




Chapter Seven

Multi-Termism and Military Coups in Africa: Evidence from Zimbabwe and Guinea

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Abstract

This chapter dissects the changing political dynamics in Africa, focusing on Zimbabwe and Guinea, utilising qualitative research methodology. Unlike in the past, recently, people have welcomed coups and preferred them to multi-term establishments. It was witnessed in Zimbabwe and Guinea. In such countries, the coups were viewed by many as a great relief from multi-term leaders. It has led to one illegitimacy being preferred over another illegitimacy. Africa is currently confronted with a double tragedy: a return to the era of coups and presidential multi-termism. Many African presidents have repudiated to renounce power through constitutional means such as electoral defeat or the lapse of their terms, leaving coups as the only means to remove them. Multi-term presidents manipulate the electoral process, hold sham elections, exploit constitutional loopholes, hold referendums to extend their terms and tinker with constitutions for expediency. They have compromised armies that are ruling parties' appendages, biased electoral commissions, and bargained judiciaries. Such despotic establishments make it apparent that those tyrannical regimes will never relinquish power through constitutional means. It has given rise to military coups, another undemocratic means of political transition, to remove such leaders. Of late, the



people have tended to welcome coups and prefer them better than multi-term presidents, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe (2017) and Guinea (2021). In such countries, the coups were viewed by many as a great relief from multi-term leaders. This undemocratic transition is detrimental to a country's right to development because it deters potential investors and lowers investor confidence. It also causes abrasive effects on a country's political and economic right to development, causing stagnation, exclusion, and sanctions. The conclusion is that political transition in Africa is taking a new twist as Africans now prefer even unconstitutional methods as remedies to eliminate multi-termism.

Introduction

The emergence of the novel famous military coups has affected the African Union and regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS, plunging the continent into a predicament. From one perspective, military coups are strongly condemned and outlawed by continental statutes such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. The latter's Chapters 2, 3 and 4 reject and prohibit unconstitutional government changes, including military coups. Article 20 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights also illegalises unconstitutional government changes by allowing people to have their political rights determined by their political status. From this perspective, the novel famous military coups in Zimbabwe (2017) and Guinea (2021) have placed the AU, ECOWAS, and the SADC in a quagmire because the coups were supported by many citizens of the countries in question. In the Zimbabwean and Guinean military coups, massive support was received from the people. They demonstrated their abhorrence towards the SADC, ECOWAS, and the AU, warning them not to interfere in the military takeovers. Most citizens thus supported the coups, tying the hands of regional organisations, handicapping and preventing them to intervene in such situations. Such novel military coups have placed regional organisations in a quandary whereby they have to but cannot intervene in such situations to restore constitutionalism and

legitimacy. This triggered the likelihood of fomenting a conflict with most citizens supporting the military takeover. Such novel developments, where military coups have amassed popular support, have posed a problem to the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC since the organisations are compelled by their commitments to intervene to change the status quo and restore legitimacy. Inaction in such circumstances would mean the beginning of the gradual decadence of such regional organisations due to non-intervention and the redundancy of the statutes that bind the continent and constitute its essential features. Inaction would also mean that such continental and regional statutes will transmogrify into mere symbolic protocols. This is a novel problem that Africa is confronted with and warrants expeditious, collective, and concerted attention and remedies. Since military coups have proven to be partly caused by leaders who tweak constitutions to stay in power for long or for life, this paper interrogates whether the novel famous coups are the new remedies to multi-termism in Africa.

Duodu (2012) says that the African Union and its collaborative organisations, such as ECOWAS, have made it abundantly clear that they do not favour violent government changes on the continent. Nevertheless, cart-wheeling and verbal gymnastics occur whenever such a change occurs within the organisations and puzzle those who follow their affairs closely. A military coup is an illegitimate usurpation of power by soldiers where they use the might of a gun to seize power from the government. Longley (2021:1) defines a military coup as “The sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group. The coup d’état is typically an illegal, unconstitutional seizure of power conducted by a dictator, guerrilla military force, or an opposing political faction.” Multi-termism is the act of governing for many terms (typically being in power for more than two terms). Many constitutions in modern liberal democratic states stipulate that a president, prime minister, or chancellor can govern for a maximum of two terms. Anything beyond that constitutes multi-termism. Military coups, although illegitimate, have become the only panacea for removing presidents who do not want to relinquish

power. Such presidents are always kept from power through elections because they manipulate and rig them for expediency. They also repudiate relinquishing power when the mandatory two terms lapse because they massage the constitutions to enable them to rule beyond two terms. They hold referendums to toy with the constitutions, allowing them to rule for life.

When elections and the lapse of presidential terms fail to remove a leader from power, it leaves military coups as the only antidote to eliminating such multi-term presidents. Military coups, albeit illegitimate, become the remedy to change the status quo. Unlike in the past, such coups have been widely welcomed by the masses, as in Zimbabwe and Guinea. It is a new trend developing in Africa that has never been witnessed before. The chapter coheres as follows: A methodology follows and discusses the method utilised by the author to gather information. It is subsequently followed by the literature review, which examines what other scholars say about the subject and critically analyses it. It utilises case studies from Namibia, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where constitutional and attempted constitutional manipulations were initiated. The discussion then unmask how multi-termism is a recipe for military coups, giving evidence from Zimbabwe and Guinea. The role of regional organisations and why many African leaders are reluctant to relinquish power is also discussed. The implications of multi-termism for a state's right to development are also discussed. The conclusion recaps the discussion.

Research Methodology

The chapter adopted a qualitative research methodology. Information was gathered from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, institutional reports, and the media. Information was obtained in both print and electronic form. Educational material with relevant information on the past and current continental political transitions was selected. The author selected academic material that covered the period from when constitutional prolongations started to the period of the popular military coups. The period covered by the study is from

1999, when former Namibian President Sam Nujoma pioneered multi-termism in Africa, to 2021, when Guinea experienced a military coup which removed former president, Alfa Conde, from power.

Research question

The paper endeavours to answer the following question:

- Are military coups the new remedies to multi-termism in Africa?

Literature review

The multi-term presidential stampede in Africa: How it all started

Namibia

Sam Nujoma: The Namibian Pioneer Multi-Term President

The prolongation of presidential tenures and manipulation of constitutional loopholes in Africa was pioneered by the former Namibian President Sam Nujoma. The behaviour had spill-over effects on other leaders, such as former Burundian President Pierre Nkrunzinda, who emulated Nujoma's tactics. The first president of the Republic of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, was elected before independence by the members of the Constituent Assembly and sworn in on Independence Day on 21 March 1990 (Melber, 2015). Among the new constitutional provisions incorporated in the Namibian constitution was the fundamental provision that stipulated that any president was allowed to serve for two five-year terms. It meant that President Nujoma, who assumed the Namibian highest office in 1990 and was re-elected to a second term in 1995, was supposed to end his second and final term in 2000, after which the constitution would forbid him to run for another term (Dulani, 2011). There has been one significant constitutional amendment to the Namibian Constitution, that of Article 29(3). In 1999, it was

amended to allow President Sam Nujoma to run for a third term of office (LeBeau, 2018). South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO)'s first constitutional change was in 1998 when its two-thirds majority in parliament modified the two-term clause for presidents. Sam Nujoma was not directly elected by the people the first time round having been appointed by the Constituent Assembly, so he was allowed to stand for re-election by popular vote for another term (LeBeau, 2018). Namibia's 1990 constitution, which contained term limits, was changed in 1999 to allow President Nujoma, who had been in power since 1990, to run for a third term. However, the two-term limit was not scrapped but amended for Nujoma only.

To quell domestic and international detractors who were suspicious and concerned about the possibility of a president-for-life syndrome, Nujoma's loyalists manipulated a constitutional loophole on technical grounds. They argued that since a Constituent Assembly had first elected the President in 1989, his first term of office fell outside the ambit of the constitutional definition of elections as being through direct universal and equal suffrage, stipulated by Article 28 (2) of the Namibian Constitution (1990). This narrow reading of the constitution reflected not only the manipulation of institutional rules to advance a personalistic agenda but also placed Namibia among a long list of countries that departed from adhering to the spirit of the constitution by focusing on the minutiae of the wording of the law itself (LeBeau, 2018). The third-term debate ultimately led to the tabling of a parliamentary motion in the Namibian legislature in 1998 seeking to amend the constitution to allow Nujoma to run for a third term. Although the lethargic Namibian civil society and opposition made frantic efforts to thwart this constitutional amendment, they were overpowered by SWAPO's parliamentary majority, which pushed the amendment bill without difficulty. Nujoma hastily signed the bill into law, paving the way for him to run for a third term in the 1999 elections, which he convincingly won with 77 per cent of the vote (Dulani, 1999). All subsequent presidents have since been limited to two terms. Nujoma stepped down in 2004 because his party did not want to change

the constitution again (Tull & Simons, 2017). The Namibian constitutional manipulation set a bad precedent for successive African governments in countries such as Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has led to the emergence of multi-term presidents on the continent, giving rise to military coups as the only remedy for removing such presidents.

Burundi

Nkrunzinza: Emulating Nujoma

Burundi adopted the Namibian style by tinkering with the country's constitution to enable former President Pierre Nkrunzinza to run for a third term. Burundi might have adopted the Namibian style of constitutional manipulation whereby ruling party loyalists capitalise on constitutional loopholes to prolong the incumbent's tenure. In August 2015, Pierre Nkrunzinza was again sworn in as the Burundian President. His successful attempt to secure a contested third term plunged the country into a severe crisis in which approximately 500 people were killed and more than 280,000 forced to flee (Vandeginste, 2016; Goehrung, 2017). His nomination triggered a constitutional and political crisis of monumental proportions, centred on his decision to run for a third term, which he won (Nagar & Nganje, 2016). This controversial re-election to a third term by the former and late Burundian leader in July 2015 led to public protests and an attempted military coup by the opposition. It also followed violent retaliation and severe repression by Nkrunzinza's supporters and government forces (Goehrung, 2017). Burundi's third-term legal framework was characterised by a two-pronged loophole, consisting of an unintended ambiguity of the legal norm and an omission in the enforcement scheme. It enabled the Executive to maintain an appearance of legality and seemingly adhere to legitimacy (Beetham, 2013). Nkrunzinza had been ruling the country for ten years. Constitutionally speaking, however, he had served only one five-year term, considering that for the first term,

he was not elected by universal suffrage but by parliament and senate (Vandeginste, 2016).

The Burundian constitutional ambiguity was caused by combining the March 2005 Articles, Article 96 and Article 302. Article 96 stipulates that the President of the republic will be elected by direct universal suffrage for five years, which will be renewable once. There is also Article 302, which was included in the transitional chapter which states: "As an exception, the first President of the Republic in the post-transition period shall be elected by the National Assembly and the Senate [...], with a two-thirds majority of the members [...]" (Vandeginste, 2016). Nkrunzinza contented that ambiguity in Article 96 of Burundi's 2005 constitution, which specifies that the President will be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once, allowed him to stand for a third term. He argued that he had not been directly elected in the 2005 election since Article 302 of the constitution stipulates that the first post-transition President be elected by the National Assembly and Senate (Vandeginste, 2016). The Arusha Agreement also stated unambiguously that the President could not serve more than two terms (Arusha Peace & Reconciliation Agreement, 2000). The most rational interpretation appears to be that Article 302 provides an exception regarding the modality of the presidential election (indirect instead of direct). However, a strictly literal reading opens the door to a potential alternative interpretation, namely, that the constitution created a special first post-transition presidency, which does not count as a first term under Article 96. The August 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) was widely viewed as Burundi's breakthrough to peace, stability, and reconciliation. It unequivocally stated that the president "shall be elected for a term of five years, renewable only once. No one may serve more than two presidential terms" (APRA, 2000).

The APRA thus contained a constitutional blueprint for post-conflict Burundi. Its signatories included a specific provision: 'No one may serve more than two presidential terms' (Protocol ii, Chapter 1, Article 7). However, most probably unintentionally, an ambiguity slipped into the constitutional

provision on presidential term limits (Nimpagaritse & Parmentier, 2015). For the first post-transitional presidency, an indirect rather than a direct presidential election was provided. According to third-term advocates, this provision derogated from the general principle, thus creating an exceptional presidency that did not count under the two-term limit (Cassimon & Vandeginste, 2019). Nkrunzinza argued that because his first term followed the election by the post-civil war transitional parliament rather than by a popular vote, he was allowed to run again by the constitution's two-term limit. More broadly, the arguments of the President's supporters were familiar among those with third-term ambitions: stability, continuity, and security (Duhan, 2015). While some international partners, such as the United States of America, were not opposed to Nkrunzinza's third term bid, they emphasised that Burundi must abide by the APRA agreement, which stated clearly that no president should serve for more than two terms. On the contrary, the government defended itself by noting that the APRA agreement was not the only peace agreement that ended armed conflict in Burundi (United Nations Security Council, 2015, in Vandeginste, 2016). There were also essential concordats, such as the Global Ceasefire Agreement of 2003, to which no one ever attributed any constitutional status. The government thus asked why the APRA can be regarded as superior to the constitution and asserted that the Burundian constitution must take precedence over any other political or legal agreement (Vandeginste, 2016).

As demonstrations intensified against Nkrunzinza's nomination, the ruling party senators, who were all Nkrunzinza loyalists, asked the Constitutional Court to interpret articles 96 and 302 of the constitution. The Court ruled that the APRA provision forbade a third presidential term, adding that the 2005 Constitution drafters wrongly interpreted the APRA (Kavakure, 2016). The Court ruled that under transitional article 302, a unique presidential mandate was created that had nothing to do with article 96. In that respect, the Court concluded that one final renewal of the then-current presidential term did not violate the constitution (Burundian Constitutional Court

ruling RCCB 303). The Constitutional Court thus interpreted the constitution as permitting one final term for Nkrunzinza (Burundian Constitutional Court ruling RCCB 303). The ruling was the most controversial decision ever handed down by Burundi's Constitutional Court. Makumbe and Compagnon (2000:88) support this by saying, "Personal rule typifies ... a kind of political regime where legal institutions and the rule of law have been systematically weakened to allow the leader (generally the head of state) to rule the country through arbitrary decisions and personal patronage." The Court's Vice President, intimidated by his position during the Court's deliberations, fled the country (Nimpagaritse & Parmentier. 2015). As highlighted earlier, the prolongation of constitutional terms breeds coups. When elections fail to remove such leaders from power (because they rig them) and constitutional provisions fail to remove them again (because they toy with the constitution and manipulate it), coups become the only remedy to remove such despots. Coups d'etat, although illegitimate, may thus solve some of the political maladies that confront the continent.

Uganda

Yoweri Museveni started well as he was critical of African presidents who stayed in power beyond their mandatory two terms. In him, all Ugandans saw a president who was breaking new ground on constitutionalism, especially on presidential terms. On the day of his swearing-in ceremony, Murray (1982) said that theirs was not a mere regime change but an essential change. He also stressed the problem with Uganda and Africa not resting with the people but with the leaders. The latter strives to stay in power beyond their mandates, which leads to corruption, patronage, and impunity. Museveni promised the Ugandans that his party, the National Resistance Movement Army (NRM/A), would govern the country for only four years. After their four-year term, they would hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government. While constitutional attempts have allowed incumbents to run for a third term in Namibia, Zambia, Nigeria, and Malawi, in Uganda, the situation

was more radical in that term limits were lifted altogether (Okuku, 2005).

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) has transmogrified in its consolidation of power. When it came to power in 1986, it had a 'fundamental change' watchword that appealed to most Ugandans. After ten years in power, Museveni ran his presidential campaign with the slogan 'no change.' In the previous election campaign, the call was 'no term limits' (Swinkels, 2019). The practice informs third-term politics in Uganda that rather than using brute military force, two-term presidents are forced to manoeuvre for constitutional change to allow them to serve extended terms in office (Oloka-Onyango, 2001). Removing term limits in the Ugandan constitution suggests a life presidency syndrome. Nevertheless, it suggests a blatant failure to revamp the post-colonial democracy, state and politics.

Presidential term limits in Uganda are informed by the country's history and the struggle to institute democratic governance and cultivate a culture of constitutionalism. In Article 105(2), the constituent assembly limited the President's tenure, regardless of performance, to two five-year terms. Museveni was the first beneficiary of this provision (Oloka-Onyango, 2001). In 2007, Museveni and his National Resistance Movement reaffirmed their commitment to adhere to term limits by promising in the parliament's election manifesto that he would step down after completing his second and final term as directly elected president (Swinkels, 2019). Since term limits had not been adopted in Uganda until 1995, Museveni could serve as president only until 2005, after which he would be ineligible to stand again (Oloka-Onyango, 2001; Swinkels, 2019). Even though he had been president for ten years since 1986, the two five-year terms only applied from 1996. From that time, he has been in power, governing based on a constitution that does not specify a term limit (Tono, 2017).

In 2001, only six years after the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, Museveni appointed a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to examine the constitution and suggest

possible amendments. Although this did not specifically address the question of term limits, it was used by Museveni and the NRM as an opportunity to push through the proposal to remove term limits on the pretext that the people should decide whether to retain or remove presidential tenure limitations (Ssempebwa Minority Report, 2004). The CRC did not propose the removal of presidential term limits. The proposals emanated from the government and cabinet's white paper of 2004. Such proposals would allow Museveni to contest in 2006 after his mandated period ends. The amendment's supporters argued that whether a person should be president depends on the people's will, expressed through the electoral process, rather than constitutional eligibility. In 2005, a constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits. The Ugandan constitution also empowers a referendum to change the political system. This is because, under Article 255 of the constitution, a referendum can be held on any issue (Oloka-Onyango, 2004). The Ugandan Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister tabled a bill to eradicate term limits from the constitution in the National Assembly in 2005. The legislators then voted for the proposal, and on 26 September 2005, Museveni assented to the amendment, paving the way for him to be re-elected infinitely in future presidential elections (Makara, 2007).

Multi-term presidents have a charismatic political charm that they utilise to prolong their terms of office. They may adopt catchphrases and promises to keep people's aspirations and expectations high. Realising that he had ruled beyond the mandatory two terms, Okuku (2005) promised Ugandans to transform the country into a second-world country. He said he was not insisting on staying in power but wanted to tell people that he had covered one phase, the minimum recovery phase. According to him, since Uganda had achieved minimum recovery, he wanted it to be separate from what was happening in Africa, whereby it would still be a third-world country after 40 years of independence. Multi-term presidents also change goalposts, deviating from what they had previously promised. Having failed to relinquish power after four years as he had promised, there were calls from some sectors of the Ugandan

community for him to step aside. Okuku (2005) took a different political trajectory by saying that the more people talked about his staying in power, the more he may change his mind about leaving because it made him wonder why they were so keen about him leaving office. Nevertheless, the Ugandans have yet to show a vision for the future. They also tend to defend what they had previously castigated. Museveni had been a staunch critic of presidents who overstayed power, later defending it when he was caught in the same groove. Museveni (2021) says that some people think being in government for a long time is dreadful. However, the more one stays, the more one learns. Museveni claims that by overstaying in power, he was then an expert in governance. Under such circumstances, whereby leaders do not relinquish power through constitutional means, coups become the only remedy to outshine such despots and change the status quo, solving some intractable problems that confront states.

Rwanda

In Rwanda, the constitution was changed through votes of both parliament and senate and endorsed by referendum (Dulani, 1999). Rwanda's president has been in power since 2000 and will theoretically be able to rule the country until 2034, which would amount to 31 years of uninterrupted presidential tenure (Dulani, 1999). Paul Kagame decided to run for re-election for a third term in defiance of a Rwandan post-genocide constitution of 2003 drawn up by his very government. While this announcement officially came after a referendum in December 2015, which resulted in a majority vote in favour of altering the constitution to accommodate a third term for Kagame, the improbable 98 per cent approval was accompanied by widespread reports of voter intimidation and coercion by the state (Goehrung, 2017). A constitutional referendum in 2015 changed the presidential term from seven to five years but exempted the sitting president from the shortened term and a two-term limit until 2024 (Article 101, Article 172) (Bardall & Arieff, 2017). The referendum was scheduled following alleged coercive national consultations in which over 3.7 million Rwandans petitioned to change the term limit. Over 98% of

voters backed the new constitution, which permits Kagame to remain in office until 2034. After that, he would be immune from prosecution for treason or severe and deliberate violation of the constitution (Article 114 of the 2015 Rwandan Constitution). Kagame would have been subject to a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency in 2017. However, a new constitution was approved in 2015 through a referendum, with a reported 98% vote. The constitution exempted the sitting president, allowing him to run for a third term, which he won with 99% of the vote (Goehrung, 2017; Bardall & Arieff, 2017). After Kagame's current term expires, the presidential term will be shortened to five years per the new constitution. He could then run for two more consecutive terms, thus potentially remaining in office until 2034. He previously denied any intention to overstay in power beyond two terms, stating that he is preparing Rwanda for an unspecified future leadership transition (Jeune Afrique, 2017).

In some cases, constitutionalism and term limits have been neither scrapped nor ignored. Instead, tailor-made solutions for incumbents were deployed the moment term limits would have forced them to leave office. A particularly striking case is Rwanda. After serving as interim president between 2000 and 2003, Kagame was elected for a full seven-year term in 2003. He was re-elected in 2010 for a second term, which expired in 2017. In November 2015, a constitutional revision was approved by both houses of parliament and later endorsed by a popular referendum. The revised constitution maintains a two-term limit but reduces the length of a term to five years. However, before coming into force, the new provisions will be preceded by a transitional presidential term of seven years (2017-2024) for which any presidential candidate, including President Kagame, will be eligible to stand (Article 172 of the Rwandan 2015 Constitution). Thus, the amended presidential two-term limit will only take effect after the following transitional seven-year term ends. In other words, President Kagame, who has declared his readiness to run again, could theoretically rule Rwanda until 2034 (Goehrung, 2017). Thus, although Rwanda's former and current (revised) constitution

foresees a two-term limit, Kagame could rule the country for 31 years in full compliance with the law. Kagame's overwhelming re-election victory may reflect popular support for his efforts to stabilise and transform Rwandan society. It may also reflect a political system that constrains opposition activity and close government scrutiny of citizen behaviour (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Under such circumstances, where constitutions are tinkered with to extend a president's tenure indefinitely, a military coup becomes the only remedy to remove them. Neither an election nor a lapse of their presidential terms can remove them from power. A military coup, though illegitimate, is the only mechanism that can change the political dynamics, proffering a remedy to some of the recalcitrant political issues bedevilling states.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Presidential term prolongation in a quest to tamper with the constitution to run for a third term is a political spirit that gripped the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under former President Joseph Kabila. Since 2015, tensions in the country have grown. In the majority opinion, former president Joseph Kabila was manoeuvring to secure a prolongation of his tenure in the face of term limits (Dulani, 1999). Six months before the end of his constitutional mandate, Kabila was largely quiet on his intentions politically, which had the potential to create political uncertainty in the country. According to Libebe (2016) and Wolters (2018), many of the supporters of President Kabila in government and society generally expressed a desire for him to continue as president of the country. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, just like other upcoming African democracies, established term limits in their constitutions in perpetuity to safeguard against long-term personal rule. The rejection of personal rule and the support for term limits is perceptible at the level of public opinion. A survey across 34 African states found that 73 per cent of citizens favour term limits, perhaps partly because elections offer only slim chances to oust incumbents, making term limits more relevant (Dulani, 2015). In January 2014, demonstrations took place in the DRC

after former President Joseph Kabila attempted to modify the constitution and electoral laws to stay in power for more than two terms. It resulted in the death of 27 demonstrators and also culminated in the Congolese parliament amending Article 220 from the updated constitution (Libebe, 2016; Wolters, 2018). The amendment would have allowed Joseph Kabila to remain in power after December 2016, when his second term ended (Camara, 2016). The quest to meddle with the constitution and prolong Kabila's presidential term led to the DRC presidential and legislative elections being delayed by two years (Wolters, 2019).

A dilemma over power maintenance or peaceful transition remained prevalent as Kabila maintained his silence over whether he would step down or contest the 2016 presidential race. He was elected in 2006 and re-elected in 2011 amidst allegations of a fraudulent electoral process (Mbiatem, 2018). Kabila made several attempts to cling to power and prolong his term. The first attempt was in June 2015, when he suggested that the presidential and parliamentary elections should be contingent upon completing a new electoral roll. The proposal sparked violent demonstrations, leading to over 40 people dying in violent clashes with the police (Mbiatem, 2018). Protesters were angry with the decision to carry out a national census ahead of the poll, which many considered could delay the polls for years, thus allowing the President to postpone standing down. Kabila also sought to extend his presidential term by postponing elections from December 2016 to April 2018, a move that the Catholic Church and the main opposition coalition parties vehemently opposed (Maclean & Burke, 2016). Kabila's second attempt to cling to power was when he struggled to organise a national dialogue with the opposition, which some opposition parties and civil society members boycotted. It was intended to maintain him at the helm of an eventual national unity government (Maclean & Burke, 2016). The third attempt was to increase the number of provinces from 11 to 26 as of 30 June 2015, which many observers viewed as a ploy to gain political momentum from loyalists he appointed to rule the new provinces, hence weakening political opponents (Engel, 2010).

Under such circumstances, where the incumbent manipulates electoral and constitutional processes to cling to power, military coups, although illegitimate, become the only antidote to change the status quo.

Multi-termism as a recipe for coups in Africa

Whenever and wherever attempts get initiated to amend constitutions against the people's will, the country's stability is threatened (Ntomba, 2015). Multi-termism is a recipe for military coups in Africa. It is because the incumbents manipulate and rig elections to stay in power. They also meddle with constitutions to remain in office beyond the mandatory two terms. Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi (2005:36) assert, "...their genesis lies in the previous military and one-party arrangements, now adapted for survival in a more open environment. Leaders have learned how to manipulate the rules of the democratic game and to stage-manage low-quality elections to their advantage." They have compromised judiciaries, police, and the army, the incumbent regimes' appendages. Neither the opposition parties nor the people will be capable of changing the status quo, leaving military coups as the only therapy to remove such presidents. Because people will be frustrated and exasperated but powerless to remove multi-term presidents, when military coups take place to change the status quo, the coups are widely welcomed by the masses with great pomp, fanfare, enthusiasm, and pageantry. This scenario occurred in Zimbabwe in 2017 and in Guinea in 2021.

Zimbabwe, the pioneer state

Multi-termers manipulate constitutional loopholes to prolong their terms of office. Zimbabwe is another case of constitutional manipulation of monumental proportions. After attaining independence from Britain in 1980, Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister. In 1987, the two revolutionary parties that fought the liberation struggle, Mugabe's ZANU PF and Nkomo's PF ZAPU, united and signed a Unity Accord (1987). The constitution was amended, removing the post of prime

minister. Mugabe then assumed a new role as President in 1987. He asserted that since he was assuming a new role as a president, his two-term office would not be affected by his previous term as prime minister. Mugabe was starting on a new slate since it was a different and new setup. From 1987, he ignored term limits, saying that although they are stipulated in the constitution, a leader can continue to rule beyond those limits if the people still want him in office (Sachikonye, 2003; Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Makumbe, 2010). Mugabe and his ZANU PF pundits also repudiated relinquishing power even after the electoral defeat to the then-main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai (Matiashe, 2022; Makumbe, 2011). Mugabe's regime, from 2000, thrived on manipulating and rigging the elections to maintain its foothold in power (Matiashe, 2022; Makumbe, 2011). Makumbe (2011:29) aptly puts it:

While less violence erupted compared to in past elections, allegations of systematic rigging soon surfaced. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change charges that 250,000 more votes appeared between the polls closing and the final result 48 hours later. The voters' roll may have contained over 2 million dead, relocated, or fictitious voters. Millions of expatriates were disenfranchised. Over 130,000 potential voters (about 10%) were turned away in six provinces. Observers had limited oversight of ballot counting. State-owned media allowed the MDC token coverage, having demonised them for six years. Constituencies were carved up anew to boost the number of rural seats and dilute the opposition's urban dominance. NGO voter education campaigns were banned. Rural voters feared casting ballots for the opposition, and the only foreign observer teams came from countries friendly to Harare.

Such developments prompted the army to seize power, in connivance with the then Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, in November 2017. The coup was widely supported by the Zimbabweans. It was welcomed as a great relief from despotism and tyranny. The November 2017 putsch was

welcomed by Zimbabweans with great enthusiasm, pageantry, pomp, ceremony, and fanfare to mark the end of a tyrannical era. The coup led to a condition where one illegitimacy was preferred over another. In this case, a military coup became a new remedy to eradicate multi-termism, becoming an antidote to a malady constricting the country.

Unlike in the past when the police and military would pounce on demonstrators, during the military coup of November 2017, which ended Mugabe's 37-year rule, this did not happen and there were voluminous marches to the state house and to the president's private residence to conduct massive demonstrations against Mugabe. Unlike many coups in Africa again, there were no curfews, public crackdowns, or restrictions on civil liberties (Mackintosh, 2017). Previously in Zimbabwe, even minor demonstrations against the government would be met with vindictive, brutal, and lethal responses such as tear gassing, firing with rubber or live bullets, water canoes, or baton sticks. The significant difference was that during that time, the aims of the demonstrators and the military, that is, the removal of Mugabe, were aligned. The military camouflaged the coup by encouraging the public to march and demonstrate against Mugabe to pile pressure on him, portraying that their operation had widespread support and legitimised the act (BBC, 2017; Matiashe, 2022). Thousands of anti-Mugabe demonstrators filled the streets of Harare, singing, dancing, and taking selfies with soldiers. Mugabe was compelled to declare the coup legitimate in his televised address, flanked by the military. He ultimately resigned unconventionally, having written a letter to the parliament, which had started initiating an impeachment motion on him. Mugabe (Mackintosh, 2017:7) says, "I have resigned to allow smooth power transfer. Kindly give public notice of my decision as soon as possible." Apart from the joy and jubilation that seized Zimbabweans after the news of Mugabe's capitulation, legislators went into ecstasy and jubilation to celebrate the abdication of a dictator (Mackintosh, 2017). The Zimbabwean 'soft coup' was crafted dexterously and discreetly, making some political analysts label it a coup that was not a coup or a 'non-coup-coup' (Tendi, 2019; BBC,

2017). Just like in other situations where leaders prolong their tenures of office to later cede power to their children or relatives, Mugabe was inclined to cede power to his wife, Grace, who had created her faction called Generation 40 (G40). The latter comprised younger and aspiring politicians who did not participate in the liberation struggle, including women and young politicians who wanted to take over from the old order (Pigou, 2017).

Major General Sibusiso Moyo, the army spokesperson, reiterated that the undertaking was not a military coup but a 'bloodless correction' or 'military constitutionalism.' Pigou (2017) says they are targeting criminals around Mugabe who are perpetrating crimes and causing economic and social suffering in Zimbabwe so that justice can be meted against them. There have been mounting frustrations over Mugabe's 37-year-old rule, characterised by a poor and unclear succession plan, economic ruin, political chaos, and instability fuelled by his wife, Grace (Pigou, 2017). When Mugabe fired then-Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017, it was anticipated that Mugabe's wife, Grace, had triumphed in the succession struggle. There were rampant expectations and speculations that she would be made vice president at the December 2017 ZANU PF congress, aligning her to succeed her husband when he dies. The army's swift reaction foiled the plan and terminated her chances to take over (Pigou, 2017). Mugabe also ruined the economy and would not submit, admit, or relinquish power to pave the way for new blood with new ideas. He wanted to take the country with him to the grave. He had plunged the economy into murky economic waters, with the country's economy going from one meltdown to the other from 1999. The UN and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) (2017) estimate that the country had gone to the precipice, with an unemployment rate of 90% by 2017. The country also grappled with hyperinflation, which reached its zenith in 2008 with an official rate of 231 million per cent. The economic cataclysmic situation compelled the country to abandon its currency, which traded at a rate of Z\$35 quadrillion to 1US\$ and compelled the country to adopt foreign currencies such as the Rand, Pula, US\$ and Pound

(UNDP, 2017; BBC News, 2017). Under such circumstances, a military coup became a necessary evil to end multi-termism and the only ultimate remedy to change the status quo.

Due to an enduring liquidity crunch, the government had to resort to a surrogate currency called the bond note (an arrangement still in place with another surrogate currency called the ZIG (Zimbabwe Gold)), and the surrogate currencies lost value and impoverished people overnight. People could not access their cash from the banks, triggering the mushrooming of parallel markets and online trading in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BBC News, 2017). Mugabe and his ZANU PF supporters maintained their toehold in power for 37 years by utilising intimidation and violence, with the assistance of state machinery, to boost himself and his party. Prior to the 2008 elections, which he allegedly lost to Morgan Tsvangirai, he had unilaterally gerrymandered the rural constituencies to disenfranchise the opposition and still lost by 33% as compared to the opposition MDC's 67% (Matiashe, 2022; Tsvangirai, 2012; BBC, 2017). Mugabe deliberately delayed the announcement of election results by three months and later forced a run-off and an inclusive government. The Zimbabwe coup, like many other military coups in Guinea, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Niger, stems from public disillusionment, fatigue, and anger with the old order that never wants to relinquish power, making citizens quest for change. People will desire to have some new leadership that will be responsive, pragmatic, and sensitive to the people's demands (Takambou, 2023). Although coups d'état are necessary evils that eradicate constitutional manipulators and multi-term presidents, (Laqueur, 2019:4) says, "They are annoying not only for the practising politicians but also from the point of view of the political scientist" because they are capricious.

Guinea, following the Zimbabwean trend

Former Guinean President Alpha Conde showed no signs of relinquishing power even after the lapse of his term. Like other power-hungry African despots, he conducted a referendum to doctor the Guinean constitution. That would enable him

to remain at the helm after holding low-quality, flouted, and bloody elections. This scenario left a military coup led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in 2021 as the only option to eliminate such a repressive tyrant. The coup was widely welcomed and celebrated by Guineans inside and outside the country. The putsch, propelled by allegations of corruption, mismanagement, human rights abuses, and monocracy, was principally triggered by Alpha Conde's bid for a third presidential term, which ultimately led to his Waterloo. Haque (2021) notes that discontent started when Conde tinkered with the constitution to run for a third term in March 2020, side-lining the country's two-term limit. Conde then won the controversial presidential election. It was grossly marred by violence and irregularities. It was also tainted with fraud and the death of several protesters. Conde responded heavy-handedly to the remonstrators by unleashing his security forces, who used live bullets, a draconian move that cast the country into catastrophic instability. He was controversially declared the winner of a bloody election that the civil society and opposition parties castigated as a sham. Hoije (2021) avers by saying that Conde became increasingly ostracised by Guineans when he pushed through a constitutional referendum. The referendum was backed by Russia, which controversially propelled him to a third term in office. He continues to say that Conde was unpopular, even though people still voted for him. With the third mandate, Conde went too far (Hoije, 2021). Conde's bid for multi-termism violated the constitution and triggered a military coup.

Hoije (2021) says that there came a time when Guineans were disillusioned and asking for change. The absence of change led to what happened, Conde's tragic downfall. In neighbouring Senegal, which has a large diaspora of Guineans who opposed Conde, news of his political demise was met with relief. Diallo (2021) avers by saying President Alpha Conde deserves to be deposed. He stubbornly tried to run for a third term when he had no mandate. Many Guineans perceive the coupists as better than a president who meddles with the country's constitution to cling to power. Diallo (2021) says they know that a coup d'état is not good and that a president must get elected by democratic

vote, but they had no choice. They had a president who was too old, who no longer made Guineans dream, and who did not want to leave power. Under such circumstances, it becomes apparent that multi-termism is detrimental to democracy as it provides fertile ground for coups. The latter becomes substantial in changing the status quo, where constitutional term limits and elections have failed to produce any effect.

Despite the contested and violent nature of the 2010 Guinea elections, Alpha Conde's victory was embraced with hope and visions for a brighter future. The 2010 poll was also ground-breaking because it ushered in a democratic epoch in Guinea after many years of totalitarian rule. Under Conde's rule, the Guineans' expectations for a better life soon evaporated (Akuamoah, 2021). In his quest to embark on a third and unconstitutional term, Conde's security forces utilised disproportionate force in the run-up to the referendum and elections, pouncing on opposition elements. State repression reached its climax prior to and after the presidential polls, with Amnesty International (Akuamoah, 2021) estimating that approximately 50 people perished in the violence, with many others arbitrarily incarcerated and sustaining injuries. When Conde meddled with the Guinean constitution to prolong his presidency, the move was an insult to the Guineans, whose preferences were unearthed by Afrobarometer (2021), reflecting that 8 out of 10 Guineans prefer a two-term presidential term limit. The economic situation in Guinea under Conde also left a lot to be desired. Corruption also rose to astronomical levels, with political instability and economic meltdown depriving every Guinean's pocket (Akuamoah, 2021). Devermont (2021) notes that the overthrow of Conde by the military is a manifestation of economic mismanagement, eroding democratic norms, and autocratic outreach. It also shows the failure of regional organisations and international allies to be proactive in thwarting impending democratic threats. Conde's administration thus achieved little to ameliorate the lives of the Guineans. Commercial mining projects in the country have failed to proffer benefits for the majority, with a dam project intended to generate and expand electricity displacing thousands

of people. There has also been massive political repression, and the general criticism of Conde's administration has been that it has not achieved any meaningful progress in revamping the lives of Guineans (Fiotatta, 2021).

Famous military coups such as the one in Guinea indicate citizens' dissatisfaction with and disapproval of the regime. When Conde was ousted from power, people escorted and cheered soldiers in Conakry, with women kissing soldiers and fellow Guineans taking selfies with soldiers. When the masses support such coups, the military is incentivised to capitalise on the lack of support of the incumbent, manipulating the legitimacy gap and proceeding to seize power with a veneer of legality from the people. It is thus unsurprising that when Mamady Doumbouya got support from Guineans, he did not experience any difficulties ousting Conde (Akuamoah, 2021). Amidst a myriad of Guinean citizens' frustrations and unfulfilled economic and social hopes, Conde went too far by doctoring the constitution to prolong his stay in power. Such developments in African politics render military coups, albeit illegitimate, to be the remedy for multi-termism in Africa. However, military coups are not the silver bullet to political and economic maladies confronting the people. They are a terrible replacement for poor civilian rule. Conversely, they have also been proven to endanger human rights and civil freedoms (Tendi, 2020). Moreover, coups breed coups, culminating in civil wars and new dictatorships (Tendi, 2020). Military regimes have also been proven to be as corrupt as civilian regimes. Citizens also bear the brunt of sanctions when military juntas usurp power, with the economic sanctions imposed by regional and international bodies hitting the 'third estate' the hardest due to the unconstitutional regime change (Akuamoah, 2021).

The role of regional organisations

Regional organisations' response to unconstitutional power changes needs to be more consistent as it is currently lukewarm and lackadaisical. For instance, they did not take stern measures against coup regimes in Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Sudan, and Mali. Duodu (2012) says that the African

Union and its collaborative regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, have made it abundantly clear that they do not favour a violent change of governments on the continent. However, cart-wheeling and verbal gymnastics occur whenever such a change occurs within the organisations. It puzzles those who follow their affairs closely. A point of departure is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted in Addis Ababa in 2007, which obliged member states to safeguard democracy in Africa (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2012). The Charter deemed any undemocratic changes of governments unacceptable, particularly military coups. It also stipulated that the violators of unconstitutional government changes would be prohibited from participating in the subsequent elections (Articles 23–26 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance). It took a step further by providing that the perpetrators of unconstitutional power changes will be prosecuted at the African Criminal Court (Article 26 (5)).

The African Union, its collaborative organisations, or member states have never implemented the above provisions. Coup presidents remain unfettered as they continue to rule and participate in the subsequent elections. Nothing was done to force, let alone prosecute, illegitimate African presidents to relinquish power. The AU, its collaborative organisations, and member states were impotent in restraining Pierre Nkrumzinza (Burundi), Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe), Andry Rajoelina (Madagascar), Yahyah Jammeh (Gambia), Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (Egypt), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea), Paul Biya (Cameroon), Denis Sassou Nguesso (Republic of Congo), Omar Al Bashir (Sudan), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Ibrahim Traore (Burkina Faso), Mahamat Derby (Chad) and Mamady Doumbouya (Guinea). Many AU heads of state cannot rebuke fellow multi-termers and coupists because many fall in the same category. For example, for Museveni to rebuke Theodore Obiang for failing to observe constitutionalism and the rule of law would be a classic case of a pot calling the kettle black. The AU has also failed to thwart African leaders who tweak constitutions to prolong their tenures beyond

the mandatory two terms. The organisations have also been powerless in restraining African leaders who repudiate to relinquish power after electoral defeats. Such leaders force inclusive governments to stay in power, for example, in the case of Mwai Kibaki (Kenya) in 2008 and Mugabe (Zimbabwe) in 2009. The role of regional organisations and states has thus been theoretical, illusory, and a façade.

Why African leaders are unwilling to relinquish power

Former United States President Barack Obama sees no reason some African presidents want to stay in power beyond the mandatory two terms. Obama as quoted by Sevenzo (2015) sees no point in why many African Presidents want to stay in power, especially if they have amassed much money. He says that when an incumbent tries to massage a constitution to remain in power, it breeds strife, instability, and fragility. He adds that when a leader tries to change the rules to stay in office in the middle of the game, it risks instability and strife. They are never willing to relinquish power because some have draconian, autocratic, bloody, and murderous stints tainted with illegality. Many perpetrated international crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. They know well that they will face justice locally or at the International Criminal Court if they relinquish power. Ayittey (1999) says that criticising them became sacrilegious. The democracy, development, and freedom promised by Nkrumah and other African nationalists transmogrified into a histrionic nightmare. In many countries, these nationalist leaders soon turned out to be crocodile liberators, Swiss bank socialists, quack revolutionaries, and grasping kleptocrats.

Some leaders refrain from handing over power because they have amassed ill-gotten gains. Those include properties and money in Swiss bank accounts. If they relinquish it, those ill-gotten gains get sequestered by the state. Ayittey (1999:16) corroborates by saying, "What one observes in many African countries is an 'artificial government' or a 'government by

deception' run by a phalanx of degreed bandits sporting Ray-Ban sunglasses and bazookas. They are out of touch with the people and perennially locked in combat with them. They prey on the rural populations to line their own empty pockets. They raid livestock, loot homes, direct humanitarian aid, and extract false taxes." Others cling to power to groom their children to succeed them, creating a hereditary presidency. Some examples include Gabon, Chad, DRC, and Uganda (where President Yoweri Museveni is allegedly grooming his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba). Others become presidents for life because they become deified, pampered, and idolised as the only capable leaders in a country. They are regarded as gods, and people create a cult around the individual. They create an impression that without the incumbent, there will be no future. The nationalists who won freedom for their respective countries were hailed as heroes, swept into office with substantial parliamentary majorities, and deified. Currencies bore their portraits, and statues were built to honour them (Ayittey,1999). One Ugandan cabinet minister said that Museveni should continue to rule. It is because he is the only language understood in Washington, where Uganda gets funds for works such as rural electrification (Ntomba, 2015). How that is possible in a country of over 35 million people is hard to fathom.

Implications on states' right to development

Both constitutional and military coups have detrimental effects on a country's right to development. The right to development is a fundamental entitlement enshrined in the 1986 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Article 22 (1) of the Charter stipulates that all peoples shall have the right to economic, social, and cultural development. It is with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of humankind. At the same time, Article 22 (2) specifies, "States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development." Military coups have abrasive effects on peoples' right to political, social, and cultural development because they attract suspension from regional organisations such as ECOWAS.

The membership of states such as Burkina Faso and Guinea in EOCOWAS was suspended by the regional organisation when military juntas usurped power. Suspension from a regional organisation means restricted trade, investment, and diplomacy. People's right to development is curtailed as people no longer conduct their cross-border economic activities. Companies will also find conducting business outside the country's jurisdiction challenging. It will likely lead to unemployment, inflation, and social malaise that is detrimental to people's development rights.

Military takeovers also attract sanctions that are detrimental to people's right to political, social, and economic development. Sanctions may include trade embargoes both by land and sea. The sanctioned country will no longer be able to access international financial markets and trade with other regional and international partners. It will have negative externalities to state-owned entities and private companies, which will no longer be able to conduct business with the outside world. It will likely result in a negative effect on states' right to development as it leads to inflation, retarded economic and infrastructural growth, poverty, unemployment, and insurrection. In Mali, for example, tighter sanctions were imposed on the country when it failed to adhere to the stipulated deadline to hold elections (Abebe, 2022). The punitive measures included closing member states' borders with Mali and freezing most of the country's financial transactions (Ndiaga & Akorlie, 2022). In the case of Zimbabwe, the US and EU imposed smart sanctions when the country embarked on a violent farm invasion rampage. They imposed targeted sanctions on specific individuals at the helm of violent farm invasions, human rights violations, corruption, political repression, democracy, and the rule of law. Their assets and foreign accounts, including some companies involved in the abetting and aiding of anti-democratic values, were also sanctioned. They were also restricted from travelling to the EU and the US (Makumbe, 2010; Chinamasa, 2010). When the Mamady Doumbouya-led military junta seized power in Guinea, ECOWAS also suspended Guinea from its membership and imposed sanctions.

Military coups also deprive people of their right to political development. In a coup government, people are denied their right to vote, thus a denial of the right to choose. Since elections are one of the defining characteristics of democracy, a coup denies people their fundamental right to vote. When people are denied such a right, it leads to stagnation of a state's growth, fragility, and resentment, and may lead to more military coups in the country. It, therefore, cultivates negative consequences for a state's right to political development. Military coups also deter potential investors. They also lower investor confidence due to the fragility and uncertainty of the prevailing environment. Military coup countries present a high-risk destination for potential investors, suffocating the country with inaccessibility to offshore financial markets.

Undemocratic transitions such as military coups may also have a deteriorating effect on a country's political, economic, cultural, and educational right to development. Such states may be forbidden to join or re-join the Commonwealth of Nations. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2003, and its attempt to re-join the Commonwealth in Kigali, Rwanda, in 2022 hit a brick wall. The Commonwealth stated that Zimbabwe first needed to resort to democratic rule, referring to the Mnangagwa regime that came to power through a military coup in 2017 (Matiashe, 2022). The Commonwealth also noted the collapse of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, shrinking democratic space, an absence of electoral reforms, wanton and grievous human rights abuses, and flouted and rigged elections (Matiashe, 2022; Chan, 2022). These are the reasons why the Commonwealth repudiated to re-admit Zimbabwe in 2022. This failure to re-join the Commonwealth has adverse effects because Zimbabwe will no longer participate in Commonwealth games where people interact, share and appreciate each other's cultures and networks. Zimbabweans will also be barred from accessing Commonwealth scholarships. It will worsen the country's education system. They will also experience restricted movement because they will need visas to travel to Commonwealth countries since they are no longer part of the

group. All this negatively impacts the country's development in almost all aspects.

Conclusion

African multi-term presidents will not relinquish power through constitutional means such as electoral defeat or the lapse of their terms. They always find means of toying with constitutions to maintain supremacy and indefinitely extend their terms of office. Such actions undermine democracy and leave coups as the only remedy to outwit such leaders. Elections must still change the status quo to remove such leaders from power. If they lose in an election, they refuse to step down. They either rig it or force an inclusive government. In some instances, they repudiate stepping down. That is because winning an election in many African countries is one thing, and getting into office is another. There is also a new trend that many African multi-term presidents are pursuing. They are holding sham referendums to massage constitutions to prolong their terms of office. In most cases, the referendums are not conducted freely and fairly, as people are coerced, coached, and forced to vote for the preferred idea. That leads to a situation where people vote without choosing. Many of these regimes liberated the countries and have been in power since independence. They do not want to relinquish power through democratic means, creating a situation where they brought liberation without democracy. In many African states, such a scenario creates a situation where the new order is never born, and the old order never dies. It breeds discontent, strife, and coups, which attract sanctions, political, economic, and social quarantine, and economic meltdown. The consequences have ripple effects on a country's right to development.

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