Chapter Seventeen

Morbid Symptoms in the Time of Monsters

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Abstract

This chapter critically examines the role of the G20 in escalating global polycrises with particular focus on the nexus between climate change, inequality, and unsustainable development. It acknowledges Brazil's G20 Presidency in 2024 and South Africa's G20 Presidency in 2025, which advanced a progressive orientation towards solidarity, equality, and sustainability. The G20 is however confronted by the challenge of reconciling its rhetorical flourish with real transformative praxis. Empirical evidence indicates increasing greenhouse gas emissions and unfulfilled global climate change objectives thereby contradicting the G20 statements. The chapter critiques the legacy of colonial exploitation and its perpetuation through unequal international exchanges. The chapter presents voices from African and South American civil societies which demand climate reparations, just transitions, and localised solutions whilst resisting solutions imposed by the global North. Youth and women activists stress intergenerational justice and the need for inclusive decision-making. The chapter calls for systemic changes in global governance, finance, and energy systems whilst advocating for increased South-South cooperation and debt relief for African nations in particular. The chapter concludes by urging the G20 to address polycrises—climate, inequality, and debt—through transformative and

equitable strategies and tactics that objectively seek to avert ecological and social collapse.

Keywords: Contemporary Conjuncture; Ecological Precarities; Intergenerational Justice; International Political Economy; Polycrises; and Structural Inequalities.

1. Introduction

The government of the Federative Republic of Brazil assumed the presidency of the Group of Twenty countries (G20) on the 1st of December 2023. The Leader's Declaration issued at the end of their term argued that the world does not only require urgent action, but that those actions should be grounded upon socially just, environmentally sustainable and economically sound measures (Brazil, 2024). The government of the Republic of South Africa subsequently took up the leadership role on the 1st of December 2024 and incorporated the progressive advances achieved by Brazil by adopting the theme of "Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability" to define its term in the annual rotation of presidency of the G20 (RSA, 2024).

The G20 originated as a forum for the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries[1] and the European Union[2] seeking to promote strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth as an antidote to the 'Asian Financial Crisis' of 1997–1998 in 1999 (ref). World systems have subsequently experienced a number of crises including another international financial crisis triggered by the collapse of the housing market in the United States of America (USA) in 2007 – 2008, and a global health pandemic in 2020 – 2023. Whereas the last mentioned involved a biophysical viral attack on our collective species-being, the former was the result of an 'economic' contagion reflecting the social determinations of our respective political economies. Notwithstanding the fundamental differences in the two crises, both served to illustrate the interconnectedness,

1 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, United Kingdom (UK), and United States of America (USA).

2 The European Union (EU) comprises 27 member states as of 2024.

co-dependencies, and shared precarities of our contemporary world systems.

In its current incarnation, the G20 also includes the African Union[3] and ostensibly therefore agglomerates 96 countries who collectively represent: approximately 60% of the world's human population, nearly 85% of global gross domestic product, and nearly 75% of international trade in world systems as at the end of 2024 (IEJ, 2025). This brief chapter discusses climate change, digital transformation, global governance, trade and the imperative of transforming the international financial architecture for sustainable development that works for all. In pursuit of this objective, this chapter draws upon the literatures of international political economy and ecology whilst also surfacing concerns and challenges raised by civil society across both Africa and South America.

In the section following this introduction, we will briefly collate some of the biophysical characteristics defining our contemporary conjuncture. In the section thereafter, we will engage with how the inequities of our uneven, yet combined world systems are reproduced through the persistence of unequal exchanges in world trade. We will then turn to presenting some civil society and governmental perspectives from Africa and South America on the climate change where we will test the relationship between the G20 rhetorics and the realities as currently measured. The chapter will then conclude with some further critical reflections on the agendas of the G20 and their potential to redress the urgent crises experienced by the global South. Due to the word-length restrictions, the chapter reflects intensive aspects of the literatures mentioned, and readers are encouraged to explore the wider and more extensive perspectives generated by progressive activists, researchers, and scholars.

3 The African Union (AU) consists of 55 member states as of 2025.

2. Our Contemporary Conjuncture

Our contemporary conjuncture references a conceptual device which affords us an opportunity to better understand and appreciate our current context, the nexus of polycrises, and the potential for progressive transformations. We will begin with our demographic and biophysical impacts before turning to the social determination of our policy responses. Our human species now numbers approximately 8.2 billion people who are unevenly distributed across our home planet. Whilst the G20 collectively collates together nearly 78.9% of the total world population, the 19 sovereign countries are home to only approximately 56% of humanity in 2025. Our species-level success as indicated by our quantitative expansion is however not supported by the quality of life experienced by all of humanity and even within the G20 countries. A crude though verifiable indicator of the quality of life can be found in the estimates of life expectancy at birth generated by the United Nations Population Division. According to the UN data, the average life expectancy at birth for all 19 member states was 78 years (UN, 2024). This aggregation masked an immense variability ranging from Australia and Japan where people could expect to live on average for 85 years whilst surviving only until age 62 in South Africa (UN, 2024).

Whilst our longevity at a species-level has been increasing, we have also been witnessing to a significant decimation of the overall biodiversity with whom we share our home planet. We are collectively complicit and culpable for the ecocide rendered in our name whilst not equitably profiting. As noted by the UN' secretary general: "… humanity is destroying biodiversity at lightening pace, the result of pollution, climate crisis, ecosystem destruction and – ultimately – short-term interests fuelling the unsustainable use of our natural world" (UN, 2025). Due to the uneven and combined nature (sic) of development experienced by different parts of the world and especially as adduced from the diversity of economic models utilised, Isbell and 66 co-authors note that "about 30% of species have been globally threatened or driven to extinction since the year 1500" notwithstanding high statistical uncertainties ranging from

16% – 50% (Isbell et al, 2022). Their extensive survey of the literatures indicates an

> "… overwhelming consensus that global biodiversity loss will likely decrease ecosystem functioning and nature's contributions to people" and warn that "[g] lobal biodiversity loss and its impacts may be greater than previously thought, due to higher estimates provided for understudied taxa and by underrepresented experts" (Isbell et al, 2022).

Further exemplifying these facts are the series of 'World Scientists' Warning to Humanity' which was initially supported by 1,700 scientists and was first published in 1992 (Kendall et al, 1992). The most recent version of the report is subtitled: "Perilous times on planet Earth" and is currently endorsed by over 15,682 scientists located in 165 countries. (Ripple et al, 2024). The massive increase in endorsements reflects the growing scientific consensus and increasing participation of scholars studying our ecology. The current version warns that "[w]e are on the brink of an irreversible climate disaster. This is a global emergency beyond any doubt. Much of the very fabric of life on Earth is imperilled. We are stepping into a critical and unpredictable new phase of the climate crisis" (Ripple et al, 2024). These finding are even further ratified by the World Meteorological Organisation who have confirmed that

> "[t]he science is clear. We are far off track from achieving vital climate goals. The impacts of climate change and hazardous weather are reversing development gains and threatening the well-being of people and the planet. Greenhouse gases and global temperatures are at record levels. The emissions gap between aspiration and reality remains high" (WMO, 2024.).

The unsustainable trajectory upon which world systems are currently advancing are however neither surprising nor shocking. They reflect the current balance of forces in the global political economy and the international division of labour.

As argued by Stuart Hall "[a] conjuncture is a period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it a specific and distinctive shape. A conjuncture can be long or short: it's not defined by time or by simple things like a change of regime – though these have their own effects. As I see it, history moves from one conjuncture to another rather than being an evolutionary flow. And what drives it forward is usually a crisis, when the contradictions that are always at play in any historical moment are condensed, or, as Louis Althusser said, 'fuse in a ruptural unity'" (Hall & Massey, 2010: 57).

Hall had based his analysis on a critique of the political economy of Britain and specifically recognised that "[c]rises are moments of potential change, but the nature of their resolution is not given" (Hall & Massey, 2010: 57). The indeterminacy of the direction and durability of change was also acknowledged, and as noted by Hall, "[i]t may be that society moves on to another version of the same thing (Thatcher[4] to Major[5]), or to a somewhat transformed version (from Thatcher to Blair[6]); or relations can be radically transformed" (Hall & Massey, 2010: 57). It is on this basis that we turn to the social determination of policy choices framed by the balance of forces within the political economy in the next section of this chapter.

3. Uneven and Combined Development Reproduced through Unequal Exchanges in World Systems

The G20 currently includes the core capitalist economies of world systems and selected representation from some of the

4 Margaret Hilda Thatcher was a British politician who served as Leader of the Conservative Party from 1975 to 1990 and was elected as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990.

5 John Major is a British politician who served as both Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1997 following Margaret Thatcher.

6 Anthony Charles Lynton Blair is a British politician who served as the Leader of the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007 and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007 following John Major.

peripheral and semi-peripheral territories. The Independent Commission on International Developmental Issues which was convened by the World Bank and chaired by Willy Brandt, described the huge chasm in living standards between countries of the North and those categorised as the South. According to Brandt and colleagues, the divide was a result of the uneven and combined developmental trajectory whereby the countries of the South exported huge volumes of low value goods whilst importing low volumes of high value manufactured goods (Brandt, 1980). It is now well established that our current world systems are the consequence of at least five centuries of uneven and combined development originating in the 'long sixteenth century' of our Common Era (Wallerstein, 2012).

The colonial processes of violent expropriation and extraction conjoined with the imperial phases of integration and exploitation largely established the contours of our contemporary world system. Jason Hickel and colleagues recently calculated using prevailing market prices, that the global North appropriated 12 billion tons of embodied raw material equivalents, 822 million hectares of embodied land, 21 exajoules of embodied energy, and 188 million person-years of embodied labour, worth $10.8 trillion from the global South just in 2015. This at the time represented sufficient monetary value to redress extreme poverty nearly 70 times over (Hickel et al, 2022). Applying their methodology in the 25 years between 1990 and 2015, these scholars reported a net cumulative drain from the South totalled approximately $242 trillion in constant 2010 US$ (Hickel et al, 2022). Their research clearly, coherently, and cogently shows that "… unequal exchange is a significant driver of global inequality, uneven development, and ecological breakdown" (Hickel et al, 2022). It is on this critical and evidence-based assertion that we turn to some of the proposals generated by the Brazilian and South African presidencies of the G20.

4. African and South American Perspectives

Both Brazil and South Africa are "rich in biodiversity and each has considerable deposits of minerals and metals" (Maharajh,

2015). Notwithstanding such natural resource wealth, both territories have evolved their respective industrial structures on the basis of settler colonial and imperialist political economies in world systems. These contradictions manifest themselves in the political ecologies of both countries and are facing considerable neo-colonial pressure to expand extraction and exploitation rather than embrace environmental sustainability.

In a preparation for the G20 Summit in Brasilia, Mauricio Lyrio acknowledged that

> "(t)he world is facing an unprecedented climate crisis, and the G20 countries, which represent the majority of carbon emissions, will discuss strategies to promote a greener and more sustainable global economy. Brazil, which has positioned itself as a leader on environmental issues in the global agenda, advocates for an approach that takes local realities and access to clean energy sources into account" (Lyrio, 2024).

These sentiments were echoed in the final Leaders Declaration which comprised a total of 85 key points (Brazil, 2025). Twenty-five key points, or 30% the Leaders Declaration, relate to sustainable development (Brazil, 2025). The South African presidency offered resonances to the perspectives determined in Brazil in both its selection of the overall organising thematic for 2025, as well as in constituting the various engagement processes.

Civil society in both countries as well as pan-continental gatherings have also weighed-in in favour of foregrounding the realities of climate change and its impact upon their developmental prospects. In a recent mobilisation to commemorate International Day of Feminist Solidarity Against the Power of Transnational Corporations, the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA-CSA) argued that "A precise diagnosis is not just necessary, but urgent, in order to develop effective responses that protect labour rights, social justice, and democratic values in the face of an increasingly organized and globalized offensive" (TUCA-CSA, 2025). By

refocusing our attention back to the actual framing of the problems currently being experienced, progressive forces are countering the dominant narrative which they define as a

> "… renewed—yet more radical—version of neoliberalism promoted by the far right reinforces and deepens anti-state ideas, discourses, and policies, consolidating the primacy of the market over the state. This approach not only weakens the ability of public institutions to regulate and redistribute wealth but also legitimizes structural inequalities by prioritizing economic interests over social well-being" (TUCA-CSA, 2025).

They also identify "a new phase for the transnational far right" which they argue is "… characterized by greater boldness and lack of disguise: transnational capital now openly promotes its agenda, pushing for policies that enhance its economic and political power" (TUCA-CSA, 2025).

Complementing this perspective, a Women's Climate Assembly which brought together over 120 women activists and community leaders from 12 countries across Central and West Africa collectively called upon their governments

> "… to stop selling their vast natural wealth to the highest bidder. They demand[ed] climate reparations to keep the oil, gas and coal underground, to recover after the climate disasters they face, and to build real alternatives to the current destructive development model. They call[ed] for polluters to get out or pay the debt due to them as they suffer the costs of extractive industries and the growing climate crisis" (Mapondera, 2024).

The Women's Climate Assembly argued further that

> "[g]lobal temperatures are hurtling towards 3.1°C by the end of the century, a catastrophic scenario for Africa, which is heating faster than other continents, despite being responsible for only 3% of historical carbon emissions! Governments and corporations are grabbing

> community lands to harvest 'green' minerals, gas and green hydrogen. All of this to make new energy, which is shipped off to meet the rising demand for 'clean energy' in the global North and some countries in the global South while Africa and its peoples live with the pollution, hardship and public debt" (Mapondera, 2024).

The Presidential Climate Commission of South Africa compiled a range of perspectives advanced by young people in the region aged between 18 and 35 and who articulate the lessons being learnt and their generational opinions. Qhamani Neza Tshazi (age 28) and Sylvia Graham (age 31) cogently argue that

> "[a]t the centre of conversations around a just transition that is tailored for the Global South, and South Africa in particular, there is a need to interrogate the parasitic relations that exist between the North and the South. The North needs to be deliberate in recusing itself from the process and allow space for countries like South Africa to chart their own path in line with their own developmental imperatives. There needs to be a shift in understanding where knowledge and solutions lie. It cannot be that African countries are prescribed solutions without a thorough understanding of their histories, challenges, and aspirations. For centuries, people of the South have lived in harmony with their physical environments. Their relations with nature were destroyed by the very people imposing solutions onto them, solutions that are failing in their own countries" (Tshazi & Graham, 2024).

Mildred Bekink draws on research from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and argues that

> "[e]ven though climate change affects children more than adults and will affect children as the future generation more than anyone else, their inclusion in climate action policy and decision making at local, national and international level has been limited. While children are critically exposed to the impacts of climate change, their

> views are in general ignored and/or acted on by adult decision-makers" (Bekink, 2024).

This aspect is of particular relevance to Africa which is home to an estimated 1.54 billion people and where half the population are aged 19.3 years old or below (UN, 2024). The intergenerational nature of climate change combined with escalating biophysical precarities, and the persistence of endemic inequalities constitute major challenges to the agenda of the G20. According to Tshazi and Graham,

> "The lack of access to financial, technological, and other resources that can aid in the implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies to effectively deal with the impacts of climate change has left many Global South countries battling to keep up. Although there is much to learn from nations that have significantly progressed in their development and are actively moving towards a just transition, this learning journey demands a tactical awareness from those seeking knowledge" (Tshazi & Graham, 2024)

In its close-out report, the government of Brazil reiterated that one of its priorities for its G20 presidency was to emphasise "the urgency of climate change and its serious consequences for all the peoples of the world" (Brazil, 2025). In a section entitled: "Tackling climate change: the world can no longer wait," Brazil noted

> "[t]he unprecedented ministerial declaration approved during the work of the Task Force for the Global Mobilization against Climate Change reinforced the G20 members' commitment to the Paris Agreement for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and keeping a global temperature rise well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels" (Brazil, 2025). Brazil also noted that the ministerial declaration was "approved in Washington, USA, in October 2024 also renewed the pact to make

> efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels" (Brazil, 2025).

The last mentioned is of critical importance as the USA is a founding member of the G20 yet withdrew from the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change through an executive order of its 47th president on the 20 January 2025 (USA, 2025). This seriously contradicts the G20 Leaders Declaration which had reaffirmed "… our respective commitments to scale up urgent action to address the crises and challenges posed by climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification, ocean and land degradation, drought and pollution" (G20, 2024).

It is therefore important to reconcile the rhetoric of the G20 emerging from socially determined policy consensus statements with the biophysical realities that are being experienced by all of humanity. Therefore, and notwithstanding the declarations of the 2024 edition of the G20 and the subsequent follow-through by South Africa in 2025, the United Nations Environmental Programme' Emissions Gap Report revealed the massive chasm between rhetoric and reality. UNEP calculated that total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions increased by 1.3% from its 2022 level in 2023. This increase was well above the average rate measured in the decade preceding the CoVID-19 global pandemic of 2020, when GHG emissions grew at an annual average of only 0.8% (UNEP, 2024). Based on an assessment of all the Nationally Determined Contributions submitted under the Paris Agreement, UNEP calculated that implementing only current policies would deliver up to 3.1°C of warming whilst acknowledging that implementing current conditional NDCs (which require external support) would deliver up to 2.8°C of warming (UNEP, 2024). For UNEP, even if we achieved full implementation of both unconditional and conditional NDCs, we would only reduce expected emissions in 2030 by 10 per cent, leading to predictions of up to 2.6°C of warming (UNEP, 2024).

The G20 includes not only the high-income countries of the global North. It includes also the dynamic economies of

the global South that have successfully advanced their climate change resilience by drawing on the global knowledge commons and consistently building their national systems of innovation. Lauri Myllyvirta shows that growth in clean power generation by the Peoples Republic of China "has caused the nation's carbon dioxide emissions to fall despite rapid power demand growth" (Myllyvirta, 2025). According to the data analysed, China's carbon dioxide emissions "have now been stable or falling for more than a year" (Myllyvirta, 2025). The lessons from such a dramatic change augurs well for advancing just transitions away from greenhouse gas intensive energy production towards improving grid performance and capacity to incorporate renewable and other less carbon intensive energy sources. This is also well supported by the Brazil' other environmental commitments adopted during their G20 presidency which includes: "increasing the use of renewable energy sources, a just energy transition in order to end the use of fossil fuels, actions to adapt to climate change, raising sources of funding to support processes in less developed and developing countries, and promoting the circular economy" (Brazil, 2025).

In his opening speech to the fourth China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum, the Brazilian President Lula da Silva stated that "[South] America, the Caribbean, and China can show the world that it is possible to fight climate change without sacrificing economic growth and social justice" (Da Silva, 2025). According to the Progressive International, "Brazil's President Lula da Silva ha[d] outlined a vision centred on six interconnected priorities: strengthening global health systems, building new financial architecture, advancing climate justice, creating ethical frameworks for artificial intelligence, reimagining security approaches, and strengthening BRICS institutions" in assuming the chairpersonship of BRICS+ in 2025 (PI, 2025). They note further that "Lula sees these not as separate technical issues — but as parts of a unified effort to democratise the multilateral system and forge paths of sovereign development that respect both human dignity and ecological limits" It is on this progressive

note regarding south-south cooperation that we turn to the concluding section of this chapter.

Conclusion

As we advance further into the 21st century of our common era, we remain confronted by the persistent scourge of uneven and combined development. Midway through the second decade, we may be reminded of an assertion often misattributed[7] to a leader of the Russian Revolution which stated that '[t]here are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen' at the beginning of the previous century. According to Richard Haass who had served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations for two decades, "[i]f he had actually said those words, Lenin might have added that there are also decades when centuries happen" (Haass, 2022). As we trespass further into 2025, the change, uncertainty, and risks are escalating exponentially. As acknowledged by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, the Director of Research at the International Monetary Fund: "[t]he global economic system under which most countries have operated for the last 80 years is being reset, ushering the world into a new era. Existing rules are challenged while new ones are yet to emerge" (Gourinchas, 2025).

Our contemporary conjuncture is replete with the morbid characteristics that align more with the famous restatement by Antonio Gramsci that "the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born" (1930). The accumulating biophysical evidence confirms that that we are living through an accelerating sixth mass extinction in the history of our home planet. Whereas the five previous mass extinction events were driven by natural processes, the current reduction of biodiversity is increasingly acknowledged as a product of human-actions based on our social, political and economic determinations. Core to effectively responding to the

7 Commonly attributed to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, leader of the majoritarian (Bolshevik) tendency, and head of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1917.

realities of rapid climate change is the need for just transitions that imply structural and systemic changes in financing of development.

In the context of rapid geopolitical changes and the high level of uncertainties arising from these epochal changes, the African Union convened a conference on debt as 20 of its 55 member states, or 36.7%, are confronted by high levels of indebtedness which is further hampering or even reducing service delivery to their citizenry in need (Langat, 2025). The report on the conference also cites the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development acknowledging that official development assistance "dropped by 7.1% in 2024" (Langat, 2025). The report further notes the United Nations Development Programme assessment which found that the "subjective credit ratings by major agencies such as S&P Global, Moody's, and Fitch Ratings have cost African countries $74 billion in missed financing opportunities" (UNDP, 2022). Therefore, the African Union "urge[d] developed countries to fulfil their commitment to allocating 0.7% of their Gross National Income to Official Development Assistance, a long-standing target set by the United Nations with a view to reducing debt financing (AU, 2025)

The African Union further noted that "the G20 Common Framework — a mechanism to provide low-income countries with coordinated debt restructurings, with broad creditors' participation — isn't working as well as it should" (Langat, 2025). Accordingly, the African Union declaration stated that it was

> "noting with concern that while the continent welcomed the G20 Common Framework as a first step towards a more comprehensive approach to the sovereign debt restructuring on the continent and beyond, it has not provided a pathway towards the quick restoration of debt sustainability, creating some considerable scepticism as to its potential to deliver effectively for highly indebted countries, particularly in Africa" (AU, 2025).

The dawning realities of accelerating climate change, the verifiable lack of the necessary financial resources to respond from existing institutions, and the inherited legacies of uneven and combined development do not auger well for the realization of the world that we want, need, and demand. South Africa' presidency of the G20 should therefore serve to continue to challenge world systems premised upon inequities arising from colonialism and imperialism and reproduced through unequal exchanges in our contemporary conjuncture. These critical aspects were well articulated in the outcomes generated during Brazil' presidency of the G20. The present polycrisis provides opportunities to redress imbalances and to establish a shared basis to counter the common threats to our entire species-being both in our contemporary conjuncture as well as across the generations to come. We cannot fail lest history holds us accountable for missing such opportunities.

The polycrisis of our contemporary conjuncture spans across and within the domains of ecology, economy, society and governance. The escalating precarity for us all as a species-being demands bold and robust systemic and structural transformations. Failing to translate the rhetorical statements of the G20 into transformative praxis risks further deepening of global inequities, the persistence of ecological precarities, and intergenerational unaccountability. The chapter therefore supports the thematic orientation of South Africa' Presidency of the G20 which sought to focus the attention of the world on Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability. The following four main recommendations emanate from the critique and analysis presented in this chapter:

1. Strengthening development financing mechanisms and enabling current debt restructuring;
2. Promoting real Just Transitions towards sustainable and resilient development;
3. Redressing geopolitical and economic inequities through accelerating structural and systemic transformations; and
4. Enabling and enhancing African agency in global governance.

These four main recommendations are broadly framed, and include the following eight components:

1. Continuously challenging unequal global systems, institutions, and structures with the overall objective of dismantling colonial and imperial legacies in in global economic governance (Brazil G20 Outcome)
2. Demanding the fulfilment of Official Development Assistance commitments of the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development within the G20 which could serve to reduce debt financing obligations amongst middle- and low-income members, and especially from Africa.
3. Transforming the G20 Common Framework to increase transparency and enable effective mechanisms which are empowered to ensure coordinated, effective, and timely debt restructuring for middle- and low-income members, and especially from Africa.
4. Redressing the negative impacts of subjective private credit rating reports and support fairer sovereign credit assessment which would assist in preventing further economic and fiscal constraints on middle- and lower-income members, and especially from Africa.
5. Advance structural and systemic transformations of financing for development which explicitly supports adaptation, mitigation, and resilience to climate change.
6. Explore alternative financial modalities including grants and concessional loans to further reduce indebtedness and fiscal austerity.
7. Improving multilateral cooperation and collaboration to strengthen institutions such as the African Union and other regional fora in promoting global democratisation of governance, intergenerational equity, and to replace outdated structures.
8. As a member in itself, the African Union carries an increased burden of representing the most marginalised and excluded interests in world systems. The AU should therefore ensure that the unified position of the continent on issues such as

climate finance, debt justice, and development aid must neither be diluted nor abrogated.

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