




Chapter 11

United Nations–African Union Relations: Towards Sustainable Peace and Economic Development and the Attainment of Agenda 2063

Dawn Isabel Nagar 

Faculty of Humanities,
University of Johannesburg (UJ), South Africa 
dawnn@uj.ac.za

Introduction¹

This chapter provides a constructive discussion of the actors and factors relevant to the African Union (AU)'s relations with the United Nations (UN) and their respective institutions. The chapter further provides a critical assessment concerning the rules of engagement between these two international organisations over 20 years since the establishment of the AU in 2002. The major discussion adopts a political economy, human security, and developmental-led approach situated in fundamental international relations theories, critique, and debates to assess how the relations between these two organisations have fared, see where the gaps are, and identify key recommendations toward building solid relations. Addressing the AU and its relations with the UN's peace and security architecture to achieve the AU's Agenda 2063, therefore cannot be discussed in the absence of geopolitical economics.

¹ I acknowledge that part of this discussion is premised on my 2022 book published by Springer, Switzerland and Palgrave Macmillan, New York, titled: *Challenging the United Nations Peace and Security Agenda in Africa: 1960 to 2022*.



On its part, the UN Charter of 1945 was primarily created for the maintenance of world peace, with a 193-member-state body comprised of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and a further rotation of ten non-permanent members on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as well as five permanent positions – the P5 comprising of the world’s most powerful global militaries and economies. However, the five powerful drivers do not align with the immense global mineral and agricultural wealth of AU member states, encompassing both land and sea resources. Africa also possesses significant human capital, with 60% of its population of 1.4 billion being youth. Additionally, the continent hosts the world’s largest free trade area by population size, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Nevertheless, the P5, comprising China, France (a European Union [EU] member state), the United Kingdom (UK) (a recent Brexit or non-EU-member), Russia, and the United States (US), have control over world peace and economic oversight through veto power. But ever since their creation and particularly in the last 20 years, Africa has simply not benefitted from peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction models as enacted within the UN and its institutions. The continent has remained resource-poor, while conflicts are spiralling with UN resolutions made, delayed, or insufficiently resourced.

While the ten non-permanent member states on the UNSC have an opportunity to push for equality of negotiations within global peace and security and human economic development, it is more of a window dressing. On the other hand, the UNGA has shown significant clout in world affairs – and has not hesitated or shied away from intervening in their attempts to maintain world order within global security and human rights affairs. For instance, the UNGA has intervened in the tumultuous Israel and Palestine wars, the Ukraine and Russia wars, the intra-state conflicts between Ethiopia’s governments and its Tigray ethnic population, and several other pertinent issues that are being constructively engaged by the UNGA. Concerning the AU and the UN security interventions, the divergence of UNSC dynamics in dealing with Africa’s conflicts has become like Groundhog Day for Africa (with the same issues being replayed and the past being

infused with Africa's present-day reality). They have responded to old issues such as the superpower rivalry during Africa's Cold War of the 1980s, with capitalist and socialist/communist blocs competing against each other in Africa's continent over Africa's economic resources, while pushing military apparatuses and proxy wars under the banner of UNSC resolutions.

The UNSC, as the purse-holder, provides the largest budget to the UN and its institutions and, as realism dictates, these powerful military and advanced economies have created the penholder system – a second UNSC structure subsumed within the current UNSC structure – best understood as a spaghetti bowl of power dynamics among P3 (France, the US, and the UK) *versus* P2 (France and the US) or P1 (the US) *versus* P2 (China and Russia), all happening behind the scenes and closed doors of engagement, as they set the rules of the game infused with infighting, economics, and trade (Ugarte 2014). Such engagements have invariably become further infused with power and greed and decisions are thus enacted in what the P5 member states think in their view are important. They also influence the development and timing of peacekeeping efforts in conflicts both across Africa and globally. For example, while Russia abstained from voting for an increase in troops for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) (MINUSCA) in December 2018, it also provided CAR's military personnel training at Russian military schools – largely provided by Russia's Wagner mercenary group. The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of National Defence of CAR signed several agreements on military co-operation in August 2018, as well as in 2019 and 2020 (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation 2020).

But this all changed in 2023 with the infighting of Russia's military contraction of its Wagner mercenary group, showing off too much muscle and over-reach against Russia's military forces, particularly against the Russian government, when it staged a mutiny in the heart of Moscow in June 2023 – in defiance of Russia's president Vladimir Putin. This move resulted in huge humiliation for President Putin and made him a laughingstock to the Russian people and the rest of the world. Within months of the

June 2023 mutiny, there was the unexplained death of Wagner's military stalwart and boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, when his plane crashed and exploded on 23 August 2023, killing all passengers on board (Yeung & Said-Moorhouse 2023). Russian investigation authorities revealed in October 2023 that the death of the Wagner boss's crashed plane showed fragments of hand grenades found in the remains among the dead (Knight & John 2023). The death of Wagner's boss came as a huge blow to Africa's West African states, particularly Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where Wagner operated extensively, resulting in these African countries expelling UN and France's troops from its countries – while also staging several military coups (Beta 2023).

Undoubtedly, France, the US, and China have their agendas and ideas of how peace and security should evolve in Africa, with major in-fighting among the three powers. The US has been proactively anticipating China's engagement with Africa, particularly since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. Since then, and with increased intensity, the US has closely monitored how China will interact with Africa during this conflict. Hence, in December 2022, US President Joe Biden invited the AU to join the Group of Twenty (G20) states as the representative of its 55 member states – a move to counter China's influence on Africa (Abutaleb 2022). On 9 September 2023, the AU was formally admitted to the G20 as a full member (Mothata 2023).

The Africa Group, as the largest bloc at the UN, has been an important platform through which African states have coordinated their positions and tried to influence decisions on the world body. Africa has created strong relations with the UN, which could be beneficial to advancing the UN's 2018 reform processes and forging stronger multilateral engagement. Ismail (2023) maintains that one of Africa's superpowers, South Africa, has strong relations with China and Russia, particularly as a member of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) Plus Six. Moreover, of the 16 UN peacekeeping operations globally, half are in Africa, such as MINUSCA, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). However, in June 2023, MINUSMA was forced out of Mali by its new military

guard since the regime change happened there (UN News 2023). The UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUSCO) was similarly asked to leave in September 2023 by DRC president Felix Tshisekedi, after a 20-year failure to rein in the rebel groups primarily operating in the Ituri region (Princewill 2023).

The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) were established (UNMISS 2023). Oil matters to the US and China business industries in the two Sudans and oil-rich Abyei region; thus, such missions were given an extended mandate under the banner of civilian protection (United Nations 2023). Somalia continues to host the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), both mandated in 2020. However, these mandates are not primarily focused on addressing the humanitarian needs of Somalians – who face dire conditions, with a child admitted to a hospital every minute (UNICEF 2022). Instead, the extended mandate aims to combat terrorism, particularly to curb the economic expansion of Al-Shabaab and other rebel groups. This effort is crucial for maintaining global economic stability, especially for superpowers whose economic interests are at stake (UN 2023a).

Chapter Hypothesis and Theories

This presentation, therefore, claims that, through a neorealist security convergence critique, Africa's peacekeeping has been infused with mineral and agricultural wealth, whereby superpowers have had as their principal gain and self-interest portrayed a dominant mercantilist approach by which they set the rules of the game (Nagar 2020; Yates 2018). A neo-imperialist critique: superpowers have used the security stage to perpetuate neocolonial domination for their geopolitical parochial interests. Thus, under the banner of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction, major parochial economic interests lie at the heart of overt conflicts, which have exacerbated wars in Africa's resource-rich, conflict-ridden states.

A neoclassical economics convergence critique is that Africa's political economy is transformed through imperialist regionalism played out in Africa's economic trade relations, consumed in Africa's regional security architecture. A neorealist security convergence critique is of the coming together of peace and security efforts of powerful state actors largely in Africa. The flip side of the neorealist security convergence critique is strongly forged in a pan-African economic convergence critique. The central argument of this critique is that the scope of trade conducted under AfCFTA, encompassing its 55 member states and nearly universal signatory participation, will foster economic convergence. This is expected to establish the necessary conditions and provide greater leverage for enhancing intra-continental and regional trade. Such convergence efforts will exponentially build socio-economic development toward achieving the ideals of Agenda 2063; such moves will also in turn create greater security gains.

In considering the past and present rules of engagement between the AU and the UN, security has been infused in economic agreements between them in the hope of achieving greater peace and security, and for timeous implementation of UN mandates and resolutions. Given the slow pace of executing peacekeeping mandates, several genocides have occurred in Africa and a tidal wave of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in dire need of humanitarian aid and survival has transpired. The Great Lakes Region witnessed a spate of civil wars and genocides in Rwanda in 1961 (300 000 people died) and again in Rwanda in 1994 (800 000 people died). Burundi experienced recurrent civil wars and deaths: in 1966 (3 000 deaths), 1972 (300 000 deaths), 1988 (150 000 deaths), and between 1993 and 2005 (300 000 deaths). The conflict in Sudan has led to about 300 000 deaths. During these killings, the French, British, US, Russian, and Chinese business monopolies progressed steadily. The UN's Global Peace Charter was fully operationalised in 1945, and African member states became members of this Charter, as they began gaining independence from colonial masters in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Despite the wars, Burundi only received its first UN peacekeeping mission intervention in 2004 for 12 months, with an insignificant brigade size provided for that country. Meanwhile, in the diamond- and coltan-rich DRC, the UN has been involved since 1960 (from three weeks into the country's independence) and have remained involved, in some way or another, with heavy artillery. Therefore, a pan-African economic convergence critique claims that trade can only be enhanced to the extent that Africa's states commit to a continental security and governance architecture. It is within this securitisation and within such incentives that will irrevocably boost trade, improve security, and rout out terrorism and transnational crime, while substantially improving socio-economic human capital development-led growth, particularly for Africa's youth and women.

In further support of these arguments, notably at the centenary of the First World War, UN Secretary-general António Guterres indicated that "it took a second global cataclysm to trigger the multilateral arrangements that exist today" (UN News 2018). Thus, in strengthening multilateralism, further efforts were orchestrated – where 120 countries expressed their commitment to create a more effective global village (UN News 2017). In this light, these countries institutionalised UN reform processes, which began implementation in earnest in 2019 with a major focus on: i) development system reform; ii) management; and iii) peace and security. The secretary-general's Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative serves as a guide to the AU and takes stock of Africa's AU Peace and Security Council, and its AU African Governance Architecture (AGA).

The African Peace and Security Architecture: A Formidable Player in Africa's Peace and Security Efforts

Over the past decades, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has grown in leaps and bounds. Evidently, with continuous regional threats of terrorist extremism, Africa's regional brigades are moving toward the forefront in prioritising regional security and creating the G5 Sahel Force. Regardless of its limited

resources, the regional security framework has attempted in every possible way to find the means to intervene in conflict regions and intra-state hostilities when necessary, while nudging the UN to come on board and fulfil its responsibility of maintaining world peace. Moreover, APSA gains further support in the modalities provided in Agenda 2063. Notably, Agenda 2063 enunciates in its Aspiration 4 Goals 1–3 respectively: “a peaceful and secure Africa [actively promoting the silencing of all guns in the continent]”, “a stable and peaceful Africa [that strengthens mechanisms for securing peace and reconciliation at all levels [...]]”, and “a fully functional and operational APSA” (AU n.d.).

In March 2021, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) again urged and stressed the need for burden-sharing, with adequate UN finances timeously executed to achieve real gains in Africa’s security challenges (AU PSC 2021). Africa has thus, through its regional brigades, and through the AU PSC, become a formidable player in executing peace and security in the African continent.² The most important takeaway of this chapter is that the AU should never sit idly watching continental inequalities or waiting on the UN to respond in case of the urgency of passing security resolutions.

The Fisher report culminated in the APSA implementation roadmap of 2011–2013. As noted by AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Chergui, APSA is particularly renowned for designing and implementing

conflict early warning systems; strengthened institutions, preventive diplomacy capabilities and the planning and conduct of its peace and security operations (PSOs); set out to operationalise the African Standby Force (ASF) by providing the ASF at [African] Union and regional economic

2 As articulated in the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, Article 13 relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 2002, and Article 18, which relates to the Policy Framework on the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee of 2004, which acts under Articles 4(h) and (j) of the 2002 AU Constitutive Act, to promote, respect and deploy peace support missions and interventions timeously.

communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) level with the required staff, training and tools to do their work effectively (APSA, 2015:14).

The major goal of these efforts is to make the 40 000 ASF Continental Brigade more visible.

The 2016–2020 APSA Roadmap again sets out key priorities and objectives to be strengthened and reinforced for its RECs/RMs and the AU to implement as guided under the main APSA pillars, which include: 1) the Peace and Security Council; 2) the Panel of the Wise; 3) the ASF; 4) the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); and 5) the Peace Fund. The 2016–2020 APSA Roadmap also addresses 15 key issues to be implemented and strengthened in their co-ordination efforts among the RECs/RMs, including:

1. the AU's strategic partnerships on peace and security with RECs/RMs, with the UN and the EU;
2. mediation and preventive diplomacy;
3. gender, peace, and security;
4. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR);
5. security sector reform (SSR);
6. maritime safety and security;
7. counter-terrorism;
8. climate change and security;
9. the AU Border Programme;
10. post-conflict reconstruction and development;
11. the AU Liaison Offices in conflict and post-conflict countries;
12. engagement with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs);
13. donor assistance to APSA;
14. the RECs and RMs' capacity-building needs for the operationalisation of APSA; and
15. the APSA Roadmap.

The P5 members have the power to inculcate a socio-economic development-led model in Africa's peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction mandates and support AU efforts. The P5 member states must use their trade agreements with Africa, and their powerful agricultural and mineral conglomerates operating in Africa's resource-rich, conflict-ridden states, to

benefit Africa's socio-economic underdevelopment much more effectively. Unless this happens, Africa will remain conflict-ridden and socio-economically deprived, regardless of how many trade partnerships are signed and peacekeeping mandates authorised. Deprivation of basic human needs has been exacerbated over 60 years since the African continent achieved independence and has only bred conflict and slow economic growth.

The African Union Redefining its Position of Power: Economics Trumps Security

The AU is in a very strong position today and its work is evident in the creation and reform of its internal institutions and the structures of APSA. It has made progress since 2002, when it evolved from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, the AU must adopt a realist approach for itself and put the continent first. Is the continental body giving away too much? In November 2020, the US, Europe, and Africa created a single Army Service Component Command (ASCC) with 41 000 US soldiers dispatched around the world, including to Africa. The major mission of the ASCC is to provide combat-ready and credible land forces to defeat aggression in Europe and Africa, which builds on a multinational military interoperability and capacity-building approach to fighting terrorism and extremism (Allen 2016).

Somalia is currently engaged in a protracted battle against Al-Shabaab, grappling with persistent security challenges. Meanwhile, key permanent members of the UNSC, including the US, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), are heavily focused on the conflict in Ukraine. Since February 2022, these nations have prioritised raising \$200 billion for Ukraine's humanitarian needs and consistently supplying billions of dollars in weapons to support its war efforts against Russia. Ironically, each minute of the day one child is dying of malnutrition in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa. In October 2023, the US was again at the forefront alongside the UK and France in providing huge military support to Israel in their fight against Hamas in Palestine, and trying to curb any Islamic states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, in strengthening the Palestinian position.

The P5 is fighting for, and more concentrated on, dealing with a 'rich man's war'. Ethiopia and the Tigray peoples were at war for several years, while the violent conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues to claim the lives of both the civilian population and combatants. Africa has instead joined forces with the creation of a single Army Service Component Command with the US and did so in the absence of a continental force. Under the auspices of the AU, Africa's strong high-level political actors eventually managed to mediate between the conflict parties – the Ethiopian government and the Tigray leaders. This led to the signing of the peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and the people of Tigray in November 2022 (Dahir 2022). But is this enough to hold the peace? These efforts are important, but equally important is Africa's brigade readiness for the implementation of effective post-conflict reconstruction models, and early warning mechanisms that can intervene promptly when necessary and support economic development in conflict-ridden states.

The UN's involvement in Africa has much more to do with economics than security. Since Belgium's footprint in the DRC, Africa at large became a main attraction to the P5, with the UK's mining interests, specifically its Tullow offshore oilfields, and the French uranium exploration multinational company, Areva, leaving Africa's people destitute and impoverished. Africa currently has the most under-developed countries in the world. Africa's conflict zones are also all major agricultural and mineral-resource rich, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, Libya, and Angola. Indeed, Algeria's oil has been very strategically important and Abyei has the largest oil field size in Africa at 48 388 square kilometres. According to Shapland (2020), similarly, other resource-rich states include Namibia (diamonds) and Mali (uranium and cotton farms), while the Great Lakes states are rich in 3Ts (Tungsten, Tin, and Tantalum), diamonds, gold, copper, and cobalt (also a critical contribution to Elon Musk's all-electric cars, with cobalt deals signed with UK's Switzerland-based Glencore). Africa has important mineral resources, which have attracted interests from global powers and foreign multinational

corporations. Below is a list of a few African countries with mineral resources:

1. South Africa and Zimbabwe: coal, diamond, gold, platinum, and sugar
2. Somalia: oil, coal, and leather
3. Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire: palm oil, rubber, and cocoa
4. Burundi, Kenya, and Ethiopia: coffee
5. Morocco: fertilizer
6. Western Sahara: phosphoric acid and natural petroleum gas

Most external concessions in agriculture and minerals involve Africa's governments signing huge deals with conglomerates from France, the UK, China, the US, and Russia. However, there has been no trickling down of endogenous economic growth³ into African communities, particularly in Africa's conflict-ridden countries, to meet peace and security efforts and towards socio-economic development and growth as aligned with the AU's Agenda 2063 targets.

Building Human Capital Development Endogenous Economic Growth Models to Defy Human Insecurity

About 160 to 200 million youth are unemployed in Africa. Thus, idleness is moving youth to join rebel groups, as seen with Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and a surge of drug and human trafficking syndicates, amid a myriad of insecurity issues across the continent. This unemployment has led youth to view terrorist extremism activities as a huge attraction to sustain themselves and their families, including the deployment of child soldiers, among others. Similarly, the Corona-2019 (COVID-19) virus setbacks affected 253 million youth in the African continent, with great losses experienced in learning in 2020, owing to the lack of internet connectivity in the African continent. On the other hand, the AU and the World Bank estimate that by 2050, half of Africa's population will be under 25 years old. The World Bank's 2022 overview of Sub-Saharan Africa also highlights greater

3 See discussion on endogenous economic growth theories by Nagar in her PhD thesis and book volume, *The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration in Africa*, Chapters 1 and 2, 2015/2016.

economic growth potential in 2023 and 2024 – projected at 3.9–4.2% growth rates, respectively. Africa’s technology sector is also booming, and technological needs in hardware could double from US\$200 billion in 2019 to US\$400 billion by 2025.

Africa’s huge technological gap and value-driven youth model bring hope to the continent with strong opportunities, if correctly harnessed. Currently, the youth represent about 60% of Africa’s current population of 1.4 billion people, as noted earlier. They could be upskilled and capacitated to provide an upward growth trajectory for Africa over the next 50 years, thereby significantly reducing their involvement in transnational crime. The AU should not sit idly by and watch this huge youth unemployment bulge in Africa, but view these issues as huge windows of opportunity if harnessed correctly, through creating tighter policy implementation instruments at national and regional levels.

The AU has prioritised investment in youth and has devised critical instruments for its member states such as the AU Roadmap of Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments in Youth, the African Plan of Action for Youth Empowerment (APAYE) 2019–2023, and the 1 Million by 2021 framework, which are all platforms and critical instruments for governments to implement and tackle youth unemployment and unleash their potential. The AU’s Science Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA) 2024 was also established to impact science and technology across critical continental sectors such as agriculture, energy, environment, health, and infrastructure development. Hence, the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR/4.0) era is a huge incentive for Africa, with the major percentage of the continent’s youth under the age of 35. While the continent has been categorised as a technologically deprived continent, this provides huge potential to turn the tide around and convert its insecurity to human capital development.

Nevertheless, Africa’s resource-rich DRC has remained economically poor and is not able to combat poverty. Africa holds 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, 12% of the world’s

oil deposits, and 8% of the world's natural gas reserves.⁴ The continent accounts for 90% of global chromium and platinum, and the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds, and uranium in the world, but lacks the technology to achieve value-additions. In 2021, for example, of the 1.5 billion smartphones sold globally, all of their parts, particularly cobalt, were from Africa. However, the DRC, Africa's major cobalt hub, remains poverty-stricken, with thousands of children used as child slaves in the cobalt mines – instead of being educated in relevant education sectors. It is important to harness the transformative power of digital technology advancements, ushered in by the 4IR. This era introduces a plethora of cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and robotics, which are poised to revolutionise this industry (African Intelligence 2022). Where an African country is making gains within the 4IR era is South Africa's strong footing in the automotive industry in producing electric cars and electric busses by its key academic institution, the University of Johannesburg.

The critical components required to build the automotive industry and produce semi-conductors are, notably, gallium (found in trace amounts in zinc ores and bauxite), gallium metal (which is produced when processing bauxite to make aluminium, 80% of which is in China); and germanium (a byproduct of zinc production and from coal fly ash, with Canada, Finland, Russia, and the US being its major producers). Such initiatives in value-added manufacturing must increase throughout the African continent (Harper 2023; Reuters 2023; Naprys 2023). The missing link to creating the requisite socio-economic development models that can create wealth in the continent is digital technology education. In 2019, Africa produced almost a billion tonnes of minerals, with a market value of US\$406 billion, (Al Jazeera 2018).

The African Governance Architecture must work closely with the AfCFTA secretariat and steer Africa's governments away from potential oligopolistic ways of conducting international business. It is important to be reminded that Asia's technocrats created the Asian Miracle while world markets and economies

4 See also <https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa>

plummeted during the 1980s. It is thus right now that we need to fervently act, and together find creative and constructive solutions and leverage the technocrats that the African continent offers to address Africa's centuries-old socio-economic and human capital underdevelopment, building collaborative partnerships to benefit Africa. These matters require solid partnerships with the relevant actors, to preserve the major achievements and strides that the AU's Peace and Security Architecture and AfCFTA is trying to consolidate.

Africa's Major Conflicts and Interventions: Progress and Challenges

The security apparatus of both the AU and the UN is actively engaged across six key African regions, including:

1. the Great Lakes Region, encompassing Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda;
2. conflict areas along the borders of the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS);
3. East Africa, with a focus on Sudan, South Sudan, and Abyei;
4. the Horn of Africa, which includes Somalia and its constituent federal states: Banadir, Galmudug, HirShabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South-West;
5. Western Sahara and Morocco; and
6. the Sahel Region, comprising the G5 Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

While conflict persists in these regions, they are notably supported by the UN Security Council, the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture, the Peace Security Council, and the African Governance Architecture. These efforts have also involved peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction, aligned to socio-economic and humanitarian development-led models supported by the AU's Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Development (CPCRD).

Currently, many African countries continue to experience violent conflicts and political instability. For instance, the Sahel

region continues to face enormous insecurity, institutional governance and economic challenges, and impeding progress in achieving lasting peace and sustainable development. In a September 2019 briefing by UN Deputy Secretary-general and the Chair of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group Amina Mohammed, she noted that “solutions to the problems in the Sahel region will only be sustainable when driven by local, national and regional actors, with external partners supporting these efforts” (UNSC 2019).

Therefore, the critical support of the now defunct peacekeeping operation, MINUSMA, required a multinational mechanism to promote local conflict prevention and resolution challenges. It did not do so and was thus booted out by the Malian regime, as earlier mentioned. Further issues in the Sahel region that aggravate of conflict among herder-farmers continue unabated, owing to the threat posed by the rising climate change challenges. Support is thus imminent for the holistic implementation of Sahel’s Climate Resilience and Sustainable Agriculture Pillar, as a key strategy towards achieving sustainable livelihood prospects for the vulnerable populations of the Sahel region, including women, farmers, pastoralists, and fishermen, particularly youth. There are insufficient economic development opportunities to curb the rising tide of migration from Africa to Europe, with millions of our people dying on these seas.

The UN will need more than \$1 billion per mandate to implement these programmes and secure these resources.⁵ Similar consideration must be given to Africa as is provided to Russia and

5 The programme focuses on three key areas: improved food security and nutrition through restoration of degraded land and sustainable management of natural resources in agro-pastoral and fishing systems; efficient and diversified value chains enhancing access to profitable markets for smallholder farmers and vulnerable households; and enhanced resilience of livelihoods through de-risking instruments, disaster risk reduction practices, and integrated food security and nutrition programmes that will make it possible to transform economies positively, improve the living conditions of the population, and give hope to young people. Fully developed initiatives within the Support Plan on the Sahel have been activated in key areas such as governance, energy, sustainable agriculture, and resilience (See, UNSC 2019).

Ukraine's war, and the latest Israel–Palestine (Hamas) war of October 2023. As the UN secretary-general highlighted in 2019 already, implementation of UN reform modalities that guarantee the required equality of peace operations ought to include humanitarian efforts, and are to be considered as the world moves forward to efforts in achieving sustainable development.

A coherent strategy and co-ordination efforts among the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), ECCAS, and the AU could strengthen responses to Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that remain strongly rooted in this region (United Nations 2019). Moreover, counter-terrorism strategies cannot be tackled through enforcement only, but require a holistic approach to identify drivers and enablers of violent extremism. Thus, hard power must be combined with soft power for sustainable peace in the Sahel region. In this regard, the EU is committed to forging a stronger partnership with Africa, and explicitly defining future modalities of co-operation described in its international co-operation initiative ("Article X"), outlining multilateralism and global governance as its key principle to promote international dialogue, with the UN at its core. The EU seeks effective solutions through partnerships to ensure peace, security, prosperity, and sustainable development for all, and to protect human rights (Immerkamp *et al* 2019:5).

In the G5 Sahel countries, the UNSC welcomed the co-operation of UNOCA with the UNOWAS, ECCAS, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Aside from peacekeeping and other efforts to resolve political crises, as seen in the Sahel region, UNOCA is also attempting to factor in how to develop long-term strategies for CAR's government to respond to climate change, ecological and natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity. Partnerships and a clear division of labour to rally regional support for peace processes in CAR are critical. Thus, close collaboration efforts between UNOCA and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in CAR could further strengthen the Central African region.

Southern Africa remains poverty-stricken, but houses Angola, which remains Africa's second-largest oil-producing country (after Nigeria). While the oil- and gas-rich Mozambique is infested with terrorism and extremism, the government is side-stepping regional military deployment and eventually agreed to the deployment of the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADC BRIG). In East Africa, apart from the ongoing violent conflict between the RSF and the SAF, the region could experience peace if socio-economic models are considered in countries like Sudan. At the root of most conflicts in Africa are socio-economic challenges. Thus, there must be a focus on agriculture and water resources and those that move beyond the sole reliance on liquid gold (oil), which the country has an abundance of. South Sudan and Abyei are yet to find common ground in defining the oil fields and similarly enact strong agricultural resource infrastructure for its farming communities, as well as iron out autonomy for the people of Abyei, which has been happening since 2011 when South Sudan became Africa's newest independent country.

The Horn of Africa, notably the Somali federal states, was battled with political power struggles in its 2021 elections, owing to its oil-rich areas amid extreme terrorism, insecurity, and regional instability, with pre- and post-election reality continuing to spike violence. The government's deficits of extreme poverty and lack of development have perpetuated armed violence and extremism. While Western Sahara and Morocco are similarly not able to meet the sustainable development goals (SDGs) target, since these countries are the wealthiest phosphate-rich globally, these regions are not able to address poverty or find peace. Moreover, internally displaced persons have been living in camps for over four decades, with thousands of Sahrawi people living in abject poverty within these camps for over 40 years under atrocious conditions. The economics of UN post-conflict reconstruction efforts of over 60 years in Africa are not bearing the required fruits (Nagar 2022).

Stronger multilateral organisations must be forged to address the illicit exploitation of natural resources. Central Africa received praise from the UNSC in September 2019 specifically for the role of the UNOCA. The UN regional office has been able to

facilitate inclusive political dialogue in non-mission settings such as Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Príncipe, consolidating peace, resolving tensions, and preventing or mitigating political crises (UN 2019a). For missions to work coherently and build sustainable peace and security within a region that provides socio-economic growth, what is required is good co-ordination between national governments, regional organisations, and the UN. They require closer co-ordination, as was the case between UNOCA and the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-general for Burundi. However, the situation is still very delicate, as UNOCA is still pressed with finding solutions to the humanitarian crises in Cameroon, where the presence of Boko Haram insurgents and deadly clashes between pastoralists and farmers have threatened regional security.

To support Africa's implementation strategies, the AU must lean more heavily on the experience of the EU parliament, which has a well-established Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR), and sharing information and data, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms, within AU operational frameworks, (Immerknamp 2019). The EU supports financing for co-operation with third countries through its Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP).⁶

AU's Post-conflict Reconstruction Model

The politics of Africa's governments must tightly match policy rhetoric with policy implementation and follow through. Such efforts will create a greater ability to move Africa's peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts exponentially forward, such that inculcating a robust post-conflict reconstruction model is

6 EU Policies, "The Fight Against Terrorism" 2019. The European Union has been a strong supporter of the UN and is a major contributor to the UN's budget of 32% in 2017 and regularly, EU member states' contributions represent 30% of the UN budget. Similarly, the EU is increasing its humanitarian aid and crisis response under its EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) budget.

possible. This model must draw on a multilateral approach, which includes harnessing the potential of Africa's critical economic and trade pillar – the AfCFTA Secretariat – and working much more robustly with the UN SDGs' department, the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Women, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and the relevant local and international business communities (agricultural and mineral resources in both land and oceans, and mining agencies). This is to introduce coherent socio-economic policies specifically for mega conglomerates' roles and responsibilities, operating in Africa's conflict-ridden states and defining such policies within peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction mandates.

There are currently 500 million people globally (including in Africa) living in areas that experience desertification affected by climate change. According to the 2019 report by the UN International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the impact of the rise in global temperatures is linked to increasing pressures on fertile soil, which risks food security for the planet. Based on the World Economic Forum's 2019 global risks report, environmental risks accounted for three of the top five risks (economic vulnerabilities; geopolitical tensions; societal and political strains; environmental fragilities; and technological instabilities) by likelihood, and four by impact, owing to extreme weather and failure of environmental policy implementation (World Economic Forum 2019). The affordability of flood resilience and natural disasters is an increasingly important issue.

There is thus a need for a robust risk financing strategy to fund both investment in adaptation and funds for recovery when climatic disasters occur. Recent cases in point are the DRC's volcanic eruption of Mount Nyiragongo in Goma on 22 May 2021, which killed 30 people and displaced 400 000 more people, and the devastating earthquake in Morocco's Atlas Mountains in September 2023 (World Economic Forum 2019; UN News

2021). Africa had similarly battled to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic with Africa's national militaries and police guards, lacking adequate training and implementation strategies to address and deal with the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted an urgency for a more robust multilateral partnership to address health and humanitarian crises through, for example, deploying national military and police guards that are effectively trained for more effective support of national humanitarian aid efforts.

There is also a lack of effective institutional templates to deal with climate challenges at national and regional levels. As noted above, Africa has become a continent under an enormous threat, with increased terrorist extremism, piracy, drug and human trafficking, and money laundering. These threats require well-equipped national and regional police and military forces to combat crime, terrorism, and extremism – which cannot be addressed or subsumed within peacekeeping mandates. It is therefore important for the stakeholders in Africa's peace and security mandates to partner with non-state actors, particularly civil society organisations, for a multidimensional approach to securing the continent and its people.

APSA must divvy its frameworks and involve the AGA more fervently to concentrate on, and work with Europe in, particular areas, such as combatting crime and terrorism, and money laundering. Economic losses of close to US\$1.8 billion in 2018 alone were owing to piracy, particularly off Somalia's coast. The AU PSC's focus and attention must lean much more heavily on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is also equally important that international organisations such as the EU's external assistance programme assess how to improve their support for Africa's national military bases in dealing with piracy issues, and particularly in equipping Africa's police force in training and development. This becomes important to effectively deal with human and drug trafficking, as well as bribery and corruption, in Africa's 100 ports, which handle major shipment containers.

Support provided and political dialogues facilitated by UN agencies and the EU between governments, opposition

leaders, and vigilante groups (in some instances) could greatly assist in achieving peaceful pre- and post-election processes. Therefore, there is a need for well-funded initiatives aligned to national governments' National Development Plans (NDPs) supported by the African Union's AGA in their Planning Element and Implementation Model, underpinned by strong endogenous economic growth models. Such models must consider policy approaches that address conglomerates' roles and responsibilities operating in Africa's conflict-ridden states, with the view to address the lack of real opportunity that breeds and feeds despair. Furthermore, it must similarly address respect for upholding human rights, preventing conflicts, addressing fragility, strengthening state institutions and civil society organisations; building durable peace, and promoting sustainable development to tackle issues of poverty, education, and inequality (UN 2015).

African Governance Architecture: Human Capital Development Framework

Also at the heart of Africa's conflicts are resource greed for oil, minerals, and agricultural concessions, with international conglomerates of these powerful P5 governments. These foreign multinational corporations do not have effective and adequate endogenous economic growth models being implemented in the countries in which they operate. Hence, there is simply no adequate socio-economic development model for Africa's people, the majority of whom remain poor and prone to conflict. This is exacerbated owing to the ongoing intra-state in-fighting and inter-state conflict with several spoilers of lawlessness, greed, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism, among others. Indeed, the list is endless— and none of the parties show regard for life.

As geopolitical tensions and competition over scarce resources in Africa intensify, the alignment of shared values and marked differences in interpretation and implementation can fragment the attempt to strengthen policy approaches in advancing the responsiveness of multilateral institutions. Multilateralism can be weakened in several ways, such as

states withdrawing from agreements and their memberships of international institutions or abstaining from participating in block consensus in support of norms and rules. Trade is arguably the most played-out arena in the global world. But one may ask: Why do states co-operate? A win-win solution must replace the current zero-sum approach to global economic engagement. For African countries, particularly the least developed countries (LDCs), producing value-added goods with tangible technological trickle-down effects in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) era is critical. Without reducing reliance on raw material exports and manufactured imports, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and addressing pressing issues like youth unemployment – which fuels vulnerability to violence, conflict, and risky migration – will remain unlikely.

The EU, the UK, and the US exhibit reluctance to embrace African Black populations, implementing stringent immigration laws and policies. The West capitalises on this stance, leveraging it to advocate for increased monetary allocations, burdening their economies, and using it as a pretext for border security. But when Ukrainians entered the UK, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's administration embraced the Whiteness with good humanitarian aid, including housing. There were no barges being built in the UK's harbours, as is the case in 2023 for Black African migrants. Clearly, racism remains deeply entrenched in the world against Africa – it is only Africa's resources that matter, and not its people. Indeed, nothing has changed for centuries. The only way that things could change is if Africa's leaders experience a psychological paradigm shift that shows them that the master/slave mentality is still very much at play in the world. America's Joe Biden, for example, took a U-turn and abandoned his original narrative about migration and in 2023 is in cahoots with the previous Donald Trump administration's thinking and building a wall to keep Mexicans out.

The value that migration brings is enormous in terms of skills, academic degrees, and others, but this does not matter to Germany, which also joined the US and UK bandwagon and staged mass protests in October 2023 against African migration. Africa's governments must now accept the fundamental fact that they are

not wanted by Europe, the UK, and the US. The West only want Africa's minerals, cheap labour, and agricultural resources that matter to the West. Such resources are further aligned to cheap and non-sensical trade policies, which are further sowing division among Africa's states as they compete for these cheap agricultural deals. Africans seem to have forgotten their roots and handed their economic growth and birthrights consciously, through African governments, for a 'bowl of lentil soup' (Nagar 2018).

Concluding Remarks

The chapter concludes by maintaining that the relationship between the West and Africa highlights the fact that the realism of powerful economies trumps economic wealth aligned to schizophrenia, double standards, and a 'spaghetti bowl' of confusion. The continent's issues have been complicated by the outbreak of COVID-19 and its socio-economic implications. Thus, the COVID-19 lockdowns have underscored the pressing need for African economies to accelerate technological innovation, integrating regional technologies with robust research and development to enhance global competitiveness and value addition. This endeavour aims to uplift Africa from poverty, ultimately reducing insecurity by bolstering peace and security efforts.

Despite the continent's resource, mineral, and agricultural wealth sectors, the continent is unable to produce value-driven agricultural and mineral commodities, nor to feed itself. Africa has strongly engaged multilaterally and signed several cheap economic trade agreements with global actors, notably Europe's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These agreements were signed with both African states and regions including the SADC-EPA, the Eastern and Southern Africa-EPA, the EU-Cameroon EPA, the EU-Côte d'Ivoire EPA, the EU-Ghana EPA (European Commission n.d.),⁷ the Central Africa EPA, the West Africa-EPA, and the East African Community (EAC)-EPA. Similarly, the US has unilateral trade agreements with many African countries,

7 These agreements do not promote migration governance between Europe and Africa.

such as phosphate (fertiliser) trade with Morocco, as well as trade agreements through the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) agreement, which it signed with several African countries, including Kenya, Namibia, and Uganda.

Beijing, on its part, has the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), enhanced through its Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) agreement, to boost Africa's special economic zones (FOCAC 2018). Trade partnerships are critical to economic growth, but their implementation should not mean a zero-sum game. This approach is crucial to prevent Africa from remaining at the periphery of peripheral economies and instead enable it to fully participate and thrive within the global economic landscape. These elaborate trade agreements can cause much trade diversion and poverty, and lead to huge insecurity, which may become a threat against peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. Therefore, it cannot run on separate tracks, but APSA must work to forge a strong partnership between its African Governance Architecture and the AfCFTA Secretariat so that Africa's smaller economies can gain from the economic growth (Nagar 2020). Moreover, trade being conducted in conflict-ridden states has to consider how to implement a coherent policy that takes into account the implementation of the UN 2018 reform agenda of addressing peace and security efforts, but also meets the AU Agenda 2063 and Global 2030 SDGs.

These open-ended, multilateral agreements between the AU's 55 member states and the powerful five economies of the P5 member states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the US) have been riding on the backs of Africa's 1.4 billion people and consciously created economic wealth, prosperity, and security for the economies of these most important global players at the expense of Africa's socio-economic and political development and sustainable development. The prioritisation of Africa's Agenda 2063, being geographic by nature, spanning over 55 countries, and driven through a region-building and regional integration approach, seems lagging behind the first ten-year targets that are stifled by several inhibitions. This backslide is also noted by the recent and ongoing Mo Ibrahim Foundation assessments and reports of Agendas 2063 and 2030, and they ask: Is Africa on

track? Well, it is not. Africa's Gini coefficient levels are relatively high compared to the rest of the world, totalling 193 million of 1.4 billion people as the working poor – earning less than US\$2 a day, with a total of 39% to 46% of people living in abject poverty, the highest in the world, and youth and women are largely affected (Bhorat & Tarp 2016; Rodrik 2018; McMillan & Rodrick 2011; Bhorat & Steenkamp 2018).

As New York's Wall Street Journal writer and financial market analyst Chris Skinner notes:

This is the one thing I believe the digital revolution will deliver: the right for everyone to have the opportunity to have a good life. That will create a better, more peaceful and more sustainable planet, as well as the thoughts of Jack Ma [Alibaba, Chief Executive Officer]. [...] technology is creating a democrati[s]ed planet where a basic right is to have a legal identity and the opportunity to trade, pay and network through the mobile network. That is definitely a better world than any we have seen before” (Skinner 2018).

While all these phenomenal instruments should facilitate an easy metamorphosis into wealth generation, and bring youth out of poverty and insecurity, the African continent remains trapped in abject poverty. The AU must urgently enhance its internal building blocks and become more committed to its people. The AU must invest fewer resources and energy in their quest to reform the UNSC. However, if the organisation wants to pursue the path of UNSC reform, it must be ready to navigate the complex relations of the P5, given the protracted nature of the division among the UNSC members since its creation in 1945. The AU member states must seriously reflect on this and rather focus on trade, economics, and security with the P5 members, important partners such as India and the UAE, and other non-permanent members.

The AU must refrain its member states from hegemonic – regional and inter-state – divisions and rivalry around who is best suited to serve on the two-year stints of non-permanent membership of the UNSC. This is, in my view, a no-brainer, which is only sowing division within the AU. That is why these forums

and additional bodies were created. They were created with neocolonial, neoimperialist, and capitalist agendas, which has been a pattern without any fundamental changes. These forums have only succeeded in wasting vast resources – human capacity and energy – by sowing division among states. This is evident within the G4: Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, as revealed in Bjarke Zink Winther's⁸ work 'Reforming the UNSC: Increasing Equality in the International Arena'. Hence division between Brazil and its Latin American countries has expanded, while Pakistan does not recognise India as a member of the UNSC. China will continue to use its veto power within the UNSC to deny Japan's quest for membership, given the recent and ongoing geopolitical tensions between the two. Spain and Italy have also opposed Germany's position in the Council. Hence, the real reason for this two-year stint created for non-permanent membership and the intergovernmental negotiations about reform – the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) – are mechanisms designed to create greater divergence and derailment. For the AU, confusion, schizophrenia, and double standards are all at play – with the notions of realism at its best.

References

- Abutaleb, Y. (2022). "Biden to call for African Union to permanently join G-20: Move comes as US seeks to engage Africa on climate and Ukraine and to counter China's influence". *The Washington Post*, 9 December. Available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/09/biden-african-nations-join-g20/>.
- Africa Intelligence. (2022). "DRC Appeal Launched in US over Child Labour in Cobalt Mines Case". 21 January. Available at <https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2022/01/21/appeal-launched-in-us-over-child-labour-in-cobalt-mines-case,109718225-bre>.
- Al Jazeera. (2018). "Mapping Africa's Natural Resources". 15 February. Available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources/>.

8 He is at Georgetown University of International Affairs.

African Union and Agenda 2063

- Allen, N.D.F. (2016). "U.S. Military Assistance to Africa Is Growing. But Is It Succeeding?". *World Politics Review*, 23 September. Available at <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding/>.
- APSA. (2015). "African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016–2020". Addis Ababa. Available at <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf>.
- AU PSC. (2021). "PSC/MIN/COMM.(CMLXXXVI), 986th Meeting, 18 March, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1–4". Available at https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/bitstream/handle/123456789/163/986.comm.18.03.2021_en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
- AU. (n.d.). "Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want". Available at <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview>.
- Beta, F. (2023). "Niger coup: List of recent military takeovers in West and Central Africa". *Reuters*, 27 July. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/recent-coups-west-central-africa-2023-07-26/>.
- Bhorat, H. & Steenkamp, F. (2018). "Foresight Africa Viewpoint – Manufacturing Complexity in Africa". *Brookings*, 5 February. Available at <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/foresight-africa-viewpoint-manufacturing-complexity-in-africa/>.
- Bhorat, H. & Tarp, F. (2016). "The Pursuit of Long-Run Economic Growth in Africa: An Overview of Key Challenges". In Bhorat, H. & Tarp, F. (eds). *Africa's Lions: Growth Traps and Opportunities for Six Economies*. Washington DC: Brookings Press. pp. 1–36.
- Dahir, A.L. (2022). "Details in Ethiopia's Peace Deal Reveal Clear Winners and Losers". *New York Times*, 3 November. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/03/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-civil-war-agreement.html>.
- European Commission. (n.d.). "Economic Partnerships". Available at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/development-and-sustainability/economic-partnerships_en.
- European Parliament. (2019). "United Nations Reform" February. Available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635517/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)635517_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635517/EPRS_BRI(2019)635517_EN.pdf).

- FOCAC. (2018). "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)". 21 August. Available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/201809/t20180912_7933578.htm.
- Harper, G.D. (2023). "China's Gallium and Germanium Controls: What they mean and what could happen next". *The Conversation*, 7 July. Available at <https://theconversation.com/chinas-gallium-and-germanium-controls-what-they-mean-and-what-could-happen-next-209156>.
- Immernkamp, B., Sgueo G. & Voronove, S. (2019). „The Fight Against Terrorism”. European Parliament, June. Available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635561/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)635561_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635561/EPRS_BRI(2019)635561_EN.pdf).
- IPCC. (2019). "Land is a Critical Resource". *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 8 August. Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/Pr_SRCL.pdf.
- Ismail, S. (2023). "'A wall of BRICS': The Significance of Adding Six New Members to the Bloc". *Al Jazeera*, 24 August. Available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/24/analysis-wall-of-brics-the-significance-of-adding-six-new-members>.
- Knight, M. & John, T. (2023). "Putin says 'Fragments of Hand Grenades' Found in Remains of Dead on Wagner boss's Crashed Plane". *CNN World*, 6 October. Available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/05/europe/russia-vladimir-putin-prigozhin-plane-intl/index.html>.
- McMillan, M.S. & Rodrik, D. (2011). "Globalization, structural change and productivity growth". (No. w17143). National Bureau of Economic Research. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w17143>
- Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. (2020). "The head of the Defence Ministry of the Central African Republic thanked Russia for its support and assistance". 23 August. Available at https://eng.mil.ru/en/news__page/country/more.htm?id=12309136@egNews&_print=true.
- Mothata, W. (2023). "AU officially admitted as Permanent Member of the G20". *SABC News*, 9 September. Available at <https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/au-officially-admitted-as-permanent-member-of-the-g20/>.

- Nagar, D.I. (2016). *The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration in Africa: A Comparative Study of COMESA and SADC, 1980-2015*. Doctoral Dissertation. University of the Witwatersrand.
- Nagar, D.I. (2018). "Conclusion". In Nagar, D. & Mutasa, C. (eds). *Africa and the World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62590-4>
- Nagar, D.I. (2020). *Politics and Pan-Africanism: Diplomacy, Regional Economies and Peace-building in Contemporary Africa*. Bloomsbury Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.5040/9781788318754>
- Nagar, D.I. (2022). "The United Nations Role in the Great Lakes Region: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo". In *Challenging the United Nations Peace and Security Agenda in Africa*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83523-1_2
- Naprys, E. (2023). "China Melting its Leverage: Will we run out of Gallium and Germanium?". *CyberNews*, 15 November. Available at <https://cybernews.com/editorial/gallium-germanium-semiconductor-alternatives/>.
- Princewill, N. (2023). "DRC President Tshisekedi tells UN peacekeepers to leave the Country from December". *CNN News*, 21 September. Available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/africa/drc-tshisekedi-un-mission-exit-intl/index.html>.
- Reuters. (2023). "What are Gallium and Germanium and which countries are producers?". 7 July. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/where-are-strategic-materials-germanium-gallium-produced-2023-07-04/>.
- Rodrik, D. (2018). "An African Growth Miracle?". *Journal of African Economies*, 27(1), 10-27.
- Shapland, M. (2020). "Tesla and Elon Musk Sign Cobalt Deal with Glencore for Electric Car Production".
- Skinner, C. (2018). *Digital Human: The Fourth Revolution of Humanity Includes Everyone*. Asia: Marshall Cavendish International. pp. 1-327.

- Ugarte, B.S. (2014). "The Role of the UN Security Council in Africa". In Kuwali, D. & Nagar, D. (eds). *Towards a New Pax-Africana: Making, Keeping and Building Peace in Africa*, Seminar Report, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 28-30 August 2013. pp. 1-75.
- UN News. (2017). "General Assembly opens 72nd Session with focus on the World's People". 12 September. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564762>.
- UN News. (2018). "Multilateralism more vital than ever, as World War centenary looms: Security Council". 9 November. Available at, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025331>.
- UN News. (2021). "Thousands in Goma Evacuated amid Fears of further Volcanic Eruption". 28 May. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1093022>.
- UN News. (2023). "UN Security Council terminates Mali Peacekeeping Mission". 30 June. Available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138257>.
- UN. (2015). "Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2250 (2015), Urges Member States to Increase Representation of Youth in Decision-Making at All Levels". 9 December. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm>.
- UN. (2019). "Threats Still Loom large in Central Africa, despite Positive Steps in Several Countries, Secretary-General's Special Representative Tells Security Council". 4 June. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13829.doc.htm>.
- UN. (2019a). "Security Council Presidential Statement Welcomes Role of United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa in Promoting Inclusive Dialogue". 12 September. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13951.doc.htm>.
- UN. (2023). "Security Council Extends Mandate of Assistance Mission in Sudan, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2685 (2023)". 2 June. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15306.doc.htm>.
- UN. (2023a). "Security Council Speakers Highlight Somalia's Progress, But Stress Support Still Critical for Security Transition, Mission Drawdown, Looming Humanitarian Crisis". 22 June. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15332.doc.htm>.

African Union and Agenda 2063

- UN. (n.d.). "Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development". Available at <https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda>.
- UNEP. (n.d.). "Our Work in Africa, United Nations Environment Programme". Available at <https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa>.
- UNICEF. (2022). "UNICEF warns of Unprecedented Numbers of Child Deaths in Somalia". 18 October. Available at <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-warns-unprecedented-numbers-child-deaths-somalia>.
- UNMISS. (2023). Mandate, Resolution 2677 (2023), United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Available at <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/>.
- UNSC. (2019). "Evolving Situation in Sahel Requires Stronger Coordination, National Leadership, Deputy Secretary-General Says at Joint Executive Board Meeting". *UN*, 13 September. Available at <https://press.un.org/en/2019/dsgsm1321.doc.htm>.
- World Economic Forum. (2019). "The Global Risks Report 2019 14th Edition". Available at https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf.
- Yates, D.A. (2018). France and Africa. *Africa and the World: Bilateral and Multilateral International Diplomacy*, 95-118. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62590-4_5
- Yeung, J. & Said-Moorhouse, L. (2023). "What could have caused the Plane Crash that reportedly killed Wagner Warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin?". *CNN World*, 25 August. Available at <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/24/europe/prigozhin-wagner-russia-plane-crash-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html>.