





Chapter Nine

Nexus between Peace, Human Security and Development in Post-Colonial Africa: The Missing Link?

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Abstract

The intricate relationship between development, peace and human security has emerged as a critical subject in various governance and development forums, particularly in African nations grappling with high poverty levels. This chapter interrogates the multifaceted debates surrounding the nexus



of these elements, questioning whether development can be achieved without addressing the underlying issues of human security and peace. With examples of ongoing violent conflicts and civil wars across the continent, the future appears bleak, undermining efforts toward achieving Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Peace is understood as the absence of conflict but also encompasses social justice, equality and wellbeing of individuals. Human security, defined as the collective efforts of government and non-state actors to safeguard individuals' welfare and safety, contrasts sharply with traditional state-centric security paradigms. It includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. In Africa, human security is often threatened by poverty, violence and social inequality. Development refers to economic growth and the enhancement of quality of life. This study employed the content analysis method and posited that development must be redefined as a bio-political endeavour prioritising the lives of citizens, particularly those in post-conflict settings. Development in post-colonial Africa hinges on a nuanced understanding of the interconnections between peace, human security, and development. Ultimately, the research highlights the necessity for adequate security measures to ensure that populations have access to essential resources, thereby facilitating sustainable development.

Introduction

Contemporary conflicts in Africa are marked by both inter and intra-state violence, often resulting in profound regional and global repercussions. These conflicts not only obstruct national development but are frequently symptomatic of failed developmental efforts (International Peace Academy [IPA], 2004; International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2020).

The interconnectedness of development, peace, and security has garnered increasing global attention, particularly in Africa, where the repercussions of violent conflicts have been devastating. The post-Cold War era has seen numerous societies ravaged by war, leading to widespread death, destruction, state

fragility, and a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and instability (IPA Report, 2004; Jinadu, 2007; IMF, 2020). The peace, human security, and development challenges are arguably more pronounced in Africa than in other regions. Countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and many others have similarly faced setbacks due to intra-state conflicts, yet the scale and impact in Africa are particularly acute (IPA, 2004; Jinadu, 2007; Gluhbegovic, 2016; IMF, 2020).

Political instability arising from military and non-military conflicts compels scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in development and conflict management to reassess the nexus between peace, human security, and development. This renewed focus on integrating Africa's development and security agendas opens a critical dialogue about their interrelationship (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The inseparable connection between socio-economic regionalism and security suggests that achieving socio-economic progress and national development goals is exceedingly challenging amidst ongoing civil wars and political instability.

Moreover, violent civil wars and security threats have challenged the traditional academic and policy paradigms that view Development, Peace, and Governance Studies as distinct fields without intersection (Venkatasawmy, 2015). The African context presents both threats and opportunities for understanding the conceptual and practical linkages between these domains (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). To explore this critical relationship, this study proposes a framework for understanding the peace-human security-development nexus as a vital interdisciplinary bridge.

The first section of this chapter outlines the global policy perspective, culminating in a comprehensive understanding of peace and human security as they relate to regional development within the African context. The subsequent section examines the empirical value of the peace-human security-development relationship, interrogating its implications for Africa. Finally,

the third section assesses the impact of civil wars and armed conflicts on achieving regional socio–economic integration and development goals.

In this context, the need for regional initiatives to foster peace, human security, and conflict management emerges as essential for sustaining development. The conclusion posits that while significant challenges persist regarding Africa’s socio–economic and security agendas—particularly the role of weak and fragmented states in the regionalisation process—there are crucial insights to be gained. These insights illuminate changes in the peace–human security–development relationship and reaffirm the need for effective policy interventions and responses to development and conflict challenges.

Conceptual clarification

To appreciate unfolding development challenges and experiences in post–conflict Africa, it is fundamental to begin with a brief conceptualisation of peace, security, human security and development.

Peace

Suppose we support the existing relationship between peace, human security and development. In that case, it becomes necessary to show the nature of peace being referred to, particularly peace for whom and performing what function? Peace remains a hotly debatable concept and has generated conflicting meanings. The concept of ‘peace’ relates to the absence of war, fear, conflict, anxiety, human suffering and violence and is about peaceful co–existence (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The Norwegian peace theorist Johann Galtung (1996) points to three categories of violence that are vital to the understanding of peace: direct violence (physical, emotional and psychological); structural violence (deliberate policies and structures that cause human suffering, death and harm); and cultural violence (cultural norms and practices that create discrimination, injustice and human suffering).

Galtung further distinguishes between “negative peace”—the absence of direct violence, war, fear and conflict at individual, national, regional and international levels, “positive peace”—the absence of unjust structures, unequal relationships and injustice, and inner peace at an individual level (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Francis, 2006). Even though these conceptual classifications may appear instrumental, it remains imperative to reiterate that diverse cultural orientations have unique understandings of peace that are deeply entrenched in a given society or region’s peculiar traditional practices and particular political background of a given society or region. For instance, many people in the Great Lakes region of Africa relate peace to the absence of war and armed conflict, while those in Southern Africa view the link between peace and the absence of depressing social and development indicators such as poverty and the AIDS pandemic (Freedman & Poku, 2005; Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Jinadu, 2007). Thus, despite extant different context-specific interpretations, the concept of peace entails human security, development and social justice. This wider appreciation of peace provides the necessary linkages with human security and development (Mills, 2000; Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2021; IMF, 2020).

Security

The term ‘security’ entails the search to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts, whether the threat originates from other states, non-state actors, or structural socioeconomic conditions (IPA, 2004). Furthermore, Francis (2006) defines it as the state of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to acquired values. A simplification of the above definitions indicates that the concept of ‘security’ entails the survival and the condition of human existence (Buzan, 1991; Thomas & Wilkin, 1999).

The concept ‘security’ has historically been interpreted as the process of safeguarding the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal or coercive instruments at the state or international level (IPA,

2004; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2018). Of late, however, the concept's definition has expanded to incorporate non-military extortions, resulting in violent conflicts and undermining citizens' security. Such threats vary from civil wars and resource conflicts to transnational crime and population movements (IPA, 2004). In certain contexts, resource conflicts have the potential to become inter-state or regional conflicts due to competition over resources in border areas or where there are disputes over ownership or use of resources. One example is Lake Nyasa, between Tanzania and Malawi, where Malawian investors are accused of oil exploration and fishing on the Tanzanian side of the lake (Tanzania CRR, 2012, cited in Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Human security

Human security is a new term that strongly emphasises development initiatives for the benefit of people at a local level. It is symbolic of the transformed linkages and governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain (Duffield, 2006). In the words of one advocate, a focus on human security meant “putting people first” (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). It entails adopting a bottom-up or local approach to security that underlines the nexus between states and their citizens and that desists from associating the security of a state with the economic, political and social well-being of the citizens (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). The Commission on Human Security (2003) defines ‘human security’ as protecting the vital core of human life through “protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life”.

Their ability to enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives—their human security—has moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda. Failure to address human security risks and civil conflict among groups, communities and people threatens states from within and, hence, global order itself (Duffield, 2006). Human security embodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional concerns with military capacity and the defence of borders (Duffield, 2006; Jinadu, 2007). In most parts of the world, the state or regime continues to be secured at the expense of

citizens' needs. It is often argued that the concept of human security brings to the fore the centrality of security that can be applied to Post-Conflict Peace Building (PCPB) (Cockell, 2000; Vhumbunu, 2021).

Human security is covertly or overtly related to PCPB and a comprehensible real and scholarly agenda rooted in a specific appreciation of democratic state-building. It gives coherence to a set of policy issues that urgently need to be addressed, including issues such as the challenge of post-conflict DDR, the situation of vulnerable groups in conflicts, the role of small arms and light weapons in armed violence, and effective security sector governance (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Duffield, 2006). Consequently, governing organised violence and relinquishing force from political, economic and social life has been pivotal to the contemporary appreciation of politics and the fight for creating a legitimate and representative political institutional framework. Therefore, as briefly discussed above, the concept of human security highlights the nature and dynamic relationship between violence and insecurity on the one hand and underdevelopment and poverty on the other (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Development

Development is a relative term that means different things to different people and communities. Generally, the concept is positive, connoting 'progress' or 'change for the better' (Ndhlovu, 2020). This can be enhanced by prioritising the various processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable living standards (IPA, 2004; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The above formulation has underscored the following: economic growth; basic human needs; human development (food, shelter, clothing, education, healthcare, freedom, democratic participation and human dignity); sustainable development; and political development (Allen & Thomas, 2000; IPA Report, 2004). Burnell & Randall, 2005). Brobbey (2010) concurs that development is "the capacity of a state to achieve higher outcomes of production for the satisfaction of citizens and

empower them to make demands” (Ndhlovu, 2020). The above definition is much closer to Gumede’s (2019) formulation that development entails “... improvements in well-being, involving socio-economic progress.”

Historically, development partners have made considerable strides in lowering conflict-related risks to their programming, preferring to focus on conflict (considering it a negative eventuality to be circumvented at all costs) or deviating from the mainstream development aid to humanitarian intervention. Francis (2004) argues that violent wars in Africa and the devastating consequences on development and security highlight the limitations of the traditional interpretation of development studies and practice. The emerging post-Cold War debate focuses on the securitisation of development, i.e., treating development as a security issue. Importantly, this approach supports the belief that wars and armed conflicts exacerbate the problems of underdevelopment and insecurity in the country and the region (IPA, 2004; Francis, 2004). Gluhbegovic (2016) goes on to suggest that civil unrest can create a ripple effect at a regional level. Unrest in one country can lead to tensions in another. For instance, experiences of conflicts in DRC, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi led to an influx of refugees into Zambia. This situation creates a challenge within Zambian society if questions of xenophobia and the like are not dealt with (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Based on the above, contemporary development actors and academics have realised that there is an intricate relationship between conflict, human security and development. There has been a growing focus on merging strategies and interventions related to security and development partners working in conflict-stricken societies. This is based on the pretext that a holistic and integrated approach must be employed to solve the problems experienced in unstable countries to realise sustainable peace and long-term prosperity—especially on the African continent (IPA, 2004; Duffield, 2006). In some instances, the cruel reality of underdevelopment epitomised by abject poverty, social segregation and gross violations of human rights becomes a breeding ground for violent conflict

in a country. As such, contemporary development studies and praxis have been compelled to go beyond their traditional emphasis on critical issues, including peace, human security and the implication of violent conflicts (Francis, 2004). Thus, it becomes imperative in the current study to attempt the existing linkages between peace, security and development in accepting the multifarious formulations of development (Francis, 2004).

Linking human security and development in the post-conflict context

While the link between peacebuilding and the provision of individual security is undoubtedly vital, this alone does not do justice to how 'peace' is understood in PCPB (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016). As Galtung (1975) argues, peacebuilding means something more positive and transitory than merely providing stability to avert violent conflict. Instead, peacebuilding entails creating political, social and economic organisations and underlines the notions of capacity-building, good governance, social inclusion, economic opportunity and individual well-being. Therefore, to include this all-inclusive formulation of peace, it is imperative to incorporate the concept of 'development' into the peacebuilding operational matrix. From an institutional perspective, human security and development issues have occasionally been tied together (IMF, 2020). For many decades, ideas about development and human security have been discussed in parallel with separate institutional and political arrangements. Entire institutions were introduced to promote either human security or development, and people working in the British, Canadian, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch or German development cooperation agencies hardly spoke to their counterparts in foreign and defence ministries (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; IMF, 2020). To date, the existing gap in institutional cultures remains huge, and, except for very limited cases, discussions on how to realise development remain devoid of any consideration of human security issues.

The obvious issue was created by the bureaucratic specialisation among development agencies and ministries, and

the justification for this isolation is comparatively clear. Firstly, throughout the Cold War, human security policy was considered a concern of national sovereignty. Therefore, aid donors or international financial institutions did not scrutinise issues like military expenditure. (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Secondly, human security policy frameworks were frequently caught up in Cold War conflicts and alliances, and consequently, they were a taboo subject for development agencies or institutions (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Jinadu, 2007). Thirdly, external scrutiny of a state's policies and practices towards its citizens was deemed to be interference in a state's internal affairs. As a result, development agencies and international financial institutions, at least until the early 1990s, excluded national security concerns from their mandates (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005).

Practically, the concepts 'security' and 'development' were difficult to separate because, for instance, economic development, on its own, proved to be a catalyst for addressing conflict and violence in societies. For instance, in the early 1990s, the global development community viewed Rwanda as a leading success story, thanks to high levels of multilateral overseas development aid coupled with rapid progress in various economic and social indicators (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). However, the 1994 genocide blatantly showed that something was wrong with this picture and that a focus on national economic development, without attention to basic human security issues, would not succeed in addressing conflicts and insecurities and could, in some cases, aggravate them (Uvin, 1998; Jinadu, 2007). There was a generally perceived assumption in the economic and development fraternity that development was a precursor for human security and that a boost in economic development would inevitably limit the cases of conflict within, and possibly even between, states. However, this notion was progressively put in disbelief. In a situation of scarcity, development assistance and relief are precious commodities (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). If wrongly distributed, they may reinforce social cleavages and, paradoxically, sow the seeds of

conflict and insecurity rather than alleviate them (Boyce, 2002; Maresko, 2004).

Therefore, the development–human security nexus has been reversed after the realisation that providing basic human security is a precursor for political, social and economic development (and well-being). Good practical illustrations of this change in thinking include the concept of ‘security first,’ the idea of ‘sustainable disarmament for sustainable development,’ and the focus on ‘security sector reform’ by major development aid agencies and international financial institutions (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). The above illustrations reflect a radical shift in thinking in the global post–conflict development arena and show a growing shift away from the ‘planning fissure’ between human security and development frantic efforts.

The peace–security–development nexus: European integration case evidence

The European integration in the post–war period is one of the few success stories to illustrate the peace–security–development linkages. Emerging from the devastation of World War II, Europe experimented with the concept and practice of regional integration and cooperation (Francis, 2006). In the immediate post–war era, the main consideration was to establish lasting solutions to address inter–state conflicts in Europe, establish a favourable atmosphere for regional peace, order and human security, and build cooperation among the states and communities that would ensure interdependence (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). The difficult shift from post–war recovery to development and addressing Europe’s continuous security challenges resulted in establishing a regional integration and cooperation grouping. Subsequently, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Notably, these initiatives are based on sharing regional collective resources in terms of development and security (Francis, 2006). Between 1960 and 2003, the EEC expanded to 25 member states and formed a European Union (EU) with a common ‘European community

identity', a supranational institution in the form of a European Commission with a parliament and a common currency, the Euro. The established EU governmental structure is underpinned by principles of liberal economics and democratic politics (Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2018).

However, as we all know today, Europe has not always been stable, economically developed and characterised by viable modern states. William Wallace argues that "West European integration was a product not only of a common culture and history, and a particular geographical density, but also of a common disaster and predicament: the war and its aftermath, American hegemony and the Soviet threat" (Wallace, 1995; IMF, 2020). In addressing these various regional challenges, Europe came up with constructive development and human security programmes and policies, including but not limited to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Lomé Convention outlining the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific economic relations (ACP), a common market with a customs union, political cooperation and a common foreign and human security policy (Francis, 2006). These regional post-war development and security programmes were supported by the US-backed Marshall Plan (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016).

The regional policy frameworks and initiatives resulted in establishing and expanding economic, social, political and human security interdependence (Francis, 2006; Jinadu, 2007; IMF, 2020). Further, European policies and programmes on regime and human security interdependence culminated in the political stability and democratic success of former military and authoritarian regimes such as Greece, Spain and Portugal and the new member states from the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe. Traditional 'enemies' such as France and Germany are now locked into a partnership involving economics, security, development and politics (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Despite the tremendous progress in linking security and development in Europe, the EU is still characterised by a continuous amity-enmity divide about the nature of the

European project as a ‘partnership of nations’ or a ‘federal political union.’ For instance, in 2005, France and the Netherlands opposed the EU-proposed constitution, which signified the worldwide view that the security-development relationship is not immune from problems (Francis, 2006). Nonetheless, in the EU, well-thought-out policy and practice to merge regional peace, security and development focus on creating interdependent states and compelling people to have a “similar European identity.” The EU case also illustrates that viable, strong and modern states are crucial to the nexus at both national and regional levels (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020).

The African perspective

In this section, we attempt to further the discussion on the extent to which African countries—most of which have weak, failing and cash-strapped economies—have the capacity to contribute to the challenging project of facilitating peace, human security and development both at national and regional levels. A further question can also be raised: Do we have any successful African cases? Addressing this fundamental question calls for deciphering the root causes of expanding regional economic integration and cooperation in Africa, which have consequently created the domain of regional peace, security and conflict management.

A cursory review of modern violent conflicts and the socio-development situation in Africa provides the basis for establishing the reasons and the imperative of the convergence (Venkatasawmy, 2015). Available literature confirms that the post-colonial political and human security situation of the African region is characterised by inter-state and intra-state wars and armed conflicts. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa have been particularly deadly.

Estimates based on the GED suggest that, in the 1990s alone, verified conflict-related deaths totalled at least 825,000 (over two-thirds of global conflict deaths) (IMF, 2020). The high death toll was driven by the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, and protracted violence in

Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone (IMF, 2020). Several of these conflicts ended in the early-2000s. As a result, the number of conflict-related deaths in the region fell sharply, reaching its lowest level of about 2,400 deaths in 2010 (IMF, 2020). By 2002, there were 18 active wars and armed conflicts in Africa at different levels of intensity or stages of transition from war to peace (Francis, 2006; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Vhumbunu, 2017).

Most of these wars are fought in some of the world's poorest countries. Civilians have become the main target and victims in these civil wars, accounting for more than 90% of the casualties (UNDP, 2002; Venkatasawmy, 2015; IMF, 2020). According to the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, an estimated 3.6 million people were killed in internal warfare in the 1990s and half of all civilian casualties were children. Furthermore, of the 300,000 child soldiers worldwide, an estimated 200,000 are in Africa. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons grew by 50%. The civil wars in Somalia, the DRC, Angola, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone have led to state collapse and societal fragmentation (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015). There have been frantic efforts to find avenues for possible civil war peace settlements, and multinational peacekeeping forces, both regional and from the United Nations (UN), have been deployed. Low-intensity ethno-religious and political conflicts in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sudan and Central Africa Republic continue to undermine peace and stability on the continent (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020).

A resurgence in violence in recent years, however, implies an increase in conflict-related deaths, which have averaged about 14,000 a year since 2014 (a significant number, though well below the average of 84,000 seen during the 1990s). This rise mirrors the global surge in conflict-related deaths, driven largely by violence in regional countries like Angola, Mozambique and Syria (IMF, 2020). According to Vhumbunu (2017), in 2016, there was an intensification of conflict in Mozambique – albeit in a sporadic fashion—mainly between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front/*Frente de Libertação de*

Moçambique (Frelimo) government, presided over by President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and Mozambican National Resistance/*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) forces, led by Alfonso Marceta Macacho Dhlakama (Vhumbunu, 2017). This is a continuation of the conflict that was revived in 2012 by Renamo, driven by several grievances, including allegations of economic marginalisation, regional economic imbalances and breach of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords (GPA), which had ended the post-independence civil war fought from 1977 to 1992. The escalation of conflict in Mozambique in early 2016 resulted in the displacement of citizens in the affected areas, while thousands of people crossed the borders into Malawi and eastern Zimbabwe as refugees (Vhumbunu, 2017).

The resultant implications of armed conflicts and instability regrettably undermine and discourage the realisation of regional economic integration and development initiatives (Gluhbegovic, 2016). Therefore, diverse intricate domestic, regional and external considerations have compelled Africa's initially created economic groups to develop into the peace and security domain (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). Despite their loopholes and drawbacks, experimental regional peace and security interventions by initially chartered economic groupings demonstrate the commitment, resilience and re-insurgence of regionalism in Africa. It also implies that development and economic integration goals cannot be realised in the context of human insecurity, wars and armed conflicts. (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015).

Efforts to facilitate peace, human security and development regionalism in the Horn of Africa

Diverse developmental problems arising from natural disasters like drought and famine, exacerbated wars, and violent conflicts have become a compelling case for countries, particularly the Horn of Africa, to devise policies demonstrating the linkages. In this case, the Horn of Africa includes countries like Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. According to Francis (2006), Jinadu (2007) and Gluhbengovic

(2016), the Horn of Africa demonstrates ecological, political, socio-cultural and economic diversity. Most of its people depend on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism in the face of scarce natural resources (Francis, 2006). The prevalence of conflicts and the extensive use of landmines have had far-reaching implications for economic endeavours and the environment itself. Many African countries in the Horn have adopted structural adjustment programmes reflecting varying degrees of success. Their level of development is reflected in gloomy economic and social indicators, underpinning the perception of the region as a 'disaster zone' (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). Woodward (2003) further suggests that the Horn is the "stage on which Africa's tragedy is played out in stark and violent form". The continental effects of environmental and development challenges on human security culminated in creating the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986. IGADD originally concentrated on the continent's challenges of drought, famine, and desertification (Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2021).

The resurgence of regionalism in world politics in the 1990s caused the political leadership of IGADD to consider transforming the authority. At an extraordinary summit in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 1995, the decision was made to revitalise the institution and expand its remit to cover peace and security (Francis, 2006; Obeng-Odoom, 2013). At a 1996 summit in Nairobi, Kenya, IGADD agreed to establish the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose three major areas of focus were food security and environmental protection; infrastructural development (transport and communications) and regional conflict prevention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs (Francis, 2006; Picciotto, 2010; IMF, 2020). An evident manifestation of the peace-security-development nexus in the Horn is the shift in IGAD's original preoccupation with environmental protection and development cooperation to a concern with regional peace and security. IGAD has made extensive efforts to facilitate civil war peace settlements in Somalia and Sudan in collaboration with sub-regional pivotal states such as Kenya and Ethiopia and

other external factors such as the EU, the US and the African Union (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020).

IGAD's developmental regionalism commitments have not yielded the anticipated economic and development results because of various national, regional and international determinants. As a result, the regional organisation began to institute the structures and arrangements for converging regional peace, security and development. It established the IGAD Centre for Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and facilitated conflict management in Sudan and Somalia (Jinadu, 2007; Gluhbengovic, 2016). The implication is that peace and stability in the Horn may generate an ideal set-up to realise regional economic and developmental aspirations (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). For instance, although met with divergent reactions locally, regionally and internationally, the 14 December 2016 announcement of a National Dialogue Initiative in South Sudan by the country's leader, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, presented a rare opportunity for the South Sudanese to engage, build peace and reconcile (Vhumbunu, 2018). The dialogue took place against a background of cross-country intercommunal violence, political power struggles, national governance challenges, economic instability, massive internal displacement of citizens, disunity and disintegration, which had been aggravated by the near collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in July 2016. This followed the resumption of fighting between forces loyal to Kiir and the then vice-president and leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon (Vhumbunu, 2018).

Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that the IGAD's peace and security commitments set a strong basis for regional peace, human security, and development (Venkatasawmy, 2015). IGAD member states, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, habitually intervene to instigate armed conflict in neighbouring countries (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2018). IGAD members failed to create a collective foreign and security policy crucial for regional

peace and a stable political climate. Instead, the relative success of IGAD's preventive diplomacy efforts in Sudan and Somalia has been made possible by the EU-IGAD Partnership Forum and US financial, political and diplomatic backing. In particular, the Bush Administration, for different political reasons (including pressures from the American Christian right, the 'war on terror,' and oil energy needs), has backed the Sudan and Somalia civil war peace settlements (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015; IMF, 2020).

SADC and the challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa

The heterogeneous regional space, now described as 'Southern Africa,' has been collectively constructed by "state, market, society and external actors in a historical perspective" (Söderbaum, 2002; Francis, 2006). The political history of Southern Africa has largely been dominated by the struggles for the political independence of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonial domination, the political liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the struggle against apartheid South Africa and its policy of regional destabilisation (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). The end of the Cold War ushered in a new wave of democratic governance in Southern Africa, changing some of its authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes. For instance, South Africa is now the economic giant in the sub-region. Though Britain, the US, Japan and Germany remain South Africa's main trading partners, Southern Africa is emerging as an increasingly strategic and valuable export market (Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016).

Unfortunately, the disheartening social and development pointers in Southern Africa not only reflect the discrepancy between the regional countries. They also resemble the multifarious security challenges that contradict the putative economic growth and development in the SADC region. For example, in 2001, the life expectancy at birth in relatively developed countries like Seychelles and Mauritius was 72,2 and 71,6 years, respectively. This is in stark contrast to the

life expectancy in other relatively developed countries in the region, like South Africa (50,9), Namibia (47,4), and Botswana (44,7) (Francis, 2006; Mills, 2001; IMF, 2020). New pandemics are mainly responsible for this discouraging discrepancy. The manifold security and development problems resulted in the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980 as the regional development mechanism to address the above issues (Mills, 2001). Nonetheless, SADCC's sectoral development route failed dismally, and coupled with the altered global security and political landscape with the end of the Cold War, the regional body was changed in 1992 to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with a collective market objective. The end of apartheid in South Africa and of the Cold War have led to relative political stability in much of Southern Africa (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020).

Like West Africa and the Horn, regional integration in Southern Africa is underpinned by an amity-enmity dynamic. Even though it may cultivate mutual interdependence and a culture of collective security, it may also result in competition, conflict, mutual suspicion and a lack of peaceful co-existence (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2021). The tensions between the late president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, and the late president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, paved the way for the region's complex politics. South Africa emerged as the reluctant sub-regional hegemon and Zimbabwe as the hegemonic pretender, separating the region into rival political camps, the "two SADCs" (Mills, 2001; Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016). The civil war in the DRC and the threat to regional peace and security resulted in an intervention by neighbouring countries like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, on the one hand, and the deployment of the SADC Allied Armed Forces (SADC-AAF), including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, on the other (Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016).

The above scenario fuelled what has been noted as "Africa's First World War" and the partitioning of the DRC into rival security, military, economic and political spheres of strategic interests (Francis, 2006). The deployment of the

SADC-AAF peacekeeping and conflict stabilisation force helped to contain the conflict, forced ceasefire and peace agreements on the warring factions, succeeded in stopping some of the killings and created a fragile security situation that ensured the survival of the Kinshasa government. It also facilitated the deployment of the French-led EU peacekeeping force—Operation Artemis—in the east of the country. This paved the way for Rwanda and Uganda’s withdrawal of foreign troops and the eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015).

SADC’s expansion into regional peacekeeping and conflict management, like that of ECOWAS, has been subject to challenges. There remain unanswered questions on whether the SADC intervention was a peacekeeping deployment or simply a “coalition of willing states,” in particular Zimbabwe, in pursuit of strategic security and economic interests in a ‘free-for-all’ exploitation of DRC’s war economy (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015; Vhumbunu, 2021). This study argues that SADC’s expansion into regional conflict management did not have any coherent policy mechanism to establish the relationship in a real sense. Instead, this *ad-hoc* initiative is principally motivated by key regional partners’ varying and contradictory strategic ambitions.

The above scenario is discouraging and makes violent conflicts and wars pervasive in Africa. Undeniably, this has far-reaching effects on the socio-economic development of this continent. For example, since early October 2017, after the Islamist militants or jihadists—identified as the Ansar al-Sunna—launched their first attacks in the villages and towns of Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado, insurgency and conflict targeting civilians, public infrastructure and government buildings have continued to escalate (Vhumbunu, 2021). While the Government of Mozambique continues to make concerted efforts to fight and subdue the terrorist insurgency through its national defence forces, the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM), a series of battles with the terrorist militants, has resulted in widespread violence,

insecurity, the death of over 2,400 people and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians by the end of November 2020. It has also disrupted economic activities, especially farming, which has worsened food insecurity (Vhumbunu, 2021). Therefore, the real issue for SADC is how to utilise this *ad-hoc* intervention to kick-start the process of institutionalising the relationship to pursue the SDGs' overarching goal to end poverty, ensuring that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030.

A more positive picture for institutionalising the nexus

Questioning whether Africa can provide a practical illustration of the relationship between peace, human security, and development from the national and regional perspectives will receive both 'no' and 'yes' responses. Even though the frantic efforts to establish this relationship are recognised, noticeable challenges are linked to sustainability. Practical illustrations from sub-regional countries point to existing problems and the need to deeply appreciate the nexus in Africa. The literature review illustrated that the African region falls short of pre-existing integrative mechanisms for development and human security, which become the breeding zone for violent wars and armed conflicts, state collapse, 'warlordism,' and societal fragmentation (France, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015).

The unfolded scenario above has forced regional countries to institute some tentative efforts to address issues of violent conflicts and human insecurity in a more integrative, regionally centred way. The peacekeeping and conflict management interventions in West Africa with the establishment of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) reflect Africa's focus on creating a stable regional peace, security and political set-up to realise development and economic prosperity in the region. The preventive diplomacy initiatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC-AAF can also provide relatively similar lessons. One instructive illustration from these *ad-hoc* 'fire brigade' programmes is the insurgency

of regional arrangements established to deal with long-standing peace, conflict, security and development issues. Typical illustrations are the ECOWAS 1999 Protocol, which is linked to the Approach for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, as well as the 1996 SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (France, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2021). Nevertheless, simply creating these structures cannot form the basis for securing practical implementation.

Also important is an urgent need to take a leaf from the European model in exploring the relationship in the African context. The European case has proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that Africa's regional economic and human security integration requires solid and feasible contemporary countries. Any commitment in the African region linking peace, human security and development, calls for a vibrant political and economic management approach from these countries. Additionally, the global systemic determinants that keep African states from accessing world markets and international economic forces serve as severe external shocks to the probability of vibrant African countries. As such, they minimise the potential of fruitfully merging peace, human security and development (Gluhbegovic, 2016; IMF, 2020).

The other crucial lesson from the European model is that combining the benefits of peace, human security, and development relationships cannot be achieved overnight. As a result, critics point to Africa's 'tortoise pace' towards institutionalising the relationship in real terms. As argued by Francis (2006) and Jinadu (2007), critics refer to Africa as a 'hopeless continent'. This is despite the fact that the continent is well-endowed with natural resources, with approximately 30% of the world's mineral reserves, and also the fact that it is the world's largest arable land mass (African Natural Resources Centre, 2015; Gluhbegovic, 2016). These riches have, however, failed to bring about concomitant development. In addition, natural resources have caused or fuelled numerous conflicts, and, as such, they are viewed as a curse rather than a blessing (Gluhbegovic, 2016).

Critics, however, fail to consider that it took several decades for Europe to establish the relationship between regional peace, human security and development. While we benefit greatly from EU efforts, Africa's attempts are yet to produce the most appropriate mechanism for regional peace, human security and development integration. Part of the reason for this state of affairs is the internal politics and poor governance systems, which result in armed conflicts and state failure. Several African nations are weak and fragmented, and, as such, they have yet to meet the requirements for creating regional peace, human security, and development. Nearly five decades on, regional economic and security integration in Africa is still driven by the governing elites with limited participation by civil society and, worse still, a lack of societal ownership of the regionalisation process (Venkatasawmy, 2015; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Furthermore, Africa's regionalist commitments continue to follow the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approaches of peace, human security and development nexus instead of experimenting with Africa-specific alternative models that are context-specific and traditionally salient, replicating the African scenarios.

For instance, the recent African Union Quadripartite Summit held in Luanda, Angola, on 27 June 2023 highlighted African leaders' commitment to devising an integrative regional strategy to address the longstanding conflict in Angola, which has become a stumbling block for development in the country and the region at large. Also of major concern is the deterioration of the peace, security and humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC following the resurgence of the March 2023 movement and the presence of other armed and terrorist groups. This has led to a diplomatic tiff between the DRC and Rwanda, and processes have been established to address the situation and de-escalate tension between the two AU member states (Chronicle, 27 June 2023).

Concluding remarks and the way forward

This chapter accentuates that the root causes of weak, fragmented, and underdeveloped African nations are deeply

intertwined with complex challenges in institutionalising the nexus of peace, human security, and development. Despite these challenges, cautious optimism exists regarding the region's potential to establish sustainable frameworks for these interrelated domains. The emergence of embryonic institutional models and ad-hoc arrangements across various regions demonstrates a commitment to fostering peace and security. Yet, the critical task lies in transitioning from these temporary solutions to robust, long-term regional mechanisms that formalise these relationships. The global political momentum generated by initiatives such as the 'Year of Africa' (2005) provides a valuable platform for integrating the peace-human security-development nexus into broader international policy frameworks. This initiative can catalyse renewed commitment and collaboration among African nations and their international partners, ensuring these relationships are prioritised in response strategies tailored to the continent. Importantly, the findings of this study indicate that African leaders must prioritise the development of more effective and coherent mechanisms to address the endemic challenges of state and nation-building. Failure to do so risks perpetuating conflict and civil war cycles that undermine regional development efforts. Moving forward, fostering inclusive governance, enhancing institutional capacities, and promoting community engagement in peacebuilding processes is essential. This will enable African nations to pave the way for a more secure, prosperous, and integrated future, ultimately realising the potential of the peace-human-security-development nexus as a foundation for sustainable development in the continent.

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