Smuts renaissance' in South African studies. He quotes Saul Dubow and Shula Marks, who, when reflecting on Keith Hancock's two-volume biography on Smuts, identified 'Renewed interest via - his theories of holism, his environmental and scientific concerns and his exemplification of a particular tradition of white South African identity - suggest that Hancock's Smuts will be continued to be studied with profit'. Grundlingh optimistically forecasted that the end of South Africa's isolation and her re-joining the Commonwealth would usher in an era where historians would again highlight Smuts's political role on the world stage (Grundlingh, 1999:352). Grundlingh's predictions of a resurgence in interest in Smuts have not come to pass. Academics have somewhat debunked Smuts's philosophy of holism, and politicians have written off his legacy as irrelevant in the new democratic South Africa. Recent attempts by Afrikaner scholars to claim Smuts for Afrikanerdom seem to have been stillborn (Du Pisani et al., 2017).

Piet Meiring, a political journalist and Director of State Information, predates Du Pisani et al. in their attempts to reclaim Smuts for the Afrikaners (Meiring, 1975). His viewpoint is that of an Afrikaner Nationalist. Meiring identified the outbreak of World War I and the execution of Jopie Fourie as Smuts's departure and alienation from the Afrikaner fold. The timing of Meiring's book coincided with the increasing isolation that South Africa was beginning to endure internationally. In reclaiming Smuts for South Africa and the Afrikaner, the book sought to remind the reader of when South Africa occupied a significant place on the international stage,

due mainly to Smuts and his statesmanship. The book adds few new insights into Smuts or his generalship in World War I.

Bernard Friedman, a co-founder of the Progressive Party, was formerly a member of the United Party under Smuts. Friedman resigned his seat in protest over the United Party's refusal to pledge the restoration of coloured voters on the Common Roll in 1955. Friedman adopted a more critical stance of Smuts compared to Millin and Hancock (Friedman, 1975). Friedman deals with three main aspects of Smuts's career. These are his role in the formation of the Union in 1910, his reconciliation with Hertzog via the Fusion Government, and his role as leader of the United Party and Prime Minister from 1945 to 1948, leading up to the shocking loss of power to the Nationalists under Malan in 1948. The book does not deal with the military aspects of Smuts's career. Friedman castigates Smuts for his paternalistic treatment of black people and failing to make adequate provision for their political aspirations. He accuses Smuts of giving Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog the two-thirds parliamentary majority required to remove African voters in the Cape from the Common Roll in 1936. Smuts's last three years in office, ending in 1948, lacked a vision for black political aspirations, and he failed to lead the way for his voters in finding a solution.

Arguably, the best post-Hancock biography is the one produced by Kenneth Ingham, a professor at Bristol University (Ingham, 1986:212). His distance from Smuts in time and space made Ingham more critical than previous biographers. However, according to Shula Marks, Ingham's book fails to deliver anything new to the pool of knowledge. It fails to adequately address Smuts's deep-seated racism or his inability to progress and solve the 'native' question (Marks, 2001:212). The lesson to be learnt by a would-be biographer is that attempts to produce a modern-day biography must address Smuts's policy towards black people, and the excuse of contextualising him as a man of his time no longer suffices. Importantly for this study, Ingham deals briefly with Smuts's campaign in GEA and, with little analysis or understanding, concludes that Smuts was indeed out of his depth.

Piet Beukes, a prominent South African journalist and a deputy director of the Bureau of Information during World War II, enjoyed personal contact with Smuts and much admired him. He produced a series of books that contained elements of a biography by dissecting Smuts's personality and his relationships with women, holism, religion, and botany (Beukes, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996). The publication date of these books coincides with the transitional period before the advent of South Africa's democratic dispensation in 1994. During this period, the Nationalist Government funded a somewhat cynical movement to enlighten the international community about South Africa's contribution to defending the West. The Ashanti series, discussed below, was part of a similar cynical effort during the same period to remind the West of South Africa's participation at their side during their times of need. Beukes never produced a work on the military Smuts.

Anthony Lentin focused on Smuts's role at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (Lentin, 2010). Unlike Richard Steyn, who entirely dispenses with primary documentation, Lentin relies heavily, if not exclusively, on two published primary sources, The *Smuts Papers* and the *British documents on foreign affairs–reports and papers from the Foreign Office*. His book contains a relatively thin bibliography without any reference to academic articles, such as those of Shula Marks (2001), Saul Dubow (2008) and Martin Legassick (1995), the most vociferous modern critics of Smuts's character and career. By ignoring academic articles, he misses an opportunity to deal with the cutting edge of research on Smuts and their harsh criticism, and by doing so, the book becomes a hagiography at worst and a eulogy at best.

Richard Steyn delivers a modern account of Smuts and, at the outset, openly states his journalist methodology. Rather than 'bury [himself] in research for the next few years and produce a thick tome that would gather dust on the shelves,' he was guided by 'an academic of renown' to produce a short and less daunting book' (Steyn, 2015:ix). As a result, he has created a popular history, 'a sort of journalism about the past in which the story and the characters are the key elements, and

the argument is secondary'. The path Steyn has travelled may have resulted in an easy read but amounts to nothing more than a rehash of the secondary sources. His approach has little chance of discovering the 'essence of the man' as demanded by Nasson, (2018) and as a result, adds little to the existing pool of knowledge. In the same category as 'historic journalism' is the latest campaign history on GSWA by Adam Cruise titled *Louis Botha's War* (2015. Also see Cruise et al., 2013). This type of book has a place serving as a primer to pique interest in a long-forgotten period in our history. However, other than raising curiosity, it failed to add to the body of knowledge on the subject and was probably not intended to.

The recent collaboration of Afrikaner historians has reversed a long-standing trend and produced a work that seeks to reclaim Smuts into the Afrikaner fold. Du Pisani, Kriek and De Jager deliver an academic reappraisal of Smuts from a distinctly Afrikaans perspective (Du Pisani et al., 2017). Pertinent to this study is Andre Wessels's chapter on Smuts and World War I (2017). Wessels does not deliver beyond what is available in the secondary sources. He relies too heavily on published material rather than primary sources, as witnessed by his endnotes. The result, combined with historical errors, amounts to a missed opportunity. Fransjohan Pretorius's chapter on Smuts in the Second Anglo Boer War gives insight into Smuts's evolution as a military leader (2017). However, this relies heavily on Keith Hancock and suffers from a scarcity of primary sources. The book offers few new insights, especially about Smuts in World War I, and its significance lies in the fact that it is an exclusively Afrikaner effort to reclaim Smuts. The quality of the chapter contributions falls short of Du Pisani's initial criteria regarding over-reliance on secondary documentation on the biographies he studied (Du Pisani, 2016).

Africa in World War I: No longer a sideshow!

The crafters of 'new' military history have a natural aversion to 'drum and trumpet' regimental and official histories

(Corvisier, 1979; Hale, 1985; Keegan, 1983). New military history avoids politics, great men and an over-reliance on primary documentation. It emphasises society, a narrative where the little people or the underdogs have a voice. The focus is on history from the bottom-up. Social historians have played a significant role in revealing aspects sometimes ignored by traditional historians. The roles of women, black people, family, labour, and religion have been given their rightful place alongside histories of campaigns, battles, and great men (Citino, 2007). However, military history demands a high level of military expertise. A reconstruction of events with a top-down approach is necessary to reveal strategic and operational considerations. Social history should and can live side-by-side with conventional military histories as the disciplines, contrary to some opinion, are not mutually exclusive. Social historians have led the way in placing World War I in Africa back on the agenda, where traditional military historians have abdicated.

Traditional histories have ignored the impact of World War I in / on Africa and treated the campaigns fought there as a mere sideshow. The myopic diminution of everything other than the Western Front has adversely affected the quality and quantity of literature on the subject. Africa and the campaigns fought on the African continent are not the only victims of general amnesia. Many Africans and Asians filled the ranks of the Allied armies fighting in Europe, and historians seldom write the history of their sacrifices in the carnage of the trenches on the Western Front. The wave of 'new' military history in the latter part of the twentieth century has travelled some way to redressing an overwhelming Eurocentric focus.

Pioneering authors have kept the memory flames flickering despite the absence of interest compared to the Western Front. The low volumes of historiography on the subject are unwarranted as the African campaigns constitute an enormous effort despite the massive human disaster that overtook Europe. Tragically, Africa's role in World War I is all but forgotten, especially in those African countries where the actual battles took place. In contrast, public interest

surrounding World War I in Europe has strengthened, and each successive anniversary ushers in reinvigorated interest. The World War I centenary in 2014 witnessed a deluge of conferences, accompanied by numerous papers, monographs and hundreds of books of a general nature, together with a plethora of work discussing the minutiae of uniforms, weapons, and medals. Despite enjoying a revival in the late 1970s and again in the early 2000s, the war in Africa remains on the historical periphery. Although Smuts played a central role in the affairs of the Empire in Africa, its history remains shrouded in the general amnesia surrounding the subject.

The first publications partially reversing this trend appeared in 1978, resulting from a conference held at the University of London on World War I in Africa. The papers presented at the conference acknowledged that the war in East Africa was a fraction of the Western Front's human and economic cost. However, its impact was no less devastating and signalled a significant change for Africa's inhabitants (Rathbone, 1978:9). The conference gave impetus to Geoffrey Hodges, who presented a paper on *African Manpower Statistics for the British Forces in East Africa* (Hodges, 1978), In addition, he published a work, *Kariakor*, revealing the appalling cost to the African porters used and abused by both sides in the war (Hodges, 1999). Additional papers emerging from the conference were, *World War I Conscription and Social Change in Guinea* (Summers & Johnson, 1978); *France, Africa, and the First World War* (Andrew & Kanya-Forstner, 1978); *Repercussions of World War I in the Gold Coast* (Killingray, 1978); *East African Christians and World War I* (Pirouet, 1978). Melvin Page published *The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and The East African Campaign* and *Africa and the First World War*, a further milestone in revealing Africa in World War I. Page then produced a monograph on the devastating effect of the war on Malawians in World War I titled *The Chiwaya War* (Page, 1978, 2000). Finally, *The South African Native Labour Contingent* by Willan broached a sensitive topic for the first time. It could be considered groundbreaking for a piece on South Africa and its race relations in wartime (Willan, 1978).

David Olusoga points out that '... World War I was the first true world war in which peoples and nations from across the globe fought and laboured alongside one another ...' (Olusogo, 2014). Olusoga is one of few commentators who have returned to history an aspect of the war deliberately and myopically ignored for close to a century. Similar authors have introduced the fact that the war involved more than just white Europeans fighting in Europe and that its devastation reached all corners of the world. Albert Grundlingh predated Olusoga and delivered an innovative book steeped in archival sources about black South Africans and black South African soldiers in World War I (Grundlingh, 1987), Grundlingh produced the book in a political climate that was anything but conducive to honouring the black military experience. His work draws attention to the sharp contrast between Smuts and von Lettow-Vorbeck and their different treatment of black soldiers. The Germans had few qualms about using black people as fully-fledged soldiers who formed the backbone of the *Schutztruppen* in GEA. Smuts reluctantly deployed black people in non-combatant roles. Grundlingh has updated his work with substantial changes to the 'style and substance' of the original material, adding chapters on the Cape Coloured Corps and the SS *Mendi* and extending the narrative shortly beyond World War I to include the Paris Peace Accord (Grundlingh, 2014).

Michelle Moyd examines the role of black people in the war. Using the lens of the GEA *Schutztruppe*, she explores the motivation and exploitation of black soldiers in the white colonial German army (Moyd, 2014, 2008). German askaris were a highly effective military force that maintained discipline and morale even under adverse conditions. Moyd explains where others have failed, the social dynamics behind askari 'loyalty'. She reveals the German ability to exploit the askari's dependence on status and prestige derived from soldiering in a mutually beneficial relationship. Predating Moyd and a pioneer on the subject was Michael von Herff, who provided one of the first insights into the formidable fighting prowess of the askari and how the Germans could

align the askari's personal goals with those of the German administration (Von Herff, 1991).

Personal Reminiscences

Fortunately, after the war, the production of personal reminiscences laid a solid historiographical foundation dealing with World War I in Africa. Historians have underutilised these personal accounts, preferring, as will be seen, to rely heavily on the skewed memoirs of Richard Meinertzhagen to the detriment of objectivity (Meinertzhagen, 1960). Senior officers and other ranks in the campaign have contributed, giving top and bottom views of the campaign. Political accounts are of value as they provide insight into the complex political mood of the times. Taken together, they offer a valuable tapestry of the events witnessed by those present. A barrier to accessing these accounts is that many are out-of-print and relatively difficult to obtain.

One of the first publications to appear for public consumption was a book published by Brigadier-General J.H.V. Crowe, who commanded the artillery in East Africa under General Smuts. He published an account of the campaign, *General Smuts's Campaign in East Africa*, in 1918. By the author's admission, it constitutes little more than a diary of the campaign's events (Crowe, 1918). The book avoids any controversy, and the fact that Smuts wrote the foreword precluded a critical analysis of his conduct in the campaign. Interestingly, Smuts pays generous tribute to the enemy, von Lettow-Vorbeck, in his foreword (dated February 1918) even though the war was not yet over. His motivation offers reasons for the failure to completely rout the Germans and points to the dangers of allowing them to retain the colony to the detriment of the security of the entire Empire. By generously paying tribute to von Lettow-Vorbeck, Smuts cleverly enhances his military prowess by constructing a worthy foe. Interestingly, this may be the first instance that gave birth to the legend of von Lettow-Vorbeck (Crowe, 1918:xvi).

The personal reminiscences of Brigadier-General C.P. Fendall, *The East African Force 1915-1919*, published in 1921, form an absorbing history of the GEA campaign (Fendall, 2006). As a member of the Imperial staff, he served under both Smuts and Lieutenantt-General Jacob van Deventer. Fendall provides solid insights into the administrative and logistical challenges faced by the British forces and the effects these challenges had on combat and movement. He details the British force by describing and analysing the administration, medical support, supply and transport, and the 'native' military service. He examined local political conditions, the climate and terrain, and an overall assessment of the campaign. His evaluation of Smuts's martial abilities and limitations are fair and, significantly, run against the tide of past and contemporary commentary. Fendall's campaign assessment is well-considered and achieves a balance seldom replicated by later historians.

The colourful Deneys Reitz was present at significant events of the Second Anglo Boer War, the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government, the GSWA campaign, the GEA campaign and finally, the Western Front. He wields a deft writing hand, and his personal experiences and sincerity make for riveting reading. He enjoyed a healthy relationship with Smuts, and his observations in *Trekking On* give further insight into the character and essence of the man (Reitz, 1933). In a similar vein is Piet van der Byl's autobiography *From Playgrounds to Battlefields* (1971) (Van der Byl, 1971). He served in both the GSWA and GEA campaigns, and his memories of Smuts and Botha are valuable. Another serviceman, P.J. Pretorius, an intelligence officer, reveals intriguing aspects of the GEA campaign under Smuts in his book *Jungle Man*, published in 1948 (Pretorius, 2001). Both these accounts add to the immediacy of the narrative by providing a first-hand record of events as witnessed by the participants.

James Bourhill has built his history on the GEA campaign using the personal accounts of his family and others that he came across in the William Cullen Library at the University of the Witwatersrand (Bourhill, 2015). He blends

the accounts with a concise campaign history, but the result is less than satisfactory when he quotes verbatim swathes of Meinertzhagen and Reitz. In addition, Bourhill claims to have 'trawled' the South African Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives) and found their holdings of GSWA and GEA documents to be 'insignificant compared to other campaigns' (Bourhill, 2015:9). It is an astounding assertion in the face of the 670+ documentation boxes on GEA and the 860+ documentation boxes on GSWA held at the Documentation Centre, according to Evert Kleynhans (2016).

Many published personal accounts deal with various aspects of the war in GSWA and GEA that explain the human condition seen by eyewitnesses during the war. Although highly subjective, they present valuable opportunities for researchers to reconstruct the events via first-hand accounts. Historians must scour the narratives and search for the witting and unwitting evidence. Personal accounts provide much value when read together and after applying a degree of triangulation (Boydell, 1948; Young, 1935; Walker & Wienholt, 2013; Downs, 2012; Dolbey, 2007; Moore & Robinson, 2013; Buchanan, 2008; Child, 1973; Rainer, 1940; Blackwell, 1971, 1938).

'Drum and trumpet': Official, semi-official, and regimental histories

Contemporary 'new' historians tend to suspect official histories. According to them, they lack balance, are uncritical, are biased, and possess an agenda to support a particular personality and political viewpoint. These criticisms are fair, and historians must treat official histories cautiously. Meant to be the 'first word' on a specific campaign; they end up as the final word in many cases. The official and semi-official histories surrounding World War I have a particular context. The official history has traditionally been a campaign narrative used as a tool by the staff colleges to provide lessons learnt. Total war from 1914 to 1918 changed the paradigm, as traumatised populations demanded an explanation for the

extraordinary sacrifices of so many soldiers during the war. In South Africa, there was a realisation that the official history would have to be a good read and serve as a nation-building exercise. Although trained soldiers were not ideal, four out of the five official historians were serving officers of the UDF (Van der Waag, 2016). The official historians encountered many challenges in their efforts, from lack of centralised records, political constraints, and a need to produce a narrative that served nation-building. Nevertheless, despite limitations and pandering to political agendas, there is much contained in the official histories of value to the historian (Grey, 2003a).

The first official history of Southa Africa's participation in World War I, dealing with aspects of the war in Africa, appeared in 1924 and was compiled by a team of historians, one of whom was Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, a land surveyor who served as an intelligence officer (General Staff, Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, 1924). This general history remained the only single volume dealing with South Africa's entire war effort during World War I until Nasson published *Springboks on the Somme* in 2007 (Van der Waag, 2003:34; Nasson, 2007). The book deals briefly with the 1914 Rebellion against the Union government, GSWA, and GEA campaigns. It also covers the actions of the UDF in Egypt and France (Leipoldt, 1920). This treatise was somewhat didactic and borrowed much from the work of Buchan (1920), which Agar-Hamilton describes as '... limited in scope and [suffering] from lack of specialised knowledge' (Grey, 2000:254). The historians behind the official histories of this period designed them to teach the lessons of war and explain the sacrifices that the population could be called on to make. However, these publications were somewhat limited in scope and critical analysis due to restricted access to records and the often-amateur nature of the authors. Some historians have come to rely too heavily on the official histories and have succumbed to some of their political obfuscation.

Nineteen years passed before the South Africans produced another official work, authored by Brigadier-General J.J. Collyer, South African Chief of the General Staff at

the end of World War I. Significantly, he had served in both the GSWA and the GEA campaigns with Smuts and had an intimate knowledge of the day-to-day operations from a South African perspective. His first book was *Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914-1915* (Collyer, 1937), and another on the GEA campaign titled *The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa 1916* (Collyer, 1939). Some have described these official histories as little more than narrow military chronicles (Grey, 2000:255). Due to the constraints dictated by the times, the South African defence authorities laid down some principles which included 'research under strict supervision' and preferably undertaken by military personnel who supposedly understood the true nature of war (Van der Waag, 2003:28). In no way can these official histories be compared to those published by the Union War Histories Section on World War II. The Union War Histories Section under J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton produced works that were nothing less than *locus classicus* and, in many respects, have yet to be surpassed nearly half a century after the publication. The official histories of World War I are amateurish by comparison and leave a wide gap for researchers to fill. Since official histories are supposedly the first and not the final word, they also play an essential role in organising records for future researchers (Grey, 2003b).

The most comprehensive work on GEA appeared in 1941 as part of the British official histories. The authors partially relied on the work of the South Africans Leipoldt and Collyer and used both publications well (Hordern, 1941). Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hordern originally meant the official history to consist of two volumes. However, only one volume covered East Africa from August 1914 to September 1916. Volume two, never published, left a lacuna for the period after September 1916 to the end of the war. A further shortcoming of the entire series of British official histories was the absence of any material on the campaign in GSWA. The whole British official history enterprise eventually amounted to 28 volumes and fell under the responsibility of Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds. Just as in the case of South Africa, the British

endeavour was military-orientated, didactic in approach, and viewed events through a robust military lens rather than a social one. Not designed for a general readership, it served the needs of the military Staff College instruction (Grey, 2000:254).

Appearing somewhat belatedly in the early 1990s as part of the Ashanti series were three semi-official histories dealing with World War I in Africa. Controversially, the South African Government funded their publication primarily for political reasons to curry favour with the West (Van der Waag, 2003:42). The first deals with the South African campaign in GSWA and relies heavily on official histories, specifically Collyer's. The author Gerald L'Ange, an accomplished journalist, offers few new insights or critical analysis (L'Ange, 1991). The second book in the series, by J.A. Brown, deals with the South African campaign in GEA in 1916 (Brown, 1991). Again, he relies heavily on the official histories produced 50 to 60 years earlier and rehashed published secondary sources. Both works show little evidence of archival sources and fail to build on the foundation laid by the official histories produced decades before. Ian Gleeson's book on black, Indian, and coloured soldiers courageously covers an aspect of the war that was neither well-researched nor reported on before that time (Gleeson, 1994). The best in the Ashanti series, unfortunately not dealing with Africa, is *Pyramids and Poppies* by Peter Digby, describing the 1st South African Infantry (SAI) Brigade in Libya, France and Flanders (Digby, 1993).

Regimental histories occupy a crucial space in the historiography of a campaign. They record first-hand experiences of different levels of command, from commander to ordinary soldier and the events as they unfolded on the battlefield. Regimental histories deal with the nitty-gritty aspects of waging war and other 'face of battle' aspects omitted elsewhere. They are an indispensable aid to reconstructing the events of a battlefield. They unashamedly have an agenda to create regimental pride, record lessons learnt, or even ensure survival in the face of budgetary cuts in peacetime. The regimental history of the Durban Light

Infantry provides extensive and valuable coverage of the GSWA and GEA campaigns (Martin, 1969). Captain Ivor Difford, the 1st Battalion Cape Corps quartermaster, constructed an entire Cape Corps regimental history, including valuable material regarding its formation, training and eventual GEA deployment (Difford, 2015). Its indispensable value lies in the text that only a person who witnessed first-hand events could have constructed. Historians can find references to the GSWA campaign in the official histories of the Natal Mounted Rifles (Goetzsche, 1971), the Kaffrarian Rifles (Coleman, 1988), the Rand Light Infantry (Simpkins, 1965) and the Kimberley Regiment (Curson, 1963). An explanation for the lack of regimental history on the GEA campaign is that the UDF recruited volunteers instead of traditional regiments.

The 'other side of the hill'

E. Mittler & Sohn published the official history of the Imperial German Army in the war of 1914 to 1918 between 1925 and 1930. It comprised 14 volumes mainly dealing with the war on the Western Front. German official historians published nothing on the GSWA or the GEA campaign. The German point of view emerged when individual participants produced narratives in the absence of official publications. The most famous of these accounts, if not the most informative, were the reminiscences of General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who conducted a remarkable campaign as commander of the German forces in GEA. He published two books in 1920 describing in some detail his experiences on the campaign in GEA (Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 1920b). Von Lettow-Vorbeck's next book highlighted his life before and after the campaign in GEA (Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 1957). These reminiscences provide a fascinating insight into the campaign's conduct from 'the other side of the hill'. They helped establish von Lettow-Vorbeck as a cult figure in German circles and amongst his former opponents, including Smuts and Meinertzhagen. The self-serving nature of these narratives must be kept in mind, especially when their authors designed them to enhance and, at other times, to protect reputations.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck overshadowed the Governor of GEA, Heinrich Schnee; hence, historians often overlook the latter. Schnee was responsible for building and maintaining the colony's infrastructure during his governorship from 1912 to 1919. An enormous tussle between Schnee and von Lettow-Vorbeck ensued at the outbreak of the war as to the future conduct of the campaign. Schnee was more concerned with protecting the assets and white settlers of the colony than with conducting a pointless war. He pursued neutrality for as long as possible, hoping for a short war in which Germany would emerge victoriously. Von Lettow-Vorbeck, in contrast, was belligerent and was keen to pursue an aggressive war and distract the Allies from their primary military effort on the Western Front. Schnee's economic and social policies before the war helped create a robust environment where von Lettow-Vorbeck operated. As a result, he played a more significant role in the campaign than commonly suggested, and his contribution to the vigorous defence of the colony is due for reassessment. His books have not been translated into English, hindering English historians (Schnee, 1919). However, his diary from November 1917 to November 1918 is available in English at the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA).

An essential semi-official German source is a young German staff officer, Ludwig Boell, who served under von Lettow-Vorbeck during the East Africa campaign. He produced the closest product to German official history in the wake of the destruction of the Colonial Office (CO) records during the Allied bombing of Germany during World War II. In April 1945, the Royal Air Force bombed Potsdam and destroyed the National Archive warehouse and countless priceless documents. Boell made extensive use of these documents and first-hand accounts before their destruction. Historians cannot test the German official and regimental histories of World War I against original documents to build a foundation for further research. Fortunately, Boell completed his monumental history of the East African campaign in 1944 and privately published it in 1951 (Boell, 1951). His literary estate, held in the modern-day *Bundesarchiv*, amounts to over 13 000

documents - a veritable treasure trove for German speakers! A reading of Boell gives a German perspective on the campaign's effectiveness in GEA waged by Smuts. Dr Hans von Oelhafen published his semi-official *Der Feldzug in Sudwes 1914/15*, covering the GSWA campaign from a German perspective, and this study has made use of translations of significant events in the text (Von Oelhafen, 1923).

Ludwig Deppe covers interesting medical aspects of the GEA campaign from the German side. The Germans enjoyed a medical advantage as the best doctors in exotic diseases researched East Africa when the war broke out. Disease rather than combat proved to be the number one killer and maimer of soldiers and porters from both sides, and relatively effective treatments gave the Germans the edge in maintaining their fighting power. A medical doctor, Deppe, initially headed the hospital at Tanga and accompanied von Lettow-Vorbeck on the campaign. His book delivers his experiences as a field doctor and other non-medical aspects of the campaign, such as the terrain, supplies, combat losses and morale. Historians have made little use of this book due to its unavailability in English (Deppe, 1919).

James Stejskal has written a modern traditional campaign history on the GSWA campaign (Stejskal, 2014). He claims to use German sources held at the Namibian National Archive, such as the diary of the German commander Victor Franke and the unpublished German official history, together with other German personal accounts. Due to the language barrier, the ability to access German accounts gives the author an advantage over the traditional British historians. However, the author failed to consult the extensive collection of papers held by the DOD Archives and missed an opportunity to support the text with primary documentation from the South African side.

World War I in Africa: Campaign Histories

As a natural progression and building on the foundations of official works was the emergence of campaign histories in the

1960s, the earliest of which followed a 'drum and trumpet' style of military history. Typically Eurocentric, they overtly admired von Lettow-Vorbeck's exploits while being somewhat dismissive of the Allied efforts to subdue him, including that of Smuts. As a result, these works appeared as popular history instead of scholarly work or work based on military expertise. Amongst the first was Brian Gardner's *German East: The Story of the First World War in Africa* (Gardner, 1963), followed a year later by Leonard Mosley's *Duel for Kilimanjaro*. The inside dust jacket of the latter adequately describes, with journalistic sensationalism, the uncritical adoration for von Lettow-Vorbeck. It tells of impossible odds – 11 000 German and native askari troops against a British Army of 200 000 men – and of the German commander, Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, who made the odds meaningless (Mosely, 1964).

Next to appear in a similar vein, short on bibliography and footnotes but long on sensationalism, was J.R. Sibley's stirring but inappropriately named *Tanganyikan Guerrilla* (1973). Again, the author liberally applies Meinertzhagen to his narrative influence, especially his take on Smuts's performance. The description on the dust jacket reveals his bias and intent.

His strength of character, drive and outstanding professional ability were the major factors in one of the most successful guerrilla campaigns ever waged. This is the consensus of opinion, then and now, on Germany's General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, one of the few popular heroes to emerge from World War I (Sibley, 1973).

The most readable of all these works, but not the most scholarly, is Charles Miller's *Battle for the Bundu* (Miller, 1974). The author makes no pretensions to any scholarly or military expertise. He admits to 'drawing heavily on the literary licence and educated guesswork'. He lays the blame for the lack of scholarly enterprise squarely at the door of 'documentary disorder'. He finds the numerous conflicting accounts of the battles to be so overwhelming to render them irretrievably confusing. Miller, in admitting that correlating

and collating battlefield experiences from different viewpoints was beyond his capability or intention (all in a day's work for a military historian), unsurprisingly perpetuates the now well-entrenched guerrilla myth. He describes,

> ' [...] a midget German force led by an obscure Prussian officer who could have conducted post-graduate courses in irregular warfare tactics for Che Guevara, General Giap, and other more celebrated but far less skilled guerilla fighters.' (Miller, 1974:x).

A book by Edwin Hoyt, appropriately titled *Guerrilla* (Hoyt, 1981), continues propagating the now popular guerrilla theme. The author describes von Lettow-Vorbeck as the 'German David'. The fact that von Lettow-Vorbeck's typical German way of war had little to do with guerrilla warfare did not deter this author nor those previous or after him from propagating that illusion. Von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded a regular army trained in traditional warfare and organised along conventional military structures. His style of warfare, manoeuvre warfare, falls soundly within and forms the cornerstone of traditional German manoeuvre doctrine.

East Africa was the one area of the world where the Germans, in effect, won their war, and *Guerrilla* reveals the military genius responsible, von Lettow-Vorbeck, who never commanded more than a few thousand men yet bested 20 times that number of highly trained British regulars in some of the most dramatic and exciting battles of modern military history (Hoyt, 1981).

The numerical disparity of the opposing forces has inspired the myth of von Lettow-Vorbeck fighting an irregular guerrilla-type war. Hoyt depicts the South Africans as excessively racist and dismissive of the askari military abilities before they suffered their first reversal at their hands at Salaita Hill in February 1916. The delicious irony of racist Boers in the form of South African soldiers being defeated by the black troops they despised and referred to as 'K.....' is

another construct of Meinertzhagen that has persisted and is a common theme appearing in many books.

Byron Farwell published the first book covering the entire war in Africa in a single volume titled *The Great War in Africa* (Farwell, 1986). His piece on Botha's conquest of GSWA contains vast swathes from Trew's *Botha Treks* (Trew, 1936). His unreferenced text includes a 'select' bibliography, which includes Trew's book. Farwell's book contains refreshing departures from his predecessors, being more measured in its cult of personality. He places von Lettow-Vorbeck's ability to survive the campaign in a more meaningful context using a style reminiscent of 'new history' but decades before its advent.

' [....] Lettow-Vorbeck was indeed a brilliant soldier who invoked universal admiration, for men admire bravery, endurance, persistence, courtesy in adversity and dignity in defeat. All these are qualities which he exemplified. He succeeded in what he set out to do, yet what he did was in the end worse than useless, for he could not prevent the victory of his country's enemies; he cost the lives of thousands and the health of tens of thousands more. He tore the social fabric of hundreds of communities and wrecked the economy of three countries. His splendid military virtues were devoted to an unworthy cause and his loyalty given to a bad monarch.' (Farwell, 1986:355; Vandervort, 2009).

Farwell has a more balanced approach when assessing Smuts in GEA and paints a picture of a man who brought decisive leadership and determination to remove von Lettow-Vorbeck from British territory and later from German territory. Smuts, frustrated at not bringing the enemy to a decisive battle, could at least boast the capture of a substantial amount of territory, especially when measured against the minuscule territorial gains in Europe (Farwell, 1986:261).

Besides Farwell, the above popular accounts presented viewpoints based on misinterpretation, shoddy research, and a solid foundation of myth. The authors placed excessive reliance on the diaries of Meinertzhagen, whose evidence

may be unreliable in the light of his exposure in 2007 as a fraud (Meinertzhagen, 1960; Garfield, 2007). Further distractions hindering a balanced account were the widely circulated and self-serving account of von Lettow-Vorbeck. His reminiscences were overly influential in the absence of material contradicting his viewpoint (Von Lettow-Vorbeck, 1920a, 1957). The heroic figure portrayed by von Lettow-Vorbeck has submerged the other personalities involved in the war in Africa, particularly that of Smuts.

Another theme dominating the historiography beyond the official histories is Smuts's portrayal as an amateur and indifferent military commander at the operational level. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, who served as an intelligence officer in GEA, can be credited with the fact that, despite the overwhelming amount of contrary evidence, his portrayal of an inept Smuts out of his depth as a general persists. Meinertzhagen offered a harsh criticism of the conduct of the war in East Africa in general and Smuts's lack of ability in particular. Contemporary historians have taken his often-baseless assessments on board uncritically, and Meinertzhagen's jaded viewpoint has occupied the prime position in their publications (Meinertzhagen, 1960). Meinertzhagen may have constructed his diaries some years after the events, emphasising the importance of corroborating evidence and not relying too much on one man's word. Nevertheless, his viewpoint has become profoundly entrenched after a century of being accorded the centrepiece in any military assessment of Smuts. Brian Garfield exposed Meinertzhagen as a fraud in 2007, but this came too late for some history heavyweights to modify their views on Smuts (Garfield, 2007).

Hancock's monumental biography of *Smuts: The Sanguine Years 1870 – 1919* displays how to treat Meinertzhagen by using corroborating and contradictory material to assess and place evidence in a proper context (Hancock, 1962, 1968). Hancock acknowledges Meinertzhagen but identifies his viewpoints in context by examining an overwhelming amount of contradictory evidence of Smuts's campaign performance.

He deftly achieves this without diminishing Meinertzhagen's character but by producing evidence that Botha and the British highly valued Smuts's military leadership and abilities.

Hew Strachan produced a book on World War I in Africa. As such, this thin volume describes military operations in a broader context, rarely delving into the details of individual battles (Strachan, 2004). Refreshingly, Strachan debunks decades-old mythology surrounding von Lettow-Vorbeck. That von Lettow-Vorbeck fought genuine guerrilla warfare is repudiated, as well as his goal of tying up Entente troops destined for Europe. Von Lettow-Vorbeck's efforts were ineffectual since South African troops were unlikely to have been deployed out of Africa. However, Strachan's treatment of Smuts lacks the same enlightened revision, and like Ross Anderson, he relies heavily on the myth created by Meinertzhagen and Armstrong. Strachan denigrates Smuts's approach to manoeuvre warfare and accuses him of adopting enveloping manoeuvres rather than direct attacks. Strachan talks rather caustically regarding Smuts's desire to manoeuvre rather than fight. However, the same strategy developed by von Lettow-Vorbeck, leading to the loss of most of the territory of GEA, receives kinder treatment from the author (Strachan, 2004:137). Smuts stands accused of seeking to prevent the carnage of the Western Front battlefields and making political rather than military decisions to avoid casualties, which would have been politically unacceptable back in South Africa. Strachan criticises Smuts's practice of placing himself well forward and close to the action. The author reveals his predilection for the British way of war, where the higher command structures were safely ensconced well to the rear. Strachan condemns the very military traits which would have found favour amongst the Germans. He examines Smuts's generalship through a very British military lens and, by doing so, has failed to achieve a balanced, objective viewpoint as to the conduct of his campaign (Strachan, 2004:131-138).

Contemporary South African historians are not exempt from portraying Smuts as a mediocre general. Bill Nasson in *Springboks on the Somme* describes Smuts as being 'obsessively

ambitious' whose 'reach was forever exceeding his grasp' and 'having a higher opinion than most of his command abilities…'. Nasson describes the skulduggery behind Smuts's appointment to the supreme command of the British East African forces, describing Smuts as nothing more than a parliamentary politician with limited military experience. Nasson joins hands with Ross Anderson in expressing Smuts's appointment as 'highly unusual' because he commanded only a fraction of the troops in the Second Anglo Boer War in familiar terrain and 'easy' climatic conditions (Nasson, 2007:96,97; Strachan, 2004:135).

With equal vigour, Nasson castigates Smuts's overall strategic and operational plan for the campaign's conduct in GEA. He finds little merit in Smuts's idea to conduct a manoeuvre warfare campaign using flanking, encircling manoeuvres, and utilising numerical superiority to dislodge the enemy. According to Nasson, Smuts's feeble attempts to surround his enemy always came to nought when a far more capable and cannier, von Lettow-Vorbeck, could evade encirclement and trade space for survival. Nasson condemns Smuts's handling of his casualties caused by the harsh, disease-ridden terrain. Nasson dismisses that Smuts controlled 90% of the former German colony at the end of 11 months of campaigning. To him, the control of territory was inconsequential in the face of the battered askari remnants remaining to carry on the fight (Nasson, 2007:98-118, 2014).

Nasson stands on firmer ground when he tackles the impact of the war on South African society. His *WWI and the people of South Africa* is a fascinating and highly readable insight into the social impact of South Africa's entry into the war. He reveals his disdain for the official and regimental histories, which military historians should use as a foundation from whence to build. John Buchan, the official historian of South Africa's campaign in France, is dismissed as a propagandist having a 'much-cultivated image … of an imperial man of action', then, 'secretive and showy,' and an 'ardent imperialist'. When dealing with characters such as Botha, he accuses Buchan of '… leaving history and entering

a realm of Buchanesque fiction'. One could sum up Nasson's view of Buchan's efforts as '... congenial interpretations of South African wartime experience' (Nasson, 2007:205-218).

Nasson embraces the value of personal accounts with equal and opposite vigour. He seems to regard these two essential aspects of reconstructing history as mutually exclusive (Van der Waag, 2016). However, this bottom-up approach will never unlock the mysteries of the higher levels of war, as the unfortunate participant views events through a keyhole. The official historian has access to the memoirs and orders of the men in charge, giving an overview of the battle. At best, an eyewitness account by an ordinary soldier will provide insight into the tactical situation of a minor engagement. At the same time, the operational and strategic levels are beyond his comprehension. Narratives can blend personal reminiscences and operational aspects derived from official histories and primary documents to produce satisfactory results. Nasson ignores the different levels of war and contrasts ordinary soldiers' reminiscences with those higher up. He uses his conclusion as a stick to beat official history, that '[personal accounts] ... [are] very different from conventional mythologies of enriching personal achievement or heroism' (Nasson, 2007:1852-204).

The Twenty-first-century Historians

British historians were at the forefront of reintroducing the history of World War I in Africa during the twenty-first century's first decade. *The Battle of Tanga* (2001) by Ross Anderson was amongst the first offerings of new insights into the campaign (Anderson, 2001b). Anderson's account of the battle deals with the tactics, or lack thereof, and some helpful observations into German command and control. The subject of his doctoral thesis and subsequent book, *The Forgotten Front (2004),* dealt with the broader campaign of GEA (Anderson, 2001a). His chapters dealing with Smuts's tenure as commander-in-chief do not offer new insights or revisionary material. Instead, Anderson repeats the mantra that he was

inexperienced in leading large forces, inept in arranging his logistics and almost criminally neglectful of the health of the soldiers (Anderson, 2004:111). This view differs little from that of a Meinertzhagen or an Armstrong.

In his book *Tip & Run* (2008), Edward Paice presents a more balanced and considered approach to assessing Smuts's military performance on the campaign in GEA (Paice, 2008). He attempts to explain different points of view on Smuts's performance as a military commander on more occasions than previous authors, benefiting from the insights revealed by Garfield of Meinertzhagen's fraudulent character. His battlefield analysis is more in-depth and less overtly critical, giving cognisance to the problematic conditions beyond the control of the warring parties (Paice, 2008:398). Refreshingly, Paice offers more criticism than most when measuring the German military performance and quotes a Belgian report which ascribes von Lettow-Vorbeck's success solely 'to his ability to withdraw and the use of terror to ensure local support' (Paice, 2008:400).

Anne Samson analyses the political manoeuvring and the motivation behind South Africa's entry into World War I (Samson, 2006). Samson picks up the expansionist thread as one of the central motivations for South Africa's entry into the conflict. Expansionism is a research area that has been neglected or only referred to in passing by some of the more modern authors since the work of Katzenellenbogen (1982), Garson (1955) and Hyam (1972) in the 1970s. She places South Africa's campaign in East Africa as an exercise in nation-building, part of an expansionist agenda by Great Britain, and a sub-Imperialist programme by Smuts. Examining the GEA campaign through a political lens places Smuts in a central role throughout the thesis and de-emphasises the Eurocentric focus of previous works on the campaign. Unfortunately, she relegates the military aspects of the campaigns, concentrating on 'the interrelatedness of policy and strategy in what was happening on the ground and in between'. She focuses on the 'strong personalities' who directed the war at all levels, including Smuts. Samson draws an interesting parallel

between von Lettow-Vorbeck and Smuts and their relationship with their direct superiors, namely Governor Schnee and Prime Minister Louis Botha. However, Samson's glaring weakness lies in military matters, and by her admission, she has left that to others who are more expert. Her suggestion that Smuts was a mediocre military commander is unfounded, given her lack of in-depth critical analysis or expert military knowledge.

Stuart Mitchell provides a fresh look at the military Smuts in GEA (Mitchell, 2014). His work swims against the current British tide and may facilitate swinging the pendulum, which has gone too far the other way. Mitchell applies a higher degree of operational analysis than other modern historians. Smuts was much concerned about his supply difficulties, and Mitchell gives testament to his agony, reversing previous perceptions that he was ignorant and uncaring. Furthermore, his operational conception and way of war were not out of kilter with the *British Field Service Regulations Part I* (Anon, 1909:131-140). They were, in large part, correct for the political and military requirements of the campaign. Mitchell advances sound reasons based on thorough analysis and reopened the debate on Smuts's generalship. Hamish Paterson joins Mitchell as one of the few voices that offer a more balanced approach to Smuts's generalship in GEA. Paterson correctly identifies that most of the criticism of the military Smuts emanates from the diaries of Meinertzhagen. Because of his unmasking as an unscrupulous fraud by Garfield, it is time for a reassessment. Interestingly, Paterson is one of few who have come across Smuts and his first encounter with military life as a volunteer in the Victoria College Volunteer Rifle Corps (Paterson, 2010).

In *The First Campaign Victory of the Great War* (2019), Antonio Garcia considers the GSWA campaign an important case study for manoeuvre warfare theory. Garcia attempts to re-evaluate the GSWA campaign within the framework of manoeuvre theory to determine the cause of victory and defeat (Garcia, 2019:xiv, 53). Garcia identifies that the Germans in GSWA were operating on interior lines of communication while facing a numerically superior foe. Delaying the inevitable would entail concentrating German forces and attacking

each UDF wing in turn. Their extensive railway network and the tactical mobility of their mounted infantry aided German operational mobility (Garcia, 2019:58). Garcia comes unstuck when considering the UDF's use or misuse of exterior lines of communication and their reliance on overwhelming numbers instead of classic manoeuvre warfare. Moreover, his inappropriate use of modern manoeuvre warfare constructs, such as John Boyd's OODA loops and modern American manoeuvre jargon, is distracting. He deflects from the poor planning and chaos the UDF experienced during the first phase of the GSWA campaign. Garcia trivialises the overwhelming numerical superiority the UDF deployed in the second phase and ignores its disastrous effects on logistics. These aspects, overlooked by Garcia, are the antithesis of manoeuvre warfare.

The Battle of Sandfontein on 26 September 1914 in GSWA is a focal point where South African authors and their British counterparts, apparently misled by the official histories, have incorrectly portrayed the operational aspects of the first phase of the GSWA campaign. Warwick introduces an interesting but erroneous notion of Smuts's culpability in ordering Lukin to advance on Sandfontein. He also stresses that Smuts's immediate political considerations in invading GSWA overrode sound strategic and operational concepts. Warwick tends to view generalship and politics as mutually exclusive, where generals have an intimate relationship with and are guided by their country's politics even as far as it influences their nation's way of war (Warwick, 2003).

Ian van der Waag uses Sandfontein to expose the underlying military structure of the UDF and how the battle, in its wake, influenced the UDF's military reform. Van der Waag paints a picture of a UDF inhabiting a contested space of open rivalries, less than competent appointments, a divided command, and non-existent general staff with a lack of trained staff officers (Van der Waag, 2013:7). However, Van der Waag commits an error, as do Strachan, Nasson, Warwick and Garcia, in placing the battle of Sandfontein within the framework of a modified three-prong operational plan whereby he assumes incorrectly that the UDF cancelled

the landings at Walvis Bay / Swakopmund on 21 August 1914. Garcia's analysis of the Sandfontein debacle descends to the tactical level of war when he ignores the fact that the failure of the UDF to occupy Swakopmund in September 1914 placed Col P.S. Beves (1863-1924) (Uys, 1992:18) and Col Tim Lukin (1860–1925) (Uys, 1992:138) in a precarious position at the operational level (Garcia, 2019:67).

With few exceptions, the scholarship of twenty-first century historians has failed to redress and reassess the leadership myths created by the first historical works. These histories have sidestepped the issues of the cult figure of von Lettow-Vorbeck, his mythical guerrilla doctrine, and the incompetence of the Allied generals in the face of a wily adversary. There has been an effort to reduce von Lettow-Vorbeck's military prowess, but not by attacking his ability, but rather to emphasise the futility and destructiveness of his efforts. These histories deemphasise the military aspects of the campaign and focus on the social issues brought about by the war in Africa. Therefore, leadership myths persist unabated and unattended due to military history's unpopularity amongst university-based historians. Rather than being subjected to reconsideration or revision, the military Smuts has continued to endure a reputation given by a rehashing of secondary sources. Historians have recycled each other's prejudices and errors, and we are none the wiser after decades of new publications.

The USA and Its Infatuation with the German way of war

The USA military enjoys a persisting infatuation with von Lettow-Vorbeck and the German way of war, resulting in a crop of academic work emerging from their military academies (Muth, 2011:7). These works tend to be uncritical of the German conduct of the war and lack balance when assessing the Allied efforts. The more rigorous research has its roots in the United Kingdom and South Africa, and some of the top graduates have progressed their theses into books.

An example of the USA military passion for all things German is a research project by Lt-Col John C. Stratis titled *A Case Study in Leadership-Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck* (Stratis, 2002; Stevens, 1973). His abstract immediately sets the tone in incorrectly describing the campaign as 'guerrilla warfare' and making sweeping statements about von Lettow-Vorbeck's military prowess. He enthusiastically proclaims that 'Studying Lettow-Vorbeck as a gifted military leader who conducted a strategic guerrilla campaign against overwhelming odds and continually won demonstrates how a numerically inferior force can achieve success on the battlefield'. Evidence that this is not a new trend for the military can be found in the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, in 1930 (Anon, 1930). The text is liberally garnished with accolades for von Lettow-Vorbeck. Its conclusion has set the tone for students at the War College for years afterwards: 'The chief reason why General von Lettow-Vorbeck was able to hold out and avoid capture was in his masterly skill, his unlimited courage, his superb leadership, his infinite resourcefulness, his supreme patience, his unlimited perseverance, and his military genius, as testified to by every historian consulted in the course of this study'.

The theme of valuable lessons learnt from von Lettow-Vorbeck in operational art and asymmetrical warfare has persisted at the United States Army Command and General Staff College. The title, *Askaris, Asymmetry, and Small Wars: Operational Art and the German East African Campaign, 1914-1918* (Adgie, 2001), reveals the high esteem that the USA staff colleges hold for von Lettow-Vorbeck. The author contends that 'Lettow-Vorbeck's campaign is not anachronistic' and that his operational art in conducting an asymmetric campaign is valid in modern times. Just as instructive is a thesis by T.A. Crowson titled *When Elephants Clash,* in which the author, predating Anderson and not using any primary sources, offers the following:

> Then came Smuts, a purely political appointment. Although he had seen some action in the Boer War as a commando,

> he was completely out of his element when commanding large formations. Even his mentor, Louis Botha, realized he was no soldier and eventually recalled him. Malleson, with his genius for cutting through the British red tape, proved to be adept at rebuilding the army. Although the reasons for his removal remain obscure, one can infer that, again, political necessity demanded a South African general be placed in charge of the force. Although ostensibly another political appointee, unlike previous commanders. Van Deventer had experience in the region and understood the importance of grabbing the German by the collar and never letting go. However, seven successive British commanders could hardly hope to match the experience of one German commander (Crowson, 2003:95).

The instructive part is that a master's student, with little regard for the primary sources and relying heavily on Armstrong and Meinertzhagen, has come to the same conclusion as some heavyweight British historians.

Jon Nesselhuf presents a convincing argument that von Lettow-Vorbeck was a product of the well-established German way of warfare. The military doctrine he applied was conventional *Bewegungskrieg* and far removed from guerrilla war (Nesselhuf, 2012). He aligned his force to comply with the latest theories of the German General Staff. He fought an aggressive war of manoeuvre until he was nearly annihilated at the Battle of Mahiwa in late 1917. It was only then that he adopted a 'guerrilla'-type war. This type of analysis departs from the hero-worship von Lettow-Vorbeck has received from most other historians. The uncritical assessment of von Lettow-Vorbeck's generalship has an equal and opposite strong following regarding Smuts.

Conclusion

As evidenced in this overview, the historiography reflects the neglect that World War I in Africa has suffered compared to the never-ending torrent of history published on the Western Front. Africa's World War I was far from insignificant

for those who participated and suffered hugely. The war devastated the local population and the countryside wherever the protagonists chose to fight. These events were not inconsequential for South Africa - shaping politics, especially Afrikaner nationalism, for decades afterwards. Capturing GSWA and failing to secure Delagoa Bay despite all the efforts in GEA contributed to setting South Africa on a political trajectory from which she was only to emerge decades later in 1994. The military career of Smuts, who played a central role in a forgotten war, has received scant coverage. His role as a general has been ignored and overlooked despite his fundamental part in the GSWA and GEA campaigns. The little published on this period of his life deals with his time as a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and his role in the peace process afterwards. The attention he has received as a general is often adverse, based on flawed research, and amounting to synography in many cases.

Emergent 'new military history' has thrown light on the enormity of the calamity that befell Africa in World War I. Africa's contribution to the overall human cost of the war has emerged from being considered a mere sideshow. Von Lettow-Vorbeck's military competence and cynical but ultimately futile approach to devastating the African countryside has come in for overdue revision. Black participation in the conflict was central to the war in Africa. Black people undertook a significant portion of the fighting and the logistical support on both sides, fighting a surrogate war for their European masters. Undoubtedly, there has been a slight but perceptible shift in emphasis on Africa and its role in World War I.

Smuts's generalship and operational conduct during World War I have not attracted the same levels of revision. As a result, the subject of Smuts occupies a problematic and contested space in the historiography. He is an anachronism to modern historians born to a period of Imperial history that has increasingly come under attack in modern times. He was written out of history by the Nationalist Government from 1948 to 1993, which was hell-bent on removing all links to the United Kingdom. Since 1994, the new Democratic South

Africa has ignored him as irrelevant. Even when receiving rare attention (much of it has been adverse), it is poorly researched, especially regarding his abilities as a general. As a result, the void in the historiography persists despite the wealth of archival sources available in South Africa and the United Kingdom.

References

Adgie, K.P. 2001. *Askaris, asymmetry, and small wars: Operational art and the German East African campaign, 1914-1918*. United States Army Command and General Staff College.

Anderson, R. 2001a. *World War I in East Africa 1916-1918*. Doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow.

Anderson, R. 2001b. *The Battle of Tanga, 2-5 November 1914.* Stroud: Tempus. https://doi.org/10.1191/096834401674001584

Anderson, R. 2004. *The forgotten front: The East African campaign 1914-1918.* Gloucestershire: Tempus.

Andrew, C.M. & Kanya-Forstner, A.S. 1978. France, Africa, and the First World War. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):11–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015929

Anon. 1909. *Field service regulations.* London: HMSO.

Anon. 1930. *A study of the war in German East Africa 1914-1918.* Command and General Staff School Fort Leavenworth.

Armstrong, H.C. 1937. *Grey steel: A study in arrogance.* London: Methuen & co.

Beukes, P. 1989. *The holistic Smuts: A study in personality.* Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.

Beukes, P. 1992. *The romantic Smuts.* Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.

Beukes, P. 1994. *The religious Smuts.* Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.

Beukes, P. 1996. *Smuts the botanist.* Cape Town: Human & Rousseau.

Blackwell, L. 1938. *African occasions: Reminiscences of thirty years of bar, bench, and politics in South Africa.* London: Hutchinson & Co.

Blackwell, L. 1971. *Blackwell remembers: An autobiography.* Cape Town: Howard Timmins.

Boell, L. 1951. *Die operationen in Ostafrika, Weltkrieg 1914-1918.* Hamburg: Druck: W. Dachert.

Bourhill, J. 2015. *Return to Morogoro: With the South African Horse through East Africa to France and Flanders 1914-1918.* Pinetown: 30 Degrees South.

Boydell, T. 1948. *My luck was in: With spotlights on General Smuts.* Cape Town: Stewart.

Brown, J.A. 1991. *They fought for King and Kaiser: South Africans in German East Africa 1916.* Rivonia: Ashanti.

Brown, R. 2015. *The secret society: Cecil John Rhodes's plan for a new world order.* Cape Town: Penguin.

Buchan, J. 1920. *The history of the South African forces in France.* London: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press.

Buchanan, A. 2008. *The lean brown men: Experiences in East Africa during the Great War*. London: Leonaur.

Cannadine, D. 2001. *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their empire.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Child, D. 1973. *Charles Smythe: Pioneer, premier and administrator of Natal.* Cape Town: Struik.

Citino, R.M. 2007. Military histories old and new: A reintroduction. *The American Historical Review*, 112(4):1070–90. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.4.1070

Coetzee, J.M. 1980. Blood, Flaw, Taint, Degeneration: The Case of Sarah Gertrude Millin. *English Studies in Africa*, 23(1):41-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/00138398008690769

Coleman, F.L. 1988. *The Kaffrarian Rifles.* East London: The Regimental Association Kaffrarian Rifles.

Collyer, J.J. 1937. *Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914-1915.* Nashville: The Imperial War Museum and Battery Press.

Collyer, J.J. 1939. *The South Africans with General Smuts in German East Africa.* Nashville: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press.

Corvisier, A. 1979. *Armies and societies in Europe, 1494-1789.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Crafford, E.S. 1943. *Jan Smuts: A Biography.* New York: Doubleday, Doron& Co. Inc.

Crowe, J.H.V. 1918. *General Smuts's campaign in East Africa.* London: John Murray.

Crowson, T.A. 2003. *When elephants clash: A critical analysis of Major General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck in the East African theater of the Great War*. Master's thesis, University of Kansas.

Cruise, A. 2015. *Louis Botha's war: The campaign in German South-West Africa, 1914-1915.* Cape Town: Zebra Press.

Cruise, A., Walker H.F.B., Wienholt, A. 2013. *Narratives of the Great War in Africa: Personal Experiences of Two Soldiers in the East African and South West African Campaigns of the First World War.* London: Leonaur.

Curson, H.H. 1963. *The History of the Kimberley Regiment.* Kimberly: Regimental Association.

De Kiewiet, C.W. 1956. *The anatomy of South African misery*, London, Oxford University.

Deppe, L. 1919. *Mit Lettow-Vorbeck durch Afrika.* Berlin: Scherl.

Difford, I.D. 2015. *The story of the 1st Battalion Cape Corps 1915-1919.* London: Forgotten Books.

Digby, P.K.A .1993. *Pyramids and poppies: The 1st SA Infantry Brigade in Libya, France and Flanders 1915-1919*. Rivonia: Ashanti.

Dolbey, R.V. 2007. *The Bush War doctor: The experiences of a British Army doctor during the East African campaign of the First World War.* London: Leonaur.

Downs, H. 2012. *Chasing von Lettow-Vorbeck : The story of Harold Downs' Great War service in East Africa.* Lincoln: Tucann.

Du Pisani, K. 2016. The Smuts biographies: Analysis and historiographical assessment. *South African Historical Journal*, 68(3):437–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2016.1230645

Du Pisani, K., Kriek, D. & De Jager, C. (eds). 2017. *Jan Smuts: Van Boerseun tot wêreldverhoog.* Pretoria: Protea.

Dubow, S. 2008. Smuts, the United Nations and the rhetoric of race and rights. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 43(1):43-72. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009407084557

Dubow, S. 2012. South Africa and South Africans: Nationality, belonging, citizenship. In *The Cambridge history of South Africa 1885-1994*, ed. By R. Ross, A. K Mager, and B. Nasson. Cambridge: Cambridge University. pp. 17-65. https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521869836.003

Engelbrecht, L. 2015. *Book review: Grey steel*. Available at http://defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=603&catid=57:Book%20Reviews&Itemid=141 [Accessed 20 April 2015].

Farwell, B. 1986. *The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Fendall, C.P. 2006. *The East African Force 1915-1919: The First World War in Colonial Africa.* Essex, UK: Naval & Military Press.

Friedman, B. 1975. *Smuts: A reappraisal.* Johannesburg: Hugh Keartland.

Garcia, A. 2019. *The first campaign victory of the Great War.* Warwick: Helion & Co. Ltd.

Gardner, B. 1963. *German East: The story of the First World War in East Africa.* London: Cassel.

Garfield, B. 2007. *The Meinertzagen mystery: The life and legend of a colossal fraud.* Washington: Potomac Books.

Garson, G. 1955. *The Swaziland question and a road to the sea 1887-1895*. Master's thesis, University of Witwatersrand.

Garson, G. 1979. South Africa and World War I. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.* 8(1):68-85. https://doi.org/10.1080/03086537908582547

General Staff, Defence Headquarters, Pretoria. 1924. *The Union of South Africa and the Great War 1918.* Nashville: Battery Press.

Gleeson, I. 1994. *The unknown force: Black, Indian and coloured soldiers through two World Wars.* Johannesburg: Ashanti.

Goetzsche, E. 1971. *Natal Mounted Rifles 1854-1969.* Durban: Regimental Association.

Grey, J. 2000. Standing humbly in the ante-chambers of Clio: the rise and fall of Union War Histories. *Scientia Militaria*, 30(2):253-266. https://doi.org/10.5787/30-2-177

Grey, J. (ed). 2003a. *The last word? Essays on official history in the United States and British Commonwealth.* London: Praeger.

Grey, J. 2003b. Introduction. In *The last word? Essays on official history in the United States and British Commonwealth.* London: Praeger.

Grundlingh, A. 1999. The King's Afrikaners? Enlistment and ethnic identity in the Union of South Africa's defence force during the Second World War, 1939–45. *Journal of African History,* 40(3):351-365. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853799007537

Grundlingh, A. 1987. *Fighting their own war.* Johannesburg: Ravan.

Grundlingh, A. 2014. *War and society: Participation and remembrance: South African black and coloured troops in the First World War, 1914-1918.* Stellenbosch: Sun Media. https://doi.org/10.18820/9781920689551

Hale, J.R. 1985. *War and society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620.* London: Fontana Press. https://doi.org/10.56021/9780801831966

Hancock, W.K. 1962. *Smuts: The sanguine years 1870-1919.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Hancock, W.K. 1968. *Smuts: The fields of force 1919-1950.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Hancock, W.K. & van der Poel, J. (eds). 1966. *Selections from the Smuts papers Vol III July 1910-November 1918.* London: Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563638

Henshaw, P. 2009. South African territorial expansion and the international reaction to South African racial policies, 1939 to 1948. *South African Historical Journal*, 50(1):65-76. https://doi.org/10.1080/02582470409464795

Hodges, G.W.T. 1978. African manpower statistics for the British forces in East Africa, 1914-1918. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):101–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015978

Hodges, G.W.T. 1999. *Kariakor: The carrier corps.* Nairobi: Nairobi University Press.

Hordern, C. 1941. *Military operations East Africa volume 1 August 1914-September 1916.* London: Her Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office.

Hoyt, E.P. 1981. *Guerilla: Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and Germany's East African Empire.* London: Macmillan.

Hyam, R. 1972. *The failure of South African expansion, 1908-1948.* London: Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01621-1

Hyam, R. & Henshaw, P. 2003. *The lion and the springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511523915

Ingham, K. 1986. *Jan Christiaan Smuts: The conscience of a South African.* Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Katzenellenbogen, S. 1982. *South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, railways, and trade in the making of a relationship.* Manchester: Manchester University.

Keegan, J. 1983. *The face of battle.* Harmonds-Worth: Penguin.

Killingray, D. 1978. Repercussions of World War I in the Gold Coast. *Journal of African History.* 19(1):39–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015942

Kleynhans, E. 2016. Deneys Reitz and the First World War: An introduction to the Department of Defence archival holdings. *Scientia Militaria*, 44(1):238-249. https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1172

Kraus, R. 1944. *Old master.* New York: Dutton, E.P.

L'Ange, G. 1991. *Urgent imperial service: South African forces in German South West Africa 1914-1915.* Rivonia: Ashanti.

Legassick, M. 1995. British hegemony and the origins of segregation in South Africa, 1901 -14. In *Segregation and apartheid in twentieth century South Africa*, ed. By W. Beinart and S. Dubow. New York: Routledge.

Leipoldt, J.G.W. 1920. *The Union of South Africa and the Great War 1914-1918.* Pretoria: General Staff, DHQ.

Lentin, A. 2010. *Jan Smuts: Man of courage and vision.* Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.

Liebenberg, B.J. & Spies S.B. (eds). 1994. *South Africa in the 20th century.* Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik.

Marks, S. 2001. White masculinity: Jan Smuts, race and the South African War. *Raleigh Lecture on History*, pp. 200-223.

Martin, A.C. 1969. *The Durban Light Infantry 1854-1934.* Durban: The Regimental Asociation DLI.

Meinertzhagen, R. 1960. *Army diary 1899-1926.* Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.

Meiring, P. 1975. *Smuts the patriot.* Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Miller, C. 1974. *Battle for the bundu: The First World War in East Africa.* London: Purnell.

Millin, S.G. 2001. *General Smuts volume I.* Safety Harbor: Simon Publications.

Mitchell, S. 2014. Jan Smuts, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Great War in German East Africa. In: *The greater war: Other combatants and other fronts 1914-1918*, ed. by J. Krause. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137360663_7

Moore, R. & Robinson, J.P. 2013. *Two views of the South-West African campaign 1914-1915.* London: Leonaur.

Mosley, L. 1964. *Duel for Kilimanjaro: An account of the East African campaign.* New York: Ballantine.

Moyd, M.R. 2008. *Becoming Askari: African soldiers and everyday colonialism in German East Africa, 1850-1918*. Doctoral thesis, Cornell University.

Moyd, M.R. 2014. *Violent intermediaries: African soldiers, conquest, and everyday colonialism in German East Africa.* Athens: Ohio University Press.

Muth, J. 2011. *Command culture.* Denton: University of North Texas.

Nasson, B. 2007. *Springboks on the Somme.* Johannesburg: Penguin.

Nasson, B. 2014. *WWI and the people of South Africa.* Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Nasson, B. 2018. Review of Jan Smuts: Afrikaner sonder grense by Richard Steyn. *Litnet*, http://www.litnet.co.za/jan-smuts-afrikaner-sonder-grense-richard-steyn/ [Accessed 9 January 2018].

Nesselhuf, F.J. 2012. *General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck's East Africa campaign: Maneuver warfare on the Serengeti*. Master's thesis, University of North Texas.

Olusogo, D. 2014. *The World's War.* London: Head of Zeus.

Page, M.E. 1978. The War of Thangata: Nyasaland and The East African Campaign, 1914-1918. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):87–100. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015966

Page, M.E. 2000. *The Chiwaya War: Malawians and the First World War.* Oxford: Westview Press.

Paice, E. 2008. *Tip & run.* London: Phoenix.

Pakenham, T. 1997. *The scramble for Africa.* Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball.

Paterson, H. 2010. Jan Christiaan Smuts as a General in East Africa 1916 - An appraisal. *Military History Journal of the South African Military History Society*, 15(2).

Pirouet, M.L. 1978. East African Christians and World War I. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):117–30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002185370001598X

Pretorius, F. 2017. Smuts se rol in die Anglo-Boereoorlog. In *Jan Smuts: Van Boerseun tot wêreldverhoog.* Pretoria: Protea.

Pretorius, P.J. 2001. *Jungle man.* New York: Alexander Books.

Quigley, C. 1981. *The Anglo-American establishment from Rhodes to Cliveden.* New York: NP.

Rainer, P.W. 1940. *African hazard.* London: Butler and Tanner.

Rathbone, R. 1978. World War I and Africa: Introduction. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):1-9. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015917

Reitz, D. 1933. *Trekking on.* Edinburgh: The House of Emslie.

Said, E.W. 1979. *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage Books.

Samson, A. 2006. *Britain, South Africa and the East Africa Campaign, 1914-1918.* London: Tauris.

Schapiro, J.S. 1945. Thomas Carlyle, Prophet of Fascism. *Journal of Modern History*, 17(2):97-115. https://doi.org/10.1086/236913

Schnee, H. 1919. *Deutsch-Ostafrika im Weltkriege. Wie wir lebten und kämpften.* Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer.

Sibley, J.R. 1973. *Tanganyikan guerrilla.* London: Pan Books.

Simpkins, B.G. 1965. *Rand Light Infantry.* Cape Town: Howard Timmins.

Smuts, J.C. 1952. *Jan Christiaan Smuts.* London: Cassel and Company.

Spencer, H. 1896. *The study of sociology.* New York: D. Appleton and Company.

Stapleton, T.J. 2010. *A military history of South Africa from the Dutch-Khoi wars to the end of apartheid.* Santa Barbara: Praeger. https://doi.org/10.5040/9798400685835

Stejskal, J. 2014. *The horns of the beast: The Swakop River campaign and World War I in South-West Africa 1914-1915.* Solihull: Helion.

Stevens, H.C. 1973. *The World War I campaigns of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and T.E. Lawrence: A comparison of two types of guerrilla warfare*. Master's thesis, Ohio State University.

Steyn, R. 2015. *Jan Smuts: Unafraid of greatness.* Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.

Strachan, H 2004. *The First World War in Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stratis, J.C. 2002. *A case study in leadership-Colonel Paul Emil Von Lettow-Vorbeck.* USA Army War College. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA404449

Summers A. & Johnson, R.W. 1978. World War I conscription and social change in Guinea. *Journal of African History*, 19(1):25–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015930

TNA, WO 106/1460, Diary of Governor Heinrich Schnee 11/1917 – 11/1918.

Trew, H.F. 1936. *Botha treks.* London: Blackie & Son.

Uys, I. 1992. *South African Military who's who 1452-1992.* Germiston: Fortress.

Van der Byl, P. 1971. *From playgrounds to battlefields.* Cape Town: Howard Timmins.

Van der Waag, I. 2003. Contested histories: Official history and the South African military in the 20th Century. In *The last word? Essays on official history, in the United States and British Commonwealth*, ed. by J. Grey. Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger.

Van der Waag, I. 2015. *A military history of modern South Africa.* Cape Town, Jonathan Ball.

Van der Waag, I. 2013. The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African Military Reform and the German South-West Africa Campaign, 1914–1915. *First World War Studies*, 4(2):141-165. https://doi.org/10.1080/19475020.2013.828633

Van der Waag, I. 2016. Recording the Great War: Military archives and the South African official history programme, 1914-1939. *Scientia Militaria*, 44(1):81–110. https://doi.org/10.5787/44-1-1163

Vandervort, B. 2009. New light on the East African Theater of the Great War: A review essay of English language sources. In *Soldiers and settlers in Africa, 1850-1918*, ed. by S.M. Millar (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004177512.i-342.42

Von Herff, M. 1991. *They walk through the fire like the blondest German: African soldiers serving the Kaiser in German East Africa (1888-1914)*. Master's thesis, McGill University.

Von Oelhafen, H. 1923. *Der feldzug in Südwest 1914/1915: Auf grund amtlichen materials bearbeitet.* Berlin: Safari-Verlag

Von Lettow-Vorbeck, P. 1957 *Mein leben.* Biberach an der Riss: Koehlers Verlag.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck, P. 1920a. *Meine erinnerungen aus Ostafrika.* Leipzig: Hase & Köhler.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck, P. 1920b. *Heia safari! Deutschlands kampf in Ostafrika.* Leipzig: Hase & Köhler.

Walker, H.F.B. & Wienholt A. 2013. *Narratives of the Great War in Africa: Personal experiences of two soldiers in the East African and South West African Campaigns of the First World War.* London: Leonaur.

Walker, E.A. 1972. *A history of Southern Africa.* London: Longman.

Warwick, R. 2003. *Reconsideration of the Battle of Sandfontein: The first phase of the German South West Africa campaign, August to September 1914*. Master's thesis, University of Cape Town.

Welsh, F.A. 2000. *History of South Africa.* London: Harper Collins.

Wessels, A. 2017. Kabinetminister en bevelvoerder: Smuts se militêre bydrae tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. In *Jan Smuts: Van Boerseun tot wêreldverhoog.* Pretoria: Protea.

Willan, B.P. 1978. The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918. *Journal of African History*, 19(1): 61–86. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853700015954

Wilson, M. & Thompson, I. (eds). 1975. *The Oxford history of South Africa 1870-1966.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, F.B. 1935. *Marching on Tanga: With General Smuts in East Africa.* London: William Heinemann.