Progress Towards the Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals Siphumelele Duma and Rich Mashimbye (Eds) Security-Development Nexus in Africa: Progress Towards the Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals Published by UJ Press University of Johannesburg Library Auckland Park Kingsway Campus PO Box 524 Auckland Park 2006 https://ujpress.uj.ac.za/ Compilation © Siphumelele Duma and Rich Mashimbye 2025 Chapters © Author(s) 2025 Published Edition © Siphumelele Duma and Rich Mashimbye 2025 First published 2025 https://doi.org/10.64449/ 9781997468233 978-1-997468-22-6 (Paperback) 978-1-997468-23-3 (PDF) 978-1-997468-24-0 (EPUB) 978-1-997468-25-7 (XML) This publication had been submitted to a rigorous double-blind peer-review process prior to publication and all recommendations by the reviewers were considered and implemented before publication. Proofreading: Sandra Smook Cover design: Hester Roets, UJ Graphic Design Studio Typeset in 9/13pt Merriweather Light

<_No_paragraph_style_>Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms  .......................................... i Editorial Foreword ......................................................... v Victoria Graham Foreword ...................................................................... vii Ambassador Jerry Matjila Chapter One: Security-Development Nexus in Africa: An Argument ................................................................. 1 Siphumelele Duma, Rich Mashimbye Part 1: Regional Integration and Cooperation ...................... 13 Chapter Two: The State and Implications of Transport Infrastructure on Regional Integration and Economic Development in the SADC Region: A Review Study ............ 15 Mareli Hugo, Johannes Bhanye, Ruvimbo Shayamunda Chapter Three: Holistic Planning and Adaptive Approaches: Towards Better Responses to Climate- Induced Disasters in Southern Africa ............................... 45 Tebello Putsoane, Ruvimbo Hazel Shayamunda, Johannes I Bhanye, Abraham R Matamanda Chapter Four: Analysis of the African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa within the Context of Securitisation of Migration ............................................. 79 Makinde Mayowa Babatunde, Oluyemi O Fayomi Chapter Five: Regional Integration in Southern Africa 32 Years after the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Intended Projections, Challenges, and Future Prognoses .................................................... 99 Daniel N. Mlambo Part 2: Political Instability ...................................................... 121 Chapter Six: Military Coups in West Africa and the Sahel as Impediments Towards the Achievement of the African Union-Agenda 2063, Aspirations (3) and (4) ......... 123 Collin Olebogeng Mongale, Boikanyo Collins Nkwatle Chapter Seven: Multi-Termism and Military Coups in Africa: Evidence from Zimbabwe and Guinea .................... 155 Daglous Makumbe Chapter Eight: Migration, Security, and the State: A Critical Review of the Securitisation of Migration in Africa ........................................................................ 191 Johannes Bhanye, Ruvimbo Shayamunda Part 3: Peace and Security ....................................................... 225 Chapter Nine: Nexus between Peace, Human Security and Development in Post-Colonial Africa: The Missing Link? ......................................................... 227 Aaram Gwiza, Vain D.B Jarbandhan, Moira Tambaoga, Noah Ariel Mutongoreni Chapter Ten: The African Continental Free Trade Area and Peacebuilding: A Turning Point for African Peace and Security? ................................................................. 255 Torque Mude Chapter Eleven: Applying Securitisation Theory to Understand Cybersecurity within the South African Armed Forces Context .................................................... 277 Kyle Bester Chapter Twelve: Land Conflicts and Development in Africa: Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development ............................................... 303 Ruvimbo Shayamunda, Johannes Bhanye Part 4: Food Security ............................................................... 333 Chapter Thirteen: The State of Food Security in Africa: Exploring the Role of Land Use Planning in Strengthening Urban Food Security ................................. 335 Leemisa Simon Matooane, Abraham Rajab Matamanda, Johannes Bhanye, Ruvimbo Shayamunda Chapter Fourteen: Post-1994 Challenges of Small-Scale Farmers in Water Irrigation and its Effect on Social Well-Being in South Africa ............................................. 377 Mthabiseng P. Ngwamba, Sinenhlanha B. Cele, Mandla A. Mubecua Chapter Fifteen: Food Availability, Accessibility, Utilisation and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Blind Roadmap to Agenda 2063 .................................... 395 Kennedy Mabuku Chapter Sixteen: Human-Wildlife Conflict and Human (In)security in Zimbabwe’s Kariba and Victoria Falls Towns  ...................................................... 421 Knowledge Mwonzora, Gift Mwonzora Notes on Contributors .................................................... 445 ARLPI Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative AASR Africa Agriculture Africa Status Report JAP Africa-Arab Joint Action Plan ACP Africa-Caribbean-Pacific economic relations ACDEG African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area AfDB African Development Bank AEC African Economic Community AFSUN African Food Urban Network ANC African National Congress AU African Union AFSA Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa AAF Allied Armed Forces APRA Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BSAC British Southern African Company CAR Central Africa Republic CAP Common Agricultural Policy CREMAs Community Resource Management Areas CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme CONSAS Constellation of Southern African states CRC Constitutional Review Commission CS Copenhagen School DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo DoD Department of Defence DoT Department of Trade, Industry and Competition EOA Ecological Organic Agriculture ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EU European Union FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Program FGDs Focus Groups Discussions FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FADM Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique FDI Foreign Direct Investment FLS Front Line States GPA General Peace Accords GDP Gross Domestic Product HSCT Harmonized Social Cash Transfer HDRs Human Development Reports HWC Human Wildlife Conflict HEC Human-Elephant Conflicts IKSs Indigenous Knowledge Systems IGADD Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration ISDSC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee IMT Irrigation Management Transfer IS Islamic State ISWAP Islamic State West Africa Province JNIM Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin LCB Lake Chad Basin LCRP Land Conflict Resolution Program LPI Land Policy Initiative LTRP Land Tenure Regularisation Program LEAP Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty MPFA Migration Policy Framework MONUC Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NNF Namibia Nature Foundation NDP National Development Plan NLC National Land Commission NRM/A National Resistance Movement Army NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NAFTA North American Free Trade Area OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OAU Organization of African Unity PIM Participatory Irrigation Management PCPB Post-Conflict Peace Building CA Qualitative Content Analysis RECs Regional Economic Communities ST Securitisation Theory SISs Smallholder Irrigation Systems SANDC South African National Defence College SANDF South African National Defence Force SWAPO South West Africa People’s Organisation SACU Southern African Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference SPLM/A-IO Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army in Opposition SDG Sustainable Development Goal TAZARA Tanzania-Zambia Railway UCG Unconstitutional Changes of Government UN United Nations UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme USA United States of America ZPWMA Zimbabwe Parks Wildlife Management Authority WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WFP World Food Program WTO World Trade Organisation Ambassador Jerry Matjila The African Continent has a huge abundance of natural resources, a youthful population, human capital and an active citizenry. Within the institutions of higher learning, academics and researchers daily dive deeper and examine various issues that hold back the much-anticipated economic boom of our continent that will address poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. If indeed Africa has 60% of the world’s arable land and huge deposits of all kinds of mineral resources needed for industrialisation, manufacturing, production of high tech equipment driving modern communications and innovation, the questions posed are: why is Africa not food sufficient, why is Africa not a leader in modern technology, why is Africa still poor. Slightly more than a decade ago, the African Union (AU) adopted its master plan, a blueprint for the next 50 years, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. In effect they were proclaiming that the next 50 years will be years for rebuilding the economy of Africa, industrialisation, continental integration through regional economic communities, peace and stability, and building a hunger free and prosperous Africa. African countries also participated in crafting, shaping, negotiating and adoption of the United Nation (UN)’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and incorporated its goals and targets in their national plans. This book, edited by the two distinguished academics, Siphumelele Duma and Rich Mashimbye and with numerous authors, is a welcome contribution towards understanding the challenges confronting our people but also making interesting recommendations for all stakeholders towards the resolution of the challenges as the continent implements AU Agenda 2063 and towards realising the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The book explores the intersection between the security and development nexus in Africa. It is an established fact that there are correlations between security and development. Unstable and conflict-ridden countries or regions are less attractive to investment. The populace remains in the clasp of grinding poverty and hunger. On the contrary, sustainable development brings peace and stability. These concepts feature predominantly in both Agendas 2030 and 2063. The editors and contributors address both issues comprehensively in this book. The UN system talks of a balanced approach to peace and security, human rights and sustainable development and makes a point that the three are interlinked and interrelated. Four chapters in this book examine the state of regional integration in Africa. At the launch of the AU in 2002, the leaders of Africa emphasised the role of the Regional Economic Communities as the building blocks for a larger integrated continent. Enablers of integration and connectivity, like physical infrastructure, especially road, rail, telecommunication and aviation, were to be given major priority to facilitate the movement of goods and services across frontiers. The contributors highlight the progress made but also point out that even more effort is needed to deal with identified bottlenecks, fund shortfalls, and develop skills needed to unlock the potential of an integrated continent. They also point out that the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) needs extra oxygen to power the resurgence of Africa. Connectivity is essential to regional and continental integration. The book further takes stock and reflects on the political developments in the various regions of Africa. The distinguished contributors look at the emerging phenomenon of military coups in Africa with a special focus on the recent upheavals in West Africa. They observe that the underlying causes of these coups need more analysis as multiple factors may be behind these developments. Some point out that in addition to lingering colonial and post-colonial political arrangements, factors like youth impatience, lack of service delivery, poverty, unemployment, corruption and lack of good governance may have contributed to coup d’états. They also call upon those in power to respect the will of the people. With a mere five years left before the UN convenes a summit to get reports of the performance of member states towards realising the goals and targets of the 2030 SDGs, the book looks at the prospects for African countries in achieving the said goals and targets. The contributors conclude that much more effort by African governments is needed towards meeting the expectations contained in the SDGs. Regarding progress in the realisation of the roadmap as contained in Agenda 2063, the contributors focus on and draw lessons from the military coups in West Africa and the Sahel and recognise them as a possible impediment towards the achievement of the AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. They pay attention to Aspirations 3 and 4, as well as food availability, accessibility, utilisation and necessary initiatives to attain food security in Sub-Sahara Africa. Although Africa has abundant natural resources, huge waterways, sunlight, arable land, a young population and a bulging middle class and intelligentsia, it still lacks the political will to deal with corruption, build strong institutions, improve governance, address legacies of colonisation, provide citizens with basic necessities like food, water, shelter, improved health systems and education, and address conditions that lead to youth uprisings. If the status quo remains, the Africa we want encapsulated in Agenda 2063 will remain a dream. The observations and recommendations of the authors of various chapters necessitate close attention by policy makers, implementers and those charged with the responsibility to lead the people of Africa. Africa should harness the ample skilled human capital demonstrated by the contributors in this book. Africa’s future lies in the mobilisation and appropriate deployment of its abundant human resources towards peace, security, stability, human rights and sustainable development. Ambassador Jerry M. Matjila Pretoria, South Africa Security-Development Nexus in Africa: An Argument Siphumelele Duma

Rich Mashimbye

Institute for Pan-African Thought & Conversation University of Johannesburg

Johannesburg South Africa Introduction The year 2023 marked the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU), which succeeded the former in 2002. While the OAU’s defining characteristics were decolonisation, self-determination and freedom for the people of Africa in the first ten years of its existence (founded in 1963), the objective swiftly shifted towards the quest for sustainable development as the decolonisation wave became “self-replicatory”. Thus, since the mid-1970s, the continent’s agenda has been dominated by industrialisation and development-related aspirations to uplift the living standard for the people of Africa. For instance, the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Abuja Treaty (1991), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2002) and the AU Agenda 2063 (2015), to name the most notable ones, all have one significant defining aspiration in common, an integrated, economically developed and self-sufficient Africa. For decades, the idea has been to decolonise the African economies through regional economic integration (Adedeji, 1983). Needless to say, the African continent’s challenges go beyond economic development, especially with the natural hazards that are recurring at an unprecedented frequency and intensity of late and the resurgence of military coups and unconstitutional changes of government over the past years. A peaceful and stable political and social climate has been shown to be a prerequisite for sustainable socio-economic development. This is why the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, United Nation (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, seeks to: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.” (UN, 2015:28). Furthermore, Aspiration 4 of the AU’s Agenda 2063 calls for a peaceful and secure continent. Thus, within the context of this volume, the particular focus on some of these issues in no way minimises the significance and urgency of others. Security-Development Nexus in a Historical Context While the history of African societies and people did not commence with colonial conquest, the colonisation of Africa by European powers was a watershed moment in the continent’s history. So historically significant in many senses and far-reaching in terms of implications, including the security and development of the people of the conquered territories. Its impact is still being felt to date despite the physical occupation and colonial administrations ending over half a century ago in most African countries. For instance, the successive apartheid governments of South Africa created and maintained homelands to marginalise the African majority, with these areas and dwellings were largely neglected with minimal service provision. Decades later, South Africa is regarded as one of the most unequal societies in the world by international organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The usurpation of Africans’ natural right to self-determination and self-government meant that their agency to ensure security and development was wrested from them. Indeed, one of the key features of colonial rule in Africa was the prevalence of insecurity and the absence of development. As is often the case with many systems predicated on gross injustice, the colonial dispensation buckled under the pressures of the liberation struggle led by African nationalists, so the system was dispelled from the continent. Africans had reclaimed the right to determine their development trajectory and influence their fate, unencumbered by hateful colonial rule. As mentioned, security and development matters assumed the back seat during colonialism. Unsurprisingly, security and development issues became preponderant in the discourses unfolding within corridors of political power in Africa. Many colonially created African states were weak, poorly institutionalised, and unable to guarantee security for their citizens (Lodge, 2008; Forrest, 1988). The institutions of accountability for those in power were barely functional, by design. In fact, these states were used as instruments to oppress and brutalise their people in service of the nefarious political agendas of the colonial powers. This is aptly put by Makumbe in Chapter Seven. The author highlights this, arguing, in essence, that much as in the case of the colonial governments who were the source of insecurity and underdevelopment of citizens, multi-termism and decades-long ruling were detrimental and citizens welcomed military coups in Zimbabwe and Guinea as they thought it was the only viable method to put an end to multi-termism and end the decades-long ruling of Robert Mugabe (Mackintosh, 2017) and Alpha Conde 2021, respectively. The chapter details how the constitutional processes have been manipulated to enable some leaders to serve multiple terms as presidents. Accordingly, the continuing state-building process on the continent ought to entail a dismantling of this character in the African state so that it becomes a leading actor in providing security to the people, including the more recently embraced idea of human security, which encumbers the state with a responsibility to ensure the development of its people. It is generally accepted that a state that cannot provide security to its citizens or people living within its borders is correspondingly unable to guarantee its development. Similarly, a state that fails to ensure the development of the people also cannot see to their security. The foregoing clearly alludes to a mutual-dependent relationship between the concepts of development and security, whereby the two are prerequisite conditions that must exist simultaneously at any given time. The majority of the African states are still challenged insofar as the responsibility to ascertain that these conditions are created (Buur, Jensen & Stepputat, 2007). Present-day Africa continues to be riddled with a myriad of security and development challenges that hinder the attainment of SDGs and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. Whither Regional Integration, Security and Development in Africa Post-independence Africa has looked to regional integration to address security and development issues. While the regional integration efforts in the continent pre-date independence in the sense that it was used to propel the decolonisation wave across Africa, regional integration has been somewhat fully consolidated in the post-independence era. As shown by the chapters in this volume, this nexus between security and development is a very important one, given that one fundamentally affects the other. At a basic level, the “security-development nexus” thesis is predicated on the understanding that the absence of security has implications for development and vice versa. African solidarity, expressed through regional integration and cooperation, has been deployed to attain development objectives and eradicate colonial domination in the continent (Mkandawire, 2014). A case in point is the then Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was mainly established to counter apartheid South Africa’s destabilisation policy in Southern Africa. As noted by Mlambo in Chapter Five, in the wake of independence in the continent, “regional integration was looked to primarily for political reasons and later as a development strategy to rise to the challenges of smaller markets and being landlocked, to benefit from economies of scale.” Africa has the highest number of least-developed countries in the world. It is replete with many modern challenges affecting humanity, such as environmental degradation, climatic deterioration, food insecurity, human displacement, and forced migration (Ahenkan & Osei-Kojo, 2014). These challenges gave rise to efforts to counter them, as governments, individually and collectively, expend their energies to address climate change, conflicts, and industrial development, among others. These problems and issues have a bearing on Africa’s attainment of the AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs aspirations. Furthermore, conflict-related security threats still pose security issues to development in the continent. This is a result of its long-lasting economic and social devastations, as we have seen in countries like South Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to mention a few. Through the Agenda 2063, the African continent has vowed to preserve peace, security and stability to build a prosperous continent with inclusive growth and sustainable development. In fact, understanding this correlation between security and development, SDG 16 seeks to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development. This means it is no longer a debate whether there is a relationship between security and development (direct or indirect), but rather how developing countries navigate complexities brought about by this in pursuit of their development and security aspirations. What progress, if any, has Africa or African countries made in addressing the aforementioned? This is an important and timely question, as it has been nearly ten years since the African countries adopted and endorsed the Agenda 2063 and SDGs by the African countries. This book is composed of chapters that delve into the subject of the development-security nexus as it applies to African states and societies, looking at and dissecting the different themes that have relevance to the attainment of security and development. Chapter Outline This volume comprises sixteen chapters, divided into four thematic parts: regional integration, political instability, peace and security, and food security. This thematic breakdown’s relevance is not only based on the pressing issues that the continent is facing and most grappled with in the literature but also very central in the context of the Agenda 2063 and SDGs. Hence, the authors touch on different aspects of the Agenda 2063 and SDGs aspirations, from infrastructural development and climate change impact mitigation to military coups, peace and stability and intra-Africa trade. As diverse as this volume is, time and scope could not permit it to touch on every aspect of Agenda 2063 and SDGs. In the next chapter, Mareli Hugo, Johannes Bhanye and Ruvimbo Shayamunda examine the impact of transport infrastructure on sustainable economic development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The authors note the significance of an adequate (cross-border) infrastructure to a successful regional integration process, especially since it could facilitate a smooth flow of goods and services. While the authors acknowledge that the regional countries have come a long way in their infrastructural development over the past two decades or so, they contend that several challenges that the region faces in this aspect, like inadequate funding and poor road conditions, undermine the prospects of achieving the region’s integration objectives. This is because higher transport costs due to inadequate transportation infrastructure disrupt the free flow of goods and services, thus limiting intra-regional trade. The authors recommend ramping up investments in the transportation infrastructure and improved maintenance. In Chapter Three, Tebello Putsoane, Ruvimbo Hazel Shayamunda, Johannes Bhanye, and Abraham Matamanda grapple with the importance of holistic planning and adaptive approaches in improving responses to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. The chapter reveals that climate change has increased the frequency and severity of regional disasters, making adopting strategies to mitigate the negative impacts imperative. The chapter argues that holistic planning and adaptive systems are necessary to develop more effective responses to climate-induced disasters at a regional level. This approach involves integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into development planning processes, incorporating local knowledge and participation, and promoting flexible and adaptive strategies that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties. The authors argue that this new (proactive) approach is vital because the region’s current approach to disaster management is more reactive and not proactive. Thus, it needs to be revised in favour of the holistic and adaptive approach, enabling decision-makers to understand climate-induced disasters and develop effective strategies to reduce their risk and impact. In Chapter Four, Makinde Mayowa Babatunde and Fayomi Oluyemi tackle how the securitisation of migration by some African countries affects the AU’s efforts to promote the free movement of people across the continent. The chapter argues that the increasing classification of migrants as security threats makes it harder for the AU to develop a more efficient migration policy framework for the continent. The authors argue that while there are issues such as unstable security environments due to threats posed by terrorist organisations, like Al Shabab in the Horn and Eastern Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa, none of these risks are substantial enough to support the possibility of excluding legitimate African travellers from entering certain countries. In contrast, the benefits of the free movement of people across the continent outweigh the risks to national security. Chapter Five, by Daniel Mlambo, examines SADC’s regional integration trajectory since the organisation’s 1992 transformation. The author focuses on the organisation’s operational mandate, assessing the encountered challenges and prospects, arguing that while the SADC has made some noticeable efforts in the quest to integrate the region, several challenges have undermined progress over the three decades of its existence. These include lower levels of development and lack of political will, in particular, to implement the regional agreements at the national level. The author notes that these challenges will persist unless the integration project goes, and is understood, beyond heads of state to include civil society, the private sector and the people at large. In Chapter Six, Collin Olebogeng Mongale and Boikanyo Collins Nkwatle interrogate the issue of military coups in the West African region and the Sahel as impediments to the realisation of the AU’s Agenda 2063, in particular, Aspirations 3 and 4, which seek to ensure good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law, and a peaceful and secure Africa, respectively. The chapter argues that while the causes of these unconstitutional changes of government are understandable issues, such as poor governance and rampant corruption, the AU should, however, intervene and provide assistance in addressing the root causes and be fair in dealing with the challenges across the board, without applying double standards. Daglous Makumbe, in Chapter Seven, draws a link between presidential multi-termism and military coups in Africa. Through the cases of Zimbabwe and Guinea, the author demonstrates that the people are increasingly tolerant and embracing coups when deployed to remove leaders who are reluctant to leave office even after electoral defeats. The author argues that unconstitutional change of governments derails the countries’ development prospects, given that investors flee and are weary of an unstable political climate. Chapter Eight, by Johannes Bhanye and Ruvimbo Shayamunda, examines the securitisation of migration in Africa, focusing on this phenomenon’s historical context, theoretical perspectives, and practical implications. The chapter provides diverse and nuanced insights into the implications of migration securitisation in the continent through case-study analysis. The chapter argues for a more holistic and human-rights-based approach to migration governance in Africa instead of seeing migrants as security threats. In Chapter Nine, Aaram Gwiza, Vain Jarbandhan, Moira Tambaoga and Noah Ariel Mutongoreni examine the nexus between peace, human security and development in Africa in the post-colonial era, arguing that underdevelopment contributes to the absence of peace in the continent. They point out that most African countries have elevated levels of poverty, which have led to debates on the security-development nexus and a general reflection on the collaboration between governments and non-governmental actors like development agencies and private actors broadly aimed at addressing the problem. Moreover, they contend that civil wars and other forms of violent conflicts have positioned the continent for a forlorn future. Collectively, these challenges and problems negatively impact African states’ pursuit of SDGs and Agenda 2063, and the authors argue that these states are unlikely to realise the objectives and goals of the two development visions. Torque Mude examines the dynamics of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)’s developmental approach from the vantage point of peacebuilding to determine how it can advance peace and security in Africa. The focus of his chapter (Chapter Ten) was informed by the fact that the problems of peace, security and development are more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere. While the AfCFTA is mainly a development and economic integration instrument, it also envisages a peaceful Africa; this implies that the AU assumes security, peace and development to be connected, a position from which this book proceeds. They argue that setting up a single market covering 1.3 billion Africans not only boosts intra-Africa trade but also lays the foundation for peace, security and development. The chapter asserts that apart from being an economic development and integration blueprint, the AfCFTA has a pivotal bearing on Africa’s peace, security and development. In Chapter Eleven, Kyle Bester zooms in on the topical subject of cybersecurity from the perspective of securitisation theory. Bester examines cybersecurity in the context of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), focusing in particular on the efforts or lack thereof of the SANDF to tackle the ever-increasing cybersecurity threats in Africa. The pervasive nature of cyber threats poses a significant security challenge to governments, organisations and individual users. As such, cybersecurity has implications for national security, not only in South Africa but also in other countries in Africa and beyond. Problematically, the SANDF is silent on cybersecurity; Bester believes this need not be the case considering the salience of cybersecurity threats in the modern era. The military officers of SANDF constitute the basic units of the organisation, and the chapter sought to gather and assess the views of SANDF officers on the question of cybersecurity. These views were aggregated and analysed using securitisation theory as a theoretical framework. Chapter Twelve, authored by Ruvimbo Shayamunda and Johannes Bhanye, discusses and analyses the problem of land conflicts, or conflicts caused by land disputes, to establish how this affects security, peace and development in Africa. They define land conflicts as disputes or struggles over land ownership, use, and control between individuals, communities, or groups. Historical factors causing and fuelling these disputes include past injustices, unequal access to land, conflicting land use practices, population growth, urbanisation, and environmental degradation. Importantly, the chapter examines how land conflicts in Africa affect peacebuilding and sustainable development on the continent. This examination has led to the (central) argument that land conflicts are a major obstacle to achieving sustainable development in Africa and that an all-encompassing approach is requisite to tackle the underlying causes of land conflicts. Hunger, even starvation, is a phenomenon that afflicts most parts of Africa, especially in urban areas or cities where there is severe scarcity of agricultural land. The idea of food security has increasingly gained prominence in discourses aimed at reflecting on how to address hunger in Africa. In Chapter Thirteen, Leemisa Simon Matooane, Abraham Rajab Matamanda, Johannes Bhanye and Ruvimbo Shayamunda explore the subject of food security in Africa’s urban areas. The authors attribute the problem of food insecurity in Africa’s cities to various factors, including climate change, civil wars, the COVID-19 pandemic, and disjointed food value chain systems. Therefore, land use planning in urban areas is crucial to addressing the issue of food security in Africa, which will likely ensure that adequate land is allocated for food production, which may, in turn, result in improvement in the production of food in urban areas. In Chapter Fourteen, Mthabiseng Ngwamba, Sinenhlanha Cele, and Mandla Mubecua look at small-scale farming and its contribution to well-being in South Africa. Access to water for irrigation purposes for small-scale farmers is a perennial challenge in South Africa, where smallholder farmers struggle to secure water rights for their farms. The authors argue that, notwithstanding the governance of water through the policies and institutional support of small-scale farmers, South African small-scale farmers still face challenges in accessing water for irrigation. The problem is particularly acute in poor rural areas across the country. This has left small-scale farmers heavily reliant on rainfall to irrigate or water their crops. Relying on rainfall reduces the risk of food product contamination but leaves room for water shortages because of inconsistent weather patterns. Furthermore, the ever-increasing and frequent problem of climate change has disrupted rainfall patterns and made the problem of scarcity of water for irrigation purposes even worse. The authors view water governance and water accessibility as pivotal to the sustenance of small-scale farming. In Chapter Fifteen, Kennedy Mabuku delves into the theme of food security as an aspect of Agenda 2063, focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter proceeds from the perspective that food security continues to be troubling and challenging in the region. There has been limited exploration of its key dimensions, including availability, accessibility, stability, and utilisation. Considering that food security is viewed as an elusive ideal at the current juncture, the authors sought to investigate the obstacles that impede the attainment of food security in the region, which include poor harvests, limited access to agricultural loans, human-wildlife conflicts impacting food availability, and inadequate road infrastructure affecting food accessibility. In Chapter Sixteen, Knowledge Mwonzora and Gift Mwonzora examine the intersection between humans and wildlife, focusing on Zimbabwe. This is interpreted as having implications on human security in that the encounter with wild animals may pose a risk to the physical security of the people involved. Equally, the encroachment of humans upon land that has been erstwhile reserved for animals creates a survival problem for wild animals. Zimbabwe is renowned for its majestic wildlife, and the preservation of this is crucial to the country and its future. For several years, many countries in Africa and elsewhere have recorded high numbers of human mortalities and injuries owing to wildlife attacks. Due to climate change characterised by high temperatures, incessant drought and drying up of water holes, most wild animals are migrating or encroaching upon human settlements throughout most parts of Zimbabwe. Indeed, instances of conflict between humans and wildlife in some towns like Kariba and Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe have increased. The authors analyse how animal mobility has contributed to increased human-wildlife conflict (HWC) in Zimbabwe’s Kariba and Victoria Falls regions. References Adedeji, A. 1983. The evolution of the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action: A regional approach to economic decolonization. Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan. 24 March 1983. Ahenkan, A. & Osei-Kojo, A. 2014. Achieving sustainable development in Africa: Progress, challenges and prospects. 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In: Sustainable Development Goals. https://doi.org/10.1201/b20466-7 https://doi.org/10.1201/b20466-7 Regional Integration and Cooperation The State and Implications of Transport Infrastructure on Regional Integration and Economic Development in the SADC Region: A Review Study Mareli Hugo

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Johannes Bhanye

African Climate and Development Initiative University of Cape Town

Cape Town, South Africa Ruvimbo Shayamunda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Abstract This chapter examines the impact of transport infrastructure on regional integration and sustainable economic development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Transport infrastructure refers to the physical structures, facilities, and networks that enable the movement of people, goods, and services from one location to another. It includes various modes of transportation such as roads, railways, airports, seaports, canals, pipelines, and associated facilities such as depots, terminals, and stations. The quality and extent of transport infrastructure have significant implications for economic development and regional integration as it facilitates trade, commerce, and social interaction. The SADC region has undergone significant changes in transport infrastructure over the past decades, resulting in regional integration projects promoting economic development through improved connectivity. However, the SADC region faces several challenges regarding transport infrastructure, which can hinder regional integration and economic development. The challenges include poor road conditions, inadequate funding, inefficient border crossings, limited use of technology, limited capacity, climate change-induced damages, and political instability. The chapter concludes that investment in transport infrastructure has significant potential to enhance regional integration and promote economic development in the SADC region. The chapter recommends that policymakers prioritise investment in key transport infrastructure projects to promote such integration and economic development. Additionally, the chapter highlights the need for policy coordination and cooperation among member states in the SADC region to maximise the benefits of transport infrastructure investment. Introduction Globally, transport infrastructure has long been recognised as a critical component of economic growth and regional integration in many developing regions (Garcıa-Milà & McGuire, 1993; Cantos et al., 2005; Golub, 2014). Transport infrastructure refers to the physical components and facilities necessary for moving goods, people, and services from one place to another (Wood, 2015). It includes constructing, maintaining, and operating roads, railways, airports, seaports, and other transportation networks and systems (Golub, 2014). Transport infrastructure promotes economic development and regional integration by providing a platform for the efficient movement of goods, services, and people (Ndukwe, 2004; World Bank, 2023). Improved transport infrastructure leads to reduced transport costs, increased trade and investment, and improved market access, ultimately boosting economic activity (Guzman & Oviedo, 2018; Ibraeva et al., 2020). Additionally, it promotes regional integration by creating links between regions, enhancing cultural exchange, and supporting regional cooperation (Ndukwe, 2004). Scholars, for example, Hrelja, 2015; Kalaoane, Matamanda & Bhanye, 2024 and Rondinelli, 2019, have argued that urban planners play a critical role in creating change, addressing change, planning, development, urban design and land use planning. To ensure accessibility, movability, and connectivity of urban areas and regions, urban planners and municipalities must pay attention to transportation planning (Hussin et al., 2021). In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), policymakers and stakeholders have focussed on the development of transport infrastructure to improve regional connectivity and promote economic development (Dominguez-Torres & Foster, 2011; Msemburi & Liza, 2014; Mlambo, 2020). However, significant challenges remain despite significant investments in transport infrastructure in regions such as the SADC (Crescenzi et al., 2016; Msemburi & Liza, 2014). This chapter examines the current state of transport infrastructure and its implications for regional integration and economic development in the SADC. Specifically, it explores the linkages between transport infrastructure development, regional integration, and economic development. Moreover, the existing challenges and opportunities for enhancing transport infrastructure in the region are also examined. The chapter draws on a range of theoretical and empirical literature on transport infrastructure, regional integration, and economic development to achieve these objectives. Case studies from countries in the SADC are analysed, highlighting successes and failures in transport infrastructure and their impact on regional integration and economic development. The chapter provides valuable insights for policymakers, academics, and other stakeholders interested in enhancing transport infrastructure and promoting regional integration and economic development in the SADC. Moreover, the chapter contributes to the broader literature on the role of transport infrastructure in promoting economic growth and regional integration in developing countries. Transport Infrastructure, Regional Integration and Sustainable Economic Development Transport infrastructure refers to the physical facilities, structures, and systems designed to support the movement of people, goods, and vehicles between different locations (Chen, Dong, Zhu, Huang & Burdette, 2019). This includes roads, highways, bridges, tunnels, airports, seaports, railways, public transportation systems, and other facilities. Transport infrastructure is essential for the economic development of a region, for it enables the movement of goods and people from one place to another (Miller et al., 2016; Wood, 2015). Effective transport systems contribute to the equitable distribution of resources and services in cities by providing access to jobs, education, healthcare, and recreation for all residents. This can help reduce spatial inequalities and promote social cohesion, creating more inclusive and sustainable cities. Effective transportation systems can reduce dependence on private cars, which can benefit local economies by reducing congestion and promoting economic vitality in urban centres (Kumar & Barrett, 2008; Mbara et al., 2014). In this way, transportation infrastructure contributes to trade and commerce between regions (Guzman & Oviedo, 2018). The quality and availability of transport infrastructure can significantly impact a region’s competitiveness, productivity, and economic growth (Ingvardson & Nielsen, 2018). Therefore, investing in the development and maintenance of transport infrastructure is critical for the long-term prosperity of a region or a country. Regional integration is a process by which neighbouring countries come together to form closer economic, political, and social ties to achieve common goals (CEPAL, 2014; Gammadigbe, 2021). This can take many forms, such as a free trade agreement, customs union, common market, or political union (Schneider, 2017). Regional integration aims to promote economic growth, improve the standard of living of the member countries, increase trade and investment, and facilitate cooperation and coordination in areas such as security, transportation, and energy. By working together, member countries can pool their resources, share knowledge and expertise, and create a larger market, which is more attractive to foreign investors (Gammadigbe, 2021; CEPAL, 2014). Examples of regional integration organisations include the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the SADC. The SADC is one of eight regional economic communities which form the building blocks of the AU (Fagbayibo, 2013). The African regional economic integration is supported by the South African Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (DTIC), focusing on the objectives and strategies set out by the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Fagbayibo, 2013). The DTIC focuses on the SADC to ensure clear trade integration within Africa. This is essential for open regional markets and development (CEPAL, 2014; Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, 2023). The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) emphasised the need for alternative development strategies in 1987. Through the Brundtland Report, the WCED defined sustainable development as development and economic growth that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising future generations (WCED, 1987; Tomislav, 2018). Sustainable development ensures that everyone’s needs are met, particularly in poor communities across the world (Mensah, 2019). Most economies and developments, such as the building blocks of the AU, strive to maintain the sustainable development spheres, namely economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental stewardship (Elliot, 2012; Hák et al., 2016). See Figure 2.1. To achieve sustainable development, these three spheres - economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental stewardship, need to be balanced (Hák et al., 2016). All spheres are equally important since they influence one another and have an effect on the overall sustainable development of an area (Elliot, 2012). A different way of presenting the spheres is indicated in Figure 2.2. This represents the environment in the outer circle that provides to society and drives the economy. With this in mind, it is clear that the economy needs society and the environment to strive and expand (Hermwille, 2017). Therefore, to achieve sustainable economic development, it is important to balance economic growth and environmental protection (Mensah, 2019).

Figure 2 .1: Sustainable Development Spheres. Source: Elliot, 2012

Figure 2 .2: Dependency of the Economic Sphere on the Social and Environmental Sphere. Source: Göpel, 2016:88 Sustainable economic development provides growth opportunities as it increases the attractiveness of a region through a stable economy. With an increase in investments, capital flow increases. Among the many benefits, external investments provide job opportunities, development of rural areas, education opportunities, healthcare infrastructure and transport infrastructure. With an increase in development, accessibility and mobility becomes important. A developed area should provide transport infrastructure to ensure movement for the flow of goods, resources, and people, which translates to capital flow. Development and investment attract more external investment and allow connections between rural and urban areas, cities, provinces, and countries. We argue that these three concepts or spheres (sustainable economic development, transport infrastructure and regional integration) intertwine. Each concept contributes to the other two, creating a cycle of positive or negative effects. Figure 2.3 presents the Integration Triangle, which provides a conceptual framework and understanding between the three concepts. The framework shows that while each has its benefits, they influence what happens in the other sphere. For example, increased capital flow allows transport infrastructure development between rural and urban areas. This, in turn, provides access from the rural area to the urban area, increasing the participation in the economy of residents in the rural area. It creates a trade route between rural and urban markets, increasing capital flow to and from both areas. The local economies experience growth, once again creating opportunities for more development. While the benefits increase, so do the challenges. One challenge in the three spheres can create a challenge in the other two. The Integration Triangle can collapse if challenges are not addressed.

Figure 2 .3: Integration Triangle: Conceptual Framework of Sustainable Economic Development, Transport Infrastructure and Regional Integration. Source: Author’s own, 2024 Southern African Development Community The SADC is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1980 to promote economic development, regional integration, and political stability in Southern Africa (Mosikari et al., 2016). Currently, there are 16 member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Pouris, 2018). The region covers an area of approximately 9,6 million square kilometres and has a population of nearly 400 million people (SARDC, 2019; Simkins, 2021). South Africa and Tanzania contribute the most to the population, with 17% and 16%, respectively (Country Economy, 2020). Countries such as Mauritius and Eswatini are small and do not make up 1% of the population. The SADC’s economy has the opportunity to grow as a whole and to grow the economies of the individual member states. Between 2021 and 2022, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo showed the highest gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 8,5%. Lesotho’s GDP decreased, followed by South Africa with a low GDP of 0,9%. The growth of these countries’ GDP impacts the growth of the SADC region. Countries with negative GDP growth are less able to develop, upgrade or partake in inter-regional projects. For the SADC region to grow a strong economy, the local economies of each country need to improve and be sustainable on their own (Gawe, 2021). The SADC’s primary goal is to achieve economic development and regional integration through increased trade and investment, industrial development, and infrastructure development (Mosikari et al., 2016). It seeks to achieve these objectives through programmes, including the SADC Free Trade Area, the SADC Investment Protocol, and the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan. The SADC Free Trade Area promotes intra-regional trade by eliminating member states’ tariffs and other trade barriers (Gawe, 2021). The SADC Investment Protocol promotes private sector investment in the region by providing a favourable investment climate and protection for foreign investors. The SADC Infrastructure Development Master Plan promotes the development of critical infrastructure, including transport networks and telecommunications infrastructure, to facilitate regional integration (SARDC, 2019). The SADC has made significant strides towards achieving its objectives, including establishing the SADC Free Trade Area in 2008 and the ongoing implementation of the SADC Infrastructure Development Master Plan (Gawe, 2021). However, the organisation still faces challenges, including limited financial resources, political instability, and insufficient infrastructure. Overview of Transport Infrastructure in the SADC Region Transport infrastructure is critical to economic development and regional integration in the SADC. However, the current state of transport infrastructure in the region is characterised by poor maintenance, inadequate investment, and inadequate capacity (Akinyemi et al., 2019). One practical example of the poor state of transport infrastructure is the road network. Many roads are in poor condition, with potholes, inadequate drainage systems, and poor maintenance leading to frequent closures and delays. In Zambia, over 60% of the country’s road network is in poor condition, leading to high transport costs (Infrastructure and Urban Development Department, 2021). There has been a drive for regional integration between Zambia and South Africa, placing pressure on the state to find solutions for collective challenges (Söderbaum, 2012). The road network between Zambia and South Africa has been the main concern to reduce transportation time. However, the road networks within Zambia lack maintenance. This reflects how regional goals can lead to negligence of local challenges in a country (Infrastructure and Urban Development Department, 2021). Additionally, Zimbabwe’s road network has been deteriorating for years, leading to increased traffic accidents, reduced trade and decreased economic activity (Mbara et al., 2010; Bafana, 2022; Chibamu, 2021). The Global Economy Survey rated the road network in Zimbabwe at 2.8 in 2019 [rating of 1 (low) to 7 (high)], with the rating having decreased since 2016 (Figure 2.4; The Global Economy, 2018). The rating of Zimbabwe’s road networks is significantly lower than the average of 4,08 for 141 countries. Road infrastructure plays an important role in GDP growth and should be a main priority for development and maintenance. The N1 highway, which connects Johannesburg to Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare, is notorious for its poor condition, leading to high transportation costs and delays (Mbara et al., 2010).

Figure 2 .4: Rate Value of Zimbabwe’s Road Networks Between 2012 and 2018. Source: Adapted from The Global Economy, 2018 Another example is the railway network, which is crucial for transporting bulk goods such as minerals, agricultural produce, and manufactured goods (Konstantinus et al., 2019). Many railway lines in the SADC region are outdated and have limited capacity, leading to high transportation costs and long transit times (Konstantinus et al., 2019). The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) line, which connects the port of Dar es Salaam to Zambia, has been declining for years due to a lack of maintenance and infrastructure development (Transport, Urban Development & ICT Department, 2015). The decline of the TAZARA line has led to reduced transport capacity and increased transport costs, which has negatively affected agricultural trade and economic growth (Takundwa, 2014). The poor state of railways in the region has resulted in a shift towards freight road transport, leading to increased congestion and wear and tear on the road network. Malawi faces the same challenges, with limited transportation networks and corridors and poor infrastructure, leading to increased transport costs and reduced economic activity. The fragmentation of the transport network causes delays, uncertainties and unpredictability within trading markets, leading to an increase in logistic, travel, and storage costs, ultimately decreasing export profits (Arvis, Raballand & Marteau, 2010). Water transport infrastructure is vital for facilitating trade and economic growth in the SADC region, but this infrastructure is inadequate. The region has multiple ports throughout the countries, including Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Walvis Bay, Maputo, Lobito, Dar es Salaam and Mauritius (Notteboom, 2012). These ports are, however, served by a limited number of freight networks, hub-and-spoke centres and interconnected operations (Notteboom, 2012). Ports in the SADC region face significant challenges, including inadequate investment in equipment and infrastructure, which have resulted in inefficiencies and long waiting times (Ranganathan & Foster, 2011). The multiple gateway systems hinder the movement of goods and the growth of the economies. Moving towards a hub and spoke model can lower trade costs for shipping lines and reduce the time vessels spend in ports (Nabee & Walters, 2018). For example, the Port of Beira in Mozambique has limited capacity and is only able to manage small vessels, leading to high transportation costs and limited access to markets for businesses in the region (Arvis, Raballand & Marteau, 2010). Many freight companies in Malawi tend to bypass Mozambique and travel to the Durban port since the turnaround time is faster, and they are able to manage large vessels and freights. This, however, increases the transportation cost and the untimely price of goods (Arvis, Raballand & Marteau, 2010). Air cargo within Africa has increased over the last 20 years, but there have been low levels of development within the domestic air markets, and international cargo flights have remained restricted and uncompetitive (Njoya, 2016; Adewole & Struthers, 2019). Of the 230 airlines in Africa, only 5,5% of the world’s commercial and freight aircraft operate across the different countries. Air infrastructure within SADC is limited, limiting the competition in the air cargo market and the region’s economic growth (Njoya, 2016). Angola and Zimbabwe’s airports are in poor condition, leading to limited air transport capacity and increased transport costs (Bhanye et al., 2024). In Mozambique, the country’s airports are outdated, limiting connectivity and accessibility for travellers and businesses. The aviation industry faces challenges, including limited runway capacity, inadequate infrastructure, obsolete navigation systems, high operating costs and delays for air cargo and passengers (Njoya, 2016). Air transportation is critical in distributing goods to landlocked countries across Africa (Adewole & Struthers, 2019; Bhanye et al., 2024). Landlocked countries within the SADC, such as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, can benefit from air infrastructure and increase their international trade, promoting economic growth within the countries and the SADC. During the last quarter of 2014, African countries showed an increase of 10,5% in international trade and demand (Adewole & Struthers, 2019). While there has been an increase in international air cargo, up to 80% of intra-continental traffic, the SADC region and the rest of the world are owned by non-African airlines (Njoya, 2016). This means that while the trade is increasing in the SADC, not all the profit stays within the SADC. Air transportation infrastructure and African-owned airlines are necessary for economic growth within the SADC (Abate, 2016) but will not necessarily address poverty challenges. However, it can play a crucial role in increasing trade, export income, the competitiveness of the countries and regions within the global market, economic growth and development (Adewole & Struthers, 2019). Implications of Good Transport Infrastructure on Regional Integration and Economic Development in the SADC Region Transport infrastructure is critical to the development of the SADC region, as it plays a crucial role in regional integration and economic development. Infrastructure facilitates the movement of goods and services across borders, reducing transportation costs and increasing market access. (Akinyemi et al., 2019; Bolaky, 2019). Transport infrastructure in the SADC region includes roads, railways, ports, airports, and inland waterways. A study by Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1993) displayed the impacts of highway developments on the movement of goods and people, ultimately contributing to economic growth. Cantos, Gumbau‐Albert and Maudos (2005) concluded that transport infrastructure and transportation positively impacted the development of one area and the connectivity and development of surrounding areas and the region. Facilitating regional trade through connected, well-maintained transport infrastructure will create more cultural exchange, trust, and increased cooperation between countries (Shahzad, 2006). This can lead to developing regional policies and frameworks that promote economic growth and development (Yang & Gupta, 2007). Infrastructure development, investment and trade are all part of the SADC’s objectives (SADC, 1992). Transport infrastructure is critical for promoting regional trade within the SADC region and overall development and economic growth (Barnekow & Kulkarni, 2017; Adewole & Struthers, 2019). Connecting countries within SADC through transport infrastructure can reduce the cost and time of moving goods and services to increase trade flow. The development of the Walvis Bay Corridor in Namibia, which connects the port of Walvis Bay to the landlocked countries of Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, has significantly enhanced trade and reduced transport costs. The Walvis Bay Corridor connects the port to Windhoek (Namibia), Johannesburg (South Africa), Gaborone (Botswana), Lusaka (Zambia) and Lubango (Angola); the corridor encompasses 11,621 km and also connects to other established trade networks within the SADC (Brundige et al., 2011). The four major corridors extending from the port of Walvis Bay are the Trans-Kalahari, Trans-Caprivi, Trans-Cunene, and Trans-Oranje highways (Brundige et al., 2011). Transport infrastructure can improve regional connectivity, which is essential for promoting economic development. The Trans-Kalahari corridor, which connects South Africa to Namibia and the Trans-Caprivi corridor, which connects Zambia to Namibia, have significantly improved regional connectivity and facilitated trade (Simon-Agolory, 2019). Investors are attracted to regions with efficient transport infrastructure, as it reduces costs and enables efficient movement. When transport infrastructure and trade routes are efficient and well maintained, they increase economic development within surrounding areas, creating economic and social opportunities (Kgamanyane, 2015). Economic development creates employment opportunities directly and indirectly (Scholvin & Plagemann, 2014). Direct employment is created through the construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure. The improved transport infrastructure creates indirect employment through increased economic activity. For instance, the Maputo Development Corridor in Mozambique has created employment opportunities in the transport, logistics, and tourism sectors. The British Vale mining company in Mozambique had employed more than 5,000 Mozambicans by 2010, making up more than 90% of their employees (Scholvin & Plagemann, 2014). The development of transport infrastructure can reduce the cost of transportation and enable people to access essential services, markets, healthcare, education, and other essential services, all of which contribute to poverty reduction (Scholvin & Plagemann, 2014). The effect on poverty may not, in all cases, be felt directly but indirectly through the spill-over effect of economic growth (Porter, 2014). Developing sustainable transport infrastructure contributes to environmental sustainability (Miller, 2016). A good transport infrastructure leads to reduced emissions and improved air quality. For example, the use of electric vehicles and other clean energy technologies in transport infrastructure can significantly reduce carbon emissions (Koengkan et al., 2022). The development of transport infrastructure improves resilience and response to natural disasters (Al-Humaiqani & Al-Ghamdi, 2022). By improving transport infrastructure, countries can better prepare for and respond to natural disasters like floods and cyclones. For example, the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique enables the efficient delivery of emergency aid and supplies during natural disasters. The development of transport infrastructure facilitates connection and interaction within Africa and leads to the transfer of technology and skills between countries, thus increasing regional innovation (Shahzad, 2006). Transport infrastructure contributes to better healthcare (reduced morbidity and mortality rates) by reducing travel time and improving access to healthcare facilities (Brown, 2019). Improved access to regional and global markets increases competitiveness, enabling the development of regional value chains, which contributes to economic growth and development (Calatayud et al., 2016; Hummels, 2007). By connecting regions and facilitating trade, businesses can use regional resources, reducing dependence on external markets. This can lead to the development of new industries and sectors, contributing to economic diversification and increased competitiveness. Furthermore, transport infrastructure may increase regional tourism (Polyzos & Tsiotas, 2020). Improving access to tourist destinations and transport infrastructure attracts more tourists, increasing capital flow (Webster & Ivanov, 2014). For example, the development of the Victoria Falls Bridge between Zambia and Zimbabwe significantly increased tourism in the region. Transport infrastructure development can promote regional cooperation by providing a platform for countries to work towards shared objectives. Countries can collaborate on projects that benefit the entire region by developing transport infrastructure, such as transport corridors and harmonising transport policies. This can increase trust and cooperation between countries, promoting regional integration and economic development. Transport infrastructure has several practical positive implications for regional integration and economic development in the SADC region. One example is the Maputo Corridor, which connects the port of Maputo in Mozambique to Gauteng Province in South Africa (Scholvin & Plagemann, 2014). The corridor includes a road network, a rail network, and the port of Maputo, which has contributed to the economic development of both Mozambique and South Africa. The corridor facilitates the movement of goods between the two countries, thereby reducing transportation costs and increasing market access (Scholvin & Plagemann, 2014). The development of the corridor led to the growth of industries in the region, such as mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. Another example is the Kazungula Bridge, which connects Zambia and Botswana over the Zambezi River. The Kazungula Bridge was developed to increase trade between the SADC countries, especially Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Sengwaketse & Maiketso, 2018). The bridge established a trade corridor between Zambia and Botswana and increased trade by reducing transportation costs. Before the bridge’s construction, traders used ferries to transport goods across the river, which was time-consuming and expensive. The bridge reduced congestion at the border post, reducing waiting times for goods to clear customs. The Chirundu Bridge in Zambia is another example of transport infrastructure’s impact on economic development and regional integration (Muqayi & Manyeruke, 2015). The Nacala Corridor also highlights the positive implications of transport infrastructure on regional integration and economic development. The corridor connects the port of Nacala in Mozambique to the landlocked countries of Malawi and Zambia. The corridor includes a rail network and the port of Nacala. The development of the Nacala Corridor significantly improved market access in Malawi and Zambia. Before the corridor, these countries heavily relied on the Port of Durban in South Africa for trade. The corridor reduced transportation costs and increased market access, promoting economic development in the region (Byiers, Karkare & Miyandazi, 2020). The construction of the Tazara railway line, which connects Tanzania’s port of Dar es Salaam to Zambia’s copper belt, significantly improved regional integration. Before the construction of the railway line, Zambia relied on South Africa’s ports for trade, which resulted in high transportation costs and limited access to markets. The Tazara railway line provided cost-effective and efficient transportation, enabling Zambia to access the Indian Ocean and expand its trading networks beyond South Africa. The Port of Durban in South Africa is a gateway for imports and exports for many SADC countries. The port’s strategic location has facilitated the movement of goods within the region and beyond, making it a critical node for regional integration (Arvis et al., 2010). Implications of Bad Transport Infrastructure on Regional Integration and Economic Development in the SADC Region Poor transport infrastructure has significant negative implications for regional integration and economic development in the SADC region since it limits connectivity between countries (Mushonga, 2014). With no railway linking Tanzania, Zambia, and Malawi, it becomes difficult for businesses to trade, limiting opportunities for economic growth. Inadequate transport networks lead to high transaction costs. This is seen in Zimbabwe, where the lack of a reliable road network makes it difficult to transport goods, resulting in higher transportation costs. Consequently, products are less competitive in regional and global markets, limiting profit from the trade. Limited access to resources is due to the poor transport infrastructure within the SADC, hindering economic growth and development. Angola has limited access to abundant natural resources, reducing economic growth and development opportunities, specifically in the industrial sector. Trade barriers between Botswana and neighbouring countries hinder regional integration and reduce trade opportunities, market competition, social exchange and economic growth. In Namibia, trade barriers reduce competitiveness and limit opportunities for product and market improvement (Yonk & Bobek, 2020). Namibian businesses struggle to compete in regional and global markets, reducing growth opportunities and related socio-economic impacts. Regional integration is limited between Zambia and Zimbabwe due to the lack of trade routes, hindering economic cooperation and reducing development opportunities (Muqayi & Manyeruke, 2015). Poor transport infrastructure in the SADC limits job opportunities, as seen in Lesotho, which results in high rural-urban migration rates and limited growth in rural areas. Food security has been reduced in Zimbabwe and Lesotho since rural farmers have limited access to sell their produce at markets, and people in rural areas struggle to access markets in urban areas (Crush et al., 2012). Direct foreign investment is limited within the SADC due to the poor transport infrastructure (Akinyemi et al., 2019). The Democratic Republic of the Congo is an example, with limited direct foreign investment in the mining and tourism sectors. Due to limited access, many view the mining and tourism sector as unreliable and difficult to navigate. The lack of a reliable transport network in Mozambique limits access to the country’s beautiful beaches and wildlife, reducing opportunities for tourism and economic growth. There are few opportunities for the tourism sector to grow within Mozambique since tourists tend to stay in one place when they visit the country. Due to the limited transportation networks within the SADC, residents have limited access to healthcare, negatively impacting communities and residents’ well-being (Brown et al., 2019). This lack of transportation networks indirectly impacts human capital in rural communities. Farmers in Tanzania find it difficult to transport their goods to markets, settling for small local markets with lower profits (Takundwa, 2014). Rural communities also face energy and electricity challenges, leading to lower production levels. Thus, rural farming communities not only have low food production, poor healthcare, lack of electricity and small-scale markets but also have no outside investment or opportunities to improve their economic state due to the poor transport infrastructure. In short, poor transport infrastructure has far-reaching implications for regional integration and economic development in the SADC. As such, developing and maintaining transport infrastructure must continue to be a priority for SADC governments and policymakers to promote regional integration and sustainable economic development. Conclusion and Recommendations Transport infrastructure plays a crucial role in the SADC’s regional integration and economic development. This chapter provided insights into the state of transport infrastructure and the implications thereof on economic development and regional integration of the SADC. The findings demonstrate that the state of transport infrastructure in the region is a significant challenge, enhancing negative implications for regional integration and economic development. Inadequate and inefficient transport infrastructure leads to high transportation costs, long lead times, and reduced competitiveness of the region’s economy. Furthermore, the lack of transport connectivity and integration between SADC countries limits the flow of goods and services, reducing the effectiveness of regional integration policies. However, there are some positive developments, including infrastructure projects, such as the North-South Corridor, which improves connectivity and enhances trade between SADC countries. Therefore, governments must prioritise transport infrastructure development to achieve greater regional integration and economic development in the SADC. The region can achieve its economic development and regional integration objectives with sustained investment and collaborative efforts. Based on the chapter’s analysis of the state and implications of transport infrastructure, the following recommendations are made:

• Increase investment in transport infrastructure: Governments in the region must prioritise investment in transport infrastructure to improve connectivity. The investment should focus on constructing modern highways, railways, airports, and seaports.

• Improve maintenance of transport infrastructure: This will ensure that infrastructure remains in good condition, reducing the costs associated with repairs and replacement. Governments should allocate sufficient resources to maintain and repair the transport infrastructure.

• Promote regional integration: Governments should work together to improve connectivity by constructing new transport networks. This will facilitate the movement of goods and people across borders, which is essential for economic development.

• Enhance the role of the private sector: Governments should create an enabling environment that promotes private sector investment in the transport sector. This can be achieved by developing public-private partnerships and creating incentives for private-sector investment.

• Implement a regional transport policy: The policy should outline the priorities for transport infrastructure development in the region and provide guidelines for allocating resources.

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Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Ruvimbo Hazel Shayamunda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Johannes I Bhanye

African Climate and Development Initiative University of Cape Town

Cape Town, South Africa Abraham R Matamanda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Abstract Southern Africa is becoming more prone to multiple climate-induced disasters. Reoccurring droughts, heatwaves, and floods triggered by cyclones have affected countries like Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The impact of climate-induced disasters, especially in urban areas, is detrimental and results in loss of life, social disruption, and economic hardships. Despite this realisation, mainstreaming innovative strategies to curb climate-induced disasters in development plans across Southern Africa has yet to catch up. This chapter discusses the importance of holistic planning and adaptive approaches in improving responses to climate-induced disasters, facilitating regional integration in Southern Africa and addressing the security and development nexus. The chapter reveals that climate change has increased the frequency and severity of regional disasters, making adopting strategies to mitigate the negative impacts imperative. Holistic planning and adaptive approaches recognise the interconnectedness of social, economic, and environmental systems and seek to address their vulnerabilities in a coordinated and integrated manner. This approach requires stakeholder collaboration, including communities, government agencies, non-governmental organisations, and academia. Adaptive techniques can help build resilience to climate-induced disasters by incorporating local knowledge and understanding of the region’s complexities. The chapter highlights the need for continued efforts to build capacity and enhance coordination to effectively implement holistic planning and adaptive approaches in Southern Africa. The chapter also demonstrates how holistic planning and adaptive approaches mitigate the adverse effects of climate-induced disasters through collaborative, cross-border efforts that enhance regional stability and sustainable development. Introduction In recent years, Southern Africa has experienced increased climate-induced disasters, including floods, droughts, and cyclones (Kamara et al., 2018). Climate-induced disasters are catastrophes triggered by climate change changes that result in significant environmental, social, and economic damages. These disasters are caused by natural phenomena such as floods, droughts, heatwaves, hurricanes, cyclones, landslides, and wildfires exacerbated by climate change (Chagutah, 2013; Putsoane, Bhanye & Matamanda, 2024). The disasters have devastated the region’s economies, societies, and ecosystems, with vulnerable communities bearing the brunt of the damage, including displacement, food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and health risks (Füssel & Klein, 2006). The frequency and intensity of these disasters are expected to increase in the coming years due to the impacts of climate change, environmental degradation, and socioeconomic vulnerabilities (Xie et al., 2023). This significantly impacts the region’s progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, and cyclones, for example, undermine efforts to eradicate poverty (SDG 1) and ensure food security (SDG 2). These disasters result in widespread crop failures, livestock deaths, and displacement of communities, exacerbating hunger and malnutrition. Additionally, the destruction of infrastructure and disruption of essential services due to climate disasters have hindered progress in achieving SDGs related to health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), and access to clean water and sanitation (SDG 6). The region’s vulnerability to climate change demonstrates the urgent need for climate adaptation and resilience measures to safeguard the progress towards the SDGs and promote sustainable development in Southern Africa. Traditional disaster management approaches, which focus primarily on reactive response and relief efforts, are insufficient to address the complex and dynamic nature of the region’s climate-induced disasters (Van Niekerk, 2014). The failure to take a more proactive approach to disaster management has resulted in increased losses and damages, exacerbating poverty and inequality in the region, making it obvious that there is a need for appropriate institutional arrangements for disaster risk management (Shaw, 2012). Therefore, there is an urgent need for new and innovative approaches that can address the underlying causes of vulnerability and enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems. This chapter argues that holistic planning and adaptive systems are necessary to develop more effective responses to climate-induced disasters at a regional level in Southern Africa. This approach involves integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into development planning processes, incorporating local knowledge and participation, and promoting flexible and adaptive strategies that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties (IPCC, 2012). Through holistic planning and adaptive approaches, decision-makers can better understand the complex and interconnected nature of climate-induced disasters and develop more effective and sustainable strategies to reduce the risks and impacts of such disasters (Niekerk & Wentink, 2017). Further and in connection to the theme of this book, the increase in frequency and intensity of climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa also poses unique challenges to regional security and development, necessitating innovative responses. This chapter posits that holistic planning and adaptive approaches are crucial in fostering regional integration and cooperation, which are vital for addressing these challenges. Through enhancing collaborative mechanisms across borders, these approaches not only mitigate the direct impact of disasters but also strengthen the resilience of socio-economic systems, contributing to both regional security and sustainable development. This dual focus aligns with the security-development nexus, which highlights the interdependence of a stable security environment and socio-economic development in achieving long-term resilience against climate change. Overall, the chapter demonstrates the potential of holistic planning and adaptive approaches as responses to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. The critical presentation supported by various case studies reflects the potential of these approaches to enhance resilience, reduce vulnerability, and promote sustainable development in the face of climate-induced disasters in the region. Definition of key concepts Climate-induced disasters Climate-induced disasters refer to extreme weather events and natural disasters caused or exacerbated by climate change (IPCC, 2012). These disasters include droughts, floods, cyclones, wildfires, heatwaves, and landslides, which can devastate human populations, infrastructure, and ecosystems (Kamara et al., 2018). Climate-induced disasters are becoming more frequent, omnipresent, and severe due to the impacts of global warming, including rising temperatures, sea-level rise, changes in precipitation patterns, and more frequent and intense extreme weather events (Mpandeli et al., 2020; Putsoane, Bhanye & Matamanda, 2024). Furthermore, climate-induced disasters significantly threaten achieving sustainable development goals, particularly in vulnerable regions such as Southern Africa. These disasters can have far-reaching impacts on the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of development, exacerbating poverty and inequality, undermining food security, loss of life, and increasing the burden of disease (Bhanye, 2024; Nhamo, 2014). Therefore, there is an urgent need for effective responses to climate-induced disasters that can reduce their impacts and enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems (Putsoane, Bhanye & Matamanda, 2024). Adopting holistic planning and adaptive approaches is essential to develop such reactions, as it considers the interconnected and dynamic nature of climate-induced disasters and promotes sustainable and resilient strategies that can adapt to changing conditions and uncertainties (Vermaak & Van Niekerk, 2004). Holistic planning Holistic planning is an approach to planning that considers the interconnected and dynamic nature of complex systems (Juhasz-Nagy et al., 2017). It recognises that the different components of a system are interdependent and that changes in one part can have far-reaching impacts on other components. Therefore, holistic planning aims to integrate various elements into a coherent and coordinated approach to achieve sustainable and resilient outcomes (Djalante, 2012). In disaster management, holistic planning is essential for effective responses to climate-induced disasters. It requires considering the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of disaster risks and integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into development planning processes (Becker et al., 2021). This approach recognises that disaster risks are determined by natural hazards and underlying vulnerabilities, such as poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation (Nemakonde et al., 2021). Holistic planning also recognises the importance of local knowledge and participation in developing context-specific and culturally appropriate disaster management strategies. It promotes collaboration across sectors and borders to create regional disaster management and enable flexible, adaptive systems that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties. Adaptive approaches Adaptive approaches refer to strategies and processes that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties (Zschau & Küppers, 2013). In the context of climate-induced disasters, adaptive approaches are essential to develop effective responses that can cope with the impacts of climate change and reduce disaster risks. Adaptive techniques are based on flexibility, learning, and collaboration (Nhamo et al., 2019). They recognise that the impacts of climate change are uncertain and that it is impossible to predict the exact nature and timing of future disasters. Adaptive approaches aim to develop flexible strategies that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties. They also emphasise the importance of learning from past experiences and continuously improving disaster management strategies based on new knowledge and insights (Pasquini & Cowling, 2015). Adaptive approaches also promote collaboration and partnerships across different sectors and levels of governance to develop context-specific and culturally appropriate disaster management strategies (Aderinto, 2023). They recognise the importance of local knowledge and participation in developing practical responses to climate-induced disasters. Climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa Southern Africa is highly vulnerable to climate-induced disasters due to geographical location and socio-economic conditions (Kamara et al., 2018). The region is characterised by a high incidence of extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, cyclones, and heatwaves, which are becoming more frequent and severe due to the impact of climate change (Owusu-Sekyere et al., 2021). These disasters devastate human populations, infrastructure, and ecosystems and pose significant threats to achieving sustainable development goals in the region. Table 3.1 summarises climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa from 1991-2023. Table 3 .1: Southern African Climate Induced Disasters from 1991-2023

Year	Explanation
1991-1992	The worst drought in living memory was experienced in Southern Africa, excluding Namibia.
1994-1995	Many countries in the SADC were hit by a severe drought, surpassing the impacts of the 1991 to 1992 drought in some regions.
1999-2000	Cyclone Eline hit the region, and widespread floods devastated large parts of the Limpopo basin (Southern and Central Mozambique, Southeastern Mozambique, parts of South Africa and Botswana).
2001-2002	Southern Africa experienced abnormally high rainfall and disastrous floods causing damage to infrastructure and loss of life and property.
2005-2006	Parts of Southern Africa received heavy rains resulting in flooding, causing considerable structural damage, destroying schools, crops, telecommunications, and roads.
2007	Cyclone Favio hit Madagascar and Mozambique, affecting parts of Zimbabwe. The floods killed about 40 people and affected more than 120,00 people in Mozambique. Nearly 90,000 people had to be evacuated. More than 700 cases of waterborne diseases like cholera, leptospirosis and typhoid fever were reported among flood victims. Devastating floods in early 2007 also struck parts of Angola, Namibia and Zambia.
Year	Explanation
2007-2008	Early-season floods were recorded in Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, affecting more than 190,000 people by January 2008.
2009	Southern Africa experienced severe drought conditions, particularly in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Swaziland. These droughts resulted in crop failures, water shortages, and food insecurity.
2010-2011	In early 2010, Mozambique was hit by severe flooding caused by heavy rains. The flooding affected over 250,000 people, displacing many and damaging infrastructure and crops. Zimbabwe experienced widespread flooding in early 2011, displacing thousands of people.
2012	In 2012, a severe drought struck southern parts of Africa, including Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. The depletion resulted in water scarcity, crop failures, and livestock losses, leading to food insecurity and economic challenges. In 2013 heavy rains and flooding affected several countries in Southern Africa, including Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
2014-2016	Malawi experienced severe flooding in early 2014 due to heavy rainfall. The floods affected over a million people, causing displacement, damaging infrastructure, and disrupting agriculture. In 2015 Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades affecting Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi, and Zambia. The drought led to widespread crop failures, water shortages, and food insecurity. In 2016 Zimbabwe and South Africa experienced another year of severe drought, exacerbating the ongoing food crisis in the region.
2017-2018	In early 2017, Cyclone Dineo struck Mozambique, bringing heavy rainfall and strong winds. The cyclone caused widespread destruction, damaging infrastructure, homes, and crops. In 2018 Southern Africa faced a drought affecting South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The depletion resulted in water scarcity, crop failures, and livestock losses, increasing food insecurity and economic challenges.
2019	In early 2019, Mozambique was hit by Cyclone Idai, one of the deadliest tropical cyclones ever affecting the region. The cyclone caused extensive flooding, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives, displacement of people, and widespread destruction of infrastructure.
Year	Explanation
2020	Southern Africa experienced another year of drought, with Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa facing significant water scarcity and crop failures. The deficit worsened the food crisis in the region.
2021-2023	The region continued to face drought impacts, particularly in Zimbabwe and Zambia, leading to water shortages, crop failures, and increased food insecurity. In April 2022, heavy rains hit the eastern coast of South Africa – causing floods and landslides across the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Cyclone Freddy struck Southern Africa in 2023, displacing more than 400,000 individuals and causing significant infrastructure damage.

Droughts Droughts are among the most common climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa, affecting millions of people and leading to food insecurity, malnutrition, and displacement (Lukamba, 2010; Rusca et al., 2023). A drought is generally characterised by an extended period when there is a deficiency of precipitation, resulting in water scarcity. In Southern Africa, deficits can be seen through a lack of rainfall and reduced water availability in rivers, lakes, and groundwater. In recent years, severe shortages have been experienced in several regions, including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa. Southern Africa is highly susceptible to droughts due to its location and climate patterns. The region’s economy relies heavily on rain-fed agriculture, making it particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall patterns. Crop failures, reduced yields, and livestock losses are expected consequences. Droughts in Southern Africa generally result in food shortages, increased food prices, and heightened food insecurity for local communities. Small-scale farmers, who often lack access to irrigation systems or insurance, are particularly affected. The economic impacts of droughts in Southern Africa are also significant. Reduced agricultural productivity leads to income losses for farmers and increased dependence on food imports. Shortages also affect other sectors, such as hydroelectric power generation, tourism, and manufacturing, further exacerbating economic challenges. Droughts also have adverse health and social effects on the affected populations. Water scarcity increases the risk of waterborne diseases, such as cholera and dysentery, due to inadequate sanitation and limited access to clean water. Drought-related food shortages can lead to malnutrition and weakened immune systems. Droughts also often result in internal and cross-border migration, creating social challenges and straining vulnerable communities. Floods Floods are also significant climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa, particularly in low-lying areas and river basins. In 2019, Cyclone Idai caused severe flooding and landslides in Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, leading to more than 1,000 deaths and large-scale migrations of over 3 million people (Chapungu, 2020). Floods cause immediate physical damage to infrastructure and homes and have long-term impacts on human health, livelihoods, and ecosystem services. Several other cyclones have hit the region recently, including Cyclone Kenneth in 2019 and Cyclone Eloise in 2021 (Mugabe, 2021). In 2023, Southern Africa was hit by Tropical Cyclone Freddy, the longest-lasting and highest-ACE-producing tropical cyclone ever recorded worldwide. Tropical Cyclone Freddy was an exceptionally long-lived, powerful, and deadly storm that traversed the southern Indian Ocean for more than five weeks in February and March 2023. It landed in south Malawi on March 12, 2023, causing heavy rainfall, floods, and landslides. The cyclone affected 14 of 28 districts, displacing more than 500,000 people and killing over 500 as of March 21, 2023. The cyclone also caused severe damage to infrastructure, including power lines and telecommunication structures, flooded houses and roads, and destroyed bridges, schools, and health facilities. The cyclone led to crop and livestock losses, affecting the livelihoods of local communities. Heavy rainfall in February and March 2023 also caused flooding in seven provinces of South Africa, including KwaZulu-Natal. The floods were caused by the La Niña weather phenomenon, resulting in casualties and damage to homes, businesses, basic infrastructure, roads, and bridges, and affected crops and livestock. The floods also resulted in the loss of basic infrastructure and forced thousands of people from their homes. KwaZulu-Natal was also hit by deadly floods in April 2022, causing over 400 deaths and destroying thousands of homes. The floods were caused by heavy rain across the province, which was also attributed to the effects of La Niña and climate change. In 2024, Cape Town experienced acute flooding that highlighted the vulnerability of urban infrastructures to extreme weather events. Particularly hard-hit were informal settlements such as Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, and Masiphumelele, where inadequate drainage systems led to substantial flooding. These areas suffered extensive property damage, infrastructural destruction, and displacement of residents, emphasising the urgent need for improved urban planning and robust flood management systems to mitigate future impacts. Heat waves In recent years, there has also been an increase in the frequency and intensity of heat waves in the region, which can be attributed to climate change, with temperatures exceeding 40°C in some areas (Meque et al., 2022). Southern Africa experiences heat waves during summer, typically between October and March. These heat waves are characterised by prolonged periods of unusually high temperatures, often accompanied by hot and dry conditions. Heat waves pose a significant risk to human health, particularly to vulnerable populations such as the elderly, children, and individuals with pre-existing health conditions. High temperatures can lead to heat exhaustion, heatstroke, and other heat-related illnesses. Heat waves can also worsen air quality, leading to respiratory problems. Heat waves also have detrimental effects on agriculture in Southern Africa. High temperatures and dry conditions can lead to drought and reduced water availability for crops and livestock. Heat stress can also harm livestock, lower crop yields, and affect regional food security. Farmers need to implement adaptive measures such as efficient irrigation systems, crop diversification, and improved soil moisture management to mitigate the impact of heat waves. Furthermore, heat waves disrupt ecosystems in the region, affecting wildlife, plant communities, and overall biodiversity. Increased temperatures and reduced water availability lead to habitat loss, reduced reproductive success, and increased mortality for many species. Furthermore, heat waves can contribute to the spread of wildfires, further impacting ecosystems. Climate-induced Disasters, Regional Integration, and the Security-Development Nexus in Southern Africa Southern Africa faces multiple challenges stemming from climate-induced disasters - droughts, floods, and heatwaves, which pose a threat to human safety and livelihoods and have broader implications for regional security and development. The security-development nexus emphasises the interconnectedness of regional stability and socio-economic development, asserting that security cannot be achieved without development and vice versa (Buzan, 2003). In this context, climate-induced disasters can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and conflicts, influencing migration patterns and straining resources, posing a security and development risk (Adger et al., 2005). Regional integration in Southern Africa has been identified as a critical mechanism for addressing these complex challenges. It involves collaborative strategies that transcend national borders to foster a coordinated response to climate threats while promoting sustainable development goals (SDGs). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is pivotal in facilitating regional integration by aligning national policies with broader regional strategies that enhance disaster resilience and promote economic stability. For instance, the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan outlines frameworks for member states to integrate climate adaptation into their national development strategies, promoting resource sharing and disaster preparedness on a regional scale. This plan emphasises the importance of adaptive approaches and holistic planning, which are vital for reducing the impact of climate-induced disasters. Such strategies ensure that infrastructure development, agricultural policies, and water resource management are approached with a view to long-term sustainability and resilience, mitigating the adverse effects of disasters on regional security and economic development. Furthermore, implementing regional water agreements, such as the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, exemplifies how cooperative management of natural resources can enhance security and development. Promoting equitable and sustainable utilisation of water resources, these agreements help mitigate conflicts over resources, which are often exacerbated by climate impacts (Turton & Funke, 2008). Additionally, the security-development nexus in Southern Africa is reinforced through regional security mechanisms that address the destabilising effects of climate-induced disasters. For example, the SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact provides a framework for collective security, enhancing regional preparedness and response to climate-related security threats. Such integration bolsters regional resilience and ensures that development gains are protected against the disruptive impacts of climate change (Tysiachniouk, 2012). Towards better responses to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa Holistic planning Holistic planning is a comprehensive approach that considers the interconnected and dynamic nature of disaster risks and aims to address them in a coordinated and integrated manner (Djalante, 2012). In the context of climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa, holistic planning can be a better response strategy that reorients the planning process from traditional siloed approaches (Wilson & Piper, 2010). Holistic planning involves the coordination of multiple sectors, including disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, social welfare, and economic development (Mattoni et al., 2019). This coordination of a multi-scale perspective allows for a more comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of disaster risks, such as poverty and inequality and promotes sustainable development that can build resilience to future disasters. The coordination of the multiple sectors is to be achieved pre-disaster through mitigation, preparedness, and early warning. Holistic planning focuses on the pre-reduction and post-disaster recovery phases, where rescue, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction strategies are mapped out before disaster attacks. This is a means to strengthen social, economic, institutional, and spatial resilience. The Malawian government developed a National Climate Change Management Policy in 2016 in Malawi that integrates disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation, and sustainable development (Pardoe, 2020). The policy aims to coordinate the efforts of multiple sectors, including agriculture, energy, water, and health, to build resilience to climate-induced disasters. The approach also recognises the importance of community participation in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation and encourages the integration of traditional knowledge into planning and decision-making. Holistic planning also involves integrating traditional knowledge and indigenous practices into disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies by unifying disaster mitigation and adaptation solutions (Gandini et al., 2021). Southern Africa has a rich diversity of cultures and indigenous knowledge systems that have evolved over centuries to cope with climate variability and extreme weather events. Integrating these practices into disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies can enhance their effectiveness and sustainability. The Zimbabwean government developed a National Climate Change Response Strategy recognising indigenous knowledge’s importance in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation (Muzari et al., 2016; Iloka, 2016). The strategy aims to incorporate traditional practices, such as conservation agriculture, agroforestry, cultivation of conventional cultivars, growing different varieties of crops simultaneously on the same field and water harvesting, into modern technologies and practices. The strategy also involves training traditional leaders and communities on climate change adaptation and developing community-based adaptation plans. There is also an emphasis on community-based approaches to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. These approaches involve working with local communities to identify their vulnerabilities and strengths and developing tailored solutions sensitive to local cultures and contexts (Shaw, 2012). By involving communities in planning and implementing disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies, these strategies are more likely to be effective and sustainable in the long term. The government of Mozambique developed a National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategy emphasising community-based approaches to disaster risk reduction (Schafer & Bell, 2002). The strategy aims to strengthen the capacity of local communities to identify and manage disaster risks and to promote participatory planning and decision-making. The process also involves the establishment of early warning systems, the development of contingency plans, and the provision of training and equipment to communities. Holistic planning also involves adopting adaptive management approaches to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation (Djalante, 2012). Adaptive management involves continually monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of strategies and adjusting as necessary in response to changing conditions and uncertainties (Gandini et al., 2021). This means disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies can be more flexible, responsive, and resilient to future disasters. In South Africa, the government developed the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, which adopts an adaptive management approach to climate change adaptation. The strategy involves monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation measures, identifying new risks and vulnerabilities, and adjusting plans and actions, as necessary. The process also consists of establishing a Climate Change Fund to finance adaptation projects and provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to local governments and communities (Koch et al., 2007). Holistic planning has also been used in developed countries to respond to climate-induced disasters, with some lessons on how this approach could be adapted to the context of Southern Africa. One example of holistic planning is the Dutch “Room for the River” project. This flood protection initiative, launched in response to the risk of flooding in the Netherlands, sought to create more space for the river to expand during periods of high water rather than relying solely on traditional flood control measures like dikes and levees (De Bruijn, de Bruijne & Ten Heuvelhof, 2015; Dutch Water Sector, 2017). The project involved a range of interventions, including land acquisition, the construction of new floodplains and channels, and the relocation of infrastructure and housing. Taking a comprehensive approach that integrated engineering, ecology, and social considerations, the project reduced the risk of flooding with adjustable openings while also improving the ecological health of the river system and enhancing the quality of life for nearby residents (Bogdan, Beckie & Caine, 2022). Another example of holistic planning is the “Rebuild by Design” initiative in the United States. Launched in response to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Sandy in 2012, this initiative brought together teams of designers, engineers, and community stakeholders to develop innovative solutions for building resilience in vulnerable coastal areas (Lentini, 2016). Projects included creating flood-resistant parks, installing new stormwater management systems, and developing new housing typologies to withstand extreme weather events. Incorporating social and environmental considerations into their designs, the teams created solutions that reduced the risk of future disasters and improved the liveability and sustainability of affected communities (Bogdan, Beckie & Caine, 2022). So, how might these examples of holistic planning be adapted to the context of Southern Africa, which faces a range of climate-induced disasters, including droughts, floods, and cyclones? One approach could be to focus on developing green infrastructure, which can help mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events while providing a range of other benefits. For example, green roofs and walls can help reduce the heat island effect in urban areas. In contrast, creating green corridors can improve the connectivity and biodiversity of ecosystems (Nyarumbu & Magadza, 2016). In addition, green infrastructure can be designed to provide ecosystem services such as water filtration, carbon sequestration, and food production, which can be critical in climate change (Busayo et al., 2022). Another key element of holistic planning is community engagement and participation. Involving the communities affected by climate-induced disasters in planning is essential to create effective and sustainable solutions. This can involve various activities, from community workshops and meetings to creating citizen science programs that allow residents to contribute data and knowledge about their environments. Engaging with communities meaningfully, planners can ensure that their solutions are culturally appropriate, socially just, and responsive to the needs and priorities of those most affected by climate change. In summary, holistic planning is a powerful tool for responding to climate-induced disasters, as it allows for a coordinated and comprehensive approach that integrates social, economic, and environmental considerations. Drawing on examples from the developed world, policymakers and practitioners in Southern Africa can create innovative and effective solutions that reduce the risk of disasters while improving the quality of life for affected communities. To adopt this approach to the context of Southern Africa, it will be necessary to focus on the development of green infrastructure and community engagement, as well as to ensure that solutions are culturally appropriate, socially just, and responsive to the needs and priorities of those who will be most affected by climate change. Adaptive approaches Adaptive approaches involve flexible and resilient strategies that enable individuals, communities, and institutions to cope with climate change impacts and reduce their vulnerability to disasters (IPCC, 2012). These approaches recognise that climate change is a long-term and evolving problem, and they aim to build the capacity of communities and institutions to adapt to changing conditions (Aderinto, 2023). This approach considers modern disaster thinking to climate change, shifting the focus to reduction and prevention strategies because disaster management is a continuous process (Uys, 2005). Various examples of adaptive approaches respond to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. Skinner and Rampersad (2014) propose that disaster risk reduction should go beyond traditional forms of communication that rely only on print and electronic media. Instead, an integrated communication strategy that involves all relevant stakeholders should be devised for disaster risk reduction and preparedness through public relations, media relations and advocacy. Early warning systems Early warning systems are prevention strategies that can provide advance notice of impending disasters, such as floods, droughts, and cyclones (Van Niekerk, 2014). These systems rely on data from weather monitoring stations, satellite imagery, and other sources to detect changes in weather patterns that could lead to disasters. Once a potential catastrophe is identified, early warning systems can alert communities and authorities, enabling them to take preventive measures or evacuate people from high-risk areas (Zschau & Küppers, 2013). Some practical examples exist where early warning systems have been used in Southern Africa to provide advance notice of impending disasters. In Malawi, the government developed a national flood forecasting and warning system that uses data from weather monitoring stations and river gauges to provide warnings of floods through the establishment of the Malawi National Flood Early Warning System (F-EWS) (Chinguwo & Deus, 2022). This system had bureaucratic complications that prevented it from delivering the desired outputs. However, a new system was proposed that involves the community’s participation, called a Community-based early warning system (CBEWS). The new and improved system has successfully reduced the impact of floods by enabling communities to prepare and evacuate people from high-risk areas by conscientizing and strengthening the community’s preparedness. However, the recent Cyclone Freddy that struck Malawi in February 2022 still left a trail of destruction (Aderinto, 2023). Nhamo et al. (2019) proved that using statistical and dynamical forecasting provides spatiotemporal data for the SADC region, allowing Drought Early Warning Systems (DEWS) to develop well-planned and proactive response mechanisms for climate-induced disasters, particularly drought. The purpose of early warning systems is to help decision-makers and stakeholders plan and prepare using an evidence-based approach to predict the future. Another example of adaptive approaches is Ecosystem-Based Approaches. Ecosystem-based strategies involve the conservation and restoration of natural ecosystems, such as wetlands and forests, to reduce the impacts of climate-induced disasters, and this was well executed in South Africa through the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System (D’MOSS) (Roberts et al., 2012). These ecosystems provide a range of services, such as flood control and water regulation, which are critical for reducing the vulnerability of communities to disasters. By conserving and restoring these ecosystems, communities can reduce their reliance on costly and unsustainable infrastructure, such as dams and levees (Pasquini & Cowling, 2015). The ecosystem-based approach is innovative in tackling climate change by acknowledging and preserving indigenous ecosystems. Busayo et al. (2022) confirm that South Africa faces a staggering 83.3% flood risk yearly, especially in Kwa-Zulu Natal, Eastern Cape, and Western Cape coastal areas. For sustainability, Nature-Based Solutions (NBS) such as green roofs, permeable pavements, soakaways, and infiltration basins are all solutions that promote the reduction of surface water overflow. Ecosystem-based approaches Ecosystem-based approaches are increasingly recognised as effective tools for mitigating the impacts of climate-induced events like floods and droughts in Southern Africa. These strategies leverage the natural properties of ecosystems to provide services that help mitigate disaster risks, enhance biodiversity, and support sustainable community livelihoods. The government has undertaken significant efforts in Zimbabwe to restore wetlands within the Lake Chivero catchment area. This area had become highly eutrophic due to agricultural runoff and urban wastewater, leading to diminished water quality and reduced flood mitigation capacity (Utete et al., 2019). The restoration project focused on rehabilitating these wetlands to their natural state, where they function as hydrological buffers. Through absorbing excess rainfall during periods of heavy precipitation, these wetlands reduce the velocity and volume of floodwaters, significantly mitigating the risk of flooding downstream. During droughts, the same wetlands slowly release stored water, maintaining river flows and providing essential water supplies to ecosystems and communities (Nyarumbu & Magadza, 2016). This dual function not only enhances water security but also supports biodiversity and provides cleaner water for agricultural and domestic use. Additionally, the concept of green infrastructure, which includes projects like the Green Roof Pilot Project in South Africa, exemplifies another successful ecosystem-based approach. Initiated in 2008, the project involved installing green roofs on urban buildings to combat rising urban heat temperatures and manage stormwater in densely populated areas. These green roofs are composed of vegetation layers that absorb rainfall, thus reducing runoff and lowering flood risks in urban settings. Furthermore, they help to insulate buildings, reducing the need for air conditioning and thereby decreasing energy consumption. Over time, these installations contribute to reducing the urban heat island effect, where urban regions experience higher temperatures than their rural counterparts due to human activities and concentrated energy use. These ecosystem-based strategies mitigate the immediate impacts of climate events and contribute to longer-term sustainability goals by restoring and maintaining the ecological functions that underpin human well-being. The continued development and expansion of such approaches across Southern Africa are crucial for building resilience against ongoing and future environmental challenges, ensuring that communities can adapt to and thrive amidst the increasing variability of the climate. Climate-smart agriculture Climate-smart agriculture is also another adaptive approach. Climate-smart agriculture involves farming practices adapted to changing climate conditions (Scherr et al., 2012). These practices include using drought-resistant crops, soil conservation techniques, and water management systems. Thus, the strategies implemented focus on changing the field and farm practices to impact climate change positively. Adopting climate-smart agriculture as a framework, farmers can increase their resilience to droughts and other climate-related risks, ensuring food security and reducing the need for external aid during times of disaster (Bhanye et al., 2024; Bhanye, 2024; Taylor, 2018). Climate-smart landscapes support adaptation and mitigation objectives to increase agricultural resilience to climate change. This is achieved through protecting natural habitats, creating climate-friendly livestock systems, farming with perennials, enriching soil carbon, and restoring degraded watersheds and rangelands. Climate-smart agriculture has been used in countries like Zambia, where the government implemented a program to promote conservation agriculture, which involves using minimum tillage, crop rotation, and cover crops. This approach has helped to reduce soil erosion, increase soil fertility, and improve water retention, making farmers more resilient to droughts (Azadi et al., 2021). Community-based disaster risk reduction Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction approaches can also be adopted. Community-based disaster risk reduction involves empowering local communities to identify and manage risks (Shaw, 2012). This approach recognises that communities have unique knowledge and skills that can be harnessed to reduce their vulnerability to disasters. Involving communities in disaster risk reduction planning and decision-making can help build resilience and ensure that disaster response efforts are effective and sustainable. Community-based disaster risk reduction has been used in Southern Africa to empower local communities to manage their risks. The Mozambiquan government implemented a program to train community members in disaster risk reduction and response (Schafer & Bell, 2002). The program enabled communities to identify and manage their risks, reducing their flood vulnerability. Kienberger (2014) developed a community map of low- and high-risk areas in Munamicua, Mozambique, which are at risk of flooding. The purpose was to create an early warning system through participatory mapping to provide the community with appropriate decision support and awareness tools. Social protection programs Governments and donor assistance can also adopt Social Protection Programs as adaptive approaches to climate-induced disasters. Social protection programs involve supporting vulnerable groups, such as older people, women, and children, during times of disaster (Heltberg et al., 2008). These programs can include social funds for community-based adaptation, emergency food aid, safety nets, and other forms of support that help to ensure that vulnerable groups are not left behind during times of crisis (Peacock & Prater, 2012). Holzmann and Jørgensen (2001) note that climate-induced disasters mainly affect people experiencing poverty because shocks are most likely to have the most significant socio-economic impact on them. Therefore, social risk management tools should be used to assist such vulnerable people. For example, in Zimbabwe, the government implemented the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) program that provides bimonthly cash transfers to vulnerable households during droughts (Bhalla et al., 2018). The program has helped to ensure that vulnerable families have access to food and other essential goods during times of crisis. Adaptive approaches are critical for responding to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. Through adopting early warning systems, ecosystem-based strategies, climate-smart agriculture, community-based disaster risk reduction approaches, and social protection programs, communities and institutions can build resilience, reduce vulnerability, and ensure that their response efforts are effective and sustainable. While challenges are associated with implementing adaptive approaches, such as funding and capacity building, the long-term benefits of these approaches make them a worthwhile investment for Southern Africa’s future. Holistic planning and adaptive approaches for regional integration and security-development in Southern Africa – A critique Holistic planning and adaptive approaches are increasingly recognised as essential strategies for addressing the multi-dimensional challenges posed by climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. These strategies are pivotal in integrating efforts across various sectors and countries to enhance regional security and development. However, their implementation is not without challenges, and their success depends on several critical factors, including governance, stakeholder engagement, and resource allocation. Holistic planning in Southern Africa should integrate environmental, economic, and social policies to enhance resilience against climate-induced disasters. This approach requires a comprehensive understanding of the interconnectedness of these systems and the potential cascading effects of disasters across sectors. For example, the transboundary water management initiatives under SADC demonstrate holistic planning by addressing shared water resources critical for agriculture, industry, and human consumption (SADC, 2020). However, while such initiatives aim to prevent conflicts and ensure sustainable use of water resources, they often run into obstacles such as differing national priorities, limited enforcement of agreements, and political tensions, which can undermine collaborative efforts. While holistic planning is conceptually sound, fragmented governance structures can hinder its practical application. Many Southern African countries struggle with coordinating policies across different levels of government and between various departments and sectors. This lack of coordination can lead to inconsistent implementation of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation strategies, reducing effectiveness. Adaptive approaches are designed to be dynamic, allowing policies and strategies to evolve in response to new information and changing circumstances related to climate variability. These approaches are crucial for managing uncertainties associated with climate change impacts, such as shifting rainfall patterns and unpredictable disaster events. An example of successful adaptive management is the use of climate-smart agriculture techniques that adjust farming practices to current conditions, which can help stabilise food security and improve economic resilience. However, adaptive approaches require robust data collection and monitoring systems to inform policy adjustments. Many Southern African countries lack the infrastructure to effectively collect and analyse environmental and meteorological data. Without accurate data, it is challenging to implement adaptive strategies effectively and to evaluate their success in real time, which is crucial for managing ongoing and future climate risks. Despite these challenges, holistic planning and adaptive approaches provide significant opportunities for enhancing regional integration and the security-development nexus. Countries can overcome individual limitations and leverage regional strengths through cooperation and sharing of best practices, resources, and data. Enhanced regional cooperation can also lead to more effective responses to transboundary climate risks, such as cyclones and droughts, which do not respect national borders. Additionally, integrating security considerations into climate adaptation strategies can help mitigate the risks of conflict over resources, exacerbated by climate impacts. For instance, joint water basin management can reduce tensions by ensuring fair and sustainable access to water, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability. Conclusion and recommendations In conclusion, this chapter argues that a holistic planning and adaptive approach is necessary to develop more effective responses to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa. The region’s current approach to disaster management, which primarily focuses on reactive response and relief efforts, needs to be revised to address the complex and dynamic nature of climate-induced disasters. The chapter presented case studies from Southern Africa that demonstrate the potential of a holistic planning and adaptive approach to enhance resilience, reduce vulnerability, and promote sustainable development in the face of climate-induced disasters. The case studies highlight the importance of integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into development planning processes, incorporating local knowledge and participation, and promoting flexible and adaptive strategies that respond to changing conditions and uncertainties. Through holistic planning and adaptive approaches, decision-makers can better understand the complex and interconnected nature of climate-induced disasters and develop more effective and sustainable strategies to reduce the risks and impacts of such disasters. The findings of this chapter are relevant not only for Southern Africa but also for other regions facing similar challenges related to climate-induced disasters. The impacts of climate change are being felt globally, and there is an urgent need for new and innovative approaches to disaster management that can address the underlying causes of vulnerability and enhance the resilience of communities and ecosystems. Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers should prioritise adopting a holistic planning and adaptive approach to disaster management, considering the interconnected and dynamic nature of climate-induced disasters. This will encourage the development of more effective, sustainable, and resilient strategies to reduce the risks and impacts of climate-induced disasters and promote sustainable development in the face of a changing climate. The following recommendations can be adopted to improve responses to climate-induced disasters in Southern Africa: Integrate disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into development planning processes: This will ensure that development activities are aligned with efforts to reduce disaster risks and enhance resilience. Incorporate local knowledge and participation: Local knowledge and participation are essential for developing context-specific and culturally appropriate disaster management strategies. Decision-makers should engage with local communities in disaster management planning and implementation. Promote flexible and adaptive strategies: Disaster management strategies should be flexible and adaptive to respond to changing conditions and uncertainties. This includes incorporating early warning systems and developing contingency plans that can be adjusted as new information becomes available. Strengthen institutional capacity: Disaster management institutions in Southern Africa should be strengthened to ensure they can implement effective disaster management strategies. This includes developing human resources, improving coordination between institutions, and providing adequate funding for disaster management activities. Address underlying vulnerabilities: To reduce the impacts of climate-induced disasters, it is crucial to address underlying vulnerabilities such as poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation. This requires a holistic approach, including social and economic development, environmental protection, and adaptation to climate change. Collaborate across sectors and borders: Collaboration across sectors and boundaries is essential for developing effective disaster management strategies. Policymakers should collaborate across industries such as agriculture, water management, and health, and across borders to evolve regional approaches to disaster management. The chapter also demonstrates the critical role of holistic planning and adaptive approaches in advancing regional integration and cooperation within the security-development nexus in Southern Africa. The evidence presented demonstrates the necessity of integrating disaster risk reduction with climate change adaptation to simultaneously secure developmental goals and regional stability. As Southern Africa continues to face escalating climate-induced challenges, fostering such integrative strategies will be paramount. 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Springer Science & Business Media. Analysis of the African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa within the Context of Securitisation of Migration Makinde Mayowa Babatunde

Institute of Governance Pan African University

Lagos, Nigeria Oluyemi O Fayomi

Department of Political Science Nigeria Army University Biu

Biu, Nigeria Abstract Human migration is an engaging topic and has been studied across many academic fields; therefore, migration is a significant determinant of socio-economic growth in the world. Humans have been migrating since the dawn of humanity; some move for economic reasons, while some are forced to flee from armed conflict, poverty, food hunger, persecution, terrorism, human rights violations and abuses, natural catastrophes, and environmental factors. This paper examines the securitisation of migration within Africa and the African Union’s efforts to establish a unified migration strategy. It questions how the linkage between migration and security affects the African Union’s efforts to promote migration throughout the continent and points out that decisions made while securitisation is in effect, make it more difficult to develop an efficient immigration strategy. It examines whether these policies were effective or not and inquires as to why the unsuccessful ones failed. This chapter relies on secondary data sources such as books, articles, journal publications, and government reports. Theoretically, the foundation of this study is examined through the lens of the theory of Push-Pull Factors (Lee’s Theory), Network theory, and Securitisation theory. These theories explain how migration occurs, how it is carried out, and how the political actors use legislative processes to discourage and label it a security threat. Introduction Approximately 41 million international migrants were moving within, from, or to Africa in 2017, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Of these, 5 million were immigrants from other parts of the world, 17 million were residents outside the continent, and 19 million were found to be living within the continent (UNCTAD, 2018). However, current research indicates that 80 per cent of Africans considering migration have no interest in leaving the continent and have no intention of going permanently. Reports on African migration have traditionally concentrated on displacement and irregular migration, particularly to Europe. Despite housing 25 per cent of the world’s refugees, just two-thirds are African citizens from the 54 nations that make up the continent (IOM, 2017). There is a need for a new narrative on modern African migration that primarily focuses on intra-African migration. According to Adeola and Fayomi (2012), international migration is a complex phenomenon enhanced by contacts with outside cultures; its dynamism within the studied areas is spurred by new aspirations for economic betterment. The spread of migration is embedded in the primary motive of migration: finding job opportunities. Its transformation into crime-related activities is viewed within the economic or politically induced prism. Migration remains a global phenomenon that most often occurs in less developed areas. Globalisation, with its open borders, is turning less industrialised nations into dumping grounds. Therefore, migration is evident in the countless daily border crossings made by traders, many of whom are market women trying to make ends meet. Contrary to the perception of the mediatised horrors of irregular migration from Africa to the Mediterranean, most African migrants traverse land borders rather than seas. It is necessary to examine the realities in terms of evidence from various countries, the lens through which migration is viewed, and the impact the narrative has had on the response to migration at the national, regional, and continental levels to understand the various narratives that exist on migration within, to, and from the continent. This chapter addresses migration and how it relates to intra-African migration. Migration in Africa is driven by push and pull factors. Push factors are conditions in the home country that make it difficult or impossible to live there, such as violence, gender inequality, political corruption, environmental degradation, climate change, and lack of access to adequate health care and education. Pull factors are circumstances in the destination country that make it a more attractive place to live, such as better opportunities, greater quality of life, freedom from religious or political persecution, and employment opportunities. This chapter makes use of a qualitative approach. It collects and analyses non-numerical (descriptive) data to comprehend people’s attitudes, beliefs, and motivations to their social reality. This chapter sketches border management, Africa’s visa policies liberalisation as part of the free movement goal, intra-African migration, African Union (AU) migration policy framework for Africa, intra-African migration securitisation, the impact of securitisation of intra-African migration on the free movement of persons, the benefits of the free movement of persons and security concerns. Border management in Africa Border governance in Africa has got substantially more difficult in the recent decade than in previous decades. States face challenges such as managing irregular migration, transnational organised crime, and terrorism, protecting the most vulnerable, such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied minors, and refugees, and responding to health epidemics and large-scale cross-border mobility caused by natural and human-made crises. Climate change also strains people’s livelihoods and security in some regions of the continent, raising the prospect of more cross-border travel. While border management in Africa has traditionally been to ensure the security and safety of the local population and, to a lesser extent, that of the migrants themselves, the emphasis is shifting more and more toward how to facilitate the movement of people across borders best to enhance formal economic development through expanded services and trade. There is a common misconception that the free movement of people entails the physical erasure of boundaries established by colonial powers; however, this is not the case, given the changing nature of border management on the continent. Instead, the vision of a continent with “seamless borders” where commodities, people, and services may flow more freely is outlined in Agenda 2063 and mirrored in the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (African Union, 2018; Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2012) migration policy guidelines. With the need for creativity, resources, capacity building, and suitable technology solutions, the significance of borders, therefore, assumes a new perspective. The African states must overcome several obstacles with boundaries that are universal and those unique to the continent. Africa’s visa policy liberalisation is part of the free movement goal One of the African Union goals outlined in Agenda 2063 is the elimination of visa requirements for citizens of the continent. Due to Africa’s division into 54 states, anyone of African origin seeking to travel across the continent by land may need to pass several borders and may need multiple visas. Visa deregulations increase trade, commerce, and tourism, as well as overall potential economic advantages, more constrained visa policies used to address concerns about irregular migration, political or economic instabilities, and security concerns, are just a few of the complex and interconnected reasons why nations may impose or relax their visa policies (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2007). Although many African countries had already begun to address this issue bilaterally, some regional economic groupings (RECs) and other trade blocs began implementing visa-free travel for their constituents, the signing of the AfCFTA Agreement and its coordinating Protocol on Free Movement of Persons on March 21, 2018, represented a significant step forward. Within the AfCFTA region, the protocol is implemented to establish a visa-free zone (African Union, 2018). The discussion surrounding the withdrawal of visas is typically oversimplified, and visa regulations and procedures are frequently misunderstood. Removing the need for visas and liberalising visa policies does not imply that a state has eliminated border restrictions or needs a visa program. The state’s genuine worries about the entrance and stay of phony immigrants can be addressed by risk management procedures that include pre-clearance technologies like Advanced Passenger Information or Passenger Name Records. Additionally, because visa requirements are a genuine source of income for immigration departments, which are frequently underfunded, nations may be hesitant to abolish them. Many countries have found success with “visa on arrival”, eager to do away with the burdensome visa procedures to promote trade and tourism. Many African nations, like Nigeria, Rwanda, and Seychelles, offer visas on arrival to most African citizens. The African Development Bank (AfDB) (2018) and Africa Visa Openness Index Report (2018) list the advancements made by the states to liberalise access to their countries as much as possible. This is especially true about the number of nations offering e-visas for Africans, which increased from nine in 2016 to 13 in 2017 and 16 in 2018. East Africa (eight nations), West Africa (seven countries), and Southern Africa (four countries) make up the majority of the top 20 countries that are most friendly to Africans. At the same time, there is only one country in North Africa (Mauritania) and none in Central Africa. Africans may obtain visas upon arrival in 24 per cent of African nations and do not require visas to visit 25 per cent of African nations and require visas to visit 51 per cent of African countries. Again, this scenario is progressively shifting for much of the continent due to the slow implementation of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol (African Union, 2018). Table 4 .1: African Union Countries with Visa Facilities to Africans. Source: AfDB, 2018

Type	Countries	Countries
Countries offering visa-free or visa-on entry to Africans	11	Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda
Countries offering visa on arrival to all Africans	4	Comoros, Djibouti, Madagascar, Somalia

Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, declared in December 2019 that it will start providing visas upon arrival to all African citizens as of January 2020. However, various groups have opposed its adoption (Olaniyi, 2020). African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa In light of the opportunities for, and obstacles to development presented by migration, the Council of Ministers of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) called for the creation of a framework for migration policy during their 74th Ordinary Session in July 2001 (OAU, 2001), which required the creation of a migration policy framework by making sure that migration and related concerns are incorporated into the national and regional agenda for security, stability, development, and cooperation, as well as creating a strategic framework for migration policy in Africa that could help solve the challenges presented by migration, to promote the freedom of movement of people and to strengthen intra- and inter-regional cooperation in topics relating to migration, based on the existing migration processes at the regional and sub-regional levels, and to provide an environment that will enable migrants, particularly those in the Diaspora, to participate in the development of their home countries. The AU Migration Policy Framework (MPFA), adopted in Banjul, the Gambia, in 2006, resulted from this (AU, 2006). The 2006 MPFA offered the AU Member States and RECs comprehensive and integrated policy guidelines, which they were urged to consider in their efforts to promote migration and development and solve migration issues on the continent. It presented policy guidance in nine theme areas: labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data management, migration and development, and interstate cooperation and partnerships (Abebe & Mudungwe, 2018). The MPFA was evaluated by the AU Commission in 2016 to see how well it had assisted states and RECs in managing migration, the difficulties encountered during implementation, the possibilities that might be taken advantage of, its ongoing applicability, and whether it needed to be revised. After the assessment, AU Member States and RECs gathered in Zanzibar in November 2016 to discuss the evaluation report for the African Union Migration Policy Framework. The Member States and RECs recognised that migration is dynamic, and that migration trends and patterns have changed over the past ten years across the continent. The AU Commission should revise the MPFA, and a 10-year action plan should be developed for its implementation, according to the meeting’s recommendations (African Union, 2017). According to a study from the International Organization for Migration (2019), the number of people migrating regularly within Africa grew from 18.5 million in 2015 to over 21 million in 2019, accounting for more than half of all regular African migration. Indeed, the modern intra-African movement is considered essential for development, and any effort by governments to stifle regular intra-African mobility by making it risky, expensive, or limited can be detrimental to the continent’s development strategy (Bastia & Skeldon, 2020). Theoretically, the foundation of this study is examined through the lens of the theory of push-pull factors (Lee’s Theory), network theory, and securitisation theory. The push-pull theory was created by Everett S. Lee (Lee, 1966) to explain the driving forces for migration frequently linked to the present developments in Africa. The push-pull forces are crucial to comprehend when looking at migration trends. According to Lee, pull factors are favourable elements at the destination, such as high earnings, jobs, and educational possibilities. In contrast, push factors are unfavourable aspects in the place of origin, such as low pay, high unemployment rates, and a lack of health care. This approach emphasises the driving and pulling forces behind the migration of thousands of individuals. Political (violations of human rights, tyranny, corruption, a lack of rule of law, poor governance, arbitrary detention, and a lack of freedom of expression), socioeconomic (lack of access to quality healthcare, inadequate educational opportunities, unemployment, poverty, low wages, and poor working conditions), and environmental conditions (such as food insecurity), and security issues (such as war, conflict, and terrorism) are all taken into account. Employment opportunities, safety, and peace are also pulling factors. These elements play a big role in understanding this study. Network theory: Migrant networks are groups of interpersonal connections that, via familial ties, friendships, and shared heritage, connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the areas of origin and destination. Reducing the costs and dangers associated with migration and raising the anticipated net gains from migration increases the likelihood of international migration (Massey et al., 1993). When the number of migrants reaches a certain point, network expansion lowers the costs and hazards associated with moving, which increases the possibility that people would migrate, which leads to more movement, which causes more networks to grow, and this is perpetuated. Instead of focusing on what initiates migration, the network theory of migration investigates what keeps it going through time and space (Thieme, 2006). According to this view, migration is a network process whereby migrants communicate with close friends and family to support one another. They communicate, provide financial assistance, and even help people find jobs. According to the argument, a relationship like this reduces the risks and expenses associated with relocation. However, there are instances of friends and family members migrating illegally, which causes difficulty and exposes migrants to violence and exploitation. Securitisation theory, developed by the Copenhagen School, proposes that security threats are socially produced through a process known as securitisation, offering a fundamentally constructivist view on how security issues arise and disappear (Jacobsen & Landau, 2013). Immigration is seen as posing a security danger in several policies that come from governments, major political parties, the general people, and even the media (Jacobsen & Landau, 2013:210). Governments are seen to be able to proclaim threats to the state’s existential security by just stating that there is a real and immediate risk, even if there need not be one, according to securitisation theory (Hoffman, 2019). Intra-African migration securitisation The Copenhagen School of Security Studies first introduced securitisation. It contends that sociological, environmental, economic, and political aspects, in addition to the military, make up a security threat (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). Furthermore, it claimed that security dangers are created socially through the discursive framing of a problem. The policy implications of the securitised discourses are greater because they justify exceptional measures outside the confines of conventional political processes (Behr, 2015). The term “securitisation of migration” refers to the portrayal of migration as an inherent security threat to a state or society as an expansion of the notion of securitisation (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998). As governments react by enacting more restrictive laws against migrants and providing justification for increased monitoring, imprisonment, and deportation of migrants, this paradigm is reducing the opportunities for lawful movement. As a result, migrants are forced to take more hazardous routes and pay migrant smugglers and human traffickers excessive sums to transport them to their final destinations, which has a severe effect on their security. Growing anti-migrant sentiment is partly a result of the securitisation of migration. A crucial entrance point for securitising tales like “invasion” of society is that a migrant signifies an outsider who arrives from a different background (Bigo, 2002). Additionally, it serves as the foundation for the excessive emphasis on preventing irregular migration, creating the impression that all movement is irregular. Improving border controls, tightening visa regulations, and demographic profiling are only a few examples of how the securitisation of migration is being realistically shown. This is clear from the fact that several of Africa’s upper-middle-income nations tend to have tighter visa policies for African travellers. Some justifications for such harsher rules include fear of a significant inflow of individuals from low-income countries and increasing rivalry for employment between immigrants and natives (Abebe, 2018). These worries have occasionally sparked xenophobic inclinations that have claimed the lives of migrants and ruined their homes. These contribute to the growing securitisation of migration, which results in limitations on total African mobility within Africa and eventually has an influence on the extension of the African Union’s agenda for the free movement of people. Intra-African migration As it has been for millennia, intra-African migration is still a major force in our society; it affects our economy as well. Internal and external migration have significant overlaps and parallels across the entire continent; they can complement one another, coexist, or happen in succession, but most importantly, they are all significant components of thousands of households’ livelihood strategies in the poorer Global South (Vullnetari, 2020:54). Migration is “essential to ensuring certain people’s lives and livelihoods are in order … governance policies make it more challenging, risky, or expensive to engage in, and such tactics may work against development” (Bakewell, 2020:74). On the African continent, migration and mobility are fundamental social, cultural, political, and economic elements (De Bruijn, van Dijk, & Foeken, 2001). The bulk of African migrants continue to migrate within the continent, despite some recent research showing a decline in intra-African migration relative to historical patterns (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016:22), emphasizing the consequences of rural movement toward cities. as well as smaller metropolitan areas (Potts, 2009, 2013). Halfway through 2019, there were 26.5 million extra-African migrants, or two per cent of the continent’s population (UNDESA, 2019). According to the 2020 World Migration Report (International Organisation for Migration, 2020), out of 281 million international migrants, almost 21 million were Africans dwelling in other African countries, a major increase from 2015, when about 18 million were anticipated to be doing so (McAuliffe & Triandafy, 2021:3). Population trends on the continent have been driven by increased intraregional migration, with substantial growth seen in nations like Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Angola, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite the possibility that migration patterns could cause social and demographic changes. “The bulk of African migration occurs within the continent, as people circulate within Africa looking for economic opportunities” (Awumbila, 2017:1). Therefore, most of the internal migration occurs inside the continent (UNCTAD, 2018), while most of the intra-African movement is focused on the nearby sub-region, especially between neighbouring nations (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Schoumaker et al., 2015). Intra-African migration has grown significantly, from 12.5 million in 2000 to 19.4 million in 2017. (UNCTAD, 2018). South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia receive most of the continent’s migrants, even though all African nations suffer out-migration (Awumbila, 2017:1). It is vital to recognise that even the largest destination nations undergo out-migration, both within the continent and to other regions. The impact of securitisation of intra-African migration on the free movement of persons’ agenda Several explanations are provided for the rising securitisation of migration within Africa, all of which have something to do with advancing the goal of the free movement of people. The first reason concerns the unstable security environment in Africa today, which is plagued by various current and new challenges, including non-state threats. Armed gangs and militia groups frequently fight for and against African governments in the continent’s civil conflicts. Threats emanating from terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State are seen as being a significant security issue. Al-Shabaab is active in this regard in the Horn and Eastern Africa, an epicentre region made up of migrant-origin nations headed for the Middle East and Gulf (the eastern route), countries in Southern Africa (the southern route), and Europe (northern route). Additionally, the region is home to more than four million of the 7.4 million African refugees and more than eight million of the 17.8 million people who are internally displaced (Abebe, 2020). Similar to this, several violent organizations, notably Boko Haram, operate throughout West Africa (particularly in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel, and the Sahara), a region that has one of the most successful systems for allowing people to roam freely (Gandhi, 2018). Porous borders, lack of standardised travel documents, lack of policy convergence among member states, lack of capacity and appropriate infrastructure for border management, and lack of knowledge about the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (African Union, 2018) are additional major issues that prevent African member states from implementing the free movement of persons agenda. These worries have sparked trends for border security between several African States. Morocco and Algeria are two examples. Morocco said in 2014 that it would erect a security barrier with electronic sensors along its shared border with Algeria to stop the flow of people smuggling and shield it from potential terrorist infiltration. Similarly, Algeria finished constructing a trench along the border with Morocco to combat illegal cross-border transactions, including smuggling milk, dates, and petrol (Boukhars, 2019). The benefits of the free movement of persons’ security concerns The experiences of African nations like Benin, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Seychelles, which have free movement laws in place, show no clear correlation with exposure to security issues. These nations’ introduction of relatively lax visa requirements has not resulted in any significant security risks. In reality, the experience of the border continent demonstrates that the advantages of a free movement policy outweigh the security risks. First, by facilitating the free movement of experts, students, and trainees to acquire appropriate skills, the protocol can help to increase free movement regimes and support labour mobility, skills transfer, and technology transfer among African residents (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). As a result, people from the eastern and southern areas continue to be drawn to Rwanda’s growing technology industry (IOM, 2019). Similarly, migrants continue to be drawn to South Africa’s economy, including the banking and information technology sectors and the well-established mining industry, mostly from Southern Africa (IOM, 2019). Rwanda would not have a free visa policy if the securitisation argument were to be used, as there would be security worries from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo across the border. Currently, the busiest border on the continent is between Rubavu in Rwanda and Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (KT Press, 2018). Second, by encouraging people to move freely across the continent, African nations may decide to implement a complete border management strategy, which calls for stronger political institutions and law enforcement capabilities. This specifically means enhancing the integrity of travel papers, improving the integration of border and security infrastructure, and embracing innovation and technology to manage borders and national security (Abebe, 2018). Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda now provide a single tourist destination visa as of 2014. These nations established the necessary border and security infrastructure, which allowed them to take advantage of successful borderless cooperation. Greater security difficulties have not yet afflicted the nations. Third, improving the African Continental Free Trade Area’s (AfCFTA) implementation, which aspires to create a single continental market for goods and services, would directly benefit from the extension of the free movement regime (African Union, 2018). After being approved in 2018, the AfCFTA Protocol became effective in May 2019. The rapid implementation of the AfCFTA attests to the increased political backing it gained throughout the continent. This is a wise decision since it will aid in developing trade in Africa. Only 18 per cent of all African exports were intracontinental in 2016, compared to 59 and 69 per cent for intra-Asia and intra-Europe (Sow, 2018). 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London: Routledge. 54-62. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315276908-4 Regional Integration in Southern Africa 32 Years after the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Intended Projections, Challenges, and Future Prognoses Daniel N. Mlambo

Department of Public Management Tshwane University of Technology

Pretoria, South Africa Abstract Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and when some African states were about to be freed from colonial oppression, the need for African solidarity became an essential doctrine for most African leaders. The effects of colonialism by European powers in Africa left many states in the continent in dire conditions that are still witnessed and felt today. This is where the need and doctrine of regional integration came to the fore, and it has manifested itself as an integral part of Africa’s post-colonial economic growth blueprints. Narrowing this down to Southern Africa, the region witnessed immense political instability, especially from the 1980s, mainly driven by South Africa’s apartheid destabilisation policies. Hence, one of the objectives of forming the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was to counter South Africa’s destabilisation policies and reliance of some states on the regional hegemon (South Africa) because of its economic hub. In 1992, the SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The SADC brought to the fore more revamped development policies to steer regional integration geared towards uniting states and stimulating economic development and growth. However, this Regional Economic Community (REC) has also experienced many hurdles as an organisation. Driven by a qualitative research approach supplemented by secondary data, this chapter dwells on the operational mandate of the SADC since its formation in 1992 through the lens of intended projections, challenges, and prospects with the importance of adding to the body of knowledge on the importance of regional integration especially for developing countries such as those in Africa. Introduction Ever since most African states gained their independence from European colonisers, the idea of and need for regional integration has been seen as a viable development aspect driven by the notion that regional integration is critical in stimulating economic growth and development through the adoption of various policies (Mlambo & Mlambo, 2018). Thus, African heads of state have endorsed the idea of regional integration driven by the critical components of their diverse development strategies through numerous regional integration arrangements. This led to the rationale for the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1980 and the Abuja Treaty a decade later. The treaty emphasised African solidarity, self-reliance, and an endogenous development strategy (Hartzenberg, 2011). As Noyoo (2013) points out, to unpack regional integration, it is also important to outline what regional integration entails. In its simplest conceptualisation, Jiboku and Okeke–Uzodike (2016) contend that regional integration as a concept refers to formal cooperation and integration arrangements by neighbouring states aimed at facilitating or enhancing collaboration (due to a sense of shared identity and purpose) through the establishment of institutions that share and drive collective action. Over the last four decades, the development of integration studies has gone hand in hand with political developments, especially during the Cold War era. Furthermore, integration is a multidimensional social phenomenon, and its study has generally been undertaken along disciplinary lines. However, after independence, regional integration was embraced mainly for political reasons and later as a development strategy to rise to the challenges of minor markets and being landlocked to benefit from economies of production and trade. Today’s globalised world and Africa’s risk of further marginalisation in a multi-polar world dominated by trading blocs in North America, Europe, South East Asia, and China have made regional integration necessary for Africa (Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014). There has been growing consensus amongst scholars that critical issues on development and governance in Africa, which have for decades remained unresolved, continue to pose various obstacles to the continent’s development blueprints. The continent continues to suffer relentless setbacks in its political and socio-economic development efforts. However, Mwasha’s (2011) assessment shows that while regional integration offers myriad benefits to member states, these are not always guaranteed as they also depend on the degree and the extent of commitment from member states. Furthermore, the lack of engagement and participation contribute to regional integration challenges, including the reluctance of African states to pool their sovereignty, poverty levels, underdevelopment, political instability, and lack of political rights. The 1980 Lusaka Declaration created the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (SADC, 2025). This was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, and to counter the political divisions that were caused by South Africa’s regional destabilisation policy. While this did not go as planned, considering the political changes in Southern Africa in 1992, the SADCC was renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Mlambo, 2020). This stemmed from the fact that South Africa’s destabilisation policies domestically and externally brought major repercussions for the economic growth of the Southern African region. It also impacted numerous aspects of Southern Africa, including social division, economic disparities, migration, political repression, and regional instability. Thus, this destabilisation shaped the region’s social, economic, and political landscape. The year 2024 marks 32 years since the formation of the SADC; while it has made considerable regional integration strides over the last two decades, it is still confronted with other challenges. With some Southern African states being young regarding their democracy and the SADC as a regional bloc, the chapter’s contributions paint a nuanced picture of the importance of regional blocs (in this case, the SADC) after over three decades of existence. Further, regional integration in Southern Africa is crucial for several reasons, including economic development, political stability, collective bargaining, and social development. Hence, one may deduce that regional integration is essential, especially for developing states and Southern Africa, as it leads to a more resilient and prosperous region. This chapter dwells on the role of the SADC since its formation through the lens of intended projections, challenges, and future prognoses. It also ponders the challenges the REC has faced over the last three decades. Driven by a qualitative research approach supplemented by secondary data, this chapter aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on the importance of regional integration and the role of RECs in stimulating regional integration, in this case, the SADC. Regional Integration: A Brief Historical Overview The European Union (EU) is the most successful regional integration initiative globally, starting with the very modest beginnings of functional cooperation between six states in Western Europe. According to Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna (2014), we may draw the historical evolution of regional integration in Europe from the 1950s with the forming of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). From an Afrocentric perspective, most African states have pursued the idea of regional integration since the 1960s, when the OAU was born. Article 2(1) of the OAU stipulates that its charter aims to:

• Promote unity and solidarity of African states;

• Coordinate and intensify their cooperation and effects in achieving a better life for the people of Africa;

• Defend the sovereignty, territory, and independence;

• Eradicate all forms of colonialism; and

• Promote international cooperation concerning the United Nations (UN) charter and the Universal Declaration of human rights.

This is primarily motivated by the political vision of African unity; as recognised by African heads of state and policymakers alike, the cost of the continent’s geographic, political, and economic fragmentation as its separation from international markets continues to rise. However, as alluded to earlier, regional integration has been at the forefront of economic development blueprint discussions in Africa since the massive movement toward independence in the 1950s and 1960s. This was primarily driven by the fact that working collectively had been a viable option since that period, considering that most African states were still economically too weak to survive independently. Thus, as Ewing (1967) echoed, the need for regional integration in Africa was made much more robust owing to the level of development and the limited significance of existing vested interests that militate against economic cooperation. According to Qobo (2007), the quest for regional integration was driven by pan-Africanism, which emphasises continental unity among Africans. While African states believed in African unity, some were divided on achieving this and how to do so moving forward. This assumed an international form when the radicals held their conference in Casablanca in June 1961(African Union, 2025). They were commonly known as the Casablanca powers, while the moderates had theirs in Monrovia and became known as the Monrovia group (African Union, 2025). While both agreed on the importance and need for regional integration, they disagreed on how this should be approached. At the first Summit of the African heads of state in Addis Ababa in 1963, which resulted in the formation of the OAU, the importance and need for regional integration was a meaningful discussion. This became an even more important discussion in Lagos in 1980 during an extraordinary summit that eventually led to what became known as the LPA. At the Abuja summit in 1991, the African Economic Community (AEC) constituent instrument was finalised (Olubomehin & Kawanishe, 2004). Post this period, African leaders saw that regional integration could stimulate development in the continent through (1) economic integration (through creating significant markets), (2) security (reducing the number of conflicts), and (3) international politico-economic relations (which assists in increasing bargaining power) (Thonke & Spliid, 2012). Regional integration has manifested itself historically, not only from an African perspective, in Europe as a vital element to facilitate the expansion of capitalism and political unification. As noted by van Nierkerk (2005), any regional integration formation may be robustly understood in the light of (1) geographical scope (such as the number of states in regional integration arrangements), (2) substantive coverage (public sectors or activity coverage like labour and trade) and (3) the depth of integration (the extent of sovereignty a particular state aims to surrender). Apart from the oldest customs union in the world, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) formed in 1910, the earliest form of regional integration in Southern Africa may be credited to the Mulungishi Club (1970-74), the predecessor to the Front-Line States (FLS). This was a minor informal grouping of Southern African heads of state focused on the region’s liberation. According to Bhebe (2015), the FLS was comprised of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland (current Eswatini), Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and this is where the FLS was born in 1975, while Mozambique joined a year later. The FLS quest for an apartheid-free Southern Africa reflected a pan-Africanist view that drove political instability in the region (Koltz, 2018). The key objective was to ponder the state of affairs that was taking place in Southern Africa at that time. While the FLS focused on regional cooperation, its pivotal imperative was regional security matters, particularly apartheid-driven South Africa. This is why the FLS thought it had to diminish member states’ economic dependence on South Africa because of its destabilisation policies. To counter South Africa’s offensive strategy, the FLS provided liberation movements fighting for the independence of Namibia (the then South West Africa), Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), and South Africa with invaluable material, diplomatic, and logistical support as some states in the region witnessed dominant white minority rule. Similarly, because of apartheid destabilisation policies, the FLS formed the inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) in 1975 to address various security challenges in Southern Africa (Hendricks, 2016). However, with the political landscape changing in Southern Africa from the 1990s, Namibia gaining its independence, and the apartheid transition taking place in South Africa, there was also a need to restructure the SADCC. The FLS was disbanded in 1994, having achieved some of its objectives of dismantling the colonial role in Southern Africa (Arnold, 2006). While one of the most critical aspects of its formation was to limit the dependence of its member states on apartheid South Africa, other factors were impetus in the communication and transport sector(s), for which member states relied heavily on South Africa. According to Evans (1984), these were driven by four objectives:

• To coordinate the reduction of dependency on metropolitan powers, especially that of South Africa;

• To create and operationalise equitable economic integration among its members;

• To master local and foreign resources to affect national, interstate, and regional policies; and

• To secure financial and technical resources from private and government sources.

This led to the SADCC member states signing the treaty on the 17th of August 1992 in Windhoek, converting the SADCC to the SADC (Mufune, 1993; Freer, 1995). Such was driven by the notion that the SADCC needed to be more successful as an organisation, and some of its timelines needed to be revised. Some of its member states continued to have relations with apartheid South Africa, such as Lesotho, Botswana, and Eswatini, which relied heavily on South Africa’s port networks. The importance of the SADC’s regional integration initiatives is tied to that of the African Union (AU) on, among other things, regional integration, migration, and the continuous development of the continent. Thus, member states of the SADC commit to developing policies envisioned for the progressive elimination of the obstacles to the free movement of people and labour, goods and services, and people of the region. Regional Integration in Southern Africa: From Apartheid to the SADCC and the Birth of the SADC This chapter intends not to provide a lengthy historical overview of South Africa’s destabilisation policies in Southern Africa; however, it is crucial to touch on some of these aspects. To understand the elements and drivers of apartheid in South Africa, it is necessary to understand it in the geographical context of Southern Africa and the historical context of colonial Africa. The South African state emerged in 1910 when the Union of South Africa came into being, with the majority black population excluded from political participation. Kibble and Bush (1986) noted that because of the National Party’s (NP) apartheid and destabilisation policies and ongoing pressure against the South African government led to what was not expected by many. This was the reform of apartheid, continuous strikes (especially from townships) from 1973 onwards, the Soweto Revolt in 1976, the increasing resistance from schools and consumer boycotts, the strengthening black trade union movement, and mass political organisations together with pressure from the African National Congress (ANC). This led to the State President, Pieter Willem Botha, declaring in early 1986 that the apartheid strategy would need to be re-looked at despite robust resistance from the Afrikaner community. According to Luiz (1998), numerous statutory laws secured and institutionalised enforced social segregation. However, when the National Party (NP) came into power in 1948, it further shaped South Africa’s political landscape as its manifesto was driven by apartheid and Afrikaner empowerment. Fresh from gaining power, the NP government was driven by Afrikaner nationalism by introducing new discriminatory laws to uplift the white population further. From 1978 to 1984, South Africa’s domestic and regional policies were regularly oriented towards a coherent strategic vision of the conditions necessary to ensure the survival of apartheid, known as the total strategy (Potgieter, 2012). The Department of Defence (DoD) of South Africa provided intelligence that the country faced a ‘total onslaught’ and advocated mobilising a full range of resources. The strategy sought to restructure specific aspects of apartheid capitalism to preserve its basic parameters, defend against mass unrest, and reduce South Africa’s international isolation. Apart from its core objectives of forging a Constellation of Southern African states (CONSAS) (Tsie, 1993), the total strategy rested on five related objectives:

• Ensuring that neighbouring states abstain from supplying the armed struggle led by the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia and the ANC in South Africa and obliging them to act as virtual policing agents for Southern Africa by prohibiting political activity by South African and Namibian refugees in their territory;

• Confirming that Soviet–Bloc Powers would gain neither a political nor military foothold in the region;

• Strengthening existing regional ties; and

• Ensuring that black states in the region would not support calls for mandatory sanctions against South Africa and that they shield South Africa from such sanctions.

However, the dream of CONSAS was dashed as (1) Muzorewa did not win the elections in Zimbabwe and (2) most neighbouring states shared the fear of a communist onslaught. Still, and because of the CONSAS being dashed, the NP government continued to wage a bitter war against the black majority in the country and region in defence of the apartheid regime. Thousands of individuals were killed, displaced, tortured, detained, thrown into prisons, and forced into exile. From this period, South Africa invaded and attacked Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia and also obstructed supplies in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe while also at times attacking railways providing import and export routes. From 1980 to 1994, this destabilisation policy had already cost the region close to US$ 10 million, severely affected development projects, and further reduced the living standard of most individuals. One may conceptualise destabilisation as a deliberate and systematic policy by the NP government to engage in insurgency actions in neighbouring states to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of their lawful governments. South Africa’s destabilisation policy was grouped into three stages. The first was the need to launch the CONSAS. The phase consisted of sophisticated destabilisation strategies, and it was selectively related to particular targets and covered the period between 1980 and 1981. The second was the period from 1982 to the end of 1983, which was made up of applying destabilisation tactics in a relatively generalised and indiscriminate manner. The last phase covered the period of the Nkomati Accord 1 1 Was a non-aggression pact signed on the 16th of March 1984 between the Peoples Republic of Mozambique and Republic of South Africa. It enabled that each country would no longer support the other states opposition movement (the ANC in South Africa and Renamo in Mozambique). in 1984 (Chikane, n.d). Like most African states after the colonial era, most, including those in Southern Africa, faced numerous problems, especially from the 1980s, apart from their underdeveloped economies and the dependent nature of their fragile and unstable political institutions. The economic, military, and political pressure from South Africa further compounded these states’ problems. South Africa’s actions were meant to destabilise the economic and political systems of neighbouring states and, by doing so, to achieve two objectives: (1) the neutralisation of the ability of such states to provide a springboard for the increasing activities of the ANC and SWAPO and (2) the perpetuation of the divisions that exist within and between such states. This reinforced their dependence on South Africa and frustrated their efforts to reduce this via regional cooperation in the form of the SADCC (Bardill, 1988). However, the democratic transition gained impetus when Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, and the NP unbanned the ANC in the same year. These changes thus paved the way for open dialogue between the ANC, NP, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and other third parties. Hence, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) that took place in Johannesburg in December 1991 may be regarded as a pivotal starting point in the transition phase of the new democratic South Africa as it brought together the NP and non-white political parties to the negotiation table (Oomen, 2005). Here, 19 of the 21 parties present, signed a declaration of intent; when discussions continued at CODESA 2 in 1992, negotiations broke down as the parties disagreed on a constitution and interim government. Fundamentally, CODESA 2 did not end well. Also, disagreements about power-sharing and majority rule led to much violence, including the Boipatong Massacre in June of the same year. However, these negotiations resumed on the 1st of April 1993 under what was known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), which paved the way to move forward (Handelman, 2014). The MPNF drew up the interim constitution endorsed by parliament, a draft constitution as South Africa transitioned from apartheid to democracy. It came into effect on the 27th of April 1994 until February 1997, when a final constitution came into force. Drawing from the above, South Africa’s pariah state had ended. Now that a democratic government was steering Pretoria, it was obligated (per its foreign policy) to involve itself in regional, continental, and global politics (McCarthy, 2003). This was to be achieved via a robust foreign policy instrument mainly geared to enhance, among other things, the development and peace of Southern Africa and the continent at large. In the same year (1994), South Africa was granted its SADC membership. According to Molefi (2003), globalisation gave much impetus to further and strengthen regional integration frameworks globally and in Africa. From a Southern African perspective, most member states could not steer their internal policies as they lacked economic diversification. Globally, successful cooperation needs a system of dynamic collective governance that requires participation by an active and capable set of institutions from the public and private sectors, both at the national and provincial levels. Thus, some institutions’ weaknesses will likely hold back successful regional integration protocols (Makamunana & Moeti, 2005). Drawing on this, one can conclude that successful regional integration must include:

• Allowing certain economies of scale which will facilitate the restructuring at a higher level of productivity;

• Creating a climate that will facilitate Foreign Direct Investment (FDI);

• Assisting in creating the kind of competitive environment to facilitate innovation;

• Assist in strengthening the bargaining position of the countries of the region in an asymmetrical world;

• Promoting the free movement of human resources, thereby increasing output productivity; and

• Helping to create an environment conducive to non-violent conflict resolution (Davies, 1994).

This outlines the need for regional integration, as one may deduce that African states are not strong enough to survive in the world markets on their own. Being military fragile, some cannot defend themselves and, therefore, need to belong to a regional group to increase their influence and ensure their security. Developing states need to integrate their national political and economic systems to counter the efforts of a turbulent global political and economic system. Regional integration enhances regional interdependence, and for it to succeed, it must focus on equitable regional development. As Hentz (2005) noted, such entails a high level of political cooperation and is driven by a centrally planned strategy for regional production and investment and a balanced distribution among the regional states involved. As the continent continues to engage at the periphery of the global economy, more crucial regional integration becomes necessary, and there is a need for the SADC and its member states to work collectively to champion this in the short and long run. Regional Integration: Progress on Paper, Obstacles on the Ground As mentioned in this chapter, after the 1960s, the need to solve Africa’s numerous political and economic development challenges led to numerous regional integration programs. However, despite this, numerous obstacles were recorded on the ground. One may deduce that the need for cooperation and integration in Africa has long been on the lips of African visionaries and pan-Africanists, albeit through some of the obstacles witnessed along the way. Looking at the level of development for most SADC states, one may deduce that regional integration is complex and challenging (Sesa, 2006). Nevertheless, despite these leaders’ great strides and actions to steer the notion of African development forward, one must also note the challenges facing regional integration. Thonke and Spliid (2012) pinpoint three megatrends that pose a significant challenge. First, the population is increasing (especially the youth). The continent is expected to be home to more than 2 billion people by 2050, of whom more than half will be younger than 30, driving increased urbanisation. If not properly managed, this will pose a serious hindrance, and millions of unemployed youths can quickly drive instability or join rebel groups for survival, as in other African states such as Sudan, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Second, climate change will further intensify demographic challenges. The continent possesses the lowest carbon emissions but will be most affected by climate change. Third, the world is driven by globalisation and has become increasingly competitive. In this case, and despite possessing a solid regional integration agenda and being supported by robust frameworks, the SADC still faces challenges, such as the slow domestication of agreed policies and legal frameworks. Such is drawn from the fact that various member states sometimes have diverse processes toward ratifying and domestication of regional statutes. For some states, getting a regional protocol through the internal process might take months or even years, thus causing a significant delay in regional integration initiatives. According to Mkhize (n.d), challenges may be country-specific or trans-border and spill over to neighbouring states. It is true that in Africa, progress has been slow as most of the integration has yet to make a positive impact on envisioned development. However, there is no denying that the situation in many cooperating countries could have been even worse had regional integration not existed. However, Adedeji (2002) avers that the most common regional integration challenges include:

• Lack of political will to establish effective and dynamic supra-national institutions and to implement agreed treaties and protocols;

• Lack of sanctions against non-performance;

• Overlapping membership, most member states are unable to manage effectively nor fund adequately the many regional arrangements they belong to;

• An inadequate mechanism for equitable sharing of the costs and benefits;

• Unrealistic time frames;

• Non-observance of the rule of law and good governance, and

• Poor private sector and civil society participation.

The points above are fundamental long-term factors that continue to hinder successful regional integration frameworks in Africa. Hence, much-needed development will remain ineffective until some of these are addressed. Other than this, persistent conflict and political instability in some states in the region have, over the last few decades, continued to cause instability and hinder development and economic growth. Political instability in states such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe and the rebel conflict in the DRC continue to be a significant challenge for continental and international observers since no instability leaves neighbouring countries unharmed, as what begins as a minor dispute can quickly engulf an entire region (Mlambo, 2020). African states and RECs have yet to succeed in their regional integration endeavours. They hoped to achieve at the continental level what they had failed to do at the domestic level, namely economic development, through a combination of sound policies. Thus, as most African states are weak and some are small physically and in terms of population, the continent’s states could be more economically sustainable. Also, most differ in development and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while some are incredibly heterogeneous with diverse languages, cultures, societal norms, and natural resources endowment. Similarly, most post-colonial leaders have not been good in the affairs of their state. National integration has been a challenge in most African states in the face of endemic poverty, inequitable distribution of natural resources, poor governance, political corruption, ethnic factionalism, ethnocentrism, and nepotism. These have dire political and economic implications for national sub-regional and regional development. Notably, the continent’s continued weak economic integration and development are linked to the workings of post-independence African states and their institutions of governance. In some cases, states’ weaknesses and poor leadership, divisive politics, the prevalence of weak socio-economic policies, and lack of concern for the needs and welfare of citizens have stimulated intra-state and inter-state conflict, which brings with it negative impact on regional integration (Jiboku & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Thus, the SADC needs to organise itself into an engine for the region that deals effectively with regional poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The SADC’s structural design and the role of both national parliaments and the regional SADC parliamentary forum are essential in hastening the ratification and domestication of SADC protocols and policies for its regional integration agenda. However, the implementation of such protocols and policies remains patchy. Discussion and Future Prospects While it is no hidden fact that colonialism and apartheid had tremendous repercussions on most states’ current lack of development, some of the policies adopted by African post-colonial leaders have been too fragile to sustain and drive much-needed development. If it is not political instability, it is terrorism or military coups. Clapham (1998) contends that regional integration is intended to provide a suitable avenue for African solidarity and development. It has been recognised that the political and economic setting, both global and continental, within which African regional integration may or may not take place has changed dramatically since the first three decades from the end of colonialism. While undermining most of the specious assumptions on which earlier integration schemes were based and destroying the delusion that African states could only develop by insulating themselves as far as possible from the exploitive tentacles of alien capitalism, these changes have enhanced the prospects and practical integration. Apart from the challenges, one must note that regional integration is an essential doctrine for African states. However, for regional integration to produce the needed and expected gains, it will depend on how regional institutions with adequate competence and capacity can stimulate and manage the regional integration process effectively and efficiently. Hence, the SADC must drive regional integration protocols through its member states as a REC. This has been a success in Europe, as states such as Germany and France have, in most cases, taken the lead in regional integration. However, drawing experience from Europe shows that regional integration is likely to succeed if one state serves as a regional hegemonic power. While the level of development, infrastructure, GDP, and FDI is different between Europe and Africa, South Africa has a vital role in regional integration post-apartheid dispensation in Southern Africa. Since 1994, South Africa has made Southern Africa an essential component of its foreign policy. Over the years, it has invested (also through its private sector) heavily in regional infrastructure, such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Mozambique corridors. In addition, through its South African National Defence Force (SANDF), South Africa has played an essential role as the mediator in peace negotiations, as evident in the DRC, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. So, for SADC’s regional integration to steer forward, South Africa must play an important oversight role, even though successful regional integration requires complete devotion from all involved member states, such as robust laws, political will, and strong institutions. However, other elements, such as political stability, will need to be realised for the SADC to realise its regional integration goals. There is also the tendency for a significant number of the Southern African population not to be aware of the SADC or its mandate(s). Thus, there is a need for the SADC to become more visible to the region’s population. This could be done through various social media platforms and roadshows. Apart from this, there is also a need for member states to robustly partner with numerous stakeholders such as civil society and the private sector. This is even though in some states, such as the DRC and Zimbabwe, civil society organisations need to be taken seriously and granted the platform to carry out their duties without fear. As mentioned earlier, regarding South Africa’s regional role, its private sector and civil society have made great regional integration strides since 1994 in collaboration with the SADC. Hence, if other African states (those with the aptitude to do so) could follow suit, great regional integration strides could be achieved in the region. In addition, bringing regional parliaments to the SADC’s regional integration agenda can be substantial. It may help speed up some of the regional policies and protocols at the national level, thus eliminating delays and setbacks (Nager & Mutasa, 2017). African heads of state will have to move beyond the gestures and abstract visions to assist the SADC and be more focused on gradual steps carefully executed at the domestic level. These should be bold and sustainable political and economic reforms. Conclusion Apart from all African states and regions driven by RECs, they must work collectively to acquire the desired economic growth prospects. This is not to say that this is not the case; however, with diverse levels of economic growth, some states tend to lag. Thus, regional integration in Southern Africa, driven by the SADC, is crucial for a broader and nuanced aspect of economic, social, and political development. By working collaboratively, states in South Africa can overcome individual limitations and build a more resilient and prosperous South Africa. Driven by a qualitative research approach supplemented by secondary data, this chapter aimed to draw a nuanced appraisal of regional integration in Southern Africa through the SADC, delving into the need for regional integration, hindrances, and future expectations. The chapter shows that regional integration has been a crucial African doctrine since the 1960s, and over the decades, significant strides, with both successes and failures, have accompanied regional integration initiatives. The importance of regional integration in Southern Africa was mainly born because of South Africa’s destabilisation policies to neighbouring states. This led to the formation of the FLS, the SADCC, and eventually the SADC when the transition period started in South Africa. However, the region and SADC continue to face many challenges. These will continue as long as other challenges include multiple memberships, weak development level, lack of collective agreements, political will and leadership, and political instability. Such a consequence will continue to be a challenge to the SADC both in the short and long term. 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[Retrieved 24 April 2023] chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-concepts_May2005.pdf Political Instability Military Coups in West Africa and the Sahel as Impediments Towards the Achievement of the African Union-Agenda 2063, Aspirations (3) and (4) Collin Olebogeng Mongale

Boikanyo Collins Nkwatle

Department of Political Studies and International Relations North-West University

Potchefstroom, South Africa Abstract In an attempt to transform Africa into a global powerhouse of the future, the African Union (AU) championed Agenda 2063, which serves as Africa’s developmental blueprint towards achieving inclusive and equitable socio-economic development over 50 years. However, close to 10 years after its implementation, Africa is still battling with challenges such as a resurgence of military coups and Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG). Recently, these military coups occurred mainly in West Africa and the Sahel regions. Although AU-Agenda 2063 is founded on seven Aspirations, this chapter will focus on Aspiration 3 (good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law) and Aspiration 4 (a peaceful and secure Africa). Findings are that the resurgence of military coups in West Africa and the Sahel are hindrances towards attaining AU-Agenda 2063 Aspirations 3 and 4. Instead of these states consolidating their democracies and adhering to the rule of law, they experienced democratic reversals and the rise of authoritarianism. Ultimately, this impedes Aspirations 3 and 4 of the AU. Thus, instead of silencing the guns by 2030, the military has turned these guns against their own states. Furthermore, demerits of military rule include the suppression of human rights, limited opposition, and lack of capacity to address the many pre-coups socio-economic challenges which pose security threats in both regions. This qualitative literature assessment will adopt content analysis to produce the study findings. This chapter intends to respond to three related objectives: (i) to explore the root causes of military coups in West Africa and the Sahel, (ii) to examine how military coups in these regions serve as impediments towards the achievement of the AU-Agenda 2063 Aspirations (3) and (4), and (iii) to evaluate the AU’s response to these coups d’état and UCGs. Introduction The African continent has been more susceptible to coups than any other region in the world, with a total of 222 coup attempts since the year 1946 (Powel et al., 2016). The first ever successful coup in Africa, which occurred in Togo in 1963, set a bad precedent in the political terrain of Africa and continues to haunt the contemporary African states (Nugent, 2012). Although Africa remains the continent with the highest recorded number of coups and unconstitutional changes of governments (UCGs), the two controversial regions of West Africa and the Sahel have contributed a high number to these coups. Suleiman and Onapajo (2022) asserted that between 1958 and 2008, West Africa recorded the highest number of coups on the continent, which were prone to occur in former French colonies. For example, since 2010, there have been more than 40 coups and attempted coups in West Africa and the Sahel regions (Zounmenou, 2010). Meanwhile, since 2019, these regions have witnessed seven coups (five successful and two failed). In this regard, West Africa has been dubbed the “coup belt” of Africa; meanwhile, a country such as Sudan has become known as the ”coup capital” of the world due to its longstanding history of coups d’état. Recent military coups and UCGs in West Africa and the Sahel are not new phenomena. Since the early days of independence, West African states have been characterised by military coups; for instance, the first successful coup in Africa was seen in Togo in 1963. Later, in independent Ghana, the country’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, was removed from power through a putsch. Nevertheless, the recent coups d’etat and attempts in West Africa and the Sahel have become emergent threats to democratisation in Africa, hence tempering the success of the African Union’s developmental blueprint of Agenda 2063. This is Africa’s initiative to become an equal partner within the international domain. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 expounds seven (7) Aspirations, which seek to guide a developmental, sustainable, equitable, and safer Africa (African Union, 2007). However, it is key to mention that, for this chapter, only two (2) aspirations of AU-Agenda 2063 will be discussed extensively, which are Aspiration 3 (an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law), and Aspiration 4 (a peaceful and secure Africa). In ensuring that its member states adhere to the principles of democracy, the African Union designed numerous legislative frameworks to guide every individual state’s behaviour. Amongst these are the 2000 Lomé declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2007. Both of these normative frameworks take a strong position against coups d’état and UCGs and thus define any of the following situations as a UCG: (i) a military coup d’état against a democratically elected government; (ii) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements; and (iii) the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections (Lomé Declaration, 2000; ACDEG, 2007). Despite all these efforts to stabilise Africa, the continent continues to witness numerous challenges, predominantly in West Africa and the Sahel region, which continue to hamper peace and security. Both of these regions are home to vast challenges of security and governance. First, these regions are exposed to large numbers of violent extremist groups, which have extended their operations throughout both of these regions. For instance, Boko Haram, which started its operations in Nigeria, has now expanded its activities to neighbouring countries such Niger and Cameroon. Also, there exist in these regions other terrorist organisations which are affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter group from Boko Haram, which focuses its operations mainly in the Sahel region. There is also Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which is a terrorist group based in the Maghreb and West African countries such as Mali, including parts of Burkina Faso and Niger (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022). The prevalence of these groups in West Africa and the Sahel has worsened the security crisis in both regions. These challenges were brought about by kleptocratic 1 1 Kleptocratic - government by those who seek chiefly status and personal gain at the expense of the governed (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2023) Accessed at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kleptocracy governments in both regions because most of the countries where violent extremism is prominent are where there are high levels of poverty, unemployment, poor governance, and corrupt politicians. As such, these groups emerge as a counter mechanism to the power held by government officials, and they seek to change all the ways of doing things, especially where they do not work for the general populace. The name Boko Haram translates to “Western Education is Forbidden.” This name refers to education and any way of doing things according to the Western way of living, including Western political systems (Sempijja & Mongale, 2021:423). West Africa and the Sahel had suffered a long period of declining democracy, with states preferring autocracy over democracy. Hence, instead of consolidating their democracies, some countries in these regions have reverted to authoritarianism. For instance, West Africa and the Sahel have seen a wave of coups d’état and UCG in the past three years. This was the case in Mali in August 2020, where the Committee for the Salvation of the People publicly alleged that the government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was corrupt and called for his removal. In Guinea, in September 2021, the President of the country, Alpha Conte, was deposed from power by a military junta organised by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya. Elsewhere, in Burkina Faso, President Christian Marc Roch Kabore’s regime was toppled by a coup led by Lt. Col. Paul Henry Damiba, who executed the coup under the pretext of trying to bring about stability in the country, especially considering the threats posed by the Islamist groups. These military juntas in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso had promised to pave the way for a transition to civilian government; however, the prospect of elections in these countries remains a far-fetched dream. This would impede the prospects of implementing Agenda 2063 Aspirations (3) and (4), which seek to ensure an Africa of good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, including a peaceful and secure Africa. In light of this, the next section will delve into a review of the literature on the causes of coups d’état and UCGs in Africa. The causes of military coups in Africa – A review of literature The root causes of military coups in Africa are complex and diverse. According to Thomson (2010), there are dominant schools of thought on the root causes of military coups in Africa. These schools contend that military coups occur due to a state’s socio-political environment. They contend that a military coup will likely occur when the state lacks proper and credible institutionalised political cultures and suffers economic hardships and social divisions. Other schools are more concerned about the organisational ability and character of the military. They believe that when the military is professional and is driven by patriotism rather than its own narrow political interest, this will be the driving factor for the military to intervene to get rid of a corrupt civilian government that does not have the interests of its citizens at heart. There is a common denominator across the African continent regarding socio-economic issues, such as poverty, inequality, unemployment, and systematic political and economic corruption. According to Biekpe (2013), military coups are known to produce no meaningful economic or social benefits to the citizens of a country. Meanwhile, these military coups can have dire repercussions on the socio-economic prospects of the country; in many cases, once the military coup occurs, the economic markets react very badly, and the country’s currency is impacted negatively. Both domestic and international organisations have adopted sanctions as a means of punishment for those countries governed through a military coup, which is legislated in the AU Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the ACDEG of 2007. Sadly, these sanctions pose a greater threat to the populace at large than the coup leaders. For example, economic sanctions over a country ruled through a coup tend to worsen poverty levels in that country while leading to economic decline with rapid inflation rates; such was the case in Zimbabwe under the rule of the country’s strongman, Robert Mugabe. Furthermore, systematic political and economic corruption is one of the major determinants of military coups in Africa. The study conducted by the Afro Barometer on policy states that in countries like “Guinea and Mali, rising perceptions of corruption and dissatisfaction with democracy formed the backdrop for military coups” (Afro Barometer, 2023, p. 21). Poverty is also being singled out as one of the root causes or determinants of military coups. Chin et al. (2021) indicate that poor states are susceptible to regime change as a result of the social status of the citizens of the country; when the state is unable to improve the living conditions of the people, there will always be uprisings in a state to push for better living conditions. Food security in Africa has been one of the causes of conflict, and even military insurgencies have used poverty as a tool to perpetuate their illicit activities. To attest to that, Ujunwa et al. (2019) state that “armed conflicts in West Africa could primarily exacerbate food insecurity, poverty, hunger, hopelessness, and the greenhouse effect” (Ujunwa et al., 2019). On the other hand, Fagbadebo and Dorasamy (2021) add that the poverty levels in Africa are dreadful. This is evident in the global poverty ranking, which indicates that about 422 million people in Africa live in poverty (Ujunwa et al., 2019). Africa is a continent that is very rich in terms of natural resources, yet it is still underdeveloped. Many contributing factors are essential to understanding why Africa remains poor and undeveloped. According to Rwafa (2017), Africa remains poor and underdeveloped mainly due to inadequate resource management; in the argument presented by Mongale (2021), this is due to corruption and greed from individuals who use government positions to amass wealth. These natural resources play an integral role in the sustainability of a coup because these mineral resources are used to finance the activities of the military coups (Donovan, 2014); the minerals are exported and provide “lucrative financial windfalls” (Donovan, 2014:62). Hence, once there is a military takeover or unconstitutional change of government, those in charge of the military coup will seize strategic centres of the economy and national key points. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is rich in mineral resources. In certain strategic regions in the country, such as the northern Katanga province, some military insurgency groups and leaders collaborate with politicians to loot these mineral resources for their benefit. In support of this, Rwafa (2017) states that in the DRC, the Mai Mai militias supported by the government are implicated in the looting of mineral resources. In the past, the AU has been accused by some sectors of society of not using a common approach when it comes to military coups and UCGs. The AU approaches some member states with kid gloves, while others are approached with an iron fist. In its defence of the criticism, the AU indicates that, to some extent, it cannot interfere with the internal affairs of its member states based on the “AU’s principle of sovereignty,” and even all member states are of the view that constitutional amendments are the sole prerogative of the internal affairs of the state itself (Woldemichael et al., 2022). The recent case which seems to have caused serious concerns about the approach of the AU on issues of military coups on a country-by-country basis was the recent coup which took place in Zimbabwe. Many critics are very sceptical of the AU’s approach to what is considered the acknowledgement and the rubber stamping of a soft coup or UCG in Zimbabwe. However, in Zimbabwe, the AU seems to have taken a different approach to its own declaration. Phakathi (2018) states that the AU was not swift enough to condemn the coup in Zimbabwe, unlike its approach to the coup in Burkina Faso or Mali. Evers (2014) states that military coups have been more successful in West and Central Africa than in East Africa. West Africa and the Sahel are the most conflict-ridden regions in Africa. They are at the receiving end of military coups, with the “wave of recent military coups in Chad, Mali, Sudan, and Guinea in 2021 and two in Burkina Faso just in 2022” (Afro Barometer, 2023:1). On the other hand, Kyirewiah (2022) states that some West African coups result from leaders trying to amend their country’s constitution to remain in power. The manipulation of constitutions in Africa remains a serious concern; He further states that from 1952 to the present, the countries in West Africa which experienced the most military coups are Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Bissau, Ghana, Benin and Sierra Leone. Ghana and Sierra Leone led the pack with about ten military coups each (Kyirewiah, 2022). According to Kandeh (cited by Adebajo & Rashid, 2004), during the first two decades of independence of states in Africa, military personnel were the masterminds behind military coups, both from the senior and junior ranks. Furthermore, he states that Nigeria incurred more military takeovers of government than any other country in West Africa for approximately twenty-nine years (Adebajo & Rashid, 2004). For many years, the Nigerian government has been battling with the scourge of military issues and forms of military insurgency groups such as the famous Boko Haram. According to Ezeani et al. (2021), Boko Haram has been a major threat to the security of the Nigerian state, especially in the Northeast of the country, for the past two decades (Sempijja & Mongale, 2021). West Africa and the Sahel regions have experienced a series of military insurgency groups disguised as religious groups. These groups have been causing serious instabilities and acts of terrorism in both West Africa and the Sahel. Zamkowska (2022) states that groups that subscribe to IS-like ideals have established themselves in the Sahel region with a long history. Military coups in West Africa and the Sahel as impediments towards the achievement of the AU Agenda 2063 Aspirations (3) and (4). To transform the African continent into a global powerhouse, the African Union (AU) adopted Agenda 2063 as a blueprint to guide these developmental aspirations. Amongst these aspirations are those that seek to ensure an Africa of good governance, peace and security. As such, the recent waves of military coups in West Africa and the Sahel pose a serious threat to the AU’s ability to realise and achieve these goals, as enshrined in the Agenda 2063. In terms of legislative frameworks that will support the implementation of Aspirations (3) and (4) of the AU Agenda 2063, in 2007, the AU produced a document titled “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance”, which focuses on issues of democracy, elections and governance within the jurisdictions of the member states. This document was a direct response to several critical issues which hamper good governance in the continent, such as military coups or unconstitutional changes of government and electoral, political, and economic corruption, which continues to plague the continent. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Union, 2007) serves as a guiding principle which emphasises the significance of “good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights” (African Union, 2007). Although the Charter is very strong, this study will limit itself to good governance, peace, and security issues that align with Agenda 2063. Article twelve of the treaty indicates that member states shall “Promote good governance by ensuring transparent and accountable administration and ensure that they strengthen political institutions to entrench a culture of democracy and peace” (AU, 2007:07). As a regional body, the AU has made concerted efforts over the years to ensure and promote good governance in the region and to encourage the member states to ensure that principles of good governance are adhered to and implemented in their respective countries or territories. However, Africa is increasingly becoming riddled with issues of bad governance, from electoral, political and economic corruption, which is rife in Africa, to mismanagement of state resources and mineral resources, which benefits a few individuals, corrupt civilians in the form of business people who are colluding with politicians and government officials to loot state resources and mineral resources. Umunakwe and Osaren (2023:138) note, “Political leaders under the disguise of political positions divert public funds through looting, embezzlement, and unjustified preferences to allies and family members” Governance in Africa The 2022 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Report defines governance as “the provision of the political, social, economic and environmental goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens” (The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013:7). The socio-economic and political state of governance in Africa is gradually declining for several reasons, including political and economic corruption. This practice remains a pressing challenge for Africa’s good governance. Corruption remains a serious factor that curtails political, social, and economic governance in Africa (Mongale, Molope & Tomodi, 2020). Many African states cannot provide public goods to their constituents, which is sparked by corrupt practices by greedy politicians who use political office as a tool to squander state resources and for self-enrichment (Mongale, 2021). In the arguments provided by Fagbadebo and Dorasamy (2021), the governance crisis in Africa should be attributed to the leadership issue. This is because many African elites loot state resources for their personal use. (Fagbadebo & Dorasamy, 2021). The AU advocates for promoting good governance based on the principle of transparency and accountability (AU, 2007). However, there seems to be an erosion of good governance in Africa because of systematic corruption and lack of political will to deal with deficiencies in governance generally. This was evident in the case of Sudan, where the former president, Omar al-Bashir, who had served as the president of Sudan for almost 30 years, had used the state’s resources (i.e. oil) to consolidate his power and enrich himself. Due to his kleptocratic rule, in December 2018, protests against the al-Bashir regime broke out in Atbara, and these pro-democracy protests were against poverty, corruption, and unemployment. Within a few days, these protests spread to Sudan’s capital, Khartoum; with rising discontent, the demands shifted, and calls were made for al-Bashir to relinquish power (Aljazeera, 2021). Following pro-democracy protests, al-Bashir was removed from power by Sudan’s military in April 2019. After his removal, the power vacuum was exploited by opportunistic military personnel who seized power and suspended the country’s constitution. Nevertheless, although al-Bashir was replaced by a transitional military government, civilians are still advocating a civilian-led government. The socio-economic and political crisis in Sudan reflects what Fagbadebo and Dorasamy (2021) had alluded to, “the notion that African countries are under the siege of the governance crisis is not an exaggeration”. High levels of unemployment, low income, poverty, and mismanagement of funds remain some of the issues that spell out the state of governance in Africa, factors that highlight governance challenges in the continent. Elsewhere in West Africa’s Sahel region, in Mali, President Ibrahim Keita had been re-elected with a 67% majority in the 2018 presidential elections. However, allegations of vote rigging had been made. Also, like the government of al-Bashir in Sudan, Ibrahim Keita’s government has been widely seen as corrupt and unaccountable to its constituents for several years (News African, 2021). As a result of it being unaccountable to its constituents, protests against Keita’s government broke out in Mali in 2020. They thus led to the removal of Keita in a coup led by Colonel Assimi Goïta. Consequently, these practices of corruption and failure by governments to provide public goods, grant the military a right to governance, as they use the existing discontents as a pretext to enter into political affairs by unconstitutionally assuming political power. As a result, this tampers with Aspiration (3) of the AU Agenda 2063, which seeks to create an Africa of good governance. Alpha Conde, the first democratically elected President in Guinea in 2010, was deposed from power through a military coup. The coup against Conde was orchestrated by Mamady Doumbouya, who dissolved the government, cancelled the country’s constitution, and closed the country’s borders (New African, 2021). The 2021 coup in Guinea was also executed under the pretext that Conde’s tenure was marked by poor governance, a declining economy, suppression of opposition parties, and a crackdown during pro-democracy protests. In addition to these challenges of bad governance, Conde went as far as changing the country’s constitution to allow him to serve for more than the prescribed two terms in office. In his utterances, as Yusuf Akinpelu (2021) quoted, Mamady Doumbouya proclaimed that the army had no other choice but “to give the people their freedom”. He quoted the late Ghanaian former president, John Rawlings, who also led through a coup in Ghana. Doumbouya was quoted making these proclamations: “If the people are crushed by their elites, it is up to the army to give the people their freedom” and “The duty of the soldier is to save the country. We will no longer entrust politics to one man. We will entrust it to the people.” (Akinpelu, 2021). African leaders’ tendency to circumvent prescribed two terms in office continues to impede democracy in the continent. Sadly, this tends to instigate military coups, executed under the pretext of restoring constitutional order by disposing civilian-led government out of office. Although Mamady Doumbouya (the junta leader) had promised to restore democratic processes such as elections, the reality is that the military in Guinea continues to entrench itself in government. The status of democracy in West Africa and the Sahel regions has been deteriorating, while authoritarianism has been on the rise. This is evident in the recent waves of military takeovers in both regions, which have been showing a setback to democracy since 2020. In Guinea, for instance, although the military had seized power from Alpha Conde under the premise of upholding democratic principles, the rule by the military in the country has not kept up the principles of democracy because the military had failed to arrange transitional elections to elect leaders democratically. Meanwhile, Guinea is subjected to the rule of a self-imposed government and a decline in political rights, actions which resulted in the country being downgraded from being partly free to not free status by Freedom House (2021). In this context, the reversal of democracy in Guinea is witnessed through the self-imposition of the military on governance because, in a democracy, a legitimate government is chosen by the people through the electoral process. Therefore, the absence of free and fair elections in the selection of government indicates a democratic deficit. Guinea’s history of military coups illustrates a troubling cycle of instability and interrupted governance. Since the first coup in 1984 led by Lieutenant Colonel Lansana Conte (Odubajo & Ishola, 2024:56), the country has witnessed several attempts, with three being successful. The December 23, 2008, coup marked a significant moment, as Captain Moussa “Dadis” Camara seized power following Conte’s death. The most recent coup on September 5, 2021, further deepened the crisis when Col. Mamadi Doumbouya and his forces stormed the presidential palace, detaining then-President Alpha Condé and forcing him to resign. Doumbouya’s declaration of a suspended constitution and dissolved government echoed the typical rhetoric of coup leaders who frame their actions as necessary for restoring order and democracy. Despite promises to return to civilian rule, Guinea remains under military control nearly four years later, with no clear path to elections or constitutional governance. According to Odubajo and Ishola (2023:50), “The coupists frame the ouster of an elected government as a defence of democratic legality and make a public promise to hold elections and restore democracy as soon as possible.” This protracted situation raises concerns about the junta’s commitment to democratic principles and the will of the Guinean people to choose their own leadership. Jalloh (2024) has opined that there is a rising discontent in the Sahel region, reflecting a significant frustration among civilians toward the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Promises of a swift return to civilian rule have largely gone unfulfilled, leading to growing impatience and scepticism among the populace (Jalloh, 2024). Despite this, the juntas appear to have entrenched their power, often justifying their continued rule through narratives of stability and security. The ongoing military rule has not only stifled political progress but also hindered the potential for economic and social development in the country. This situation not only undermines hopes for democratic governance but also poses challenges for regional stability and development in West Africa and the Sahel. ECOWAS’s economic sanctions aimed to pressure the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to abandon their unconstitutional methods of governance. In response, these regimes withdrew from ECOWAS and formed a military alliance, signalling a determined shift toward a more autonomous approach to security. This pact represents a strategic move to consolidate their military capabilities against persistent insurgencies, reflecting a belief that external interventions, such as those from ECOWAS, have been ineffective. Kaledzi (2023) states, “The organisation is failing to achieve its objectives. Worse, the legitimate ambitions of our countries of making the G5 Sahel a zone of security and development are hindered by institutional red tape from a previous era, which convinces us that our process of independence and dignity is not compatible with G5 participation in its current form”. This development raises concerns about the implications for regional cooperation and the prospects for returning to civilian rule. The juntas’ withdrawal from ECOWAS could hinder collaborative efforts to address broader security and governance challenges in the Sahel, potentially leading to further isolation and a prolonged state of military rule. In Chad, following the April 2021 death of strongman and long-time serving president Idriss Deby Itno, his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, seized power through a military putsch. Following this coup, which can be labelled as a ‘dynastic coup,’ the Transitional Military Council suspended the country’s constitution and declared that elections would be facilitated within 18 months. However, up to now, Mahamat Idriss Deby is still the president of Chad. The actions executed by Mahamat Idriss Deby to deal with pro-democracy protests sent a strong message that Chad is continuously led by a strongman. This was evident in the violent crackdowns on every opposition against his rule; a case in point is the pro-democracy protests that occurred on 20th October 2022, which the Chadians call “Black Thursday” (Nodjimbadem, 2022). These pro-democracy protests led to mass arrests, and several pro-democracy protestors were killed, while others suffered malicious body injuries. Due to its chaotic nature, “Black Thursday” remains one of the worst repressions in Chad’s history. The suppression of freedom of association and political participation (protest action) hinders democratic consolidation. This is because, in a democracy, people should enjoy freedom of expression, association and participation through formal mechanisms, such as electing their government or unconventional participation, such as freedom of assembly and protest. Nevertheless, this was different in Chad as the country was ruled by a military leader who was not voted into power, depicting that the government of Chad was illegitimate. Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire have proven their desire to move towards a full democracy by subscribing to the norms and principles of democracy, such as good governance, peace and security, since the end of the 2011 conflict. However, the country’s democratic momentum faltered in 2020 after President Alassane Ouattara circumvented the constitutional term limit of two (2) terms and assumed a third term of office. Not only did he circumvent the constitutional term limit, but he went as far as disqualifying candidates who showed themselves as a political threat to his power. This resulted in widespread political violence, while the opposition parties boycotted the elections (Freedom House, 2022:13). Nevertheless, in the March 2021 parliamentary elections, improvements seemed to exist in the country’s democratic processes, as there was less violence during elections, and several opposition candidates freely registered and participated in the elections. Meanwhile, the Ivorians enjoyed their freedom of expression and participation through organised public gatherings (Freedom House, 2022:13). In essence, these unconstitutional changes of government impede Aspiration (3) of the AU Agenda 2063, which seeks to ensure an Africa of good governance and democracy. Instead of progressing towards democratic consolidation, African states have been susceptible to coups d’état; this continues to be against the norms and principles of democracy. Also, these military takeovers are not only impeding the implementation of Agenda 2063, but they also violate the African Union’s legislative frameworks, such as the 2000 Lomé Declaration and the ACDEG of 2007, including the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Sadly, the prospects of democracy in this sense remain a farfetched dream, especially if countries in both West Africa and the Sahel continue to align themselves with global hegemons such as Russia and China, whose political systems are nowhere near democratic. In this sense, when taking a closer look at the recent waves of coups in West Africa and the Sahel regions, countries that have experienced military takeovers have detached themselves from Western powers such as the USA and its European allies (e.g. France). Hence, the exit of former neo-colonialists in countries such as the Central Africa Republic (CAR), Mali, and Sudan has coincided with the prevalence of Russia’s ‘missionary’ group (Wagner Group), which has replaced the French troops who have been combating insecurity threats in the region. Peace and security in Africa In their concerted effort to ensure peace and security in the region, the AU has established the Peace and Security Council under Articles 24 and 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Peace and security remain very critical components of a healthy democracy, and they ensure that civilians live in a peaceful environment that is conducive to economic development (ACDEG, 2007). Some parts of Africa have been experiencing instability for a very long time due to wars. Sadly, security threats in Africa interfere with Aspiration (4) of the AU Agenda 2063, which aspires to a peaceful and secure Africa for all those who live on the continent. Multiple factors create instability and insecurity in regions such as West Africa and the Sahel. Amongst these challenges is the drying of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), which had been a source of livelihood and survival over many years; hence, its drying has resulted in increased violent competition for resources. In this context, climate change and its impact on the drying of the LCB has presented itself as a threat intensifier in the region, adding to the cocktail of insecurities such as communal violence (between herders and farmers), the rapid spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and the Islamist militants, who continue to launch terror campaigns in these regions. In the arguments presented by Sempijja and Mongale (2022), both the Sahel and West Africa are compounded by a growing threat of insurgency groups who operate throughout both regions. The prevalence of insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Islamic State, and Al-Qaeda affiliated groups have contributed to deteriorating security, which requires an intense response from various governments in the Sahel and West Africa. The emerging reality is that African troops fighting these insurgent groups are often underpaid, undersupplied with ammunition and underappreciated (Venter, 2020). Perhaps it is in this context that coups in Africa do not occur in countries with rapidly developing economies. However, these coups are likely to take place in those struggling democracies, where weak economies exist with low standards of living and minimal opportunities for the rapidly increasing youth population. This is the case in West Africa’s Sahel states, which are characterised by high youth unemployment. Sadly, due to these socio-economic challenges, wherever the state seems unable to provide public goods, insurgent groups tend to fill this vacuum by offering the vulnerable youth the opportunities to work under them. As such, it becomes difficult for state security forces to drive out terrorism in these regions because, in some communities within the Sahel and West Africa, groups such as JNIM are recognised as legitimate groups through their operations as they tend to provide governance where the government seems to be absent (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022). The growing number of affiliates to terrorist organisations in both the Sahel and West Africa, therefore, exacerbates security challenges throughout these regions, hence tampering with the prospects of AU to implement its developmental blueprint of Agenda 2063, especially Aspiration (4), for an Africa that is peaceful and secure. Furthermore, West Africa and the Sahel have become home to terrorist organisations affiliated to or owing their allegiance to ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups, thus contributing to the Islamic State franchise in Africa, fulfilling the sole mandate of the Islamic State to build its brand throughout the entire globe, as it aspires to be the world’s biggest terrorist organisation (Sempijja & Mongale, 2021). The growing number of insecurities in the region has served as one of the causes of coups d’état in some of West Africa’s Sahel regions. For instance, one of the reasons behind the overthrow of Colonel Paul Henry Damiba, who seized power through a coup in Burkina Faso, was due to intensifying terrorist attacks in the country. As such, Captain Ibrahim Traore, whose status has been relatively associated with Thomas Sankara (the jewel and demi-god of Burkina Faso), removed Colonel Damiba from power after he had failed to fight attacks launched by JNIM and ISIS in the Greater Sahara. Victims of these terrorist attacks included state security forces, civilians, humanitarian workers, as well as religious, political, traditional, and community figures (Human Rights Watch, 2022). As a result of these attacks caused by insurgent groups, over 237,000 people were forced to flee their homes in 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2022), resulting in the number of internally displaced people since 2016 rising to over 1.4 million, which is equivalent to 6% of the population. The level of instability and insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel continues to be on the rise as both regions enter 2023, Siaplay and Werker (2023) posit that the resurgence of coups worsened these instabilities in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali. It is worth noting that these military takeovers occurred amidst the ongoing conflicts in both regions, violence which has led to the displacement of more than 2.5 million people, while it has been projected that these violent conflicts have led to the deaths of an estimated 8,000 individuals in 2022 (Shurkin, 2022). What has also become apparent is that these conflicts have started to affect previously peaceful countries in West Africa. This was the case in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, where in 2021 and 2022, these countries started to witness fatal attacks associated with armed groups. Thus, efforts have been made to enact counter-terrorism mechanisms in these countries to curb the spread of violent extremism. As Kwarkye (2022) alluded, the states of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo have conducted military operations facilitated through their collective means within the confines of the Accra Initiative. In Operation Koudanlgou 4, Zone 2, which was last conducted in November 2021, these countries deployed about 6,000 soldiers and arrested 300 suspected members of extremist groups (Reuters, 2021). Through such operations, these states are attempting to implement the aspiration of the AU Agenda 2063, which seeks to ensure that security prevails in Africa and that the people are protected from any threat. However, violent extremist groups continue to threaten these initiatives and aspirations of the AU and its developmental blueprint of Agenda-2063. The recent governments which assumed power through military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali, for instance, have not brought any stability to their countries, even though these military governments had executed these coups under the pretext of offering security to the people. These military governments are yet to provide security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel regions, which are rocked by violent extremism. Also, the internationalisation of the region’s insecurity led to the involvement of Russia’s ‘missionary’ group, the Wagner group, alongside Russia’s disinformation campaign in Mali at the end of 2021. However, Wagner has not produced any security and stability in Mali (Siaplay & Werker, 2023). Instead, there have been allegations of human rights violations by the Wagner group in Mali, Sudan, and the CAR, actions which are in contrast to Aspirations (3) and (4) of the AU Agenda 2063, which aspire to see an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law, including a peaceful and secure Africa. In essence, although these military coups had been successful in countries such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, the Central Africa Republic (CAR), the Republic of Chad and the recent coups in Niger (which was staged later in 2023), there have been allegations of failed coups in Guinea Bissau including a coup attempt in Gambia (Wally, 2022). These coups came as a result of state fragility in both West Africa and the Sahel region, where there exists bad governance, insecurity, high unemployment rates (with a population of 429 million youths in West Africa alone), high poverty levels that are worsened by erratic changes in climate which have led to the drying of the Lake Chad Basin. Hence, intra-communal conflicts between herders and farmers are rising, with deteriorating livelihood sources exacerbating conflicts over resources (Sempijja & Mongale, 2022). In this regard, the quest for survival is always accompanied by risks to human security in both the Sahel and West Africa, making it difficult to implement the Aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063. The African Union’s Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa The African continent has been pounded by numerous threats to good governance, peace and security. Hence, the recent waves of military takeover serve as a threat intensifier to the already existing challenges of religious extremism, drug and weapon smuggling, and other forms of transnational organised crime. As such, all these challenges impede the AU and its mandate of placing Africa as an equal partner in the world. To achieve this mandate, the AU adopted the 2000 Lomé Declaration and ACDEG 2007 as legislative frameworks, supporting the AU mandates of a free and safer Africa and peace, security and good governance. However, despite all these efforts, the AU, including regional bodies such as ECOWAS, has been less effective in responding to military coups and unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in West Africa and the Sahel. Some of the shortcomings of coups d’état and UCGs include struggling economies with few prospects for development; hence, there is a need for supranational bodies to treat these actions with an iron fist. However, what has become apparent in Africa is that regional bodies such as the AU have been reluctant to deal strictly with coups and UCGs, which continue to pose a threat not only to stability and security in West Africa and the Sahel but also to the AU’s implementation of Agenda 2063. Apart from military coups, West Africa and the Sahel have been exposed to constitutional coups, where democratically elected presidents circumvented their constitutional term of office and thus prolonged their terms in office. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara, the country’s President since 2011, amended the country’s constitution to allow himself a third term in office. These incidents, such as the one in Côte d’Ivoire, tend to set a bad precedent in West Africa and the Sahel’s political domains. For one, due to a successful coup (whether military or constitutional), other African leaders also follow these acts because, in Africa, regional bodies and continental bodies such as the AU have failed to take decisive action by holding accountable those who assume power through unconstitutional means. The AU and ECOWAS condemned countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea following their waves of coups, and economic sanctions were imposed against these states. This has not been adequate to curtail coups, especially against military leaders who staged coups in their states. Hence, countries such as Togo, (President Gnassingbe) and Guinea (former President Alpha Conde) and Cameroon (Paul Biya), have also amended their constitutions to allow the presidents to serve for more than the prescribed two terms of office. Instead of effectively dealing with the plotters of these constitutional coups, the African Union reacted only through rhetoric by condemning these actions. Such was the case with Guinea, whose coup was condemned by the AU without imposed sanctions. Meanwhile, in Mali, following the military’s takeover of the government, both the AU and ECOWAS imposed sanctions against the country, thus denouncing the coup as unconstitutional and therefore unacceptable (Maluleke, 2022). In addition to this reaction, French President Emmanuel Macron and the United States of America reacted by condemning these UCGs and calling for the rapid return of democratically elected governments. Meanwhile, no calls were made for these states’ governments to address the key factors that had resulted in these UCGs and coups d’état. In this sense, neglecting to address these pre-coup challenges will often result in new coups, together with the emergence of violent insurgent groups. Amongst these challenges are poor economic conditions, bad governance, and high unemployment rates, with little or no development (Gerits, 2022). In Chad, following the death of Idriss Deby Itno, when his son Mahamat Idriss Deby seized power through a coup, the AU, ECOWAS and France (expert in the former French African colony), from the international community, applied double standards to the unconstitutional change of government. Furthermore, the support for Mahamat Idriss Deby’s reign was witnessed after the October 20th ‘Black Thursday’ protests, when Deby executed fatal crackdowns against pro-democracy movements and violated people’s basic human rights, actions which resulted in the punishment and coercion of everyone who was against Mahamat Deby’s rule (Ramadane, 2022). If Mahamat can rule through the culture of impunity, it simply means that the regional bodies (AU and ECOWAS) and the international community have accepted this practice. Nevertheless, these actions by Mahamat Deby could be sparked and motivated by Chad’s reputation for providing stability in the Sahel through the reputation of its armed forces. In the Sahel and West Africa regions, Chad continues to be one of the leading countries in military assistance to combat the spread of violent extremism in both regions, with its long-standing experience of preserving peace and security. Chad has been a key partner in international strategies such as France’s Operation Barkhane, the United Nations-backed counterterrorism G5 Sahel Joint Task Force, the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and the Multinational-Joint Task Force created in the late 1990s to combat jihadist group Boko Haram in Nigeria. Perhaps it is due to its militaristic role in fighting for peace and security in the already fragile region of the Sahel. Chad continues to enjoy biased reactions from the AU, ECOWAS and the international community. This brings into question whether in Africa there are ‘good coups,’ which are accepted based on their justifications, and ‘bad coups,’ which are not acceptable and thus face condemnation from African regional bodies and the global communities. In support of these assertions, when attending the funeral of the late Idriss Deby Itno, the French President declared that his country would not “let anyone, either today or tomorrow, challenge Chad’s stability and integrity” (Pelz, 2021). At the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, called for a democratic transition in Chad. Still, in her utterances when she paid tribute to the late Deby, she announced him as “a leader and a partner who dedicated his life to fighting against violent extremism” (Nodjimbadem, 2022), forgetting the very fact that he served as the country’s strongman for almost 30 years. In contrast, democracy permits each president to serve only two terms in office, while each term can amount to five years. Hence, the reaction towards a coup in Chad validated that a coup is only a bad coup when facilitated by a leader not advocated by certain global hegemons. Lastly, in May 2021, the European Union foreign policy chief, Joseph Borrell, when paying tribute to Deby, advised that the country should return to constitutional order facilitated through democratic processes but also added that it was “necessary to ensure that the country remains stable so that it can continue to play a role in the fight against insurgency in the region” (Nodjimbadem, 2022). In essence, this could mean that for as long as Chad continues to stabilise both regions of West Africa and the Sahel through its military contribution, the nature of its government or political system does not matter if peace and security are preserved within these regions. Conclusion In its effort to ensure peace and security in the continent, during the celebration of its golden jubilee, the AU declared to end violent conflicts by 2020, or what is to be known as ‘silencing the guns by 2020.’ This is also part of the AU Agenda 2063’s aims and objectives. However, the set target by the AU to silence the guns by the year 2020 seems like a farfetched ideal because many parts of the continent are still experiencing a proliferation of guns, violence, and conflicts. In West Africa and the Sahel regions, the military, vested with the responsibility to take control of their state’s arms, have turned their arms against the same state they had sworn to protect. Hence, in 2020, during the year in which the AU had wished to silence the guns in Africa, countries such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Chad, Sudan, and the Central Africa Republic (CAR) witnessed guns blazing loudly in calls for the removal of governments that the people had elected, while others still had long-standing regimes. Amongst the causes of these military coups and unconstitutional changes of governments in West Africa and the Sahel are factors such as lack of development, poor governance, high-level corruption, historical injustices and grievances, flawed electoral processes, including circumvention of the constitution to allow for a third term in office, and violent extremism, to name but a few. Sadly, these factors of state fragility serve as reasons behind the undemocratic means of assuming power, whereby the military is using citizens’ genuine grievances to seize power under the pretext of addressing all these human security challenges. In conclusion, the chapter expounds that, for the African Union to reach its implementation of the developmental blueprint titled Agenda 2063, the continental body needs to approach every case of unconstitutional change of government or military coup in a holistic way. Unlike applying double standards to certain cases, the AU needs to be fair when condemning unethical and illegitimate practices that impede the implementation of Aspirations (3) and (4) of the AU-Agenda 2063, as already discussed under the chapter’s findings. Moving forward, the African Union should also find ways to deal with governments where democracy is flawed because it is in such fragile states where these unconstitutional government changes are likely to occur. Hence, failure to devise a mechanism to deter bad governance will lead to democratic backsliding in Africa, where everyone can do as they please within their states due to the culture of impunity. 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Zamkowska, I. 2022. Islamic insurgency in the Sahel as the root of mass displacement in Burkina Faso. International Journal for Religious Freedom, 15(1):53-69. Multi-Termism and Military Coups in Africa: Evidence from Zimbabwe and Guinea Daglous Makumbe

Department of Political Studies University of the Western Cape

Cape Town, South Africa Abstract This chapter dissects the changing political dynamics in Africa, focusing on Zimbabwe and Guinea, utilising qualitative research methodology. Unlike in the past, recently, people have welcomed coups and preferred them to multi-term establishments. It was witnessed in Zimbabwe and Guinea. In such countries, the coups were viewed by many as a great relief from multi-term leaders. It has led to one illegitimacy being preferred over another illegitimacy. Africa is currently confronted with a double tragedy: a return to the era of coups and presidential multi-termism. Many African presidents have repudiated to renounce power through constitutional means such as electoral defeat or the lapse of their terms, leaving coups as the only means to remove them. Multi-term presidents manipulate the electoral process, hold sham elections, exploit constitutional loopholes, hold referendums to extend their terms and tinker with constitutions for expediency. They have compromised armies that are ruling parties’ appendages, biased electoral commissions, and bargained judiciaries. Such despotic establishments make it apparent that those tyrannical regimes will never relinquish power through constitutional means. It has given rise to military coups, another undemocratic means of political transition, to remove such leaders. Of late, the people have tended to welcome coups and prefer them better than multi-term presidents, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe (2017) and Guinea (2021). In such countries, the coups were viewed by many as a great relief from multi-term leaders. This undemocratic transition is detrimental to a country’s right to development because it deters potential investors and lowers investor confidence. It also causes abrasive effects on a country’s political and economic right to development, causing stagnation, exclusion, and sanctions. The conclusion is that political transition in Africa is taking a new twist as Africans now prefer even unconstitutional methods as remedies to eliminate multi-termism. Introduction The emergence of the novel famous military coups has affected the African Union and regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS, plunging the continent into a predicament. From one perspective, military coups are strongly condemned and outlawed by continental statutes such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. The latter’s Chapters 2, 3 and 4 reject and prohibit unconstitutional government changes, including military coups. Article 20 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also illegalises unconstitutional government changes by allowing people to have their political rights determined by their political status. From this perspective, the novel famous military coups in Zimbabwe (2017) and Guinea (2021) have placed the AU, ECOWAS, and the SADC in a quagmire because the coups were supported by many citizens of the countries in question. In the Zimbabwean and Guinean military coups, massive support was received from the people. They demonstrated their abhorrence towards the SADC, ECOWAS, and the AU, warning them not to interfere in the military takeovers. Most citizens thus supported the coups, tying the hands of regional organisations, handicapping and preventing them to intervene in such situations. Such novel military coups have placed regional organisations in a quandary whereby they have to but cannot intervene in such situations to restore constitutionalism and legitimacy. This triggered the likelihood of fomenting a conflict with most citizens supporting the military takeover. Such novel developments, where military coups have amassed popular support, have posed a problem to the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC since the organisations are compelled by their commitments to intervene to change the status quo and restore legitimacy. Inaction in such circumstances would mean the beginning of the gradual decadence of such regional organisations due to non-intervention and the redundancy of the statutes that bind the continent and constitute its essential features. Inaction would also mean that such continental and regional statutes will transmogrify into mere symbolic protocols. This is a novel problem that Africa is confronted with and warrants expeditious, collective, and concerted attention and remedies. Since military coups have proven to be partly caused by leaders who tweak constitutions to stay in power for long or for life, this paper interrogates whether the novel famous coups are the new remedies to multi-termism in Africa. Duodu (2012) says that the African Union and its collaborative organisations, such as ECOWAS, have made it abundantly clear that they do not favour violent government changes on the continent. Nevertheless, cart-wheeling and verbal gymnastics occur whenever such a change occurs within the organisations and puzzle those who follow their affairs closely. A military coup is an illegitimate usurpation of power by soldiers where they use the might of a gun to seize power from the government. Longley (2021:1) defines a military coup as “The sudden, often violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group. The coup d’état is typically an illegal, unconstitutional seizure of power conducted by a dictator, guerrilla military force, or an opposing political faction.” Multi-termism is the act of governing for many terms (typically being in power for more than two terms). Many constitutions in modern liberal democratic states stipulate that a president, prime minister, or chancellor can govern for a maximum of two terms. Anything beyond that constitutes multi-termism. Military coups, although illegitimate, have become the only panacea for removing presidents who do not want to relinquish power. Such presidents are always kept from power through elections because they manipulate and rig them for expediency. They also repudiate relinquishing power when the mandatory two terms lapse because they massage the constitutions to enable them to rule beyond two terms. They hold referendums to toy with the constitutions, allowing them to rule for life. When elections and the lapse of presidential terms fail to remove a leader from power, it leaves military coups as the only antidote to eliminating such multi-term presidents. Military coups, albeit illegitimate, become the remedy to change the status quo. Unlike in the past, such coups have been widely welcomed by the masses, as in Zimbabwe and Guinea. It is a new trend developing in Africa that has never been witnessed before. The chapter coheres as follows: A methodology follows and discusses the method utilised by the author to gather information. It is subsequently followed by the literature review, which examines what other scholars say about the subject and critically analyses it. It utilises case studies from Namibia, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where constitutional and attempted constitutional manipulations were initiated. The discussion then unmasks how multi-termism is a recipe for military coups, giving evidence from Zimbabwe and Guinea. The role of regional organisations and why many African leaders are reluctant to relinquish power is also discussed. The implications of multi-termism for a state’s right to development are also discussed. The conclusion recaps the discussion. Research Methodology The chapter adopted a qualitative research methodology. Information was gathered from secondary sources such as books, journal articles, institutional reports, and the media. Information was obtained in both print and electronic form. Educational material with relevant information on the past and current continental political transitions was selected. The author selected academic material that covered the period from when constitutional prolongations started to the period of the popular military coups. The period covered by the study is from 1999, when former Namibian President Sam Nujoma pioneered multi-termism in Africa, to 2021, when Guinea experienced a military coup which removed former president, Alfa Conde, from power. Research question The paper endeavours to answer the following question:

• Are military coups the new remedies to multi-termism in Africa?

Literature review The multi-term presidential stampede in Africa: How it all started Namibia Sam Nujoma: The Namibian Pioneer Multi-Term President The prolongation of presidential tenures and manipulation of constitutional loopholes in Africa was pioneered by the former Namibian President Sam Nujoma. The behaviour had spill-over effects on other leaders, such as former Burundian President Pierre Nkrunzinza, who emulated Nujoma’s tactics. The first president of the Republic of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, was elected before independence by the members of the Constituent Assembly and sworn in on Independence Day on 21 March 1990 (Melber, 2015). Among the new constitutional provisions incorporated in the Namibian constitution was the fundamental provision that stipulated that any president was allowed to serve for two five-year terms. It meant that President Nujoma, who assumed the Namibian highest office in 1990 and was re-elected to a second term in 1995, was supposed to end his second and final term in 2000, after which the constitution would forbid him to run for another term (Dulani, 2011). There has been one significant constitutional amendment to the Namibian Constitution, that of Article 29(3). In 1999, it was amended to allow President Sam Nujoma to run for a third term of office (LeBeau, 2018). South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO)’s first constitutional change was in 1998 when its two-thirds majority in parliament modified the two-term clause for presidents. Sam Nujoma was not directly elected by the people the first time round having been appointed by the Constituent Assembly, so he was allowed to stand for re-election by popular vote for another term (LeBeau, 2018). Namibia’s 1990 constitution, which contained term limits, was changed in 1999 to allow President Nujoma, who had been in power since 1990, to run for a third term. However, the two-term limit was not scrapped but amended for Nujoma only. To quell domestic and international detractors who were suspicious and concerned about the possibility of a president-for-life syndrome, Nujoma’s loyalists manipulated a constitutional loophole on technical grounds. They argued that since a Constituent Assembly had first elected the President in 1989, his first term of office fell outside the ambit of the constitutional definition of elections as being through direct universal and equal suffrage, stipulated by Article 28 (2) of the Namibian Constitution (1990). This narrow reading of the constitution reflected not only the manipulation of institutional rules to advance a personalistic agenda but also placed Namibia among a long list of countries that departed from adhering to the spirit of the constitution by focusing on the minutiae of the wording of the law itself (LeBeau, 2018). The third-term debate ultimately led to the tabling of a parliamentary motion in the Namibian legislature in 1998 seeking to amend the constitution to allow Nujoma to run for a third term. Although the lethargic Namibian civil society and opposition made frantic efforts to thwart this constitutional amendment, they were overpowered by SWAPO’s parliamentary majority, which pushed the amendment bill without difficulty. Nujoma hastily signed the bill into law, paving the way for him to run for a third term in the 1999 elections, which he convincingly won with 77 per cent of the vote (Dulani, 1999). All subsequent presidents have since been limited to two terms. Nujoma stepped down in 2004 because his party did not want to change the constitution again (Tull & Simons, 2017). The Namibian constitutional manipulation set a bad precedent for successive African governments in countries such as Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has led to the emergence of multi-term presidents on the continent, giving rise to military coups as the only remedy for removing such presidents. Burundi Nkrunzinza: Emulating Nujoma Burundi adopted the Namibian style by tinkering with the country’s constitution to enable former President Pierre Nkrunzinza to run for a third term. Burundi might have adopted the Namibian style of constitutional manipulation whereby ruling party loyalists capitalise on constitutional loopholes to prolong the incumbent’s tenure. In August 2015, Pierre Nkrunzinza was again sworn in as the Burundian President. His successful attempt to secure a contested third term plunged the country into a severe crisis in which approximately 500 people were killed and more than 280,000 forced to flee (Vandeginste, 2016; Goehrung, 2017). His nomination triggered a constitutional and political crisis of monumental proportions, centred on his decision to run for a third term, which he won (Nagar & Nganje, 2016). This controversial re-election to a third term by the former and late Burundian leader in July 2015 led to public protests and an attempted military coup by the opposition. It also followed violent retaliation and severe repression by Nkrunzinza’s supporters and government forces (Goehrung, 2017). Burundi’s third-term legal framework was characterised by a two-pronged loophole, consisting of an unintended ambiguity of the legal norm and an omission in the enforcement scheme. It enabled the Executive to maintain an appearance of legality and seemingly adhere to legitimacy (Beetham, 2013). Nkrunzinza had been ruling the country for ten years. Constitutionally speaking, however, he had served only one five-year term, considering that for the first term, he was not elected by universal suffrage but by parliament and senate (Vandeginste, 2016). The Burundian constitutional ambiguity was caused by combining the March 2005 Articles, Article 96 and Article 302. Article 96 stipulates that the President of the republic will be elected by direct universal suffrage for five years, which will be renewable once. There is also Article 302, which was included in the transitional chapter which states: “As an exception, the first President of the Republic in the post-transition period shall be elected by the National Assembly and the Senate […], with a two-thirds majority of the members […]” (Vandeginste, 2016). Nkrunzinza contented that ambiguity in Article 96 of Burundi’s 2005 constitution, which specifies that the President will be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once, allowed him to stand for a third term. He argued that he had not been directly elected in the 2005 election since Article 302 of the constitution stipulates that the first post-transition President be elected by the National Assembly and Senate (Vandeginste, 2016). The Arusha Agreement also stated unambiguously that the President could not serve more than two terms (Arusha Peace & Reconciliation Agreement, 2000). The most rational interpretation appears to be that Article 302 provides an exception regarding the modality of the presidential election (indirect instead of direct). However, a strictly literal reading opens the door to a potential alternative interpretation, namely, that the constitution created a special first post-transition presidency, which does not count as a first term under Article 96. The August 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA) was widely viewed as Burundi’s breakthrough to peace, stability, and reconciliation. It unequivocally stated that the president “shall be elected for a term of five years, renewable only once. No one may serve more than two presidential terms” (APRA, 2000). The APRA thus contained a constitutional blueprint for post-conflict Burundi. Its signatories included a specific provision: ‘No one may serve more than two presidential terms’ (Protocol ii, Chapter 1, Article 7). However, most probably unintentionally, an ambiguity slipped into the constitutional provision on presidential term limits (Nimpagaritse & Parmentier, 2015). For the first post-transitional presidency, an indirect rather than a direct presidential election was provided. According to third-term advocates, this provision derogated from the general principle, thus creating an exceptional presidency that did not count under the two-term limit (Cassimon & Vandeginste, 2019). Nkrunzinza argued that because his first term followed the election by the post-civil war transitional parliament rather than by a popular vote, he was allowed to run again by the constitution’s two-term limit. More broadly, the arguments of the President’s supporters were familiar among those with third-term ambitions: stability, continuity, and security (Duhan, 2015). While some international partners, such as the United States of America, were not opposed to Nkrunzinza’s third term bid, they emphasised that Burundi must abide by the APRA agreement, which stated clearly that no president should serve for more than two terms. On the contrary, the government defended itself by noting that the APRA agreement was not the only peace agreement that ended armed conflict in Burundi (United Nations Security Council, 2015, in Vandeginste, 2016). There were also essential concordats, such as the Global Ceasefire Agreement of 2003, to which no one ever attributed any constitutional status. The government thus asked why the APRA can be regarded as superior to the constitution and asserted that the Burundian constitution must take precedence over any other political or legal agreement (Vandeginste, 2016). As demonstrations intensified against Nkrunzinza’s nomination, the ruling party senators, who were all Nkrunzinza loyalists, asked the Constitutional Court to interpret articles 96 and 302 of the constitution. The Court ruled that the APRA provision forbade a third presidential term, adding that the 2005 Constitution drafters wrongly interpreted the APRA (Kavakure, 2016). The Court ruled that under transitional article 302, a unique presidential mandate was created that had nothing to do with article 96. In that respect, the Court concluded that one final renewal of the then-current presidential term did not violate the constitution (Burundian Constitutional Court ruling RCCB 303). The Constitutional Court thus interpreted the constitution as permitting one final term for Nkrunzinza (Burundian Constitutional Court ruling RCCB 303). The ruling was the most controversial decision ever handed down by Burundi’s Constitutional Court. Makumbe and Compagnon (2000:88) support this by saying, “Personal rule typifies … a kind of political regime where legal institutions and the rule of law have been systematically weakened to allow the leader (generally the head of state) to rule the country through arbitrary decisions and personal patronage.” The Court’s Vice President, intimidated by his position during the Court’s deliberations, fled the country (Nimpagaritse & Parmentier. 2015). As highlighted earlier, the prolongation of constitutional terms breeds coups. When elections fail to remove such leaders from power (because they rig them) and constitutional provisions fail to remove them again (because they toy with the constitution and manipulate it), coups become the only remedy to remove such despots. Coups d’etat, although illegitimate, may thus solve some of the political maladies that confront the continent. Uganda Yoweri Museveni started well as he was critical of African presidents who stayed in power beyond their mandatory two terms. In him, all Ugandans saw a president who was breaking new ground on constitutionalism, especially on presidential terms. On the day of his swearing-in ceremony, Murray (1982) said that theirs was not a mere regime change but an essential change. He also stressed the problem with Uganda and Africa not resting with the people but with the leaders. The latter strives to stay in power beyond their mandates, which leads to corruption, patronage, and impunity. Museveni promised the Ugandans that his party, the National Resistance Movement Army (NRM/A), would govern the country for only four years. After their four-year term, they would hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government. While constitutional attempts have allowed incumbents to run for a third term in Namibia, Zambia, Nigeria, and Malawi, in Uganda, the situation was more radical in that term limits were lifted altogether (Okuku, 2005). The National Resistance Movement (NRM) has transmogrified in its consolidation of power. When it came to power in 1986, it had a ‘fundamental change’ watchword that appealed to most Ugandans. After ten years in power, Museveni ran his presidential campaign with the slogan ‘no change.’ In the previous election campaign, the call was ‘no term limits’ (Swinkels, 2019). The practice informs third-term politics in Uganda that rather than using brute military force, two-term presidents are forced to manoeuvre for constitutional change to allow them to serve extended terms in office (Oloka-Onyango, 2001). Removing term limits in the Ugandan constitution suggests a life presidency syndrome. Nevertheless, it suggests a blatant failure to revamp the post-colonial democracy, state and politics. Presidential term limits in Uganda are informed by the country’s history and the struggle to institute democratic governance and cultivate a culture of constitutionalism. In Article 105(2), the constituent assembly limited the President’s tenure, regardless of performance, to two five-year terms. Museveni was the first beneficiary of this provision (Oloka-Onyango, 2001). In 2007, Museveni and his National Resistance Movement reaffirmed their commitment to adhere to term limits by promising in the parliament’s election manifesto that he would step down after completing his second and final term as directly elected president (Swinkels, 2019). Since term limits had not been adopted in Uganda until 1995, Museveni could serve as president only until 2005, after which he would be ineligible to stand again (Oloka-Onyango, 2001; Swinkels, 2019). Even though he had been president for ten years since 1986, the two five-year terms only applied from 1996. From that time, he has been in power, governing based on a constitution that does not specify a term limit (Tono, 2017). In 2001, only six years after the promulgation of the 1995 constitution, Museveni appointed a Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to examine the constitution and suggest possible amendments. Although this did not specifically address the question of term limits, it was used by Museveni and the NRM as an opportunity to push through the proposal to remove term limits on the pretext that the people should decide whether to retain or remove presidential tenure limitations (Ssempebwa Minority Report, 2004). The CRC did not propose the removal of presidential term limits. The proposals emanated from the government and cabinet’s white paper of 2004. Such proposals would allow Museveni to contest in 2006 after his mandated period ends. The amendment’s supporters argued that whether a person should be president depends on the people’s will, expressed through the electoral process, rather than constitutional eligibility. In 2005, a constitutional amendment removed presidential term limits. The Ugandan constitution also empowers a referendum to change the political system. This is because, under Article 255 of the constitution, a referendum can be held on any issue (Oloka-Onyango, 2004). The Ugandan Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister tabled a bill to eradicate term limits from the constitution in the National Assembly in 2005. The legislators then voted for the proposal, and on 26 September 2005, Museveni assented to the amendment, paving the way for him to be re-elected infinitely in future presidential elections (Makara, 2007). Multi-term presidents have a charismatic political charm that they utilise to prolong their terms of office. They may adopt catchphrases and promises to keep people’s aspirations and expectations high. Realising that he had ruled beyond the mandatory two terms, Okuku (2005) promised Ugandans to transform the country into a second-world country. He said he was not insisting on staying in power but wanted to tell people that he had covered one phase, the minimum recovery phase. According to him, since Uganda had achieved minimum recovery, he wanted it to be separate from what was happening in Africa, whereby it would still be a third-world country after 40 years of independence. Multi-term presidents also change goalposts, deviating from what they had previously promised. Having failed to relinquish power after four years as he had promised, there were calls from some sectors of the Ugandan community for him to step aside. Okuku (2005) took a different political trajectory by saying that the more people talked about his staying in power, the more he may change his mind about leaving because it made him wonder why they were so keen about him leaving office. Nevertheless, the Ugandans have yet to show a vision for the future. They also tend to defend what they had previously castigated. Museveni had been a staunch critic of presidents who overstayed power, later defending it when he was caught in the same groove. Museveni (2021) says that some people think being in government for a long time is dreadful. However, the more one stays, the more one learns. Museveni claims that by overstaying in power, he was then an expert in governance. Under such circumstances, whereby leaders do not relinquish power through constitutional means, coups become the only remedy to outshine such despots and change the status quo, solving some intractable problems that confront states. Rwanda In Rwanda, the constitution was changed through votes of both parliament and senate and endorsed by referendum (Dulani, 1999). Rwanda’s president has been in power since 2000 and will theoretically be able to rule the country until 2034, which would amount to 31 years of uninterrupted presidential tenure (Dulani, 1999). Paul Kagame decided to run for re-election for a third term in defiance of a Rwandan post-genocide constitution of 2003 drawn up by his very government. While this announcement officially came after a referendum in December 2015, which resulted in a majority vote in favour of altering the constitution to accommodate a third term for Kagame, the improbable 98 per cent approval was accompanied by widespread reports of voter intimidation and coercion by the state (Goehrung, 2017). A constitutional referendum in 2015 changed the presidential term from seven to five years but exempted the sitting president from the shortened term and a two-term limit until 2024 (Article 101, Article 172) (Bardall & Arieff, 2017). The referendum was scheduled following alleged coercive national consultations in which over 3.7 million Rwandans petitioned to change the term limit. Over 98% of voters backed the new constitution, which permits Kagame to remain in office until 2034. After that, he would be immune from prosecution for treason or severe and deliberate violation of the constitution (Article 114 of the 2015 Rwandan Constitution). Kagame would have been subject to a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency in 2017. However, a new constitution was approved in 2015 through a referendum, with a reported 98% vote. The constitution exempted the sitting president, allowing him to run for a third term, which he won with 99% of the vote (Goehrung, 2017; Bardall & Arieff, 2017). After Kagame’s current term expires, the presidential term will be shortened to five years per the new constitution. He could then run for two more consecutive terms, thus potentially remaining in office until 2034. He previously denied any intention to overstay in power beyond two terms, stating that he is preparing Rwanda for an unspecified future leadership transition (Jeune Afrique, 2017). In some cases, constitutionalism and term limits have been neither scrapped nor ignored. Instead, tailor-made solutions for incumbents were deployed the moment term limits would have forced them to leave office. A particularly striking case is Rwanda. After serving as interim president between 2000 and 2003, Kagame was elected for a full seven-year term in 2003. He was re-elected in 2010 for a second term, which expired in 2017. In November 2015, a constitutional revision was approved by both houses of parliament and later endorsed by a popular referendum. The revised constitution maintains a two-term limit but reduces the length of a term to five years. However, before coming into force, the new provisions will be preceded by a transitional presidential term of seven years (2017-2024) for which any presidential candidate, including President Kagame, will be eligible to stand (Article 172 of the Rwandan 2015 Constitution). Thus, the amended presidential two-term limit will only take effect after the following transitional seven-year term ends. In other words, President Kagame, who has declared his readiness to run again, could theoretically rule Rwanda until 2034 (Goehrung, 2017). Thus, although Rwanda’s former and current (revised) constitution foresees a two-term limit, Kagame could rule the country for 31 years in full compliance with the law. Kagame’s overwhelming re-election victory may reflect popular support for his efforts to stabilise and transform Rwandan society. It may also reflect a political system that constrains opposition activity and close government scrutiny of citizen behaviour (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Under such circumstances, where constitutions are tinkered with to extend a president’s tenure indefinitely, a military coup becomes the only remedy to remove them. Neither an election nor a lapse of their presidential terms can remove them from power. A military coup, though illegitimate, is the only mechanism that can change the political dynamics, proffering a remedy to some of the recalcitrant political issues bedevilling states. Democratic Republic of the Congo Presidential term prolongation in a quest to tamper with the constitution to run for a third term is a political spirit that gripped the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under former President Joseph Kabila. Since 2015, tensions in the country have grown. In the majority opinion, former president Joseph Kabila was manoeuvring to secure a prolongation of his tenure in the face of term limits (Dulani, 1999). Six months before the end of his constitutional mandate, Kabila was largely quiet on his intentions politically, which had the potential to create political uncertainty in the country. According to Libebe (2016) and Wolters (2018), many of the supporters of President Kabila in government and society generally expressed a desire for him to continue as president of the country. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, just like other upcoming African democracies, established term limits in their constitutions in perpetuity to safeguard against long-term personal rule. The rejection of personal rule and the support for term limits is perceptible at the level of public opinion. A survey across 34 African states found that 73 per cent of citizens favour term limits, perhaps partly because elections offer only slim chances to oust incumbents, making term limits more relevant (Dulani, 2015). In January 2014, demonstrations took place in the DRC after former President Joseph Kabila attempted to modify the constitution and electoral laws to stay in power for more than two terms. It resulted in the death of 27 demonstrators and also culminated in the Congolese parliament amending Article 220 from the updated constitution (Libebe, 2016; Wolters, 2018). The amendment would have allowed Joseph Kabila to remain in power after December 2016, when his second term ended (Camara, 2016). The quest to meddle with the constitution and prolong Kabila’s presidential term led to the DRC presidential and legislative elections being delayed by two years (Wolters, 2019). A dilemma over power maintenance or peaceful transition remained prevalent as Kabila maintained his silence over whether he would step down or contest the 2016 presidential race. He was elected in 2006 and re-elected in 2011 amidst allegations of a fraudulent electoral process (Mbiatem, 2018). Kabila made several attempts to cling to power and prolong his term. The first attempt was in June 2015, when he suggested that the presidential and parliamentary elections should be contingent upon completing a new electoral roll. The proposal sparked violent demonstrations, leading to over 40 people dying in violent clashes with the police (Mbiatem, 2018). Protesters were angry with the decision to carry out a national census ahead of the poll, which many considered could delay the polls for years, thus allowing the President to postpone standing down. Kabila also sought to extend his presidential term by postponing elections from December 2016 to April 2018, a move that the Catholic Church and the main opposition coalition parties vehemently opposed (Maclean & Burke, 2016). Kabila’s second attempt to cling to power was when he struggled to organise a national dialogue with the opposition, which some opposition parties and civil society members boycotted. It was intended to maintain him at the helm of an eventual national unity government (Maclean & Burke, 2016). The third attempt was to increase the number of provinces from 11 to 26 as of 30 June 2015, which many observers viewed as a ploy to gain political momentum from loyalists he appointed to rule the new provinces, hence weakening political opponents (Engel, 2010). Under such circumstances, where the incumbent manipulates electoral and constitutional processes to cling to power, military coups, although illegitimate, become the only antidote to change the status quo. Multi-termism as a recipe for coups in Africa Whenever and wherever attempts get initiated to amend constitutions against the people’s will, the country’s stability is threatened (Ntomba, 2015). Multi-termism is a recipe for military coups in Africa. It is because the incumbents manipulate and rig elections to stay in power. They also meddle with constitutions to remain in office beyond the mandatory two terms. Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi (2005:36) assert, “…their genesis lies in the previous military and one-party arrangements, now adapted for survival in a more open environment. Leaders have learned how to manipulate the rules of the democratic game and to stage-manage low-quality elections to their advantage.” They have compromised judiciaries, police, and the army, the incumbent regimes’ appendages. Neither the opposition parties nor the people will be capable of changing the status quo, leaving military coups as the only therapy to remove such presidents. Because people will be frustrated and exasperated but powerless to remove multi-term presidents, when military coups take place to change the status quo, the coups are widely welcomed by the masses with great pomp, fanfare, enthusiasm, and pageantry. This scenario occurred in Zimbabwe in 2017 and in Guinea in 2021. Zimbabwe, the pioneer state Multi-termers manipulate constitutional loopholes to prolong their terms of office. Zimbabwe is another case of constitutional manipulation of monumental proportions. After attaining independence from Britain in 1980, Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister. In 1987, the two revolutionary parties that fought the liberation struggle, Mugabe’s ZANU PF and Nkomo’s PF ZAPU, united and signed a Unity Accord (1987). The constitution was amended, removing the post of prime minister. Mugabe then assumed a new role as President in 1987. He asserted that since he was assuming a new role as a president, his two-term office would not be affected by his previous term as prime minister. Mugabe was starting on a new slate since it was a different and new setup. From 1987, he ignored term limits, saying that although they are stipulated in the constitution, a leader can continue to rule beyond those limits if the people still want him in office (Sachikonye, 2003; Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Makumbe, 2010). Mugabe and his ZANU PF pundits also repudiated relinquishing power even after the electoral defeat to the then-main opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai (Matiashe, 2022; Makumbe, 2011). Mugabe’s regime, from 2000, thrived on manipulating and rigging the elections to maintain its foothold in power (Matiashe, 2022; Makumbe, 2011). Makumbe (2011:29) aptly puts it: While less violence erupted compared to in past elections, allegations of systematic rigging soon surfaced. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change charges that 250,000 more votes appeared between the polls closing and the final result 48 hours later. The voters’ roll may have contained over 2 million dead, relocated, or fictitious voters. Millions of expatriates were disenfranchised. Over 130,000 potential voters (about 10%) were turned away in six provinces. Observers had limited oversight of ballot counting. State-owned media allowed the MDC token coverage, having demonised them for six years. Constituencies were carved up anew to boost the number of rural seats and dilute the opposition’s urban dominance. NGO voter education campaigns were banned. Rural voters feared casting ballots for the opposition, and the only foreign observer teams came from countries friendly to Harare. Such developments prompted the army to seize power, in connivance with the then Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, in November 2017. The coup was widely supported by the Zimbabweans. It was welcomed as a great relief from despotism and tyranny. The November 2017 putsch was welcomed by Zimbabweans with great enthusiasm, pageantry, pomp, ceremony, and fanfare to mark the end of a tyrannical era. The coup led to a condition where one illegitimacy was preferred over another. In this case, a military coup became a new remedy to eradicate multi-termism, becoming an antidote to a malady constricting the country. Unlike in the past when the police and military would pounce on demonstrators, during the military coup of November 2017, which ended Mugabe’s 37-year rule, this did not happen and there were voluminous marches to the state house and to the president’s private residence to conduct massive demonstrations against Mugabe. Unlike many coups in Africa again, there were no curfews, public crackdowns, or restrictions on civil liberties (Mackintosh, 2017). Previously in Zimbabwe, even minor demonstrations against the government would be met with vindictive, brutal, and lethal responses such as tear gassing, firing with rubber or live bullets, water canoes, or baton sticks. The significant difference was that during that time, the aims of the demonstrators and the military, that is, the removal of Mugabe, were aligned. The military camouflaged the coup by encouraging the public to march and demonstrate against Mugabe to pile pressure on him, portraying that their operation had widespread support and legitimised the act (BBC, 2017; Matiashe, 2022). Thousands of anti-Mugabe demonstrators filled the streets of Harare, singing, dancing, and taking selfies with soldiers. Mugabe was compelled to declare the coup legitimate in his televised address, flanked by the military. He ultimately resigned unconventionally, having written a letter to the parliament, which had started initiating an impeachment motion on him. Mugabe (Mackintosh, 2017:7) says, “I have resigned to allow smooth power transfer. Kindly give public notice of my decision as soon as possible.” Apart from the joy and jubilation that seized Zimbabweans after the news of Mugabe’s capitulation, legislators went into ecstasy and jubilation to celebrate the abdication of a dictator (Mackintosh, 2017). The Zimbabwean ‘soft coup’ was crafted dexterously and discreetly, making some political analysts label it a coup that was not a coup or a ‘non-coup-coup’ (Tendi, 2019; BBC, 2017). Just like in other situations where leaders prolong their tenures of office to later cede power to their children or relatives, Mugabe was inclined to cede power to his wife, Grace, who had created her faction called Generation 40 (G40). The latter comprised younger and aspiring politicians who did not participate in the liberation struggle, including women and young politicians who wanted to take over from the old order (Pigou, 2017). Major General Sibusiso Moyo, the army spokesperson, reiterated that the undertaking was not a military coup but a ‘bloodless correction’ or ‘military constitutionalism.’ Pigou (2017) says they are targeting criminals around Mugabe who are perpetrating crimes and causing economic and social suffering in Zimbabwe so that justice can be meted against them. There have been mounting frustrations over Mugabe’s 37-year-old rule, characterised by a poor and unclear succession plan, economic ruin, political chaos, and instability fuelled by his wife, Grace (Pigou, 2017). When Mugabe fired then-Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa on 6 November 2017, it was anticipated that Mugabe’s wife, Grace, had triumphed in the succession struggle. There were rampant expectations and speculations that she would be made vice president at the December 2017 ZANU PF congress, aligning her to succeed her husband when he dies. The army’s swift reaction foiled the plan and terminated her chances to take over (Pigou, 2017). Mugabe also ruined the economy and would not submit, admit, or relinquish power to pave the way for new blood with new ideas. He wanted to take the country with him to the grave. He had plunged the economy into murky economic waters, with the country’s economy going from one meltdown to the other from 1999. The UN and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) (2017) estimate that the country had gone to the precipice, with an unemployment rate of 90% by 2017. The country also grappled with hyperinflation, which reached its zenith in 2008 with an official rate of 231 million per cent. The economic cataclysmic situation compelled the country to abandon its currency, which traded at a rate of Z$35 quadrillion to 1US$ and compelled the country to adopt foreign currencies such as the Rand, Pula, US$ and Pound (UNDP, 2017; BBC News, 2017). Under such circumstances, a military coup became a necessary evil to end multi-termism and the only ultimate remedy to change the status quo. Due to an enduring liquidity crunch, the government had to resort to a surrogate currency called the bond note (an arrangement still in place with another surrogate currency called the ZIG (Zimbabwe Gold)), and the surrogate currencies lost value and impoverished people overnight. People could not access their cash from the banks, triggering the mushrooming of parallel markets and online trading in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BBC News, 2017). Mugabe and his ZANU PF supporters maintained their toehold in power for 37 years by utilising intimidation and violence, with the assistance of state machinery, to boost himself and his party. Prior to the 2008 elections, which he allegedly lost to Morgan Tsvangirai, he had unilaterally gerrymandered the rural constituencies to disenfranchise the opposition and still lost by 33% as compared to the opposition MDC’s 67% (Matiashe, 2022; Tsvangirai, 2012; BBC, 2017). Mugabe deliberately delayed the announcement of election results by three months and later forced a run-off and an inclusive government. The Zimbabwe coup, like many other military coups in Guinea, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Niger, stems from public disillusionment, fatigue, and anger with the old order that never wants to relinquish power, making citizens quest for change. People will desire to have some new leadership that will be responsive, pragmatic, and sensitive to the people’s demands (Takambou, 2023). Although coups d’etat are necessary evils that eradicate constitutional manipulators and multi-term presidents, (Laqueur, 2019:4) says, “They are annoying not only for the practising politicians but also from the point of view of the political scientist” because they are capricious. Guinea, following the Zimbabwean trend Former Guinean President Alpha Conde showed no signs of relinquishing power even after the lapse of his term. Like other power-hungry African despots, he conducted a referendum to doctor the Guinean constitution. That would enable him to remain at the helm after holding low-quality, flouted, and bloody elections. This scenario left a military coup led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in 2021 as the only option to eliminate such a repressive tyrant. The coup was widely welcomed and celebrated by Guineans inside and outside the country. The putsch, propelled by allegations of corruption, mismanagement, human rights abuses, and monocracy, was principally triggered by Alpha Conde’s bid for a third presidential term, which ultimately led to his Waterloo. Haque (2021) notes that discontent started when Conde tinkered with the constitution to run for a third term in March 2020, side-lining the country’s two-term limit. Conde then won the controversial presidential election. It was grossly marred by violence and irregularities. It was also tainted with fraud and the death of several protesters. Conde responded heavy-handedly to the remonstrators by unleashing his security forces, who used live bullets, a draconian move that cast the country into catastrophic instability. He was controversially declared the winner of a bloody election that the civil society and opposition parties castigated as a sham. Hoije (2021) avers by saying that Conde became increasingly ostracised by Guineans when he pushed through a constitutional referendum. The referendum was backed by Russia, which controversially propelled him to a third term in office. He continues to say that Conde was unpopular, even though people still voted for him. With the third mandate, Conde went too far (Hoije, 2021). Conde’s bid for multi-termism violated the constitution and triggered a military coup. Hoije (2021) says that there came a time when Guineans were disillusioned and asking for change. The absence of change led to what happened, Conde’s tragic downfall. In neighbouring Senegal, which has a large diaspora of Guineans who opposed Conde, news of his political demise was met with relief. Diallo (2021) avers by saying President Alpha Conde deserves to be deposed. He stubbornly tried to run for a third term when he had no mandate. Many Guineans perceive the coupists as better than a president who meddles with the country’s constitution to cling to power. Diallo (2021) says they know that a coup d’état is not good and that a president must get elected by democratic vote, but they had no choice. They had a president who was too old, who no longer made Guineans dream, and who did not want to leave power. Under such circumstances, it becomes apparent that multi-termism is detrimental to democracy as it provides fertile ground for coups. The latter becomes substantial in changing the status quo, where constitutional term limits and elections have failed to produce any effect. Despite the contested and violent nature of the 2010 Guinea elections, Alpha Conde’s victory was embraced with hope and visions for a brighter future. The 2010 poll was also ground-breaking because it ushered in a democratic epoch in Guinea after many years of totalitarian rule. Under Conde’s rule, the Guineans’ expectations for a better life soon evaporated (Akuamoah, 2021). In his quest to embark on a third and unconstitutional term, Conde’s security forces utilised disproportionate force in the run-up to the referendum and elections, pouncing on opposition elements. State repression reached its climax prior to and after the presidential polls, with Amnesty International (Akuamoah, 2021) estimating that approximately 50 people perished in the violence, with many others arbitrarily incarcerated and sustaining injuries. When Conde meddled with the Guinean constitution to prolong his presidency, the move was an insult to the Guineans, whose preferences were unearthed by Afrobarometer (2021), reflecting that 8 out of 10 Guineans prefer a two-term presidential term limit. The economic situation in Guinea under Conde also left a lot to be desired. Corruption also rose to astronomical levels, with political instability and economic meltdown depriving every Guinean’s pocket (Akuamoah, 2021). Devermont (2021) notes that the overthrow of Conde by the military is a manifestation of economic mismanagement, eroding democratic norms, and autocratic outreach. It also shows the failure of regional organisations and international allies to be proactive in thwarting impending democratic threats. Conde’s administration thus achieved little to ameliorate the lives of the Guineans. Commercial mining projects in the country have failed to proffer benefits for the majority, with a dam project intended to generate and expand electricity displacing thousands of people. There has also been massive political repression, and the general criticism of Conde’s administration has been that it has not achieved any meaningful progress in revamping the lives of Guineans (Fiotatta, 2021). Famous military coups such as the one in Guinea indicate citizens’ dissatisfaction with and disapproval of the regime. When Conde was ousted from power, people escorted and cheered soldiers in Conakry, with women kissing soldiers and fellow Guineans taking selfies with soldiers. When the masses support such coups, the military is incentivised to capitalise on the lack of support of the incumbent, manipulating the legitimacy gap and proceeding to seize power with a veneer of legality from the people. It is thus unsurprising that when Mamady Doumbouya got support from Guineans, he did not experience any difficulties ousting Conde (Akuamoah, 2021). Amidst a myriad of Guinean citizens’ frustrations and unfulfilled economic and social hopes, Conde went too far by doctoring the constitution to prolong his stay in power. Such developments in African politics render military coups, albeit illegitimate, to be the remedy for multi-termism in Africa. However, military coups are not the silver bullet to political and economic maladies confronting the people. They are a terrible replacement for poor civilian rule. Conversely, they have also been proven to endanger human rights and civil freedoms (Tendi, 2020). Moreover, coups breed coups, culminating in civil wars and new dictatorships (Tendi, 2020). Military regimes have also been proven to be as corrupt as civilian regimes. Citizens also bear the brunt of sanctions when military juntas usurp power, with the economic sanctions imposed by regional and international bodies hitting the ‘third estate’ the hardest due to the unconstitutional regime change (Akuamoah, 2021). The role of regional organisations Regional organisations’ response to unconstitutional power changes needs to be more consistent as it is currently lukewarm and lackadaisical. For instance, they did not take stern measures against coup regimes in Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Sudan, and Mali. Duodu (2012) says that the African Union and its collaborative regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, have made it abundantly clear that they do not favour a violent change of governments on the continent. However, cart-wheeling and verbal gymnastics occur whenever such a change occurs within the organisations. It puzzles those who follow their affairs closely. A point of departure is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, adopted in Addis Ababa in 2007, which obliged member states to safeguard democracy in Africa (African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2012). The Charter deemed any undemocratic changes of governments unacceptable, particularly military coups. It also stipulated that the violators of unconstitutional government changes would be prohibited from participating in the subsequent elections (Articles 23-26 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance). It took a step further by providing that the perpetrators of unconstitutional power changes will be prosecuted at the African Criminal Court (Article 26 (5)). The African Union, its collaborative organisations, or member states have never implemented the above provisions. Coup presidents remain unfettered as they continue to rule and participate in the subsequent elections. Nothing was done to force, let alone prosecute, illegitimate African presidents to relinquish power. The AU, its collaborative organisations, and member states were impotent in restraining Pierre Nkrunzinza (Burundi), Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe), Andry Rajoelina (Madagascar), Yahyah Jammeh (Gambia), Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (Egypt), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea), Paul Biya (Cameroon), Denis Sassou Nguesso (Republic of Congo), Omar Al Bashir (Sudan), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Ibrahim Traore (Burkina Faso), Mahamat Derby (Chad) and Mamady Doumbouya (Guinea). Many AU heads of state cannot rebuke fellow multi-termers and coupists because many fall in the same category. For example, for Museveni to rebuke Theodore Obiang for failing to observe constitutionalism and the rule of law would be a classic case of a pot calling the kettle black. The AU has also failed to thwart African leaders who tweak constitutions to prolong their tenures beyond the mandatory two terms. The organisations have also been powerless in restraining African leaders who repudiate to relinquish power after electoral defeats. Such leaders force inclusive governments to stay in power, for example, in the case of Mwai Kibaki (Kenya) in 2008 and Mugabe (Zimbabwe) in 2009. The role of regional organisations and states has thus been theoretical, illusory, and a façade. Why African leaders are unwilling to relinquish power Former United States President Barack Obama sees no reason some African presidents want to stay in power beyond the mandatory two terms. Obama as quoted by Sevenzo (2015) sees no point in why many African Presidents want to stay in power, especially if they have amassed much money. He says that when an incumbent tries to massage a constitution to remain in power, it breeds strife, instability, and fragility. He adds that when a leader tries to change the rules to stay in office in the middle of the game, it risks instability and strife. They are never willing to relinquish power because some have draconian, autocratic, bloody, and murderous stints tainted with illegality. Many perpetrated international crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. They know well that they will face justice locally or at the International Criminal Court if they relinquish power. Ayittey (1999) says that criticising them became sacrilegious. The democracy, development, and freedom promised by Nkrumah and other African nationalists transmogrified into a histrionic nightmare. In many countries, these nationalist leaders soon turned out to be crocodile liberators, Swiss bank socialists, quack revolutionaries, and grasping kleptocrats. Some leaders refrain from handing over power because they have amassed ill-gotten gains. Those include properties and money in Swiss bank accounts. If they relinquish it, those ill-gotten gains get sequestrated by the state. Ayittey (1999:16) corroborates by saying, “What one observes in many African countries is an ‘artificial government’ or a ‘government by deception’ run by a phalanx of degreed bandits sporting Ray-Ban sunglasses and bazookas. They are out of touch with the people and perennially locked in combat with them. They prey on the rural populations to line their own empty pockets. They raid livestock, loot homes, direct humanitarian aid, and extract false taxes.” Others cling to power to groom their children to succeed them, creating a hereditary presidency. Some examples include Gabon, Chad, DRC, and Uganda (where President Yoweri Museveni is allegedly grooming his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba). Others become presidents for life because they become deified, pampered, and idolised as the only capable leaders in a country. They are regarded as gods, and people create a cult around the individual. They create an impression that without the incumbent, there will be no future. The nationalists who won freedom for their respective countries were hailed as heroes, swept into office with substantial parliamentary majorities, and deified. Currencies bore their portraits, and statues were built to honour them (Ayittey,1999). One Ugandan cabinet minister said that Museveni should continue to rule. It is because he is the only language understood in Washington, where Uganda gets funds for works such as rural electrification (Ntomba, 2015). How that is possible in a country of over 35 million people is hard to fathom. Implications on states’ right to development Both constitutional and military coups have detrimental effects on a country’s right to development. The right to development is a fundamental entitlement enshrined in the 1986 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Article 22 (1) of the Charter stipulates that all peoples shall have the right to economic, social, and cultural development. It is with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of humankind. At the same time, Article 22 (2) specifies, “States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.” Military coups have abrasive effects on peoples’ right to political, social, and cultural development because they attract suspension from regional organisations such as ECOWAS. The membership of states such as Burkina Faso and Guinea in EOCOWAS was suspended by the regional organisation when military juntas usurped power. Suspension from a regional organisation means restricted trade, investment, and diplomacy. People’s right to development is curtailed as people no longer conduct their cross-border economic activities. Companies will also find conducting business outside the country’s jurisdiction challenging. It will likely lead to unemployment, inflation, and social malaise that is detrimental to people’s development rights. Military takeovers also attract sanctions that are detrimental to people’s right to political, social, and economic development. Sanctions may include trade embargoes both by land and sea. The sanctioned country will no longer be able to access international financial markets and trade with other regional and international partners. It will have negative externalities to state-owned entities and private companies, which will no longer be able to conduct business with the outside world. It will likely result in a negative effect on states’ right to development as it leads to inflation, retarded economic and infrastructural growth, poverty, unemployment, and insurrection. In Mali, for example, tighter sanctions were imposed on the country when it failed to adhere to the stipulated deadline to hold elections (Abebe, 2022). The punitive measures included closing member states’ borders with Mali and freezing most of the country’s financial transactions (Ndiaga & Akorlie, 2022). In the case of Zimbabwe, the US and EU imposed smart sanctions when the country embarked on a violent farm invasion rampage. They imposed targeted sanctions on specific individuals at the helm of violent farm invasions, human rights violations, corruption, political repression, democracy, and the rule of law. Their assets and foreign accounts, including some companies involved in the abetting and aiding of anti-democratic values, were also sanctioned. They were also restricted from travelling to the EU and the US (Makumbe, 2010; Chinamasa, 2010). When the Mamady Doumbouya-led military junta seized power in Guinea, ECOWAS also suspended Guinea from its membership and imposed sanctions. Military coups also deprive people of their right to political development. In a coup government, people are denied their right to vote, thus a denial of the right to choose. Since elections are one of the defining characteristics of democracy, a coup denies people their fundamental right to vote. When people are denied such a right, it leads to stagnation of a state’s growth, fragility, and resentment, and may lead to more military coups in the country. It, therefore, cultivates negative consequences for a state’s right to political development. Military coups also deter potential investors. They also lower investor confidence due to the fragility and uncertainty of the prevailing environment. Military coup countries present a high-risk destination for potential investors, suffocating the country with inaccessibility to offshore financial markets. Undemocratic transitions such as military coups may also have a deteriorating effect on a country’s political, economic, cultural, and educational right to development. Such states may be forbidden to join or re-join the Commonwealth of Nations. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2003, and its attempt to re-join the Commonwealth in Kigali, Rwanda, in 2022 hit a brick wall. The Commonwealth stated that Zimbabwe first needed to resort to democratic rule, referring to the Mnangagwa regime that came to power through a military coup in 2017 (Matiashe, 2022). The Commonwealth also noted the collapse of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, shrinking democratic space, an absence of electoral reforms, wanton and grievous human rights abuses, and flouted and rigged elections (Matiashe, 2022; Chan, 2022). These are the reasons why the Commonwealth repudiated to re-admit Zimbabwe in 2022. This failure to re-join the Commonwealth has adverse effects because Zimbabwe will no longer participate in Commonwealth games where people interact, share and appreciate each other’s cultures and networks. Zimbabweans will also be barred from accessing Commonwealth scholarships. It will worsen the country’s education system. They will also experience restricted movement because they will need visas to travel to Commonwealth countries since they are no longer part of the group. All this negatively impacts the country’s development in almost all aspects. Conclusion African multi-term presidents will not relinquish power through constitutional means such as electoral defeat or the lapse of their terms. They always find means of toying with constitutions to maintain supremacy and indefinitely extend their terms of office. Such actions undermine democracy and leave coups as the only remedy to outwit such leaders. Elections must still change the status quo to remove such leaders from power. If they lose in an election, they refuse to step down. They either rig it or force an inclusive government. In some instances, they repudiate stepping down. That is because winning an election in many African countries is one thing, and getting into office is another. There is also a new trend that many African multi-term presidents are pursuing. They are holding sham referendums to massage constitutions to prolong their terms of office. In most cases, the referendums are not conducted freely and fairly, as people are coerced, coached, and forced to vote for the preferred idea. That leads to a situation where people vote without choosing. Many of these regimes liberated the countries and have been in power since independence. 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[Retrieved 04 August 2022] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42003020 Migration, Security, and the State: A Critical Review of the Securitisation of Migration in Africa Johannes Bhanye

African Climate and Development Initiative University of Cape Town

Cape Town, South Africa Ruvimbo Shayamunda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Abstract This chapter critically examines the securitisation of migration in Africa, focusing on this phenomenon’s historical context, theoretical perspectives, and practical implications. It explores the emergence of migration as a security concern in African states and the policies and measures adopted to address migration-related security concerns. The role of international actors, such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), in shaping migration securitisation in Africa is also analysed. The chapter highlights the impact of securitisation on migrants’ rights and experiences, emphasising the ethical implications, the disproportionate focus on border control, and the consequences for regional integration and cooperation. Additionally, the chapter explores alternatives to securitisation, including humanitarian approaches to migration management, comprehensive migration policies focusing on development and integration, and the importance of regional and international cooperation in addressing migration challenges. Through case studies on country-specific analysis and the impact of securitisation on specific migrant populations, the chapter provides valuable insights into the complexities and implications of migration securitisation in Africa. It concludes with policy recommendations and reflections on the securitisation of migration, highlighting the need for a balanced, rights-based, and comprehensive approach to migration governance in Africa. Introduction Migration, a dynamic force that shapes societies, economies, and political landscapes worldwide, stands at the crossroads of global change and challenge (Johannes, Dzingirai & Chirisa, 2023; Castelli, 2018). With its diverse range of countries and unique migration patterns, Africa is particularly affected by migration dynamics (Teye, 2018). The movement of people within and across African borders has been shaped by historical, economic, political, and environmental factors, resulting in a rich tapestry of migration experiences on the continent (Carling & Collins, 2018; Kirwin & Anderson, 2018; Van Hear et al., 2018). Understanding and analysing migration in Africa necessitates a critical examination of the securitisation of migration. Securitisation refers to constructing an issue as a security threat, thereby justifying exceptional measures, policy responses, and securitisation practices (Bourbeau, 2011; Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). In recent years, migration has increasingly been securitised by African states and the international community, elevating it to national security concerns (Barana, 2017). Examining the securitisation of migration in Africa is paramount due to its far-reaching implications. It raises fundamental questions about the balance between security imperatives and the protection of migrants’ rights, as well as the impact of securitisation on regional integration and cooperation (Kleinschmidt, 2017). Moreover, understanding the underlying drivers and consequences of migration securitisation is crucial for formulating more effective, equitable, and comprehensive migration policies. This chapter provides a critical examination of the securitisation of migration in Africa. Analysing the historical context, policy responses, and the impact on migrants and the broader region, the chapter sheds light on the complexities surrounding migration securitisation and stimulates informed discussions on alternative approaches. The chapter follows a structured approach. It begins by establishing the conceptual framework, defining securitisation and its application to migration. Theoretical perspectives on securitisation and migration are explored to provide a foundation for the analysis. The subsequent section explores the historical perspectives on migration in Africa, examining the diverse factors that have shaped migration patterns on the continent and the implications for African societies and economies. This historical understanding serves as a backdrop for comprehending the emergence and intensification of migration securitisation. The chapter then critically analyses the securitisation of migration in Africa, investigating the policies and measures adopted by African states and the involvement of international actors in shaping migration securitisation. The impact of securitisation on migrants’ rights and experiences is also examined, paying particular attention to the ethical implications of securitising migration and the disproportionate focus on border control over human rights. To illustrate the complexities and variations of migration securitisation in Africa, the chapter incorporates case studies, exploring country-specific analysis and the impact of securitisation on different migrant populations, such as refugees and economic migrants. These case studies provide empirical evidence and nuanced insights into the diverse contexts and implications of migration securitisation in Africa. Finally, the chapter presents alternatives to securitisation, discussing humanitarian approaches to migration management and comprehensive migration policies prioritising development and integration. The role of regional and international cooperation in addressing migration challenges is also examined. The chapter contributes to academic discussions, policy debates, and formulating more holistic and human rights-based approaches to migration in Africa. Through a deeper understanding of the securitisation of migration, it is hoped that policymakers, practitioners, and scholars can navigate the complexities of migration governance in a way that upholds human dignity, promotes regional cooperation, and addresses genuine security concerns while safeguarding the rights and well-being of migrants. Conceptual framework The conceptual framework of this chapter focuses on the securitisation of migration in Africa, exploring its definition, theoretical perspectives, and the linkages between migration, security, and the state. This framework provides a theoretical lens through which to understand securitisation processes and their implications for migration governance in Africa. Definition of securitisation and its application to migration The concept of securitisation is central to understanding the dynamics of migration and how it is framed within political and societal contexts. Securitisation is the process through which an issue or phenomenon is transformed into a security concern, demanding exceptional measures and resources to address it effectively (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). In the context of migration, securitisation refers to the process through which migration is framed as a security issue, not necessarily because of its nature or the actual level of the threat it poses, but because of the way it is presented and perceived by political actors and the public (Farny, 2016). The securitisation of migration involves using security discourse and practices to manage migration flows, which can have significant implications for the rights and freedoms of migrants and the societies they live in. Securitisation of migration has become a major topic of discussion in recent years, not only in Europe and North America but also in Africa because of the rise in immigration and growing fear of terrorism and other threats to internal safety (Bhanye, Shayamunda & Tavirai, 2023). A range of factors drive the securitisation of migration. These include political and economic instability, demographic changes, and increasing interconnectedness of the world (Bello, 2022). The securitisation of migration has significant implications for the way migration is governed and managed. It can lead to the adoption of restrictive immigration policies, the use of surveillance and border control measures, and the criminalisation of irregular migration (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2015). The securitisation of migration can also have negative consequences for the rights and freedoms of migrants, including the right to asylum and protection from persecution (Von Rosen, 2019). Theoretical perspectives on securitisation and migration Three theoretical perspectives, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, Critical Security Studies and the Human Security approach, provide a lens to understand the securitisation processes and their implications for migration governance in Africa. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies offers a foundational perspective on securitisation, emphasising the social and political processes involved in framing an issue as a security threat (Floyd, 2007a; McSweeney, 1996). According to this approach, securitisation is a speech act that involves the construction of an issue as an existential security concern, thereby justifying exceptional measures and policies (Floyd, 2007b). Actors such as state officials, media organisations, and interest groups are crucial in securitising migration. In the context of migration, securitisation within the Copenhagen School’s framework involves portraying migrants as potential risks to national security, social cohesion, or economic welfare (Demirkol, 2023; Hammerstad, 2014). This framing may be based on concerns related to the impact of migration on the labour market, cultural identity, public services, or social order (Hammerstad, 2014). By presenting migration as a security threat, securitisation enables the deployment of extraordinary measures such as enhanced border controls, restrictive immigration policies, and securitisation practices to manage and control migrant populations. Critical Security Studies offer a critical lens through which to analyse securitisation and migration. This perspective highlights power relations, discourses, and the role of dominant actors in constructing security threats (Krause & Williams, 2002; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2020). From a critical standpoint, the securitisation of migration is viewed as a social and political practice that perpetuates existing power structures, reinforces inequalities, and often neglects the rights and vulnerabilities of migrants (Browning & McDonald, 2013; Squire, 2015). Critical Security Studies scrutinise the discourses and narratives surrounding migration securitisation, revealing how they shape public perceptions, policy agendas, and practices. This perspective highlights the role of powerful actors, such as governments, security institutions, and media organisations, in influencing the securitisation process (Bhanye & Bhanye, 2023; Browning & McDonald, 2013; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2020). It questions the underlying motivations behind the securitisation of migration, exposing potential hidden agendas, scapegoating marginalised groups, or diverting attention from other pressing social and economic issues. The critical lens perspective challenges dominant narratives, uncovers alternative voices, and advocates for more inclusive and rights-based approaches to migration governance. The Human Security critical approach expands the understanding of security beyond the traditional state-centric perspective. It shifts the focus from the security of the state to the protection and well-being of individuals (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007). Applied to migration, this perspective critiques securitisation for prioritising state security over human security concerns, potentially leading to the violation of migrants’ rights and the neglect of their well-being (Floyd, 2007b). The human security approach highlights the multidimensional nature of security, encompassing physical safety and economic, social, and environmental aspects (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007; Newman, 2010). When migration is securitised, the focus often lies on protecting state borders, national interests, and public order, sometimes overshadowing the rights and needs of migrants themselves. This perspective emphasises the importance of respecting migrants’ human rights, ensuring their access to basic services, promoting social integration, and addressing the root causes of migration, such as poverty, inequality, and conflict. Through the human security lens, the critique of securitisation in the context of migration calls for a more holistic and inclusive approach that seeks to balance security concerns with the rights and well-being of migrants. It highlights the need to address the structural factors that drive migration and pursue policies promoting human dignity, equality, and social justice. Linkages between migration, security, and the state The linkages between migration, security, and the state are complex and multifaceted. Migration is influenced by various factors, including economic, political, and environmental conditions (Carling & Collins, 2018; Kirwin & Anderson, 2018; Van Hear et al., 2018). The movement of people across borders raises concerns about national security, social cohesion, and the management of resources. Different states respond to these concerns by adopting securitisation measures, such as stricter border controls, immigration policies, and cooperation with international actors. The securitisation of migration has implications for migration governance, human rights, and social dynamics (Bello, 2017; Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005). It shapes the legal frameworks and policies governing migration, influencing the experiences of migrants and their access to rights and services (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007). The securitisation discourse and practices can also impact social cohesion, contributing to xenophobia, discrimination, and marginalisation of migrants. Understanding the linkages between migration, security, and the state is crucial for developing comprehensive and rights-based approaches to migration management in Africa. Table 8.1 summarises the linkages between migration, security, and the state. Table 8 .1: Linkage Between Migration, Security and the State

Linkage	Explanation
National Security Concerns	Nation-states often perceive migration as a security challenge due to concerns of border control, territorial integrity, and socio-economic stability. The movement of people across borders is seen as potentially threatening national security, particularly in contexts where conflicts, political instability, or economic disparities exist.
Resource Competition	Migration can trigger competition over resources, including jobs, land, and social services. This competition may lead to tensions between migrants and host communities, raising security concerns for the state and potentially exacerbating intergroup conflicts.
Regional Stability	Migration patterns in Africa can have implications for regional stability. Mass movements of people due to conflicts, environmental disasters, or economic disparities can create political and social tensions that may spill over into neighbouring countries. This necessitates regional cooperation and coordination to manage migration-related security challenges.
Transnational Threats	Migration routes can be used by transnational criminal networks, including human traffickers, drug smugglers, and terrorist groups. These transnational threats pose security risks for both the states of origin and destination, necessitating security measures and cooperation between countries.
Governance and Policy Responses	Migration challenges require effective governance and policy responses from the state. How migration is securitised and addressed through policy frameworks can have significant implications for the rights, well-being, and integration prospects of migrants, as well as for regional cooperation and stability.

Historical perspectives on migration in Africa Africa has a rich migration history, characterised by diverse patterns and movements of people within the continent and across its borders. Throughout the centuries, Africans have migrated for various reasons, including economic opportunities, political stability, environmental factors, and social-cultural exchanges (Bhanye, 2024; Curtin, 2018; Van Hear et al., 2018). Historically, migration in Africa was influenced by factors such as trade routes, the expansion of empires and kingdoms, labour movements, and demographic changes (Adepoju, 1995; Curtin, 2018). Trans-Saharan trade routes facilitated the movement of goods, ideas, and people across the Sahara Desert, leading to the exchange of cultures and establishing commercial centres along these routes. Additionally, migration within Africa was driven by factors such as the Bantu expansion, which led to the diffusion of Bantu languages and cultures across vast regions (Cartwright, 2020). Colonialism in Africa also significantly shaped migration patterns (Bhanye, 2020b; Bhanye, 2022). European powers established colonies, leading to forced migration through the transatlantic slave trade and the displacement of populations. The colonial era also saw the movement of Europeans and Asians to Africa for economic opportunities, such as mining, plantation agriculture, and administrative roles (Emmer, 2012). Various factors have influenced migration in Africa throughout history, including economic, political, and environmental drivers. These factors continue to shape migration dynamics in the present day. Economic opportunities and disparities have been key drivers of migration in Africa. Push factors such as poverty, unemployment, limited access to resources, and economic inequalities drive individuals and communities to seek better livelihoods elsewhere (Van Hear et al., 2018). Pull factors, including employment prospects, entrepreneurship opportunities, and the availability of resources, attract migrants to specific regions or countries within Africa (Carling & Collins, 2018; Castelli, 2018). Political instability, conflicts, and wars have resulted in significant movements of people within and across African borders (Castelli, 2018). Internal displacement and forced migration have been common consequences of political crises as individuals and communities flee violence, persecution, or human rights abuses. Political changes, such as the end of apartheid in South Africa or the decolonisation process, have also influenced migration patterns (Hiropoulos, 2020; Reed, 2013). Environmental challenges, including droughts, floods, desertification, and resource scarcity, have also triggered African migration (Adaawen et al., 2019). Climate change exacerbates these environmental factors, leading to the displacement of populations and the search for more habitable areas (Zickgraf, 2019). Migration has significant implications for African societies and economies historically and in the contemporary context through cultural diversity and exchange, labour markets and economic development, and social and demographic changes. Movements of people lead to the diffusion of languages, religions, artistic expressions, and knowledge systems, enriching African societies and contributing to the continent’s vibrant cultural heritage (Jerardino et al., 2014). Migrants also contribute to the labour markets by filling gaps in various sectors, such as agriculture, mining, construction, and services. Remittances sent by African migrants working abroad are a significant source of income for households and contribute to local economies, investment, and poverty reduction (Dzingirai et al., 2014). Migration also brings social and demographic changes in African societies. Migrant communities often establish diaspora networks, maintaining connections with their countries of origin while adapting to new environments (Bhanye, 2022; Bhanye, 2023). Migrants also contribute to urbanisation processes, leading to the growth of cities and the emergence of multicultural urban societies. However, migration also poses challenges for African societies and economies. It strains social services and infrastructure in destination areas, creates tensions over resource competition and cultural differences, and exacerbates inequalities (Abel et al., 2019). The brain drain phenomenon, where highly skilled individuals migrate to seek better opportunities abroad, can also have negative implications for African countries, depriving them of valuable human capital (Dzinamarira & Musuka, 2021). Furthermore, irregular and forced migration poses significant humanitarian challenges. Human trafficking, smuggling, and exploitation of migrants are prevalent in certain regions, leading to human rights abuses and vulnerabilities (Bello & Olutola, 2020). Women and children, in particular, are at risk of various forms of exploitation, including trafficking for forced labour or sexual exploitation. In recent years, migration in Africa has also become a pressing issue due to the large-scale displacement caused by conflicts, political instability, and environmental disasters (Adaawen et al., 2019; Zickgraf, 2019). The movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within and across borders has strained host countries, affecting their social systems, resources, and security. Securitisation of migration in Africa Migration has increasingly been framed as a security concern in African states over the past decades (Gidron, 2020; Laine, 2020). This shift can be attributed to various factors, including economic disparities, political instability, conflicts, and transnational threats. African states have come to view migration through a security lens, perceiving it as a potential risk to national security, social cohesion, and economic stability (Abebe, 2019; Estevens, 2018). A combination of internal and external factors often drives the emergence of migration as a security concern in Africa. Internally, countries may experience large-scale movements of people due to conflicts, political crises, or economic disparities. These movements can create challenges for state institutions, strain social services, and raise concerns about the potential for social unrest or the infiltration of criminal networks. Externally, African states face pressures from destination countries and international organisations to control irregular migration and address transnational threats such as human trafficking, smuggling, and terrorism (Bello & Olutola, 2020). African states are implementing various policies and measures in response to migration-related security concerns. These measures aim to enhance border control, strengthen immigration laws and enforcement, and manage migrant populations. Policies include the establishment of border surveillance systems, the deployment of security forces to border areas, the introduction of stricter visa requirements, and the development of immigration detention facilities. African states also address security concerns by cooperating with regional and international partners (Moyo, 2021). This includes engaging in bilateral or multilateral agreements on border management, information sharing, and joint operations to combat transnational crime (Moyo, 2021; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014). Some countries have participated in initiatives such as the Rabat Process 1 1 The Rabat Process is a political process initiated in 2006 by the European Union and the African Union to address the challenges and opportunities of migration in the Euro-African region. and the Khartoum Process 2 2 The Khartoum Process is a regional migration and border management initiative that was launched in 2014. It is named after the city of Khartoum, Sudan, where the first ministerial meeting took place. The process aims to enhance cooperation among countries along the migration routes in the Horn of Africa and the European Union (EU) in addressing irregular migration, human trafficking, and smuggling of migrants. , which promote dialogue and cooperation between African and European countries on migration and security issues. The securitisation of migration in Africa is influenced by the involvement of international actors, including the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). To address migration challenges, the EU has focused on externalising its borders by cooperating with African countries to prevent irregular migration and improve border management (Zanker, 2019). This has led to the negotiation and implementation of migration agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU-Morocco Partnership, which aim to control migration flows from Africa to Europe. The AU has also been shaping migration securitisation in Africa through its policy frameworks (Nakache & Losier, 2017). The AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa emphasises the importance of managing migration in a way that promotes development, human rights, and regional integration. However, the AU also recognises the need to address security concerns related to migration, particularly in the context of conflicts, terrorism, and organised crime (Léonard & Kaunert, 2022). The involvement of international actors in shaping migration securitisation in Africa has implications for how migration is framed, prioritised, and addressed by African states. Such partnerships and agreements should strike a balance between security concerns and the protection of migrants’ rights, as well as promoting sustainable development and regional cooperation. Implications of securitisation of migration in Africa The securitisation of migration in Africa has significant implications for migrants’ rights and experiences, host communities, and regional integration. The subsections that follow substantiate this claim. Implications for Migrants The securitisation of migration in Africa has had significant implications for migrants, who are often stigmatised and criminalised (Laurent, 2021). Migrants are often denied access to basic services and opportunities and face social exclusion and discrimination (Gabrielli, 2014). The securitisation of migration has also led to increased border control and detention policies, violating migrants’ human rights and dignity. Table 8.2 summarises the implications of securitisation of migration for migrants in Africa. Table 8 .2: Implications of Securitisation of Migration for Migrants in Africa

Implication	Explanation
Increased risk of human rights violations	When migration is securitised, it can violate migrants’ human rights, including the right to seek asylum and protection from persecution. Migrants may face arbitrary detention, forced deportation, or other forms of mistreatment.
Implication	Explanation
Marginalisation and exclusion	Securitisation of migration can also exacerbate existing inequalities and tensions within societies, particularly when it is accompanied by xenophobic attitudes and behaviour towards migrants. Migrants may face discrimination and exclusion from basic services and opportunities, such as healthcare, education, and employment.
Loss of agency and autonomy	The securitisation of migration can also limit migrants’ agency and autonomy, as they may be subject to restrictions on their movement and activities. This can prevent them from pursuing their goals and aspirations or accessing opportunities for personal and economic development.
Increased vulnerability to exploitation and abuse	Migrants subject to securitisation measures may become more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, including trafficking, forced labour, and sexual exploitation. This is particularly true for irregular migrants who may be afraid to seek help, or report abuses for fear of being detained or deported.
Reduced access to services and protection	The securitisation of migration can also make it more difficult for migrants to access services and protection. For example, suppose migrants are afraid to come forward and access health care, education, or other services due to fear of deportation. In that case, this can lead to their social exclusion and marginalisation.
Forced displacement	The securitisation of migration can also lead to the forced displacement of migrants. For example, in some countries, migrants who are deemed to be a security threat may be forcibly removed from the country, even if they face persecution or danger in their country of origin.
Limited legal options	Finally, the securitisation of migration can limit legal options for migrants, particularly those seeking asylum or refugee status. For example, if countries tighten their borders and limit access to asylum procedures, this can make it more difficult for migrants to seek protection and safety.

Implications for host communities The securitisation of migration also has significant implications for host communities in Africa. Exclusionary policies lead to social tensions and the marginalisation of vulnerable groups. Host communities are often ill-equipped to deal with the influx of migrants, leading to social and economic pressures. Table 8.3 presents some of the implications of the securitisation of migration in Africa on host communities. Table 8 .3: Implications of Securitisation of Migration for Host Communities in Africa

Implication	Explanation
Social tension and conflict	The securitisation of migration can exacerbate social tension and conflict between host communities and migrants, particularly when migrants threaten social and economic stability. This can lead to xenophobia, discrimination, and violence against migrants, which can lead to retaliation and further tension between communities.
Strain on resources and services	Host communities may also feel the strain of an increased number of migrants, particularly if there are insufficient resources and services to support them. This can lead to competition for resources, such as housing, healthcare, and education, and can strain the capacity of local institutions to provide these services.
Economic impacts	The securitisation of migration can also have economic implications for host communities. On the one hand, migrants can contribute to the local economy by providing a source of labour and contributing to the local tax base. On the other hand, competition for jobs and resources can lead to resentment and tension between host communities and migrants. It can even result in a decrease in local wages and working conditions.
Implication	Explanation
Displacement and loss of cultural identity	In some cases, the securitisation of migration can lead to the displacement of host communities, particularly when they are forced to move to make way for migrants. This can lead to a loss of cultural identity and connection to the land and can have long-term impacts on the well-being of these communities.
Increased crime	The securitisation of migration can also lead to increased crime in host communities. For example, in some countries, migrants may be forced to resort to illegal activities to survive, contributing to rising crime rates and social unrest.
Trauma and psychological distress	The securitisation of migration can also psychologically impact host communities, particularly if they are exposed to violence, discrimination, or other forms of trauma due to tensions with migrants.
Political tensions	The securitisation of migration can also lead to political tensions in host communities, particularly if migrants threaten national security or stability. For example, in some countries, anti-migrant sentiment has been used to mobilise political support and gain power.

Implications for regional integration The securitisation of migration in Africa can also have significant implications for regional integration efforts, which aim to promote cooperation and economic development between countries. Borders have become increasingly militarised, and the movement of people and goods is restricted (Wilson, 2017). This has significant economic implications, with cross-border trade and investment being hindered. The securitisation of migration also hinders efforts to build regional solidarity, with countries adopting increasingly protectionist policies (Moyo, 2021). Table 8.4 shows the implications of the securitisation of migration for Regional Integration in Africa. Table 8 .4: Implications of Securitization of Migration for Regional Integration in Africa

Implication	Explanation
Border closures	The securitisation of migration can lead to the closure of borders between countries, making it more difficult for migrants to move freely between nations. For example, in 2019, Nigeria closed its borders with neighbouring countries to combat smuggling and illegal immigration. While this policy had some short-term success, it also negatively impacted regional integration efforts.
Disrupting cross-border trade	The securitisation of migration can also disrupt cross-border trade, a key component of regional integration in Africa. For example, in some countries, increased border security measures have led to delays and increased costs for traders, making it more difficult to do business across borders.
Reduced cross-cultural exchange	The securitisation of migration can also reduce cross-cultural exchange between nations, which is a key component of regional integration efforts. For example, if migrants are seen as a threat to national security, this can lead to increased isolationism and xenophobia, making it more difficult for people from different cultures to connect and share ideas.
Undermining regional agreements	The securitisation of migration can undermine regional agreements and cooperation efforts, particularly if countries prioritise their national security interests over regional integration. For example, if countries begin to see migration as a national security threat, this can lead to the erosion of regional integration efforts and the breakdown of cross-border cooperation.

Case Studies on migration securitisation in Africa This section presents specific case studies on migration securitisation in Africa. The case studies analyse the securitisation of migration in specific countries, namely South Africa, Libya, and Morocco. Each country presents unique dynamics and challenges related to migration, shaping its approach to securitisation. South Africa South Africa faces complex migration dynamics influenced by a mix of economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (De Jager & Musuva, 2016). Migration securitisation measures in South Africa aim to address perceived threats to national security, social tensions, and job competition. These measures include stringent immigration policies, increased border control, and deploying security forces in areas with high migrant populations (Tshishonga, 2022). While these measures aim to regulate migration flows and maintain social stability, their implementation raises concerns about their impact on migrants’ rights and overall experiences in the country (Mbiyozo, 2018). One of the key effects of securitisation on migration governance in South Africa is the restriction of migrants’ access to essential services and opportunities. Migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, often face challenges in accessing healthcare, education, and formal employment due to securitisation measures (Hlatshwayo & Vally, 2014). This lack of access violates their human rights and perpetuates social inequalities and marginalisation. Securitisation measures also contribute to hostility and xenophobia towards migrants in some instances (Chekero, 2023; Mushonga, 2022; Nyamwanza, 2023). The securitisation discourse, which frames migrants as threats to national security and economic stability, fuels negative perceptions and discrimination against migrants. This results in social tensions and violence targeting migrant communities, further hindering social cohesion within South African society. Xenophobia is often fuelled by the perception that foreign migrants pose a security threat to the country, particularly in terms of crime and competition for resources (Claassen, 2017). Another example of the securitisation of migration in South Africa is the construction of walls and fences along the country’s borders. The South African government justified the measures on security grounds, claiming that they are necessary to prevent the entry of illegal migrants and criminal elements. However, the measures have also led to the displacement of many people who rely on cross-border trade and migration for their livelihoods. Libya Libya implemented specific securitisation measures in response to migration flows, particularly as a transit country for migrants attempting to reach Europe. These measures have significant consequences on migrants’ rights, and external actors have played a crucial role in shaping migration securitisation within the country (Nakache & Losier, 2017). One of the primary securitisation measures employed by Libya is the establishment of detention centres for migrants. Detention facilities are centred around Bani Walid, with approximately 20 camps, including the Bani Walid detention camp. Al Mabani Centre, which opened in January 2021, is located in Tripoli and detains approximately 1,500 abductees. The Triq al-Sika detention centre is located in Tripoli. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) indicated that in 2023, around 5,000 migrants are being held in official detention centres in Libya, but they could represent just the tip of the iceberg. Speaking in Geneva in March 2023, IOM Chief Antonio Vitorino decried “the violation of the rights of migrants” in Libya as he urged to look for alternatives to the detention of people on the road to exile. While the detention facilities are intended to detain and control the movement of migrants, particularly those in irregular situations, the conditions within the detention centres raise serious concerns about the violation of migrants’ rights (Al-Dayel et al., 2021). Reports of overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, lack of access to healthcare, and abuse have emerged, pointing to a systemic failure to uphold human rights standards (Beşer & Elfeitori, 2018). The securitisation of migration in Libya is closely tied to external pressures and regional dynamics. External actors, including international organisations and neighbouring countries, have played a role in shaping migration securitisation policies within Libya (Nakache & Losier, 2017). For instance, the European Union (EU) collaborated with Libya to strengthen border controls and prevent migrants from reaching European shores. This external involvement influenced the securitisation approach taken by Libya, which had consequences for migrants’ rights (Al-Dayel et al., 2021). Migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, face widespread abuse, exploitation, and violations of their fundamental rights (Beşer & Elfeitori, 2018). Morocco Morocco implemented securitisation measures in response to migration flows, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa. The measures include enhanced border controls, increased cooperation with the EU, and establishing migration management policies (Qadim, 2014). While these measures aim to address concerns related to irregular migration, human trafficking, and security threats, they have implications for migrants’ rights and social integration. The securitisation of migration in Morocco has positive and negative effects on migrants’ rights. On the one hand, securitisation measures decreased irregular migration and improved border control, enhancing security and facilitating orderly migration processes. On the other hand, securitisation led to human rights concerns, particularly regarding migrants’ access to asylum procedures, adequate living conditions, and protection from exploitation. The securitisation approach sometimes results in the confinement of migrants in detention centres or informal settlements, raising questions about their rights and well-being. Securitisation measures in Morocco also impacted social integration efforts. The securitisation discourse, framing migration as a security threat, can contribute to social tensions and xenophobia, making it challenging for migrants to integrate into Moroccan society (Berriane et al., 2015). The securitisation focus on border control and migration management has sometimes overshadowed social cohesion and inclusion initiatives. Regarding migration governance, the securitisation measures have influenced the legal framework and policies governing migration in Morocco. The emphasis on border control and cooperation with the EU shape the country’s migration management strategies. These measures impact the experiences of migrants, affecting their mobility, access to services, and legal protections. Lessons learned and implications from case studies Drawing from country-specific case studies, common patterns, lessons and implications of migration securitisation in Africa can be drawn as follows in Table 8.5. Table 8 .5: Lessons Learned and Implications from Case Studies

Lesson learned	Explanation
Human rights and dignity:	The case studies highlight the importance of upholding migrants’ human rights and dignity in migration governance. They shed light on the negative consequences of securitisation on migrants’ rights and the need for a rights-based approach that respects their inherent worth and agency.
Balancing security and human rights	The case studies underscore the need for a balanced approach that addresses security concerns while safeguarding migrants’ rights. They emphasise the importance of comprehensive migration policies that integrate security considerations with respect for human rights, social cohesion, and sustainable development.
Regional cooperation and responsibility-sharing	The case studies also demonstrate the significance of regional cooperation and responsibility-sharing in managing migration effectively. They will highlight the benefits of collaboration between African countries in addressing common migration challenges. The case studies also shed light on the consequences of fragmented approaches and the importance of fostering regional cooperation, information-sharing, and joint decision-making to develop comprehensive and coordinated responses to migration.
Contextual factors and tailored approaches	The case studies emphasise the need for context-specific and tailored approaches to migration securitisation. They highlight the diverse migration patterns, drivers, and dynamics in different countries and populations, underscoring the importance of understanding these nuances in designing effective and appropriate policies and measures.
Long-term implications and unintended consequences	The case studies explored the long-term implications of migration securitisation, including its impact on regional integration, social cohesion, and the well-being of both migrants and host communities. They will draw attention to the unintended consequences of securitisation, such as the perpetuation of inequalities, xenophobia, and the erosion of trust between states.

Critique of migration securitisation in Africa This section critiques migration securitisation in Africa, focusing on the ethical implications of securitising migration, the disproportionate focus on border control and securitisation over human rights, and the consequences of securitisation on regional integration and cooperation in Africa. The securitisation of migration in Africa raises significant ethical concerns. Treating migration primarily as a security issue tends to dehumanise migrants and overlook their rights, dignity, and well-being (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007). Migration is a fundamental human right, and securitising it can violate migrants’ rights, including the right to seek asylum, freedom of movement, and protection from discrimination (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007; Newman, 2010). Ethically, migration should be approached from a perspective that respects migrants’ inherent worth and recognises their agency and contributions to society. By securitising migration against the backdrop of the human security approach that shifts the focus from the security of the state to the protection and well-being of individuals (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007), African states risk perpetuating harmful narratives that criminalise and stigmatise migrants, fuelling prejudice and discrimination. Another main critique of migration securitisation in Africa is the disproportionate emphasis on border control and security measures at the expense of migrants’ human rights. This framing relates to the Copenhagen School, where migrants are portrayed as potential risks to national security, social cohesion, or economic welfare (Demirkol, 2023; Hammerstad, 2014). While border management is important for maintaining security and order, it should not overshadow the obligation to protect and respect migrants’ rights. Securitisation measures often prioritise deterrence, interception, and detention of migrants, focusing on preventing irregular migration rather than addressing the underlying causes and vulnerabilities that drive migration. This approach neglects the fact that many migrants are forced to undertake dangerous journeys due to limited legal pathways and a lack of opportunities in their home countries. A more balanced approach is needed, one that combines effective border management with policies and practices that ensure the protection, dignity, and well-being of migrants. This includes creating legal pathways for migration, establishing fair and efficient asylum systems, addressing root causes of migration, and promoting integration and social cohesion. The securitisation of migration has also negatively affected regional integration and cooperation in Africa. Migration is inherently a regional and transnational phenomenon, and addressing it requires collaborative approaches beyond national borders (Demirkol, 2023; Hammerstad, 2014). However, when migration is securitised, it can also lead to the securitisation of regional cooperation. Securitisation measures often prioritise national interests and control over collaborative efforts to manage migration. This can hinder regional integration initiatives, undermine trust among countries, and impede the establishment of comprehensive regional frameworks for migration governance. It also risks perpetuating a fragmented approach to migration management, where countries focus on protecting their borders rather than working together to address the shared challenges and opportunities migration presents. Alternatives to securitisation This section presents alternatives to securitisation. It focuses on humanitarian approaches to migration management, comprehensive migration policies focusing on development and integration, and the role of regional and international cooperation in addressing migration challenges. One alternative to securitisation is adopting humanitarian approaches to migration management. This approach emphasises the protection and well-being of migrants, recognising their vulnerability and the need for a compassionate response (Floyd, 2007b; Kaldor et al., 2007; Newman, 2010). Humanitarian approaches prioritise saving lives, providing access to basic services, and ensuring the protection of migrants’ rights, particularly for those needing international protection, such as refugees and asylum seekers. Humanitarian approaches involve establishing robust asylum systems that provide fair and efficient procedures for assessing asylum claims, ensuring access to legal pathways for migration, and creating reception and integration programs that support the social and economic inclusion of migrants (Panebianco, 2016). These approaches promote rights-based and dignified treatment of migrants, aiming to address their immediate needs while recognising their long-term contributions to host societies. Another alternative to securitisation is adopting comprehensive migration policies that focus on development and integration. These policies recognise the multifaceted nature of migration and aim to address its root causes while promoting social cohesion and inclusive development (Carling, 2017). Comprehensive migration policies encompass measures such as investing in education and skills development in countries of origin to create opportunities and reduce the push factors for migration. They also include programs facilitating regular migration channels, allowing migrants to seek employment or reunite with their families through legal and safe pathways (Baizán et al., 2014). Additionally, comprehensive policies promote social integration through language training, cultural orientation, and support for access to healthcare, education, and housing for migrants. Regional and international cooperation plays a crucial role in addressing migration challenges and providing alternatives to securitisation. Migration is a complex and transnational issue that requires collaborative efforts and shared responsibilities (Carling, 2017). Regionally, African countries can strengthen cooperation frameworks, such as the African Union and regional economic communities, to develop common strategies and mechanisms for managing migration. This includes harmonising migration policies, enhancing information-sharing and intelligence exchange, and jointly addressing the root causes of migration, such as conflicts, poverty, and climate change. Internationally, cooperation between African states and external factors, such as the European Union and international organisations, is essential. This cooperation should be based on the principles of partnership, mutual respect, and shared responsibility. It should address the drivers of migration, ensure the protection of migrants’ rights, promote sustainable development, and enhance capacity-building efforts. Furthermore, international cooperation can support African countries in developing comprehensive migration policies, including financial assistance for infrastructure development, technical support for capacity building, and sharing best practices in migration management. This cooperation can contribute to a more holistic and rights-based approach to migration governance, reducing the need for securitisation measures. Conclusion This chapter critically examined the securitisation of migration in Africa, exploring its historical context, theoretical perspectives, and practical implications. Analysing key concepts, theories, case studies, and alternative approaches, the chapter sheds light on the complex dynamics surrounding migration securitisation and its impact on migrants, societies, and regional cooperation. The chapter highlighted several key findings and arguments. Economic, political, and environmental factors influence migration in Africa. Understanding the complexity and diversity of migration patterns is crucial for developing effective policies. The securitisation of migration in Africa has emerged as a response to perceived security threats, with actors framing migration as a risk to national security, social cohesion, or economic welfare. The securitisation of migration is perpetuated through the discourses and practices of powerful actors, often neglecting the rights and vulnerabilities of migrants. The securitisation of migration also has ethical implications, as it prioritises border control and security measures over human rights and dignity. Further, securitisation measures have unintended consequences, including the disproportionate focus on border control, the reinforcement of inequalities, and the erosion of regional integration and cooperation. Alternative approaches, such as humanitarian and comprehensive migration policies and regional and international cooperation, offer viable alternatives to securitisation. The implications of the findings presented in this chapter are significant for policy, practice, and future research. In terms of policy and practice, policymakers and practitioners should prioritise protecting migrants’ rights, adopt a humanitarian approach to migration management, and develop comprehensive policies that address the root causes of migration while promoting social integration and sustainable development. Regarding regional and international cooperation, African states should strengthen regional cooperation frameworks, foster dialogue and collaboration, and engage with international partners to develop coordinated and comprehensive approaches to migration governance. Future research should delve further into the experiences and perspectives of migrants, explore the gender dimensions of migration securitisation, and examine the potential for alternative approaches to migration governance in specific African contexts. Additionally, research should investigate the role of non-state actors, such as civil society organisations and diaspora communities, in challenging securitisation narratives and promoting inclusive migration policies. In conclusion, the securitisation of migration in Africa is a complex issue that warrants critical examination and alternative approaches. While recognising the importance of addressing security concerns, it is imperative to strike a balance that upholds the rights, dignity, and well-being of migrants. The securitisation of migration should not overshadow the ethical obligations to protect vulnerable individuals and respect their human rights. By adopting humanitarian approaches, comprehensive migration policies, and fostering regional and international cooperation, African countries can chart a path towards a more inclusive, rights-based, and sustainable approach to migration governance. 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Centre for Public Management and Governance University of Johannesburg

Johannesburg, South Africa Vain D.B Jarbandhan

Centre for Public Management and Governance University of Johannesburg

Johannesburg South Africa Moira Tambaoga

Department of Development Sciences Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology

Marondera, Zimbabwe Noah Ariel Mutongoreni

Director Manicaland State University of Applied Sciences

Mutare, Zimbabwe Abstract The intricate relationship between development, peace and human security has emerged as a critical subject in various governance and development forums, particularly in African nations grappling with high poverty levels. This chapter interrogates the multifaceted debates surrounding the nexus of these elements, questioning whether development can be achieved without addressing the underlying issues of human security and peace. With examples of ongoing violent conflicts and civil wars across the continent, the future appears bleak, undermining efforts toward achieving Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Peace is understood as the absence of conflict but also encompasses social justice, equality and wellbeing of individuals. Human security, defined as the collective efforts of government and non-state actors to safeguard individuals’ welfare and safety, contrasts sharply with traditional state-centric security paradigms. It includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. In Africa, human security is often threatened by poverty, violence and social inequality. Development refers to economic growth and the enhancement of quality of life. This study employed the content analysis method and posited that development must be redefined as a bio-political endeavour prioritising the lives of citizens, particularly those in post-conflict settings. Development in post-colonial Africa hinges on a nuanced understanding of the interconnections between peace, human security, and development. Ultimately, the research highlights the necessity for adequate security measures to ensure that populations have access to essential resources, thereby facilitating sustainable development. Introduction Contemporary conflicts in Africa are marked by both inter and intra-state violence, often resulting in profound regional and global repercussions. These conflicts not only obstruct national development but are frequently symptomatic of failed developmental efforts (International Peace Academy [IPA], 2004; International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2020). The interconnectedness of development, peace, and security has garnered increasing global attention, particularly in Africa, where the repercussions of violent conflicts have been devastating. The post-Cold War era has seen numerous societies ravaged by war, leading to widespread death, destruction, state fragility, and a vicious cycle of underdevelopment and instability (IPA Report, 2004; Jinadu, 2007; IMF, 2020). The peace, human security, and development challenges are arguably more pronounced in Africa than in other regions. Countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and many others have similarly faced setbacks due to intra-state conflicts, yet the scale and impact in Africa are particularly acute (IPA, 2004; Jinadu, 2007; Gluhbegovic, 2016; IMF, 2020). Political instability arising from military and non-military conflicts compels scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in development and conflict management to reassess the nexus between peace, human security, and development. This renewed focus on integrating Africa’s development and security agendas opens a critical dialogue about their interrelationship (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The inseparable connection between socio-economic regionalism and security suggests that achieving socio-economic progress and national development goals is exceedingly challenging amidst ongoing civil wars and political instability. Moreover, violent civil wars and security threats have challenged the traditional academic and policy paradigms that view Development, Peace, and Governance Studies as distinct fields without intersection (Venkatasawmy, 2015). The African context presents both threats and opportunities for understanding the conceptual and practical linkages between these domains (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). To explore this critical relationship, this study proposes a framework for understanding the peace-human security-development nexus as a vital interdisciplinary bridge. The first section of this chapter outlines the global policy perspective, culminating in a comprehensive understanding of peace and human security as they relate to regional development within the African context. The subsequent section examines the empirical value of the peace-human security-development relationship, interrogating its implications for Africa. Finally, the third section assesses the impact of civil wars and armed conflicts on achieving regional socio-economic integration and development goals. In this context, the need for regional initiatives to foster peace, human security, and conflict management emerges as essential for sustaining development. The conclusion posits that while significant challenges persist regarding Africa’s socio-economic and security agendas—particularly the role of weak and fragmented states in the regionalisation process—there are crucial insights to be gained. These insights illuminate changes in the peace-human security-development relationship and reaffirm the need for effective policy interventions and responses to development and conflict challenges. Conceptual clarification To appreciate unfolding development challenges and experiences in post-conflict Africa, it is fundamental to begin with a brief conceptualisation of peace, security, human security and development. Peace Suppose we support the existing relationship between peace, human security and development. In that case, it becomes necessary to show the nature of peace being referred to, particularly peace for whom and performing what function? Peace remains a hotly debatable concept and has generated conflicting meanings. The concept of ‘peace’ relates to the absence of war, fear, conflict, anxiety, human suffering and violence and is about peaceful co-existence (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The Norwegian peace theorist Johann Galtung (1996) points to three categories of violence that are vital to the understanding of peace: direct violence (physical, emotional and psychological); structural violence (deliberate policies and structures that cause human suffering, death and harm); and cultural violence (cultural norms and practices that create discrimination, injustice and human suffering). Galtung further distinguishes between “negative peace”—the absence of direct violence, war, fear and conflict at individual, national, regional and international levels, “positive peace”—the absence of unjust structures, unequal relationships and injustice, and inner peace at an individual level (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Francis, 2006). Even though these conceptual classifications may appear instrumental, it remains imperative to reiterate that diverse cultural orientations have unique understandings of peace that are deeply entrenched in a given society or region’s peculiar traditional practices and particular political background of a given society or region. For instance, many people in the Great Lakes region of Africa relate peace to the absence of war and armed conflict, while those in Southern Africa view the link between peace and the absence of depressing social and development indicators such as poverty and the AIDS pandemic (Freedman & Poku, 2005; Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Jinadu, 2007). Thus, despite extant different context-specific interpretations, the concept of peace entails human security, development and social justice. This wider appreciation of peace provides the necessary linkages with human security and development (Mills, 2000; Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2021; IMF, 2020). Security The term ‘security’ entails the search to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts, whether the threat originates from other states, non-state actors, or structural socioeconomic conditions (IPA, 2004). Furthermore, Francis (2006) defines it as the state of feeling safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to acquired values. A simplification of the above definitions indicates that the concept of ‘security’ entails the survival and the condition of human existence (Buzan, 1991; Thomas & Wilkin, 1999). The concept ‘security’ has historically been interpreted as the process of safeguarding the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal or coercive instruments at the state or international level (IPA, 2004; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2018). Of late, however, the concept’s definition has expanded to incorporate non-military extortions, resulting in violent conflicts and undermining citizens’ security. Such threats vary from civil wars and resource conflicts to transnational crime and population movements (IPA, 2004). In certain contexts, resource conflicts have the potential to become inter-state or regional conflicts due to competition over resources in border areas or where there are disputes over ownership or use of resources. One example is Lake Nyasa, between Tanzania and Malawi, where Malawian investors are accused of oil exploration and fishing on the Tanzanian side of the lake (Tanzania CRR, 2012, cited in Gluhbegovic, 2016). Human security Human security is a new term that strongly emphasises development initiatives for the benefit of people at a local level. It is symbolic of the transformed linkages and governmental technologies that shape the post-Cold War security terrain (Duffield, 2006). In the words of one advocate, a focus on human security meant “putting people first” (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). It entails adopting a bottom-up or local approach to security that underlines the nexus between states and their citizens and that desists from associating the security of a state with the economic, political and social well-being of the citizens (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). The Commission on Human Security (2003) defines ‘human security’ as protecting the vital core of human life through “protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life”. Their ability to enjoy complete, safe and fulfilled lives—their human security—has moved from the shadows of domestic affairs onto the international political agenda. Failure to address human security risks and civil conflict among groups, communities and people threatens states from within and, hence, global order itself (Duffield, 2006). Human security embodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional concerns with military capacity and the defence of borders (Duffield, 2006; Jinadu, 2007). In most parts of the world, the state or regime continues to be secured at the expense of citizens’ needs. It is often argued that the concept of human security brings to the fore the centrality of security that can be applied to Post-Conflict Peace Building (PCPB) (Cockell, 2000; Vhumbunu, 2021). Human security is covertly or overtly related to PCPB and a comprehensible real and scholarly agenda rooted in a specific appreciation of democratic state-building. It gives coherence to a set of policy issues that urgently need to be addressed, including issues such as the challenge of post-conflict DDR, the situation of vulnerable groups in conflicts, the role of small arms and light weapons in armed violence, and effective security sector governance (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Duffield, 2006). Consequently, governing organised violence and relinquishing force from political, economic and social life has been pivotal to the contemporary appreciation of politics and the fight for creating a legitimate and representative political institutional framework. Therefore, as briefly discussed above, the concept of human security highlights the nature and dynamic relationship between violence and insecurity on the one hand and underdevelopment and poverty on the other (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Development Development is a relative term that means different things to different people and communities. Generally, the concept is positive, connoting ‘progress’ or ‘change for the better’ (Ndhlovu, 2020). This can be enhanced by prioritising the various processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable living standards (IPA, 2004; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The above formulation has underscored the following: economic growth; basic human needs; human development (food, shelter, clothing, education, healthcare, freedom, democratic participation and human dignity); sustainable development; and political development (Allen & Thomas, 2000; IPA Report, 2004). Burnell & Randall, 2005). Brobbey (2010) concurs that development is “the capacity of a state to achieve higher outcomes of production for the satisfaction of citizens and empower them to make demands” (Ndhlovu, 2020). The above definition is much closer to Gumede’s (2019) formulation that development entails “… improvements in well-being, involving socio-economic progress.” Historically, development partners have made considerable strides in lowering conflict-related risks to their programming, preferring to focus on conflict (considering it a negative eventuality to be circumvented at all costs) or deviating from the mainstream development aid to humanitarian intervention. Francis (2004) argues that violent wars in Africa and the devastating consequences on development and security highlight the limitations of the traditional interpretation of development studies and practice. The emerging post-Cold War debate focuses on the securitisation of development, i.e., treating development as a security issue. Importantly, this approach supports the belief that wars and armed conflicts exacerbate the problems of underdevelopment and insecurity in the country and the region (IPA, 2004; Francis, 2004). Gluhbegovic (2016) goes on to suggest that civil unrest can create a ripple effect at a regional level. Unrest in one country can lead to tensions in another. For instance, experiences of conflicts in DRC, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi led to an influx of refugees into Zambia. This situation creates a challenge within Zambian society if questions of xenophobia and the like are not dealt with (Gluhbegovic, 2016). Based on the above, contemporary development actors and academics have realised that there is an intricate relationship between conflict, human security and development. There has been a growing focus on merging strategies and interventions related to security and development partners working in conflict-stricken societies. This is based on the pretext that a holistic and integrated approach must be employed to solve the problems experienced in unstable countries to realise sustainable peace and long-term prosperity—especially on the African continent (IPA, 2004; Duffield, 2006). In some instances, the cruel reality of underdevelopment epitomised by abject poverty, social segregation and gross violations of human rights becomes a breeding ground for violent conflict in a country. As such, contemporary development studies and praxis have been compelled to go beyond their traditional emphasis on critical issues, including peace, human security and the implication of violent conflicts (Francis, 2004). Thus, it becomes imperative in the current study to attempt the existing linkages between peace, security and development in accepting the multifarious formulations of development (Francis, 2004). Linking human security and development in the post-conflict context While the link between peacebuilding and the provision of individual security is undoubtedly vital, this alone does not do justice to how ‘peace’ is understood in PCPB (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016). As Galtung (1975) argues, peacebuilding means something more positive and transitory than merely providing stability to avert violent conflict. Instead, peacebuilding entails creating political, social and economic organisations and underlines the notions of capacity-building, good governance, social inclusion, economic opportunity and individual well-being. Therefore, to include this all-inclusive formulation of peace, it is imperative to incorporate the concept of ‘development’ into the peacebuilding operational matrix. From an institutional perspective, human security and development issues have occasionally been tied together (IMF, 2020). For many decades, ideas about development and human security have been discussed in parallel with separate institutional and political arrangements. Entire institutions were introduced to promote either human security or development, and people working in the British, Canadian, Swiss, Swedish, Dutch or German development cooperation agencies hardly spoke to their counterparts in foreign and defence ministries (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; IMF, 2020). To date, the existing gap in institutional cultures remains huge, and, except for very limited cases, discussions on how to realise development remain devoid of any consideration of human security issues. The obvious issue was created by the bureaucratic specialisation among development agencies and ministries, and the justification for this isolation is comparatively clear. Firstly, throughout the Cold War, human security policy was considered a concern of national sovereignty. Therefore, aid donors or international financial institutions did not scrutinise issues like military expenditure. (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Secondly, human security policy frameworks were frequently caught up in Cold War conflicts and alliances, and consequently, they were a taboo subject for development agencies or institutions (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Jinadu, 2007). Thirdly, external scrutiny of a state’s policies and practices towards its citizens was deemed to be interference in a state’s internal affairs. As a result, development agencies and international financial institutions, at least until the early 1990s, excluded national security concerns from their mandates (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). Practically, the concepts ‘security’ and ‘development’ were difficult to separate because, for instance, economic development, on its own, proved to be a catalyst for addressing conflict and violence in societies. For instance, in the early 1990s, the global development community viewed Rwanda as a leading success story, thanks to high levels of multilateral overseas development aid coupled with rapid progress in various economic and social indicators (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). However, the 1994 genocide blatantly showed that something was wrong with this picture and that a focus on national economic development, without attention to basic human security issues, would not succeed in addressing conflicts and insecurities and could, in some cases, aggravate them (Uvin, 1998; Jinadu, 2007). There was a generally perceived assumption in the economic and development fraternity that development was a precursor for human security and that a boost in economic development would inevitably limit the cases of conflict within, and possibly even between, states. However, this notion was progressively put in disbelief. In a situation of scarcity, development assistance and relief are precious commodities (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). If wrongly distributed, they may reinforce social cleavages and, paradoxically, sow the seeds of conflict and insecurity rather than alleviate them (Boyce, 2002; Maresko, 2004). Therefore, the development–human security nexus has been reversed after the realisation that providing basic human security is a precursor for political, social and economic development (and well-being). Good practical illustrations of this change in thinking include the concept of ‘security first,’ the idea of ‘sustainable disarmament for sustainable development,’ and the focus on ‘security sector reform’ by major development aid agencies and international financial institutions (Krause & Jütersonke, 2005). The above illustrations reflect a radical shift in thinking in the global post-conflict development arena and show a growing shift away from the ‘planning fissure’ between human security and development frantic efforts. The peace-security-development nexus: European integration case evidence The European integration in the post-war period is one of the few success stories to illustrate the peace-security-development linkages. Emerging from the devastation of World War II, Europe experimented with the concept and practice of regional integration and cooperation (Francis, 2006). In the immediate post-war era, the main consideration was to establish lasting solutions to address inter-state conflicts in Europe, establish a favourable atmosphere for regional peace, order and human security, and build cooperation among the states and communities that would ensure interdependence (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). The difficult shift from post-war recovery to development and addressing Europe’s continuous security challenges resulted in establishing a regional integration and cooperation grouping. Subsequently, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Notably, these initiatives are based on sharing regional collective resources in terms of development and security (Francis, 2006). Between 1960 and 2003, the EEC expanded to 25 member states and formed a European Union (EU) with a common ‘European community identity’, a supranational institution in the form of a European Commission with a parliament and a common currency, the Euro. The established EU governmental structure is underpinned by principles of liberal economics and democratic politics (Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2018). However, as we all know today, Europe has not always been stable, economically developed and characterised by viable modern states. William Wallace argues that “West European integration was a product not only of a common culture and history, and a particular geographical density, but also of a common disaster and predicament: the war and its aftermath, American hegemony and the Soviet threat” (Wallace, 1995; IMF, 2020). In addressing these various regional challenges, Europe came up with constructive development and human security programmes and policies, including but not limited to the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Lomé Convention outlining the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific economic relations (ACP), a common market with a customs union, political cooperation and a common foreign and human security policy (Francis, 2006). These regional post-war development and security programmes were supported by the US-backed Marshall Plan (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). The regional policy frameworks and initiatives resulted in establishing and expanding economic, social, political and human security interdependence (Francis, 2006; Jinadu, 2007; IMF, 2020). Further, European policies and programmes on regime and human security interdependence culminated in the political stability and democratic success of former military and authoritarian regimes such as Greece, Spain and Portugal and the new member states from the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe. Traditional ‘enemies’ such as France and Germany are now locked into a partnership involving economics, security, development and politics (Francis, 2006; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Despite the tremendous progress in linking security and development in Europe, the EU is still characterised by a continuous amity-enmity divide about the nature of the European project as a ‘partnership of nations’ or a ‘federal political union.’ For instance, in 2005, France and the Netherlands opposed the EU-proposed constitution, which signified the worldwide view that the security-development relationship is not immune from problems (Francis, 2006). Nonetheless, in the EU, well-thought-out policy and practice to merge regional peace, security and development focus on creating interdependent states and compelling people to have a “similar European identity.” The EU case also illustrates that viable, strong and modern states are crucial to the nexus at both national and regional levels (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). The African perspective In this section, we attempt to further the discussion on the extent to which African countries—most of which have weak, failing and cash-strapped economies—have the capacity to contribute to the challenging project of facilitating peace, human security and development both at national and regional levels. A further question can also be raised: Do we have any successful African cases? Addressing this fundamental question calls for deciphering the root causes of expanding regional economic integration and cooperation in Africa, which have consequently created the domain of regional peace, security and conflict management. A cursory review of modern violent conflicts and the socio-development situation in Africa provides the basis for establishing the reasons and the imperative of the convergence (Venkatasawmy, 2015). Available literature confirms that the post-colonial political and human security situation of the African region is characterised by inter-state and intra-state wars and armed conflicts. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa have been particularly deadly. Estimates based on the GED suggest that, in the 1990s alone, verified conflict-related deaths totalled at least 825,000 (over two-thirds of global conflict deaths) (IMF, 2020). The high death toll was driven by the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, and protracted violence in Angola, the DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone (IMF, 2020). Several of these conflicts ended in the early-2000s. As a result, the number of conflict-related deaths in the region fell sharply, reaching its lowest level of about 2,400 deaths in 2010 (IMF, 2020). By 2002, there were 18 active wars and armed conflicts in Africa at different levels of intensity or stages of transition from war to peace (Francis, 2006; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Vhumbunu, 2017). Most of these wars are fought in some of the world’s poorest countries. Civilians have become the main target and victims in these civil wars, accounting for more than 90% of the casualties (UNDP, 2002; Venkatasawmy, 2015; IMF, 2020). According to the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, an estimated 3.6 million people were killed in internal warfare in the 1990s and half of all civilian casualties were children. Furthermore, of the 300,000 child soldiers worldwide, an estimated 200,000 are in Africa. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons grew by 50%. The civil wars in Somalia, the DRC, Angola, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone have led to state collapse and societal fragmentation (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015). There have been frantic efforts to find avenues for possible civil war peace settlements, and multinational peacekeeping forces, both regional and from the United Nations (UN), have been deployed. Low-intensity ethno-religious and political conflicts in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sudan and Central Africa Republic continue to undermine peace and stability on the continent (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). A resurgence in violence in recent years, however, implies an increase in conflict-related deaths, which have averaged about 14,000 a year since 2014 (a significant number, though well below the average of 84,000 seen during the 1990s). This rise mirrors the global surge in conflict-related deaths, driven largely by violence in regional countries like Angola, Mozambique and Syria (IMF, 2020). According to Vhumbunu (2017), in 2016, there was an intensification of conflict in Mozambique – albeit in a sporadic fashion—mainly between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front/Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) government, presided over by President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and Mozambican National Resistance/Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) forces, led by Alfonso Marceta Macacho Dhlakama (Vhumbunu, 2017). This is a continuation of the conflict that was revived in 2012 by Renamo, driven by several grievances, including allegations of economic marginalisation, regional economic imbalances and breach of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords (GPA), which had ended the post-independence civil war fought from 1977 to 1992. The escalation of conflict in Mozambique in early 2016 resulted in the displacement of citizens in the affected areas, while thousands of people crossed the borders into Malawi and eastern Zimbabwe as refugees (Vhumbunu, 2017). The resultant implications of armed conflicts and instability regrettably undermine and discourage the realisation of regional economic integration and development initiatives (Gluhbegovic, 2016). Therefore, diverse intricate domestic, regional and external considerations have compelled Africa’s initially created economic groups to develop into the peace and security domain (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). Despite their loopholes and drawbacks, experimental regional peace and security interventions by initially chartered economic groupings demonstrate the commitment, resilience and re-insurgence of regionalism in Africa. It also implies that development and economic integration goals cannot be realised in the context of human insecurity, wars and armed conflicts. (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015). Efforts to facilitate peace, human security and development regionalism in the Horn of Africa Diverse developmental problems arising from natural disasters like drought and famine, exacerbated wars, and violent conflicts have become a compelling case for countries, particularly the Horn of Africa, to devise policies demonstrating the linkages. In this case, the Horn of Africa includes countries like Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. According to Francis (2006), Jinadu (2007) and Gluhbengovic (2016), the Horn of Africa demonstrates ecological, political, socio-cultural and economic diversity. Most of its people depend on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism in the face of scarce natural resources (Francis, 2006). The prevalence of conflicts and the extensive use of landmines have had far-reaching implications for economic endeavours and the environment itself. Many African countries in the Horn have adopted structural adjustment programmes reflecting varying degrees of success. Their level of development is reflected in gloomy economic and social indicators, underpinning the perception of the region as a ‘disaster zone’ (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). Woodward (2003) further suggests that the Horn is the “stage on which Africa’s tragedy is played out in stark and violent form”. The continental effects of environmental and development challenges on human security culminated in creating the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986. IGADD originally concentrated on the continent’s challenges of drought, famine, and desertification (Francis, 2006; Vhumbunu, 2021). The resurgence of regionalism in world politics in the 1990s caused the political leadership of IGADD to consider transforming the authority. At an extraordinary summit in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 1995, the decision was made to revitalise the institution and expand its remit to cover peace and security (Francis, 2006; Obeng-Odoom, 2013). At a 1996 summit in Nairobi, Kenia, IGADD agreed to establish the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose three major areas of focus were food security and environmental protection; infrastructural development (transport and communications) and regional conflict prevention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs (Francis, 2006; Picciotto, 2010; IMF, 2020). An evident manifestation of the peace-security-development nexus in the Horn is the shift in IGAD’s original preoccupation with environmental protection and development cooperation to a concern with regional peace and security. IGAD has made extensive efforts to facilitate civil war peace settlements in Somalia and Sudan in collaboration with sub-regional pivotal states such as Kenya and Ethiopia and other external factors such as the EU, the US and the African Union (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). IGAD’s developmental regionalism commitments have not yielded the anticipated economic and development results because of various national, regional and international determinants. As a result, the regional organisation began to institute the structures and arrangements for converging regional peace, security and development. It established the IGAD Centre for Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and facilitated conflict management in Sudan and Somalia (Jinadu, 2007; Gluhbengovic, 2016). The implication is that peace and stability in the Horn may generate an ideal set-up to realise regional economic and developmental aspirations (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). For instance, although met with divergent reactions locally, regionally and internationally, the 14 December 2016 announcement of a National Dialogue Initiative in South Sudan by the country’s leader, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, presented a rare opportunity for the South Sudanese to engage, build peace and reconcile (Vhumbunu, 2018). The dialogue took place against a background of cross-country intercommunal violence, political power struggles, national governance challenges, economic instability, massive internal displacement of citizens, disunity and disintegration, which had been aggravated by the near collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in July 2016. This followed the resumption of fighting between forces loyal to Kiir and the then vice-president and leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon (Vhumbunu, 2018). Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that the IGAD’s peace and security commitments set a strong basis for regional peace, human security, and development (Venkatasawmy, 2015). IGAD member states, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, habitually intervene to instigate armed conflict in neighbouring countries (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2018). IGAD members failed to create a collective foreign and security policy crucial for regional peace and a stable political climate. Instead, the relative success of IGAD’s preventive diplomacy efforts in Sudan and Somalia has been made possible by the EU-IGAD Partnership Forum and US financial, political and diplomatic backing. In particular, the Bush Administration, for different political reasons (including pressures from the American Christian right, the ‘war on terror,’ and oil energy needs), has backed the Sudan and Somalia civil war peace settlements (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015; IMF, 2020). SADC and the challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa The heterogeneous regional space, now described as ‘Southern Africa,’ has been collectively constructed by “state, market, society and external actors in a historical perspective” (Söderbaum, 2002; Francis, 2006). The political history of Southern Africa has largely been dominated by the struggles for the political independence of Angola and Mozambique from Portuguese colonial domination, the political liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the struggle against apartheid South Africa and its policy of regional destabilisation (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). The end of the Cold War ushered in a new wave of democratic governance in Southern Africa, changing some of its authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes. For instance, South Africa is now the economic giant in the sub-region. Though Britain, the US, Japan and Germany remain South Africa’s main trading partners, Southern Africa is emerging as an increasingly strategic and valuable export market (Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016). Unfortunately, the disheartening social and development pointers in Southern Africa not only reflect the discrepancy between the regional countries. They also resemble the multifarious security challenges that contradict the putative economic growth and development in the SADC region. For example, in 2001, the life expectancy at birth in relatively developed countries like Seychelles and Mauritius was 72,2 and 71,6 years, respectively. This is in stark contrast to the life expectancy in other relatively developed countries in the region, like South Africa (50,9), Namibia (47,4), and Botswana (44,7) (Francis, 2006; Mills, 2001; IMF, 2020). New pandemics are mainly responsible for this discouraging discrepancy. The manifold security and development problems resulted in the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980 as the regional development mechanism to address the above issues (Mills, 2001). Nonetheless, SADCC’s sectoral development route failed dismally, and coupled with the altered global security and political landscape with the end of the Cold War, the regional body was changed in 1992 to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with a collective market objective. The end of apartheid in South Africa and of the Cold War have led to relative political stability in much of Southern Africa (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020). Like West Africa and the Horn, regional integration in Southern Africa is underpinned by an amity-enmity dynamic. Even though it may cultivate mutual interdependence and a culture of collective security, it may also result in competition, conflict, mutual suspicion and a lack of peaceful co-existence (Francis, 2006; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2021). The tensions between the late president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, and the late president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, paved the way for the region’s complex politics. South Africa emerged as the reluctant sub-regional hegemon and Zimbabwe as the hegemonic pretender, separating the region into rival political camps, the “two SADCs” (Mills, 2001; Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016). The civil war in the DRC and the threat to regional peace and security resulted in an intervention by neighbouring countries like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, on the one hand, and the deployment of the SADC Allied Armed Forces (SADC-AAF), including Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, on the other (Francis, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016). The above scenario fuelled what has been noted as “Africa’s First World War” and the partitioning of the DRC into rival security, military, economic and political spheres of strategic interests (Francis, 2006). The deployment of the SADC-AAF peacekeeping and conflict stabilisation force helped to contain the conflict, forced ceasefire and peace agreements on the warring factions, succeeded in stopping some of the killings and created a fragile security situation that ensured the survival of the Kinshasa government. It also facilitated the deployment of the French-led EU peacekeeping force—Operation Artemis—in the east of the country. This paved the way for Rwanda and Uganda’s withdrawal of foreign troops and the eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015). SADC’s expansion into regional peacekeeping and conflict management, like that of ECOWAS, has been subject to challenges. There remain unanswered questions on whether the SADC intervention was a peacekeeping deployment or simply a “coalition of willing states,” in particular Zimbabwe, in pursuit of strategic security and economic interests in a ‘free-for-all’ exploitation of DRC’s war economy (Francis, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015; Vhumbunu, 2021). This study argues that SADC’s expansion into regional conflict management did not have any coherent policy mechanism to establish the relationship in a real sense. Instead, this ad-hoc initiative is principally motivated by key regional partners’ varying and contradictory strategic ambitions. The above scenario is discouraging and makes violent conflicts and wars pervasive in Africa. Undeniably, this has far-reaching effects on the socio-economic development of this continent. For example, since early October 2017, after the Islamist militants or jihadists—identified as the Ansar al-Sunna—launched their first attacks in the villages and towns of Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado, insurgency and conflict targeting civilians, public infrastructure and government buildings have continued to escalate (Vhumbunu, 2021). While the Government of Mozambique continues to make concerted efforts to fight and subdue the terrorist insurgency through its national defence forces, the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM), a series of battles with the terrorist militants, has resulted in widespread violence, insecurity, the death of over 2,400 people and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians by the end of November 2020. It has also disrupted economic activities, especially farming, which has worsened food insecurity (Vhumbunu, 2021). Therefore, the real issue for SADC is how to utilise this ad-hoc intervention to kick-start the process of institutionalising the relationship to pursue the SDGs’ overarching goal to end poverty, ensuring that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. A more positive picture for institutionalising the nexus Questioning whether Africa can provide a practical illustration of the relationship between peace, human security, and development from the national and regional perspectives will receive both ‘no’ and ‘yes’ responses. Even though the frantic efforts to establish this relationship are recognised, noticeable challenges are linked to sustainability. Practical illustrations from sub-regional countries point to existing problems and the need to deeply appreciate the nexus in Africa. The literature review illustrated that the African region falls short of pre-existing integrative mechanisms for development and human security, which become the breeding zone for violent wars and armed conflicts, state collapse, ‘warlordism,’ and societal fragmentation (France, 2006; Venkatasawmy, 2015). The unfolded scenario above has forced regional countries to institute some tentative efforts to address issues of violent conflicts and human insecurity in a more integrative, regionally centred way. The peacekeeping and conflict management interventions in West Africa with the establishment of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) reflect Africa’s focus on creating a stable regional peace, security and political set-up to realise development and economic prosperity in the region. The preventive diplomacy initiatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC-AAF can also provide relatively similar lessons. One instructive illustration from these ad-hoc ‘fire brigade’ programmes is the insurgency of regional arrangements established to deal with long-standing peace, conflict, security and development issues. Typical illustrations are the ECOWAS 1999 Protocol, which is linked to the Approach for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, as well as the 1996 SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (France, 2006; Gluhbengovic, 2016; IMF, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2021). Nevertheless, simply creating these structures cannot form the basis for securing practical implementation. Also important is an urgent need to take a leaf from the European model in exploring the relationship in the African context. The European case has proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that Africa’s regional economic and human security integration requires solid and feasible contemporary countries. Any commitment in the African region linking peace, human security and development, calls for a vibrant political and economic management approach from these countries. Additionally, the global systemic determinants that keep African states from accessing world markets and international economic forces serve as severe external shocks to the probability of vibrant African countries. As such, they minimise the potential of fruitfully merging peace, human security and development (Gluhbegovic, 2016; IMF, 2020). The other crucial lesson from the European model is that combining the benefits of peace, human security, and development relationships cannot be achieved overnight. As a result, critics point to Africa’s ‘tortoise pace’ towards institutionalising the relationship in real terms. As argued by Francis (2006) and Jinadu (2007), critics refer to Africa as a ‘hopeless continent’. This is despite the fact that the continent is well-endowed with natural resources, with approximately 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, and also the fact that it is the world’s largest arable land mass (African Natural Resources Centre, 2015; Gluhbegovic, 2016). These riches have, however, failed to bring about concomitant development. In addition, natural resources have caused or fuelled numerous conflicts, and, as such, they are viewed as a curse rather than a blessing (Gluhbegovic, 2016). Critics, however, fail to consider that it took several decades for Europe to establish the relationship between regional peace, human security and development. While we benefit greatly from EU efforts, Africa’s attempts are yet to produce the most appropriate mechanism for regional peace, human security and development integration. Part of the reason for this state of affairs is the internal politics and poor governance systems, which result in armed conflicts and state failure. Several African nations are weak and fragmented, and, as such, they have yet to meet the requirements for creating regional peace, human security, and development. Nearly five decades on, regional economic and security integration in Africa is still driven by the governing elites with limited participation by civil society and, worse still, a lack of societal ownership of the regionalisation process (Venkatasawmy, 2015; Gluhbegovic, 2016). Furthermore, Africa’s regionalist commitments continue to follow the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approaches of peace, human security and development nexus instead of experimenting with Africa-specific alternative models that are context-specific and traditionally salient, replicating the African scenarios. For instance, the recent African Union Quadripartite Summit held in Luanda, Angola, on 27 June 2023 highlighted African leaders’ commitment to devising an integrative regional strategy to address the longstanding conflict in Angola, which has become a stumbling block for development in the country and the region at large. Also of major concern is the deterioration of the peace, security and humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC following the resurgence of the March 2023 movement and the presence of other armed and terrorist groups. This has led to a diplomatic tiff between the DRC and Rwanda, and processes have been established to address the situation and de-escalate tension between the two AU member states (Chronicle, 27 June 2023). Concluding remarks and the way forward This chapter accentuates that the root causes of weak, fragmented, and underdeveloped African nations are deeply intertwined with complex challenges in institutionalising the nexus of peace, human security, and development. Despite these challenges, cautious optimism exists regarding the region’s potential to establish sustainable frameworks for these interrelated domains. The emergence of embryonic institutional models and ad-hoc arrangements across various regions demonstrates a commitment to fostering peace and security. Yet, the critical task lies in transitioning from these temporary solutions to robust, long-term regional mechanisms that formalise these relationships. The global political momentum generated by initiatives such as the ‘Year of Africa’ (2005) provides a valuable platform for integrating the peace-human security-development nexus into broader international policy frameworks. This initiative can catalyse renewed commitment and collaboration among African nations and their international partners, ensuring these relationships are prioritised in response strategies tailored to the continent. Importantly, the findings of this study indicate that African leaders must prioritise the development of more effective and coherent mechanisms to address the endemic challenges of state and nation-building. Failure to do so risks perpetuating conflict and civil war cycles that undermine regional development efforts. 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The national dialogue initiative in South Sudan: Assessing progress and pitfalls. Africa Journals, 4(1):14-32. Vhumbunu, C.H. 2021. Insurgency in Mozambique: The role of the Southern African development community. Africa Journals, 3(3):45-62. Wallace, W. 1995. Regionalism in Europe: Model or exception? In: L. Fawcett &, A. Hurrell (eds). Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford University Press. Woodward, P. 2003. The Horn of Africa: Politics and international relations. I.B. Tauris. https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755619177 The African Continental Free Trade Area and Peacebuilding: A Turning Point for African Peace and Security? Torque Mude

Centre for Africa-China Studies University of Johannesburg

Johannesburg, South Africa Abstract This chapter examines the dynamics of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)’s developmental approach, which serves as a peacebuilding framework capable of advancing peace and security in Africa. The primary concern of this chapter relates to the contribution of the AfCFTA in conflict stabilisation, sustaining peace and catalysing security in Africa. This is against the background of the problems of peace, security and development being more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere. Nonetheless, debates on the prospects for harnessing the AfCFTA as an avenue for advancing African transformation have left gaps in exploring the importance of this epic development from a peace-security-development perspective. Nevertheless, the AfCFTA, as the African Union’s (AU) flagship project, envisages an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa. Arguably, establishing a single market covering 1.3 billion Africans boosts intra-Africa trade and lays the foundation for peace, security and development. As underscored in Article 3(a) of the AfCFTA Agreement, the free trade area creates a single market to deepen the economic integration in Africa towards the pan-African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa enshrined in Agenda 2063. Hence, it can be argued that apart from economic implications, the AfCFTA’s developmental approach has significant peace, security and development connotations for Africa. This is because trade cannot be treated primarily as an economic growth and development issue but also as a conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding mechanism. Therefore, what warrants exploration pertains to the contribution of the AfCFTA in setting the stage for transformative integration towards accelerating peace and security on the continent. Hence, this chapter concludes that the trajectory of the AfCFTA provides a nascent framework for building peace and security in Africa. Data for this chapter were obtained from secondary sources, including books, journal articles, organisational reports and policy papers. Introduction This chapter examines how the AfCFTA’s developmental regionalism approach potentially builds peace towards advancing economic development, peace and security in Africa. This is because it warrants interrogation of how the AfCFTA could neutralise the foundations of domestic privilege–protective barriers to free trade, a traditional setup that enhances internal powers of societal groups that likely support conflict, aggressive foreign policy and potentially generate political support for war. Already gaining traction with AfCFTA, development regionalism denotes cooperation on a broader scope beyond trade and trade facilitation dynamics. It is conceptualised as intensive cooperation on industrial development, upgrading regional value chains, cross-border infrastructure development, fair trade and strengthening good governance, peace and security (Ismail, 2020; UNECA, AU and AfDB, 2017; UNCTAD, 2013). Against this backdrop, the chapter explores the extent to which the emerging trajectory of the AfCFTA trade integration accelerates peacebuilding towards reducing the ubiquitous military and non-military security threats on the continent. This is against the background that the contribution of trade integration under AfCFTA in preventing war and transforming conflicts towards a peaceful and prosperous Africa, as envisaged by Agenda 2063, is a critical issue that academics and policymakers are yet to explore. In other words, literature is scarce on building and sustaining peace through the opportunities, interventions and policy options presented by the AfCFTA. This is because existing scholarly interest or inquiry in the AfCFTA have concentrated on the continental free trade area’s implications for economic development by transforming intra-African trade (Mude, 2021; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2018), boost Africa’s manufacturing sector (Mambongo, 2019) and promote African youth entrepreneurship opportunities (Lungu, 2019). Furthermore, little has been said about the continental free trade area’s contribution to peace and security because it is still nascent in its early implementation stages, and institutionalisation is not yet fully consolidated. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate scholarly conversations on the peacebuilding potentialities of the AfCFTA to provide context, insight, and foresight for further exploration of its effective implementation. By attempting to fill the AfCFTA literature gaps, this chapter constitutes an epistemic break by generating and expanding the urgently needed academic and policy-relevant knowledge of the dynamics of advancing peace and security through the AfCFTA. Hence, this timely exploration of the AfCFTA peacebuilding prospects aims to generate debates to inform the academic and policy environment upon which the AfCFTA and associated peace-security-development dynamics are espoused and advanced. This is against the background of inherently deep intra-African divisions, instability and volatility attributed to conflicts which regional economic communities (RECs) 1 1 These RECs include the East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community for West African Community (ECOWAS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Since the proliferation on regional integration in Africa beginning in the 1960s, slow progress has been made in preventing conflicts, sustaining peace and advancing security. , among other African trade blocs, have so far illuminated pitfalls in preventing, resolving, transforming and managing conflicts to build as well as sustain peace. In continuation of the above, it can be argued that inherent pitfalls in these RECs’ conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding mechanisms emanate from disunity, individualistic foreign policies and limited incentives to collectively resolve common problems. With the AfCFTA setting the stage for transformative African integration (Mude, 2021), the question is how the continental free trade area presents opportunities for protecting trade gains under it through compelling African states to bridge these peacebuilding gaps. For instance, the ways through which the continental free trade area’s developmental regionalism approach catalyses peace, security and development, warrant interrogation. To this end, this chapter demonstrates the dynamics that make the AfCFTA a potential and significant peacebuilding actor with a promising capacity to maintain peace and security on the continent. With trade under the AfCFTA having commenced in January 2021, the concomitant role, significance and prospects for the contribution of this monumental development towards peace and security in Africa warrants urgent scholarly exploration. The aim is to expansively illuminate to academics, policymakers and relevant stakeholders the significance of exploiting trade integration for catalysing Africa’s peace and security agenda. This chapter generates thought-provoking insights about the significance of capitalising on the AfCFTA’s developmental regionalism approach towards attaining sustainable peace and security. The key objective is to examine the role of and extent to which the AfCFTA presents opportunities for accelerating peacebuilding towards harmony and security in Africa. The chapter, therefore, maintains that the AfCFTA is a promising peacebuilding initiative that, if effectively implemented, can be a powerful tool for promoting peace and security in Africa by addressing the root causes of conflict and promoting economic growth and development. This chapter is organised into six sections. The first section introduces the chapter, followed by a section exploring the debates on how trade promotes peace and security. Third is a section on the chapter’s theoretical foundation, followed by a discussion of the methodological parameters employed in the chapter. The fifth section discusses the chapter’s findings, followed by the conclusion, which is the last section. The next section historicises the dynamics of integration in Southern Africa and delves into the debate underpinnings of this chapter. Does AfCFTA trade promote peace and security? Answering whether the emerging trajectory of the AfCFTA has a peacebuilding capability warrants reflection on the nexus between trade and peace as well as the dynamics of the continental free trade area’s developmental approach. The conventional belief embraced in this chapter maintains that free trade lays the foundation for peace (Krugman, 2022). One example cited regarding the nexus between trade and peace is how European integration’s developmental regionalism approach locked traditional rivals France and Germany into economic, political security and development partnership, which minimised incentives for hostility (Francis, 2006). Even though the AfCFTA is not comparable to the European Union (EU) in terms of the levels of integration, the benefits of AfCFTA trade can also eliminate Rwanda-Uganda, Egypt-Ethiopia and Kenya-Tanzania rivalries, among others. Arguably, cooperation on mutually beneficial trade, infrastructural development, development of value chains and governance under the auspices of the AfCFTA catalyses unity and minimises the incentives for conflicts. Therefore, African countries could capitalise on the integration opportunities presented by the AfCFTA to cooperate in addressing deep-rooted political, economic, and ideological problems that generate instability on the continent. According to Article 3(a) of the Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA (2018), the AfCFTA established a single market of goods and services towards deepening economic integration in Africa in accordance with the pan-African vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa” enshrined in Agenda 2063. The broad scope of the AfCFTA, which transcends boosting intra-African trade to include cooperation on inclusive socio-economic development, industrial development, structural transformation and food security outlined in Article 3 of the AfCFTA Agreement (2018), also illustrates the peacebuilding orientation of the continental free trade area. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that peace and security are on the agenda of the AfCFTA. More so, building on the governance, peace and security mechanisms of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), African countries can combine this with the integration framework and economic cooperation dynamics of the AfCFTA to pool their efforts as a region towards the pursuit of good governance, peace and security. Having said this, it is crystal clear that the AfCFTA constitutes a monumental framework for advancing African peace and security with comparable magnitude to which the Marshal Plan created stability in post-World War II European affairs. It suffices to mention that the peacebuilding potential of the continental free trade area depends largely on its effective implementation in addition to the commitment of African states to capitalise on the AfCFTA’s free trade benefits. Of particular interest is how the provisions of the AfCFTA Agreement and the benefits of the continental free trade area bridge conflict management gaps, improve cooperation, enhance conflict resolution, and reduce aggression in foreign policy towards building peace in Africa. This is against the background that Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) recognises the role of regional institutions in advancing peace and security. More so, Article 3(a) of the AfCFTA Agreement (2019) sets the tone of the key mandate of the agreement, which is to deepen the economic integration of the African continent in accordance with the pan-Africanist vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa. While theatres of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, Great Lakes Region and East Africa have exposed the weaknesses of integration, trade and collective security in peacebuilding processes, it is anticipated that the AfCFTA offers distinct structural and normative frameworks which are compatible with reducing the scourges of conflicts in Africa. For instance, Article 3(d) of the AfCFTA Agreement (2019) envisions the continental free trade area as the foundation of an African customs union, which is a step closer to reaching the EU’s peacebuilding capabilities, which neutralised hostilities in Western Europe. The above explains why the AfCFTA has become the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation in 1994 (Tralac, 2019). Moreover, Article 19 of the AfCFTA Agreement implores member states of other regional economic communities, regional trading agreements and customs unions to maintain higher levels of cooperation among themselves outside of the framework of the continental free trade area. Even though this is viewed as a limitation of the continental free trade area, an exploration of how and to what extent this poses an insurmountable challenge towards laying the path for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa constitutes the premise of this chapter. According to the World Bank (2020), AfCFTA trade can lift approximately 30 million Africans out of extreme poverty. Studies have also shown that the AfCFTA establishes a single African market, which boosts intra-Africa trade by approximately 52.3 % and increases real income gains by 7%, approximately US$450 billion (UNECA, 2021; World Bank, 2020). Moreover, it has also highlighted that the continental free trade area covers a market of 1.3 billion Africans with a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$2.5 trillion (World Bank, 2020). Suffice it to indicate that achieving these benefits is not automatic; it depends on implementing robust policy reforms and facilitation mechanisms. This is against the background of the AfCFTA Country Business Index (ACBI) findings. The ACBI feedback, which has largely been neutral to negative and positive in some instances (UNECA, 2022), is key to strengthening AfCFTA trade policies and mechanisms. Since this chapter aims to examine the peacebuilding potential of the AfCFTA’s transformation of African integration, it is significant for providing insights useful in formulating interventions for strengthening the continental free trade area’s peacebuilding capacity. The next section focuses on the theoretical foundations of this chapter. Theorising the dynamics of AfCFTA and peacebuilding in Africa Theoretically, this chapter employs the functionalist perspective of international relations, which explains how integration fosters the peaceful coexistence of states (Keohane & Nye, 1989). Arising from the experiences of the Second World War, the functionalist theory focuses on states’ common interests in the integration process, illustrating how this minimises state individualism and international anarchy and subsequently fosters peace (Mitrany, 1943). The theory maintains that regional integration is an alliance that promotes interdependence and peaceful cooperation (Schimmelfenning, 2018). Hence, functionalism presents integration as the means to peace, security and development. In this chapter, the theory is used to examine the role and extent of the AfCFTA as a peacebuilding actor. Since the main objective of the AfCFTA is to consolidate African integration by reducing embargoes, import taxes, subsidies, competition, human and capital flow restrictions and other tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between African states, functionalism is appropriate for examining how and to what extent, from a peacebuilding perspective, this objective is achieved. This is against the background of functionalism, which is said to be exclusively applicable in the European setting, making it incompatible with comprehending African integration dynamics (Aworaro, 2015). Justification for applying this theory in the African context is premised on the fact that the globalisation of political ideas, economic systems and societal ideologies has culminated in the extinction of the two cultures problem that dichotomises North (Euro-North American systems) and South (Africa, South America and Asia) issues. Therefore, it can be argued that the proliferation of concepts and theories previously applied in a compartmentalised and discriminatory manner became obsolete in the 19th century. Methodological parameters and procedures The ontological and epistemological underpinning of the research for this chapter was compatible with a qualitative research methodology which relied on secondary data. To this end, the research was organised into two methodological phases. In the first phase, secondary research was conducted by critically analysing key literature representative of the AfCFTA and peacebuilding discourses. These include the AfCFTA Agreement, books, journal articles, policy documents and newspaper articles. Because of the dearth of literature on the continental free trade area, this phase constituted a systematic analysis of representative literature and theoretical paradigms that closely interact with the AfCFTA on the one hand and peacebuilding on the other hand. In the second methodological phase, data from the initial methodological exercise were organised, synthesised and interpreted through thematic analysis. Hence, data were critically analysed in search of common patterns, trends, themes, and inferences that are crucial in providing insights into the continental free trade area’s peacebuilding role. The AfCFTA, African integration and peacebuilding The main thesis of the chapter is that while the AfCFTA presents opportunities for accelerating peace and security through trade, the pitfalls of African integration, whose dynamics also spill into the AfCFTA institutional mechanisms, limit its peacebuilding capacity. That the AfCFTA signals a new era of transformative African integration through which the continent speaks with one voice, boosts intra-African trade and lays a solid foundation for economic growth and development has been illustrated (UNECA, 2021; World Bank, 2020; Mude, 2021). What these outcomes entail for African peace and security has eclipsed scholarly attention. Yet, trade cannot be treated solely as an economic growth and development issue but as a conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding issue. Scholarly debates outside the African contexts have illuminated the centrality of trade in advancing the peace agenda in the post-World War II epoch and the post-Cold War political and economic developments. The arguments maintain that the proliferation of free trade arrangements has led to peace through trade in non-African contexts (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2005; McDonald, 2004). In advancing the above assertion, the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) have been cited as case studies of integration arrangements through which regional peace, security and order have been maintained in the post-war era. Proponents of the trade-peace nexus have long maintained that providing common needs through functional strategies across national borders culminates in unity among people, and the subsequent mutual interactions and interconnectedness create a conducive environment for order, peace and security (Mitrany, 1966). During the early years of the proliferation of regional integration, Deutsch (1957) defined a framework for establishing a security community that prefers peace to using force in inter-state relations and pacific resolution of conflicts. As anticipated, trade integration fostered security communities, resulting in desirable peace and security levels in Western Europe and North America. Drawing from these successes to replicate their trajectories, questions should be posed about whether AfCFTA trade can build peace and advance security in Africa. Can trade under the AfCFTA culminate in the desirable African peace and security levels? For some time now, the role of African integration and free trade in building peace has been discounted and attracted criticism and doubts. Shortcomings inherent in African RECs are cited as barriers (Nwangwu et al., 2019; Mude, 2018; Adetula, Bereketeab & Jaiyebo, 2016) to the extent that conversations on trade and peacebuilding in the African context are branded as inapt and archaic. This leads to another question: Does the AfCFTA set the stage for defying these pessimistic views regarding trade and peace linkages in the African context? Since AfCFTA has a wide integrative and cooperative scope spanning Africa, there are strong chances that the AfCFTA can defy the odds by contributing to peacebuilding dynamics on the continent. Free trade under the AfCFTA can be maximised to ‘silence guns’ in Africa by promoting economic growth and development, creating jobs, reducing poverty and increasing regional integration and cooperation. According to Collier (2000), unemployment generates grievance and greed as motives for joining a conflict because unemployment constitutes a grievance that leads to unrest and instability, which may escalate to conflict. Like unemployment, poverty is widely viewed as one of the underlying causes of conflict (Braithwaite, Dasandi & Hudson, 2016). By enhancing trade and investment among African countries, the AfCFTA can help address the underlying causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and economic marginalisation, and promote stability and peace. More so, the AfCFTA aims to include the formerly marginalised in the corridors of power, youth, and women. Therefore, the Protocol on Women and Youth will ensure the inclusion and beneficiation of women and youth through the AfCFTA trade. Given all these potentialities, the question is whether it will work. It can be argued that it will work, albeit if political will is maximised on the continent, through developmental regionalism, fostering inclusive industrial growth and economic development, infrastructural development, cross-border investment and democratic governance (Ismail, 2020). In addition, the AfCFTA can also help to reduce the demand for illicit trade in arms by creating legal and legitimate channels for trade and investment. By reducing the incentives for arms trafficking and other illegal activities, the AfCFTA can help to enhance security and reduce the risk of conflict and violence. In an interview, Ambassador Martin Kimani, the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the UN and Chair of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (2021), in Kuwonu (2021), stated that “The AK-47 rifle has probably claimed more African lives than many diseases”. The continental free trade area’s capacity to transform and deepen African integration, compounded by cross-border investment to plug illicit trade in arms, would go a long way in building peace on the continent. Above all, this requires African states’ collective will and commitment to change and transform procedures, mechanisms, and processes to unplug the aforementioned challenges. Furthermore, the AfCFTA can facilitate the exchange of ideas, knowledge, and best practices among African countries, which can help promote peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts. This can be achieved through the establishment of regional mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration, such as joint economic and development projects, capacity-building programs and research analysis. Research and development are crucial in Africa for enhancing cooperation on early warning systems, conflict management and resolution. The lack of seriousness in this area in Africa will likely render the AfCFTA’s peacebuilding potential a pipedream. The AfCFTA can also promote equality and fairness in the inter-African terms of trade. In their theory of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye (1977) emphasise that interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or non-state actors in different countries. Sensitivity examines how fast changes in one state influence another and how fast this could be reversed with policy changes. Sensitivity is a temporary problem as it can be fixed; vulnerability is permanent. It occurs when one does not have options due to policy changes except compliance. Additionally, Keohanne and Nye (1977) note that cooperation and competition characterise the relationship between actors under mutual dependence. The theory suggests that even though states are mutually dependent, they are not equally dependent. One state is usually more dependent on another. This could be used as bargaining power by the independent actor. Therefore, through the protocol on Trade in services, the AfCFTA will ensure openness and transparency among traders by clearly defining the market access and national treatment, which will make the expectations from all actors very clear. Also, if the competition policy is adopted, it will promote healthy and equal competition as rules will apply to all members. Furthermore, if realised, the perceived economic gains of the AfCFTA to the member states will strengthen their power to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty, thereby minimising interference from powerful nations such as the United States, China and Russia. If the Agenda 2063 is to be achieved, it is high time that Africa looks within for self-sustained economic growth and development. Whilst trading with the powerful nations is unavoidable and brings its benefits, African leaders have for a long time now complained of the unfair terms of trade that come with inter-continental trade that the World Trade Organization regulates. The AfCFTA is a chance for Africa to rethink African Governance based on the traditional ethos of ‘Ubuntu,’ which can foster unity among Africans. Pan-Africanism, the ideology behind the formation of the African Union, which was founded as the Organization of African Unity in 1963, was based on ‘Ubuntu’, an adjective for ‘Being Human’, which promotes a spirit of unity and brotherhood. African governance was built around the values, traditions and norms of Africans. These forms of governance did not conform to the Western notions of constitutionalism, which entailed a unilateral form of governance where the need for a controlled, formal governmental authority is expressed in Western societies. Having said all the above, the argument advanced in this chapter is that strengthening the linkages between peace, security and development in African integration is one of the crucial steps towards accelerating African peace and security through AfCFTA trade. While African integration under the auspices of the AfCFTA is yet to reach the normative level of political cooperation anchored on common foreign and security policy premised on trade integration, it can be argued that the AfCFTA lays the much-needed foundation for a peace-security-development model. The foundations of economic convergence laid by the continental free trade area would culminate in solidarity among African people whose mutual interactions and interconnectedness set the stage for political and security convergence. Political and security convergence are the two missing links in African integration, including in the AfCFTA architecture. Therefore, it can be argued that political and security convergence can only ameliorate the amity-enmity divide that has plagued Africa since the 1884 Berlin Conference that drew colonial and ideological boundaries, haunting contemporary Africa, can only be ameliorated by political and security convergence. The subsequent diverse political divisions reflected in the Lusophone, Francophone, Germanosphere and Anglophone countries, which usually play out in the spectre of regional and sub-regional political economy dynamics, should be addressed to strengthen the AfCFTA’s peacebuilding capacity. Moreover, Article 19(2) of the AfCFTA Agreement implores member states of other regional economic communities, regional trading agreements and customs unions to maintain higher levels of cooperation outside of the framework of the continental free trade area (Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA, 2018). Even though this appears to be a limitation of the continental free trade area, how and to what extent this counters the insurmountable challenges of instability by laying the path for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa warrants exploration. First, even though it is not explicitly mentioned but directly implied, the continental free trade area recognises the significance of existing integration arrangements in driving economic convergence. One of the implications of this acquis preservation in Article 19(2) pertains to its flexibility to strengthen economic convergence through deepening economic integration in existing RECs, which are considered the building blocks of the African Economic Community. While it is desirable to persistently deepen economic integration, moving towards political and security convergence is overdue in Africa. With that said, the peacebuilding role of the AfCFTA is limited in the absence of political and security convergence. Even though the African Union’s key aims include intensifying African integration and safeguarding African states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, the organisation has exhibited weaknesses in creating a robust political community of African states and securitising development. Since succeeding the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, the African Union (AU), to which the AfCFTA is a flagship programme, has preoccupied itself more with pan-African rhetoric. In a continent plagued with instability more than any other, the AU should detach from the obsession with an anti-colonial agenda and embrace transformative policies and programmes on convergence towards accelerating political stability and democratic practices. Short of that, the AfCFTA’s peacebuilding potential would remain a phantom on the horizon. Since the continental free trade area’s peacebuilding aptitude is premised on its capacity to strengthen integration and intra-African trade, the objectives of the AfCFTA will be difficult to achieve in an environment of wars, insecurity and instability. Recent intra-state conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, as well as Rwanda-DRC, Uganda-Rwanda, Egypt-Ethiopia and Tanzania-Kenya inter-state tensions, pose the threat of undermining and limiting trade under the continental free trade area. According to Francis (2006), the cumulative implications of instability and conflicts include deterring the attainment of desirable levels of integration and development objectives. As illustrated in Table 10.1, political instability has always been rife in Africa. For a continent rising and poised to harness trade, integration and development opportunities offered by the AfCFTA, a lot needs to be done to create a secure environment that accelerates peace, security and development. The African political, economic and security environment is fragile yet promising with the emergence of the AfCFTA. Not all growth is seduced by trade integration unless the operating environment fundamentals are conducive and intact. Trade integration generates growth and development only if and when all the political, economic, social, security and ideological fundamentals are strategically wired to solve past and contemporary challenges rather than randomly adopted because they worked elsewhere. Unless and until Africa’s political and security atmosphere is reconfigured along the lines of addressing the deep-rooted historical disadvantages, including the legacy of colonial divisions, insecurity, democratic deficit and contemporary problems such as instability and poor economic governance, leveraging on the peacebuilding capacity of the AfCFTA could be equivalent to chasing a mirage. More so, the fact that some African states are still dragging their feet, including Eritrea, concerning participating in AfCFTA trade is the tip of the iceberg pertaining to the trade and peacebuilding future of the continental free trade area. Even though participating in integration arrangements is voluntary and non-membership has no sanctions, the lack of interest in cooperating and integrating with others mirrors disunity. Therefore, the African integration question that can be posed is how does the AfCFTA reshape the African market, boost trade and connect 1.3 billion people towards creating a political and security convergence in an economic environment marred by disunity? The AfCFTA’s objectives to accelerate economic integration and development goals are clearly outlined in the agreement establishing the AfCFTA. However, the agreement is not clear on how the continental free trade area architecture is geared towards embracing the peace, security and development mechanism as a sustainable strategy to foster African peace and security. Francis (2006) contends that this is the prerequisite for regional economic growth and development. Despite being a relatively old model tried and tested in Western Europe in the context of the European Union, the idea of securitising development to build what Francis (2006) calls diverse and interdependent states and people sharing a common identity is yet to be embraced in African integration. This does not imply that the EU model of economic integration and securitising development is the best model Africa should adopt through the AfCFTA. But what if an Africanised hybrid model of it is the missing piece of the jigsaw puzzle required to deal with Africa’s perpetual peace, security and development problems? In an increasingly globalised world in this 21st century, economic ideas, political systems, security orientations and integration models have permeated continents, ideologies and diverse peoples. Undoubtedly, the extent of this interdependence underscores the necessity of peace, security and development as it was used elsewhere or in its hybrid Africanised form. Africa’s integration model towards the peace, security and development model is not hard to come by if African states commit to formulating and implementing such a model. Perhaps, it must come to waiting for the attainment of a political community after establishing an African economic community at a later stage as envisaged by the AfCFTA Agreement. Does this mean that the AfCFTA, as a free trade area, is not fit for Africa’s peacebuilding aspirations? The answer is no. Through developmental regionalism, the AfCFTA has the potential to advance inclusive growth and economic development, enhance trade by stimulating robust and equitable economic growth, reduce conflict and enhance trade liberalisation (Faizel, 2020; Africa Development Bank, 2018). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2013) conceptualises developmental regionalism as “cooperation among countries in a broader range of areas than just trade and trade facilitation, to include—for example—investment, research and development, as well as policies aimed at accelerating regional industrial development and regional infrastructure provision, such as the building of better networks of roads and railway”. Hence, if the AfCFTA embraces a developmental regional approach, trade under Africa will be integrated into the global trade environment as a unified continent. At the heart of the AfCFTA is “a developmental approach that recognises the need for trade liberalisation to proceed, and at the same time, address supply capacities and promote structural transformation” (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Union and Africa Development Bank, 2017). While a developmental approach is embraced in the AfCFTA, a developmental regionalism approach to trade integration under the AfCFTA ought to be adopted to catalyse the process of transformative industrialisation, mutually beneficial trade, cross-border investment, strengthen democratic governance and enhance African peace and security. Therefore, it can be argued that economic regionalism, which is essentially reducible to a notion of rational self-interest, will make states involved in economic regionalism unwilling to put the economic benefits or even simply the anticipated future benefits in jeopardy by engaging in aggression. With economic regionalism adopted within the AfCFTA context, the missing political and security aspects of convergence crucial for the AfCFTA-peacebuilding linkages will go a long way in strengthening mechanisms for African peace and security. With the AfCFTA emphasis on the developmental approach as a path to poverty reduction, non-economic benefits such as securitisation, the creation of collective identities, and the emergence of some collective bargaining capacity have been largely ignored. Nevertheless, there is ample time to make things right through securitising African trade and development towards building peace through free trade. Conclusion The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that the trajectory of the AfCFTA provides a nascent framework for building peace in Africa due to inherent pitfalls in African integration. Because the continental free trade area is the flagship programme of the AU, the challenges of the successful establishment of a political and security community since the 1960s are still prevalent to this day. The same pitfalls that have militated against the securitisation of development through strengthening peace, security and development linkages in African integration programmes and policies are yet to be addressed. With the continental free trade area operating in the same environment of instability and insecurity, it would be a mammoth task for the AfCFTA to foster unity among African people from across borders towards subsequent mutual interactions and interconnectedness to establish a conducive environment for order, peace and security. If these pitfalls are addressed in the continental free trade area’s phased implementation, the AfCFTA will unlock remarkable peacebuilding opportunities in Africa. References Adetula, V.A., Bereketeab, R. & Jaiyebo O. 2016. Regional economic communities and peacebuilding in Africa: The experiences of ECOWAS and IGAD. Nordic Africa Institute Policy Dialogue No.12:1-54. 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African Continental Free Trade Area Legal Texts and Documents. [Retrieved 12 December 2019] http://www.tralac.org/resources/our-resources/6730-continental-free-trade-area-cfta.html Charter of the United Nations. 1945. [Retrieved 13 June 2020] https://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/ctc/uncharter.pdf Schimmelfenning, F., 2018. Regional integration theory. Oxford research encyclopaedia of politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.599 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2022. Primer for the AfCFTA Country Business Index (ACBI): Summary results for Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa. [Retrieved 26 August 2022] https://repository.uneca.org/ bitstream/handle/10855/47540/b12000322 https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.599 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2018. Continental free trade area deal set to boost intra-African trade. 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Department of Psychology University of South Africa

Pretoria, South Africa Abstract The pervasive nature of cyber threats poses a significant security challenge to governments, organisations and individual users. Cybersecurity in the context of South African armed forces has received minimal attention as an emerging threat in the 21st century. In terms of Agenda 2063, the South African National Defence Force has yet to place cybersecurity at the centre of its plan to advance itself as an African cyber army. The chapter aims to explore the views and perceptions of military officers, which requires a qualitative approach. A non-probability purposive sampling technique was used to select 13 participants enrolled in a senior officer’s course at a South African site where professional military education is offered. The views and perceptions of the South African military officers were analysed within a securitisation framework. Under the guise of Securitisation Theory’s (ST) security process of transforming an ordinary threat into the realm of politics, rests the central tenant of the speech act. This study locates itself within the widened view of ST, which suggests that the military officer is a key role player in orchestrating a security move through the speech act. Two main findings emerged from the individual views on cybersecurity. First, not all threats require an emergency response in the context of South African armed forces, alluding to the value placed on cyber threats. Second, cyber securitisation is a continuous process and does not necessarily take on existential features that require an emergency response. The findings showed that cybersecurity is an emerging issue in the South African threat landscape. The theoretical value placed on ST highlights the various dimensions, threat actors and the mechanisms through which the speech act is executed. The chapter contributes to the existing body of knowledge concerning securitisation theory by (1) expanding the contextual boundaries through which security threats are viewed, (2) positioning the military officer as a key player in the securitisation process, and (3) understanding the process of threat elevation in the context of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Introduction Cyber threats have become an international concern for many nation-states, and this is due to the transnational nature of the consequences emanating from extremely complex, malicious software (Bester, 2023). With the ever-changing nature of threats and attacks originating from cyberspace, the importance has shifted to cybersecurity and its capabilities by nation-states due to four reasons: (1) Nation-states are increasing their cybersecurity capability to compete with their adversaries and nefarious actors (Letho & Henselmann, 2020; Gazula, 2017). (2) Cyber threats and attacks have distressing consequences for the socio-economic capacity of a country; therefore, whatever measures are taken should ensure civil society and national security interests are taken into account (Hlase, 2018). (3) Nation states advance their cybersecurity capabilities to maintain their approach to a modern armed force and also for defensive measures to secure their interests from cybersecurity threats (Mulazzani & Sarcia, 2011). It is important to define cybersecurity at the outset of this chapter, as it may provide a background to when the researcher refers to the term as a response to threats. Bester (2023:43) defines cybersecurity as follows: Cybersecurity is a flexible security process through which individuals constantly interact with a technical environment in the social context. Cybersecurity is also the immersive process through which the human factor utilises security software tools in tandem with education, training, guidelines, technical knowledge and best practices such as awareness training, technical skills, and risk assessment. Cybersecurity also requires applying knowledge to risk perception and precautionary behaviour while being fully aware of physical and cyberspace vulnerabilities. There is a shift in how cyberspace is conceptualised from a multidisciplinary view of security (Bester, 2023). Cyberspace is considered a new domain of warfare. It demands a new approach to understanding the role of security and the position of the armed forces in securing this digital domain (United States Army Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). (4) The human aspect of cybersecurity is not void of vulnerabilities; therefore, countries and organisations have invested in cyber-awareness to reduce the notion of users involuntarily being victims of cybercrime. Furthermore, with the increasing threat rate, it is evident that there is more focus on creating cybersecurity awareness among cyberspace users. Thus, it is argued that there is a growing dialogue internationally and locally on cybersecurity, which positions cyber threats at the centre of security agendas. In this way, the logic of security travels to new and emerging domains is highlighted; thus, ST is an applicable framework to explore emerging threats in social landscapes (Philipsen, 2018). Cyberspace has increased the vulnerability of users’ data and advanced the level of dependence on technology. This is due to the increasing trend of internet-connected device use. Furthermore, this level of vulnerability impacts data housed in government organisations and may even increase the likelihood of cyber threats if no adequate security measures are implemented. Therefore, with the increase in use, the organisation or entity responsible for user data must ensure that precautionary measures are employed against cyber threats and potential attacks (Toch, Bettini, Shmueli, Radaelli, Lanzi, Riboni & Lepri, 2018). The storage of volumes of data in organisations also exposes the organisations to threats such as data breaches and privacy concerns, which ultimately places user information and sensitive organisational information at risk (Toch et al., 2018). Zukic (2020) highlights that advancing the cybersecurity knowledge of military members is essential as the space is evolving, which also results in an ever-changing threat landscape, thus posing a significant threat to national security and human security in cyberspace. Bester (2023) contends that the armed forces have a complex relationship with cyberspace and emerging technology, which can be likened to a double-edged sword. It is argued that cyberspace is continuously being integrated into the function of the armed forces, especially with the employment of operational and strategic military activities where intelligence gathering, surveillance systems and reconnaissance activities are carried out (Sayler, 2020). According to Martin (2020), technology and cyberspace have the potential to amplify forces, yet they also present security risks to personnel. Adding to the importance of the human being at the centre of cybersecurity, one may argue that there is an expectation that the armed forces context is the primary actor within a security cluster that is responsible for advancing national cybersecurity and protecting the cyber sovereignty of the state (Kolton, 2017). This chapter takes the positionality of securitisation theory (ST) to understand how cybersecurity threats are understood among senior South African National Defence Force (SANDF) military officers. Furthermore, this chapter aims to explore cyber threats as emerging security challenges within the SANDF. Ultimately, this chapter contributes to research on new conceptualisations of security by focusing on cyber threats and using ST as a theoretical guide in positioning how this new and emerging threat is framed. What is Securitisation Theory? It is argued that ST focuses on elements associated with war and conflict, particularly when viewing the securitisation procedure as successful. This level of success may not necessarily imply that all facets of the theory were “ticked on the list;” it indicates the resolution of addressing existential threats that were resolved using an extraordinary measure (Lucke, 2016). To describe ST, the constituent elements of its definition must be identified. The definition of ST is as follows: The discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan & Waever, 2003:491). In their definition, Buzan and Waever (2003) suggest that there is movement in understanding and communicating threats. The definition posed echoes the process where an issue moves from the political realm and transforms into an existential threat. This transformation of the threat is done by the securitising actor, which enforces the value and importance of the threat to an audience that may or may not agree with the threatened object of reference. Bester (2023) notes that an existential threat may threaten the survival of a referent object. However, Philipsen (2018) cautions that not all threats can be classified as existential or demand an emergency response. Dos Santos (2018) considers the role of the state an important facet of the securitisation process, and its role is central to its emphasis on how domestic and international issues are threatened and addressed by its existential measures (Bote, 2019; Egloff & Cavelty, 2021). Eroukhmanoff (2018) adds that ST offers a rational process through which security procedures are announced and elevated to deal with existential threats. The chapter suggests that ST’s linear process may not apply in non-Western contexts when considering cybersecurity threats. The researcher puts forth that in the context of SA, the securitising actors (the state and an authorised representative) have acknowledged cyber threats as threatening the national security interests of the state and civil society, thus ultimately challenging SA’s position on establishing cyberspace sovereignty (Republic of South Africa, 2018). Philipsen (2018) notes that the traditional notion of ST can be challenged by the idea of who may speak of security. Traditionally, ST emphasises that actors in positions of authority are a pre-condition for speaking of security and possibly proclaiming the significance of the threat. Instead, Philipsen (2018) argues that speaking of security should be the primary condition under which authority is exercised. Egloff and Cavelty (2021) argue that ST considers constructing policies linked to security agendas. Therefore, a threat might be classified as objective and even, to a certain extent, described as existential. However, the securitisation process’s success is achieved when threats are established and presented successfully in the political domain (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). In terms of politics, the Copenhagen School (CS) first considered public issues to be politicised, after which they were securitised (Hama, 2017). Based on this view, securitisation is elevating political issues beyond normal political practices designed to respond to security threats and vulnerabilities (Hama, 2017). Egloff and Cavelty (2021) assert that ST is grounded in the speech act theory, which purports that the use of language can be a performative act. Security speech acts containing performative power can reconstruct and change social reality. This might impact how security is described within social and political contexts. Additionally, the security utterances made by the securitising actors may influence the response to certain threats (Stritzel, 2007). It is important to note that the ST process is understood in its sequential format. Based on the information in Figure 11.1, it is evident that securitisation follows a logical process where security measures are introduced and elevated to deal with existential threats (Eroukhmanoff, 2018). It can be argued that the linear progression of ST might not be applicable in some contexts. Within the context of the SANDF, the securitising actor (the state and authorised representative), in this case, lends itself to the activity where the Minister of Defence openly declares cyber threats and attacks a security challenge for security clusters in the nation-state. The SA Minister of Defence also acknowledges that cyber threats impact national security interests, highlighting the human element as a potential actor that may challenge cyber sovereignty at risk (Republic of South Africa, 2018). Therefore, the state and the human element are considered referent objects worth protecting through security measures. It is worth noting that the new SA Minister of Defence indicated in the budget speech debate on the Defence Vote 2022/2023 (Republic of South Africa, 2022) that cybersecurity is one of the SANDF’s chief defence concerns by highlighting the following: “... protecting South Africa’s intangible sovereignty through support to the National Cyber Resilience Initiative and ensuring Defence Digital Protection” (Republic of South Africa, 2022, par. 44).

Figure 11 .1: The logical flow of the securitisation process Within the social context, the politician-state-centred view of the ST may be countered by a new way of thinking that questions this monopoly on an issue carrying the label of being securitised when the state as an organ of power must proclaim a specific issue to be a realistic threat to its citizens so that adequate measures can be taken to counteract or mitigate the threat. Philipsen (2018) notes that the traditional notion of ST can be challenged by the idea of who may speak of security. Traditionally, ST emphasises that actors in positions of authority are a pre-condition for speaking of security and possibly proclaiming the significance of the threat. Instead, Philipsen (2018) suggests that speaking of security should be the condition of authority. Buzan and Waever (2003) define the securitisation process as the transition of an ordinary security issue progressing to a level where the securitising actor classifies it (the security issue) as an existential threat. The existential threat can be narrowly defined as the threat to survival (May et al., 1958). However, Philipsen (2018) cautions that not all identified threats might be classified as existential or require an emergency response. Furthermore, Van Ooijen (2020) believes that the threat response through emergency measures and the verbalisation of threats by the securitising actor is measurable by scale. This may typically be performed by the rate of execution of measures and how well the audience responds to the value placed on the referent object. However, it is noted that this measurement may not be applicable in all contexts as the sequential nature of ST may not occur in a rigid fashion. Philipsen (2018) indicates that security iterations develop over time and that the securitisation process may not necessarily be the same across all contexts as new meanings are added systematically. This impacts the way securitisation is carried out in different contexts. The positioning of ST and its relevance to cyber threats This chapter positions itself within the security studies discipline and explores cybersecurity as a new emerging threat within the South African armed forces context. By applying social network theory, one can recognise how cyber threats are communicated to South African military officers and understand the response patterns to threats and attacks emerging from a digital landscape. This section of the chapter engages with the often-overlooked actors within the security process, such as the South African military officer. The traditional perspective of ST is that the state is the central element in the securitisation process (Buzan & Waever, 2003). ST entails the subjective process of managing and understanding elevated security threats against a recognised object of reference (Bester, 2023). ST highlights the process of framing a threat as existential, therefore demanding an extraordinary response. Once the threat has been identified in the political realm, it is escalated by the securitising actor to a point that requires extraordinary responses through security mechanisms. Herein rests the focal point of the theory. Aydindag (2021) puts forth that after the threat has been identified and communicated by a securitising actor, a call is issued in the political community to enable exceptional measures relating ST to cyber threats. The South African Government has advanced the narrative regarding cyber threats and attacks by developing its defensive measures and creating a cyber command within its military. Furthermore, the nation-state is also developing its national legislation framework on cybersecurity by employing the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (Republic of South Africa, 2015) and the Cybercrimes Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2019). These two legislative frameworks indicate the advancement SA has made in addressing cybersecurity threats. However, the slow-paced ratification of these policies is not necessarily in line with the advancement and complexities of cyber threats (van Niekerk, 2017). Importance of the human element The SANDF serves in a democratic dispensation and is subject to the state’s civil authorities (Janse van Rensburg, 2019). It is worth noting that civil control of the military denotes the hierarchical nature of armed forces, which serve the executive branch of the state (Aldis & Drent, 2008). The SANDF is an important element in the pursuit of establishing national security. Van’t Wout (2019) argues that the capability of an armed force is only as good as the human capital being continuously developed and recruited. Additionally, cybersecurity training and awareness creation are crucial for equipping the human element with the necessary security behaviour and knowledge to effectively counteract threats in a digital space. Four central reasons exist in support of why the human element is considered the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain, and they are: (1) Deception and exploitation of the human element by nefarious actors may result in sensitive organisational information being disclosed (Zwilling, Klien, Lesjak, Wiechetek, Cetin & Basim, 2020; Rauf, 2019). Thus, when linking it to the context of the armed forces, it might be possible for military members to be psychologically targeted to disclose restricted information about strategic activities. (2) The internet is integrated into everyday life, especially with mobile devices. Therefore, the connection between organisational and personal information being shared on convenient communication platforms, such as social media platforms, may pose a security risk to the online security credibility of the organisation and may compromise the military members’ devices (Ani, He & Tiwari, 2019). (3) The role of the voluntary and involuntary points of access in organisational network systems, through the actions of the human element, may lend itself to the notion that the military member might be vulnerable to being a medium through which malicious software is passed (McMahon, 2020; Rauf, 2019). (4) The online security behaviour and the protocol used for responding to threats might be influenced by individual levels of security awareness (Zwilling et al., 2020). The South African military officer is closely integrated into the civilian domain and functions within the broader armed forces community. The military member is allocated specific security mandates and responsibilities. This duality is mainly linked to the notion that cyberspace is ephemeral and the threats originating from this space may target anyone. The researcher adds that this view lends itself to the argument that the human element is vulnerable and may act as a security challenge for the SANDF and the sovereignty of the nation state. Furthermore, cyber threats are unconventional and necessitate that the armed forces context and human capital adapt to the challenges the cyber domain offers, as the adversary is often unseen. The role of the speech act in cyber securitisation The previous section of the chapter emphasised the role of the human element and its position with ST. This section of the chapter offers a brief discussion on the role of the speech act in ST. An emergency measure is actioned based on the seriousness of the security threat. This statement aligns with the view that security is performative; in other words, to speak security, one must do security. It is worth noting that the SA military officer takes on a performative stance within the ST process (Bester, 2024). The SA military officer may also be in a vulnerable position and be susceptible to cyber threats. These military members may also be impacted by the deployed security responses. The coordination of cybersecurity efforts in the nation state has become the responsibility of the SANDF, as noted by the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (Republic of South Africa, 2015a). One may put forth that the acting of security and speech acts that were performed by various actors beyond the military elevated the importance of cyber threats. Consequently, the SANDF is becoming a key actor responsible for maintaining cyber defence. This responsibility allows the military officer to enter the practice of security. Floyd (2020) highlights that ST is not a once-off event but rather a political process where issues are transformed into security threats over a period of time. Floyd (2020) suggests that the process of securitisation commences with the securitising actor, who engages in a speech act or makes a securitising move. The speech aims to announce a referent object being vulnerable to a threat (Floyd, 2020). This is followed by the audience, who must agree with the speech being verbalised and the securitising move. Once the audience accepts the narrative, the deployment of an emergency response is required to manage the perceived threat (Floyd, 2020). When linking this to cyber threats and attacks, the discourse regarding the severity of the attacks increases the coordination process, ensuring accountability and maintaining cyber defence measures. These acts of ensuring cybersecurity connect with the notion that the SA military officer speaks due to the political elite engaging in the speech act and the security incidents that have transpired. Methodology This section of the chapter explores the methodological considerations of this particular study. The methodology section explores the research design, sampling descriptions, and data collection process. The data analysis is also briefly covered in this section of the chapter. Research design This study utilised an interpretivist approach to explore the perceptions of cybersecurity within the SANDF. The study used a cross-sectional design. The cross-sectional design is employed within research studies to explore a phenomenon at a particular time (Setia, 2016). In this study, the researcher explores the role of ST within the SANDF by specifically focusing on the perceptions of cybersecurity and how threats are framed. Furthermore, the recruited participants were recruited using a non-probability sampling method. Homogenous purposive sampling, a non-probability method, was used to obtain key information regarding security orientation from participants (Creswell, 2007). Homogenous purposive sampling is a technique that seeks to attain participants who have common sampling traits and experiences (Laerd Dissertation, 2012). All participants in this study served in the military and were of senior rank. It is important to note that ethical standards were maintained throughout the study. Sample size and research participants The researcher recruited participants located at the South African National Defence College (SANDC), which is a site where professional military training is offered. The SANDC is a military training institution where senior military officers undergo professional training for promotional purposes (Bester, 2023). Biographical factors such as age and gender were not considered as these factors were not essential for this study’s aims and objectives. Due to a sampling limitation associated with the military officers’ academic obligations, the researcher could, ultimately, only recruit 13 participants. Data collection and data analysis The data collection approach used in this study was qualitative, which was employed to obtain perceptions of cybersecurity in the context of the armed forces. The researcher conducted 13 semi-structured interviews to extract views on (1) cybersecurity orientation, (2) cybersecurity training, (3) the organisation’s approach to cybersecurity and (4) security culture. A set of pre-determined questions were designed for the interviews. The questions focused on aspects related to how threats are constructed in the armed forces context, the level of importance placed on cybersecurity in the SANDF context and the narrative associated with cyber threats in the organisation. The 13 senior military officers were purposively selected, and all semi-structured interviews were conducted at the SANDC. The interviews offered a bird’s-eye view of the qualitative features of how threats are constructed and elevated to a point of importance among South African military officers. Qualitative Content Analysis (CA) was used to analyse the data received from the 13 interview transcripts. Qualitative CA is a type of analysis that explores the written, verbal and visual messages from the social world (Bester, 2023). Krippendorff (2004:18) describes CA as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use.” Themes Three main themes emerged from the data analysis: (1) awareness and knowledge of cyberspace and its connected dangers; (2) culture of digital security among officers; and (3) perception as an important aspect for senior military officers. This section of the chapter explores the qualitative narratives regarding how military officers construct cyber threats and considers the importance of cybersecurity. Theme 1: Awareness and knowledge of cyberspace and its connected dangers The theme ‘awareness and knowledge of cyberspace and its connected dangers’ speaks to the notion that military officers need to be acquainted with cyberspace and cyber threats. The theme also focused on the level of awareness military officers have pertaining to the potential implications of cyber threats in the workplace. Sohrabi and Von Solms (2016) highlight that when individuals accumulate experiences, these contribute to their knowledge of events. In the context of this theme, awareness and knowledge related to cyberspace also refer to the participants’ level of familiarity with cyberspace, which might be linked to how well they respond to security threats. Thus, the focus should shift to the skills and the capacity to prevent, manage, and alleviate the risk of exposing sensitive data (Ashenden, 2008). The purpose of this theme links to the participant’s awareness of the threats in cyberspace and indicates that they were equally cognisant of the practices that went hand in hand with remaining active in cyberspace. This outlook was, for example, corroborated by Participant 2, who argued: I believe that the organisation should employ cybersecurity policy more strongly. If there is a presentation during the Officer Commanding period once a month, to indicate that there were seven violations on social media and counter-M should look at this to create that awareness on rules and order within cyberspace (Participant 2, senior military officer). When analysing the extracted narrative produced by Participant 2, it became clear that the senior military officer was referring to violations within cyberspace and highlighting that the organisation should be more active in enforcing policies and directives, which linked up with creating awareness of cyber threats. From an ST perspective, it is clear that elevating the threat has been identified. However, enforcing policies as a security measure has not yet been performed or accepted. This also highlights the argument that securitisation may occur over a long period, and not all actors and processes may occur logically. Theme 2: Culture of digital security among officers The theme addresses the culture of digital security among military officers. Cybersecurity awareness emerged as an important factor in constructing a digital-orientated organisation. The notion of a digital culture being linked to online awareness was evident from the narratives of Participant 1. This narrative described urgency relating to cybersecurity awareness as a challenge in the SANDF. In addition, urgency as a challenge was revealed specifically during the coding process, as the narratives indicated that there was a need for the organisation to improve and accelerate addressing cybersecurity. The relevant narratives of participants in this respect are captured in the following extracts: There is no level of awareness culture in the SANDF concerning cybersecurity. I would score cybersecurity it as a 4 out of 10, which is at its worst, because the majority of officers save DOD information on their personal USB sticks or email it to their personal accounts and do not worry about whether their emails are hacked (Participant 1, senior military officer). The culture of digital security in the excerpt above showed that the participant considered the cybersecurity efforts made by the SANDF concerning. The application of security behaviour is also coming into question, as extremely limited information sharing practices were actively applied, thus reflecting how well digital technology is integrated into the everyday operational activities within the organisation. Theme 3: Perception as an important aspect for senior military officers The theme focused on perception and how military members felt about cybersecurity efforts made by the SANDF. Perception is an important factor in predicting reactions to certain events and a reflection on the behavioural response exhibited (Saban, Rau & Wood, 2021). It can be argued that there is a link between the security perceptions of users and the level of awareness that is displayed. When the perception of cybersecurity is low, the activity to secure information decreases. Thus, the researcher indicates that perception of cyber threats and attacks may have a role to play when employing security protocols. Furthermore, perceptions of certain issues in organisations may impact how employees respond to certain events. In addition, this perception may also infer to how employees respond to change, roles and developing social identities (Saban et al., 2021). Currently, yes, uhm, I don’t think there is good control over it. There are people posting on the DOD web and there’s undisciplined comments being made and stuff. So, I think it can be a big threat in general, and I do believe that most people are not very secure (d). We know about the dangers, but I don’t think we are doing enough. I have the ability to access my phone and laptop with my thumb scanner, but now I am thinking I should have actually applied it and I haven’t (Participant 2, senior military officer). When analysing the qualitative extract from Participant 2, it is clear that there is extremely limited control over the information being shared on media sites. This view extends to the point where the senior military officer has little trust in fellow military members concerning security behaviour. Furthermore, it is also clear from the extract that security behaviour is not actively applied, and directives are not adhered to as military members post carelessly. Although the military officer is aware of the threat information, certain guidelines and best practices are not consistently followed in their application and employment. This view also extends to the ST, where the essence is that a response needs to follow from threat verbalisation (speech-act). Therefore, speaking security and doing security, in this case, may not necessarily be applicable. However, the researcher adds that not all threats require an emergency response and for this reason, the haphazard application of guidelines and best practices might be sufficient, as the threat does not constitute an emergency measure. Discussion The discussion of this chapter starts with the statement that securitisation may take place over a long period and may or may not complete this process in some contexts (Bester, 2024). It is important to note that, historically, institutionalised security actors such as political institutions and military establishments may have more claim to ST than new actors entering the securitisation space. However, newer securitising actors may also challenge the established conceptualisations of security. The traditional view is that the armed forces are utilised to secure the interest of the state. It is often the state that may utilise the military as a response to a threat. This chapter included cyber threats as an emerging conceptualisation of ST. The newer or emerging conceptualisation of ST invites newer actors to challenge the current nuances about security and may challenge the status quo. It is important to note that not all facets of ST may be suitable in the context of cyber threats in the context of SA armed forces. This is because the researcher explored cybersecurity at the individual level and did not opt to view the elevation of cyber threats at a macro level, where the state and its actors are primary drivers for threat elevation and the deployment of security responses. It is clear from the qualitative excerpts that the SANDF acknowledges that cyber threats are a serious security challenge. Furthermore, the participants also indicate that the perceptions of senior SA military officers of cybersecurity play an important part in how organisations view and respond to threats. It is worth stressing that the referent object in the case of ST takes on dual roles: (1) the SANDF as an organisation within the SA security cluster and (2) the senior military officer as the human element. The reason for this duality is that the SANDF is an important actor within the SA security cluster, which is primarily responsible for maintaining national security and performing strategic operational activities that align itself to coordinating cybersecurity in the nation state (Van der Waag-Cowling, 2017; Republic of South Africa, 2015). Philipsen (2018) indicates that security actors must perform and speak security. The importance of the SA military officer takes on two positions in the securitisation process: (1) the senior SA military officer is accountable for the implementation of security measures as instructed by the organisation; (2) the senior SA military officer must announce cyber threats as a security challenge for the organisation and NS, and that emergency measures need to be implemented. The senior SA military officer takes on a very influential position, especially since senior ranking officers can inform decision-making and implement the directives used in the organisation to address security issues. The military officer generally takes on a role where they are accountable for executing plans and operations. This position corresponds with the concept of the securitising actor, which actively identifies and articulates the threat along with its associated risks. It is worth noting that the securitising actor does not necessarily have to be associated with the political elite or more influential decision makers. Philipsen (2018) indicates that new actors may intervene and challenge the traditional conceptualisations of security. However, these newer actors may still rely on established views of security. Philipsen (2018) notes that to speak about security, one must capture the reality of the threat. The senior SA military officers indicated in their narratives that the threat of cyber-attacks is challenging and that they apply security behaviour. However, there is a dissonance in their perception of the elevation of cyber threats and the emergency response employed. The researcher notes that the element of power might be one of the deciding factors when distinguishing anyone to become a securitising actor. However, it is worth indicating that historically institutionalised actors are more established than emerging actors attempting to enter the securitisation process. These historically institutionalised actors have power in the speech act, and their claim on legitimising threats is more accepted than newer actors. Furthermore, there are many referent objects that need to be protected through emergency responses. The researcher argues that while the state might be considered the referent object under the traditional perspective of ST due to its national interests and sovereignty, it is imperative to note that other referent objects may also require attention (Hirsch Ballin, Dijstelbloem & De Goede, 2020). Thus, the researcher believes that in the context of the SANDF and cybersecurity, additional layers of referent objects require survival. Due to cybersecurity being ephemeral and being integrated into people’s daily lives, one cannot be fixed on the premise that cyber threats (non-traditional) may only threaten the state and its sovereignty. Newer actors entering the security debate may challenge existing elements of “what” and “who” constitute a referent object other than the state (Bester, 2023). Conclusion Cyber threats in the South African context are pervasive and challenges cyber sovereignty. The findings suggest that perceptions of cyber threats are important as they establish the legitimacy of securitisation. The result of the securitisation of cyber threats is cybersecurity. Cybersecurity does not just constitute the process of employing technical capabilities, it also includes applying best practices and guidelines. Education and training as an emergency response to threats should be ongoing and with the perspective that securitisation may occur over a prolonged period. ST denotes the process through which a normal threat transitions from the ordinary to existential, therefore acting as a threat to an individual’s safety. Cyber threats have no boundaries, and their impact is often felt offline. Thus, the voice of the human factor remains an important element in the widened approach to ST, as it provides an alternative view of security conceptualisations. This chapter positioned cybersecurity within the wider ST security debate by arguing that SA senior military officers are valuable actors within the securitisation process. The perceptions of cybersecurity prove to be a crucial factor when ascertaining the current process of how cyber threats are elevated and responded to. The perceptions of SA military officers also provided a snapshot into how cybersecurity, as a response to threats, is approached by the SANDF. 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Journal of Computer Information Systems, 62(1):82-97. https://doi.org/10.1080/08874417.2020.1712269 Land Conflicts and Development in Africa: Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development Ruvimbo Shayamunda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Johannes Bhanye

African Climate and Development Initiative University of Cape Town

Cape Town, South Africa Abstract Land conflicts are a pervasive and longstanding issue in Africa, with significant implications for peace and development. Land conflicts are disputes or struggles over land ownership, use, and control between individuals, communities, or groups. These conflicts can arise due to various factors, including historical injustices, unequal access to land, conflicting land use practices, population growth, urbanisation, and environmental degradation. This chapter examines the relationship between land conflicts and development in Africa, focusing on the implications for peacebuilding and sustainable development. The chapter argues that land conflicts are a major obstacle to achieving sustainable development in Africa and that a comprehensive approach is necessary to address the root causes of these conflicts. Drawing on case studies from different African countries, the chapter analyses the drivers and consequences of land conflicts and their impact on sustainable development. The chapter also examines the role of land governance, institutional capacity, and stakeholder engagement in addressing land conflicts and promoting sustainable development. The chapter also identifies gaps in existing policy frameworks for addressing land conflicts and offers recommendations for a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and development in Africa. The chapter argues that addressing land conflicts requires a comprehensive approach that prioritises conflict prevention, resolution, and transformation and integrates social, economic, and environmental considerations into development planning. Introduction Land conflicts are a pervasive and longstanding issue in Africa, with significant implications for peace and development across the continent (Kalabamu, 2019). By definition, land conflicts are disputes or struggles over land ownership, use, and control between individuals, communities, or groups (Kandel, 2016). These conflicts can arise due to various factors, including historical injustices, unequal access to land, conflicting land use practices, population growth, urbanisation, and environmental degradation (Kandel, 2016). Despite the critical role of land in sustaining livelihoods, culture, and identity, many African countries experience frequent disputes and violent conflicts over land ownership and use (Palmer, Fricska & Wehrmann, 2009). These conflicts are often fuelled by various factors, including historical injustices, population growth, climate change, and competition for resources, making land issues increasingly complex and contentious (Clover & Ericksen, 2009). There is growing recognition of the need for comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding and sustainable development that consider the complex interplay between land, conflict, and development (Bhanye, Matamanda, Kohima & Bandauko, 2024; MacGinty & Williams, 2016). Such approaches require a deep understanding of the drivers and dynamics of land conflicts in Africa and potential solutions and strategies for promoting peace and sustainable development (Bhanye, Shayamunda, Mpahlo, Matamanda & Kachena, 2023). This chapter contributes to this critical discussion by exploring the nature and causes of land conflicts in Africa and their impact on development. It focuses on the potential for peacebuilding and sustainable development approaches to address these conflicts. Drawing on case studies from across the continent, this chapter examines the role of various actors and institutions in land governance and management, their implications for conflict prevention and resolution, and for promoting sustainable development. The chapter provides insights and recommendations for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in peacebuilding, development, and land governance to promote a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to addressing land conflicts in Africa. The chapter contributes to building peaceful, prosperous societies grounded in social justice, equity, and human rights. Review Approach The methodology for this chapter follows a review of existing literature on land conflicts in Africa, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. The first step in the review methodology was to identify relevant databases for literature search. In this case, databases such as JSTOR, Google Scholar, Google, Scopus, and Web of Science were used. The second step identified relevant keywords such as land conflicts, peacebuilding, sustainable development, conflict resolution, community empowerment, and legal frameworks. The third step was to search the identified databases using the keywords comprehensively. The fourth step was to screen the articles to identify those that meet the inclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria included articles on land conflicts, peacebuilding, and African sustainable development. The fifth step was to assess the quality of the selected articles based on factors such as the validity of the study, reliability of the data, and the relevance of the findings to the research questions. The sixth step was to extract relevant data from the selected articles. The data included information on the causes of land conflicts in Africa, the implications of land conflicts for peacebuilding and sustainable development, and the various approaches to land conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The extracted data were analysed to identify patterns, themes, and relationships. Finally, the findings from the selected articles were synthesised to answer the research questions and make recommendations for future research and policy. Conceptualising Land Conflicts, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development Land conflicts refer to disputes or tensions arising from competing claims over access, use, or ownership of land between individuals, communities, or institutions (Boone, 2014). These conflicts can occur in various forms, such as disagreements over customary land rights, disputes over land acquisition and development projects, and conflicts over boundaries and resources (Peters, 2013). Land conflicts can be complex and multi-faceted, often involving economic, social, cultural, and political factors. In some cases, land conflicts can escalate into violent conflicts, posing a significant threat to peace, security, and development. Peacebuilding refers to a process of activities and initiatives that aim to prevent violent conflicts, resolve disputes peacefully, and promote sustainable peace and development (Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Peacebuilding involves various actors, including governments, civil society organisations, community leaders, and international organisations, to address the root causes of conflicts, build social cohesion and trust, and foster inclusive and participatory governance (Cox, Osborn & Sisk, 2017). Peacebuilding efforts often include conflict resolution and mediation, institution-building, capacity development, reconciliation and transitional justice (Sharp, 2013). The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to create sustainable peace by addressing the underlying factors that contribute to conflicts and promoting a culture of peace, social justice, and human rights. Sustainable development refers to a development approach that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Borowy, 2013). It is based on the idea of balancing economic, social, and environmental factors to achieve long-term development goals that are socially inclusive, economically viable, and environmentally sustainable (Barbosa, Drach, & Corbella, 2014). Sustainable development recognises that economic growth and development must be accompanied by social progress and environmental protection and that the three pillars of sustainable development are interconnected and interdependent. Sustainable development aims to address the challenges of poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, and climate change and promote inclusive and equitable growth and development (Gupta & Vegelin, 2016). It emphasises the importance of integrating economic, social, and environmental considerations into policies and decision-making processes and encourages participation and collaboration among various stakeholders to achieve sustainable development goals. Figure 12.1 shows the sustainable development framework.

Figure 12 .1: Sustainable Development Framework. Source: ? Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) serve as a framework to guide countries, organisations, and individuals in their efforts to achieve sustainable development. They provide specific targets and indicators that help track progress towards sustainable development at the global, regional, and national levels. The goals are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, meaning that progress in one goal can positively impact progress in others. Land conflicts, peacebuilding, and sustainable development are interconnected in various ways. Land conflicts can arise due to various reasons, such as scarcity of resources, land grabbing, ethnic tensions, and political instability (Bhanye et al., 2023). These conflicts can lead to violence, displacement of people, and destruction of property, which can severely affect sustainable development (Justino, 2011). Peacebuilding efforts aim to address the root causes of conflicts and prevent them from escalating (Schirch, 2008). This involves promoting dialogue, negotiation, and mediation to resolve conflicts peacefully. By peacefully resolving land conflicts, communities can create an environment conducive to sustainable development. Sustainable development aims to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This involves creating economic, social, and environmental policies that are sustainable in the long run. Land conflicts can have a negative impact on sustainable development by disrupting economic activities, destroying infrastructure, and hindering the implementation of development projects (Omer, 2008). However, sustainable development can also play a role in preventing land conflicts by addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts. For example, by promoting sustainable agriculture and resource management practices, communities can reduce their dependence on scarce resources and mitigate conflicts arising from resource scarcity. Land Conflicts, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development in Africa Land conflicts in Africa are complex with multi-dimensional issues that have been a persistent problem across the continent for many years (Bhanye et al., 2024; Ikome, 2012). Conflicts over land ownership, access and use are a major source of tension, violence and displacement in many African countries. These conflicts often arise due to competing claims and interests, including ethnic, religious, cultural, economic and political factors (Bhanye et al., 2024; Bhanye, 2023; Kymlicka & Norman, 2002). This section will explore some specific examples of land conflicts in Africa. One of the most notable examples of land conflict in Africa is the case of the Maasai people in Tanzania and Kenya (Nelson & Makko, 2005). The Maasai are a pastoralist community who rely on grazing lands for their livelihoods. However, their traditional lands are subject to encroachment and land grabbing by large-scale agriculture and conservation projects, leading to violent confrontations between the Maasai and these groups. In 2017, there were reports of clashes between the Maasai and farmers in Tanzania over land use, resulting in the displacement of hundreds of families (Bluwstein, Lund, Askew, Stein, Noe, Odgaard, Maganga, & Engström, 2018). Another example of land conflict in Africa is the case of the Ogoni people in Nigeria (Ukeje, 2001). The Ogoni are an Indigenous community in the Niger Delta region who have been protesting against the exploitation of their land and natural resources by multinational oil companies (Naanen, 2012). The conflict led to widespread environmental degradation, loss of livelihoods, and human rights abuses. In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a prominent Ogoni leader and environmental activist, was executed by the Nigerian government for his role in the protests (Osha, 2020). In Zimbabwe, land conflicts have been a major issue since the country gained independence in 1980. The government’s land reform program, which sought to redistribute land from white farmers to Black Zimbabweans, was mired in controversy and violence (Masaka, 2011). The program was criticised for its lack of transparency, corruption, and violation of property rights. In some cases, white farmers were forcibly removed from their land, leading to protests and violence. The land reform program has also been blamed for the country’s economic decline and food shortages (Hove & Gwiza, 2012). In Ethiopia, land conflicts are also a persistent problem. Recently, the government has promoted large-scale commercial agriculture and infrastructure projects, which displaced Indigenous communities and small-scale farmers (Dube, 2009). For example, in the Omo Valley, the government’s plan to build a hydroelectric dam and large-scale plantations led to protests by local communities, who fear that their land and livelihoods will be destroyed (Abbink, 2012). These examples illustrate the complex nature of land conflicts in Africa and the various factors that contribute to them. Land conflicts are often deeply rooted in historical, cultural, and political contexts and require comprehensive approaches to address them. Implications of Land Conflicts for Sustainable Development in Africa Land conflicts have severe implications for sustainable development in Africa. The challenges posed by land conflicts are multi-faceted and often hinder the achievement of sustainable development goals. In this section, we examine the implications of land conflicts for sustainable development in Africa with the aid of specific examples. One of the major implications of land conflicts for sustainable development in Africa is the disruption of agricultural production. Land conflicts often lead to the displacement of farmers and the destruction of crops, causing devastating impacts on food security in the affected regions (Adelaja & George, 2019; Hufe & Hueuermann, 2017). For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, land conflicts between communities displaced over a million people, and the destruction of farms left many without food (Kelly, 2014). Another implication of land conflicts for sustainable development in Africa is the displacement of communities. Land conflicts often result in the displacement of communities from their homes, which can have a negative impact on their social and economic well-being. For instance, Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region witnessed several land conflicts, leading to the displacement of entire communities (Mmom & Igwe, 2012). These communities’ displacement significantly impacted their access to education, healthcare, and other essential services. Land conflicts can also lead to environmental degradation, undermining sustainable development efforts. In Kenya, the Mau Forest Complex has been a site of ongoing land conflicts between communities and the government (Chaudhry, 2019). The deforestation caused by these conflicts, led to soil erosion, reduced water availability, and loss of biodiversity, have long-lasting impacts on the region’s ecology and human well-being. In addition, land conflicts can create social unrest and undermine political stability, which are crucial components of sustainable development. In Zimbabwe, land conflicts between the government and white commercial farmers led to widespread unrest and violence, undermining the country’s political stability and hindering economic development (Mlambo & Raftopoulos, 2010). Finally, land conflicts can undermine efforts to promote inclusive and equitable development in Africa. In Ethiopia, land conflicts between Indigenous communities and the government over land use for commercial agriculture raised concerns about the potential for large-scale land acquisitions to perpetuate social and economic inequalities (Ojulu, 2014). Implications of Land Conflicts for Peacebuilding in Africa Land conflicts in Africa have significant implications for peacebuilding efforts on the continent. These conflicts often arise due to contestation over land ownership, access, and control, leading to tensions and violence among communities. The implications of land conflicts for peacebuilding in Africa are complex and multi-faceted. One of the primary implications of land conflicts for peacebuilding in Africa is the exacerbation of existing social and political tensions (Moyer, 2014). Land conflicts are often deeply rooted in historical and cultural issues and often involve multiple stakeholders with competing interests. These conflicts can result in violence, displacement, and loss of life, all of which undermine peacebuilding efforts on the continent. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), land conflicts perpetuate violence and instability (Rugaza, 2022). The conflict in the eastern part of the country claimed the lives of millions of people and is linked to disputes over land and other natural resources. Similarly, in Nigeria, the ongoing conflict between farmers and herders displaced thousands of people and undermined peacebuilding efforts in the country (Vande, 2023). Land conflicts also have economic implications for peacebuilding in Africa. These conflicts often disrupt agricultural production, a critical livelihood source for many communities on the continent. In some cases, land conflicts destroy infrastructure, including schools and health facilities, further undermining development efforts (Juana, Kahaka & Okurut, 2013). In Zimbabwe, land conflicts resulting from the country’s Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) had significant economic implications for the country. The program, which aimed to redistribute land from white farmers to Black Zimbabweans, led to violent evictions and contributed to the country’s economic decline (Moyo, 2013). The resulting instability undermined peacebuilding efforts in the country. Another implication of land conflicts for peacebuilding in Africa is their potential to exacerbate existing political tensions. In other instances, political actors manipulate land conflicts to gain power or control resources (Bhanye et al., 2023). This often resulted in the marginalisation and disenfranchisement of certain groups, which can lead to further conflict (Bhanye, 2023). For example, in South Sudan, land disputes between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups have been exploited by political actors, contributing to the outbreak of civil war in the country (Serfa, 2016). Similarly, in Ethiopia, land conflicts are linked to political tensions between the government and opposition groups, contributing to the country’s ongoing instability (Smith, 2007). Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Land Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding for Sustainable Development The findings of this chapter on land conflicts and peacebuilding and sustainable development in Africa reveal a complex web of social, economic, and political factors that contribute to land conflicts in the region. The study found that land conflicts result from scarcity of land resources and various forms of inequalities, including economic, social, cultural, and political. In addition, the chapter highlights the importance of peacebuilding and sustainable development as critical components in addressing land conflicts in Africa and promoting peaceful and sustainable development. One of the key findings of this study is the significant role that historical and structural factors play in fuelling land conflicts in Africa (Alao, 2007; Boone, 2017). The legacy of colonialism, the resulting policies of land dispossession, and the persistent patterns of inequality and marginalisation contribute to the underlying tensions that often erupt into violent conflicts over land resources (Forde, Kappler & Björkdahl, 2021; Thu, 2012). Furthermore, the findings show that land conflicts are often intertwined with other forms of conflict, including ethnic, political, and religious conflicts, highlighting the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to peacebuilding and sustainable development (Bob, 2010; Sriram, Martin-Ortega, & Herman, 2017). Another important finding of this study is the impact of land conflicts on sustainable development in Africa. The loss of land and natural resources due to conflicts undermines communities’ ability to sustain themselves and hampers economic growth and development. Moreover, the displacement of communities due to land conflicts often leads to increased poverty and insecurity, exacerbating the already dire socio-economic conditions in many parts of the region (George & Adelaja, 2022; Mpandeli, Liphadzi & Mabhaudhi, 2022). The study also reveals the challenges that arise in efforts to promote peacebuilding and sustainable development in the context of land conflicts in Africa (Annan, 2004). The lack of political will, weak institutional capacity, and limited resources often constrain the ability of governments and other actors to effectively address the root causes of conflicts and promote sustainable development (Brinkerhoff, 2005). In addition, the fragmentation of land tenure systems and the complexity of land use patterns make it difficult to develop comprehensive and inclusive solutions to land conflicts. Despite these challenges, the study finds a range of practical approaches and best practices that can contribute to peacebuilding and sustainable development in the context of land conflicts in Africa. This section presents possible approaches that could be adopted to achieve a lasting solution to land conflicts in Africa. A comprehensive approach to land conflict resolution and peacebuilding is required to address the root causes of conflicts and promote sustainable development. Such an approach should involve strengthening legal frameworks, promoting dialogue and negotiation, strengthening institutions, empowering local communities, and addressing underlying issues (Figure 12.2).

Figure 12 .2: Comprehensive Approach to Land Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. Source: Authors Strengthening legal frameworks Land conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa require a multi-faceted approach that addresses the underlying causes of the conflicts. One key aspect of this approach is strengthening legal frameworks that govern land ownership and use (Williamson, 2010). This involves a comprehensive review of existing laws, policies and regulations to identify gaps and inconsistencies and make necessary adjustments to ensure they are aligned with international best practices. In Kenya, for instance, the government adopted the Community Land Act (2016), which provides a legal framework for recognising, protecting, and registering community land. Many land conflicts in Africa stem from unclear land tenure systems, weak land governance institutions, and inadequate legal frameworks for resolving land disputes. Enhancing the legal frameworks for land governance and dispute resolution is crucial for promoting peacebuilding and sustainable development in Africa. This can be done by enacting and enforcing laws that protect the land rights of vulnerable groups such as women, youth, and marginalised communities. For example, the Land Tenure Act in Nigeria recognises women’s land rights and prohibits discriminatory practices that deny them access to land. Similarly, the Land Act in Uganda establishes a legal framework for recognising and protecting customary land rights. The implementation of such laws can help to prevent land conflicts that arise from the denial of land rights to vulnerable groups. Another way to strengthen legal frameworks is by establishing effective dispute-resolution mechanisms for land conflicts (Van Leeuween, 2017). Many African countries have established land dispute resolution mechanisms, but they often lack the capacity to handle the high number of cases that arise. Therefore, it is essential to invest in the training of personnel and the establishment of effective mechanisms for the resolution of land disputes. For example, the Community Land Bill in Kenya establishes a community land tribunal responsible for resolving disputes over community land. The tribunal has the power to enforce its decisions, and its establishment helped to reduce the incidence of land conflicts in Kenya. Furthermore, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration can effectively resolve land conflicts (Menkel-Meadow, 2015). These mechanisms can be less costly and time-consuming than traditional litigation processes, often resulting in mutually beneficial outcomes for conflicting parties. For instance, in Ghana, the Land Administration Project established community land secretariats that use mediation to resolve land disputes at the community level. Mediation helped reduce the backlog of land disputes and improve access to justice for those affected by land conflicts. In addition to the above, adopting land governance policies that promote transparency and accountability can help reduce the incidence of land conflicts in Africa (Deininger, Selod, & Burns, 2014). For instance, the Land Governance Assessment Framework developed by the African Union Commission provides guidelines for assessing the effectiveness of land governance policies and institutions. The framework evaluates land governance’s legal, institutional, and social aspects and promotes good governance practices such as transparency, accountability, and participation. Promoting dialogue and negotiation Promoting dialogue and negotiation is important for resolving land conflicts, building peace, and promoting sustainable development in Africa (Robertson & Finnegan, 2013). Dialogue and negotiation are essential tools for resolving conflicts, as they allow conflicting parties to discuss their interests, concerns and needs peacefully and respectfully. Through dialogue and negotiation, conflicting parties can reach a mutual understanding and find common ground, leading to a peaceful conflict resolution (Saunders, 2009). This approach requires a structured process that involves identifying the parties to the conflict, establishing common ground, and exploring possible solutions. In Uganda, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) has been instrumental in resolving land conflicts in northern Uganda. Through its interfaith approach, ARLPI brought communities and leaders from different religions together to dialogue and find solutions to land conflicts. In the context of land conflicts, promoting dialogue and negotiation can be particularly effective. For example, in Kenya, the National Land Commission (NLC) has been promoting dialogue and negotiation to resolve land disputes. The NLC brings together all parties involved in a land dispute, including the local community, government officials, and investors, to discuss the issue and find a mutually acceptable solution. Through this process, the NLC has resolved many land disputes peacefully and sustainably, reducing the risk of violence and promoting sustainable development. Another example of promoting dialogue and negotiation to resolve land conflicts in Africa is Liberia’s Land Conflict Resolution Program (LCRP). The LCRP brings together communities, government officials, and investors to discuss land issues and develop solutions through dialogue and negotiation. The program successfully resolved many land disputes, promoted peaceful coexistence, and enabled sustainable development in Liberia. In addition to resolving land conflicts, promoting dialogue and negotiation can also help prevent conflicts from occurring in the first place (Moore, 2014). Creating a platform for dialogue and discussion can identify and address potential conflicts before they escalate into full-blown conflicts. This proactive approach to conflict prevention is important to peacebuilding and sustainable development in Africa. To promote dialogue and negotiation to resolve land conflicts and build peace in Africa, there is a need for strong political will, effective conflict resolution mechanisms, and an enabling environment that encourages the participation of all stakeholders. Civil society organisations, community leaders, and religious groups can also play an important role in promoting dialogue and negotiation and creating an environment of peace and cooperation (Zanker, 2014). Strengthening institutions Strengthening institutions is another important approach to land conflict resolution and peacebuilding for sustainable development in Africa (Issifu, 2016). Institutions are critical in land management, administration, and dispute resolution (Bhanye et al., 2023). Weak or ineffective institutions can exacerbate conflicts and undermine peacebuilding efforts, while strong and effective institutions can contribute to sustainable development and peace. The capacity of institutions such as courts, land registries, and local governments should be strengthened to manage land conflicts effectively. This involves equipping these institutions with the necessary skills, resources, and technology to manage disputes and enforce the law. In Rwanda, the government established the Land Tenure Regularisation Program (LTRP), which seeks to improve land governance and management by establishing a comprehensive land registry. One way to strengthen institutions is to ensure they have the legal and regulatory frameworks to operate effectively (Bryson, 2018). This includes laws and regulations that define the roles and responsibilities of institutions in land management, administration, and dispute resolution. These frameworks should be clear, transparent, and enforceable to ensure institutions operate fairly and effectively. In addition, institutions must have the necessary resources and capacity to carry out their functions effectively. This includes sufficient funding, trained personnel, and appropriate technology and infrastructure. When institutions are well-resourced and have the necessary capacity, they can better manage land conflicts and promote peacebuilding. Another way to strengthen institutions is to promote collaboration and coordination between different institutions involved in land management and conflict resolution. This can include government agencies, civil society organisations, and traditional leaders. Collaboration and coordination can help to ensure that different institutions work together to address land conflicts and promote sustainable development. One example of strengthening institutions for land conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa is the Land Policy Initiative (LPI), launched in 2006 by the African Union Commission, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the African Development Bank. The LPI aims to strengthen institutions and promote sustainable land management in Africa by providing policy advice and technical assistance to governments and other stakeholders. Empowering local communities Empowering local communities is a crucial component of a comprehensive approach to land conflict resolution and peacebuilding for sustainable development in Africa (Akande, Kaye, & Rukuni, 2021). Land conflicts often arise due to power imbalances and the marginalisation of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and Indigenous people (Bob, 2010). In other instances, land conflicts arise due to the marginalisation of local communities from the decision-making processes that affect their land and resources (Castro & Nielsen, 2001). Empowering local communities through capacity building, raising awareness, and participation in decision-making processes can help address these power imbalances and prevent land conflicts (Allen, 2006). In Namibia, the Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF) has been instrumental in empowering local communities through its community-based natural resource management approach. This approach helped reduce land conflicts by involving communities in managing natural resources. One way to empower local communities is to recognise and protect customary land tenure systems (Syn, 2014). In many African countries, customary land tenure is the primary means of land management and resource allocation in rural areas. However, these systems are often unrecognised by formal legal frameworks, leading to conflicts when outsiders seek to exploit the resources, or the government attempts to allocate the land for development. Recognising customary land tenure systems and integrating them into formal legal frameworks gives local communities greater control over their land and resources, leading to more sustainable and peaceful outcomes (Toulmin, 2009). Another way to empower local communities is through providing legal and technical assistance (Walker, Roberts, Jones III & Fröhling, 2008). Many local communities lack the resources and knowledge to effectively advocate for their rights or to engage in complex negotiations with external actors. Therefore, providing legal and technical assistance can help to level the playing field and enable local communities to participate more effectively in decision-making processes. This can be done through training on negotiation and conflict resolution skills and legal support to help communities protect their land rights. Finally, empowering local communities requires the provision of opportunities for meaningful participation in decision-making processes (Ahmad & Talib, 2015). This can include creating mechanisms for community consultation and involvement in developing policies and projects that affect their land and resources. It can also include ensuring that local communities have access to the information they need to make informed decisions and to hold decision-makers accountable. Examples of successful community empowerment initiatives can be found across Africa. In Ghana, the Community Resource Management Areas (CREMAs) program empowered local communities to manage their resources and to participate in decision-making processes related to land and natural resource management (Murray, 2019). In Tanzania, the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (HAKIARDHI) provided legal support to local communities to help them defend their land rights. It advocated for recognising customary land tenure systems (Massay, 2020). These examples demonstrate that empowering local communities can be a powerful means of resolving land conflicts, promoting peacebuilding, and achieving sustainable development in Africa. Addressing underlying issues Land conflicts are often a symptom of underlying issues such as poverty, inequality, and exclusion (Perdesen, 2002). Addressing underlying issues is crucial in resolving land conflicts and promoting sustainable development and peacebuilding in Africa. The underlying issues are often complex and deeply rooted in historical, cultural, economic, and political factors. Failure to address these issues can result in temporary and ineffective solutions to land conflicts (Palmer et al., 2009). Addressing these underlying causes requires a holistic approach. This involves providing social services such as education, healthcare and infrastructure to marginalised communities. In Ghana, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme provides cash transfers to vulnerable households to improve their livelihoods and reduce poverty. One of the main underlying issues contributing to land conflicts in Africa is the issue of land tenure (Lund et al., 2006). Many African countries lack clear and well-defined land tenure systems, often leading to overlapping claims and disputes over land ownership. This problem is particularly acute in rural areas where customary land tenure systems are prevalent. To address this issue, clear and well-defined land tenure systems must be developed that consider the needs and rights of local communities. Another underlying issue is the unequal distribution of resources and economic opportunities (Corak, 2013). Land is a valuable resource, essential for local communities’ livelihoods. The unequal distribution of land and other resources can lead to conflict between different groups, particularly when access to resources is linked to political power and patronage. To address this issue, there is a need for policies and programs that promote equitable distribution of resources and economic opportunities, particularly in rural areas. Political instability and weak governance also contribute to land conflicts in Africa (Mackatian, 2014). In many African countries, political instability and weak governance have resulted in the failure of the state to enforce laws and regulations related to land use and ownership. This led to the emergence of informal and often violent mechanisms for resolving land disputes. There is a need to establish strong and effective governance systems capable of enforcing laws and regulations related to land use and ownership to address this issue. The issue of ethnicity and identity also contributes to land conflicts in Africa (Robinson, 2014). Land is often associated with ethnic identity, and disputes over land ownership can easily escalate into inter-ethnic conflicts (Kweyu, 2022). To address this issue, inclusive governance systems that recognise and accommodate different groups’ diverse identities and interests need to be promoted. Contextual Analysis in Land Conflict Resolution The application of the comprehensive and integrated approach should consider the specific drivers of land conflicts across cases, for example, in Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, among other African nations. Each presents unique challenges and opportunities for peacebuilding and sustainable development, calling for the importance of tailored strategies that reflect the diverse socio-political landscapes of the continent. For example, the conflict involving the Maasai people highlights tensions between traditional pastoralist rights, conservation efforts, and agricultural expansion. An effective resolution would legally recognise pastoralist routes that coexist with conservation and agriculture, mediated through community-led dialogues. This ensures all stakeholders, including Indigenous communities and commercial interests, have a voice in shaping land use practices that respect cultural traditions while promoting economic development. The struggle of the Ogoni people in Tanzania against multinational oil exploitation underscores the necessity for frameworks that prioritise environmental justice and corporate accountability. This includes enforcing regulations that protect local ecosystems and ensure that communities affected by resource extraction activities have a significant role in resource management decisions, thereby preventing conflicts and fostering sustainable development. In Zimbabwe, the historical injustices stemming from the land redistribution policies necessitate a reconciliation approach incorporating historical grievances and current governance needs. This should aim at equitable land distribution through transparent processes that reconcile the need for redress and the imperative for economic stability and productivity. The displacement of Indigenous communities by government-led development projects in regions like the Omo Valley in Ethiopia calls for development approaches that include community consent and benefit-sharing agreements. Such measures would ensure that development projects do not exacerbate existing land conflicts but rather contribute to community welfare and national development goals. Comparatively, these cases demonstrate that despite their differing origins, common themes such as the need for legal reform, community empowerment, and inclusive dialogue are crucial. These elements should be integral to a unified framework for addressing land conflicts. This approach emphasises governance structures adaptable to specific historical, cultural, and political contexts, ensuring relevance and efficacy in conflict resolution strategies. Conclusion and Recommendations In conclusion, this chapter highlighted the critical role that land plays in shaping peace and development in Africa and the complex and diverse nature of land conflicts on the continent. These conflicts are often driven by various factors, including historical injustices, population growth, climate change, and competition for resources, making them increasingly difficult to address. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the need for a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to land governance and management, which considers the interplay between land, conflict, and development. Such an approach requires the engagement of various actors and institutions, including governments, civil society, traditional leaders, and the private sector, and integrating multiple policy domains, such as land tenure, agriculture, and environmental management. Through case studies and examples from across the continent, this paper highlighted the potential of peacebuilding and sustainable development approaches to address land conflicts in Africa. These approaches require a focus on conflict prevention through the promotion of inclusive land governance and management systems grounded in social justice, equity, and human rights, and they must consider the diverse needs and perspectives of all stakeholders. This paper revealed that addressing land conflicts in Africa requires a more comprehensive and sustainable approach that integrates various policy domains and engages multiple actors and institutions. Based on the analysis presented in this chapter, the following recommendations (Table 12.1) are offered for addressing land conflicts and promoting sustainable development in Africa. Table 12 .1: Recommendations for Addressing Land Conflicts and Promoting Sustainable Development in Africa

Recommendation	Explanation
Engage multiple stakeholders	Effective land governance and management require the engagement of multiple stakeholders, including governments, civil society, traditional leaders, and the private sector. Building inclusive and participatory platforms for dialogue and collaboration is crucial, where all stakeholders’ diverse needs and perspectives are considered.
Recommendation	Explanation
Foster conflict prevention	Preventing land conflicts is more cost-effective and sustainable than resolving them. It is essential to promote conflict prevention through the promotion of inclusive land governance and management systems grounded in social justice, equity, and human rights, taking into account the diverse needs and perspectives of all stakeholders.
Address historical injustices	Historical injustices such as land dispossession and marginalisation significantly drive land conflicts in Africa. Therefore, it is essential to address these injustices through land restitution and compensation processes, and to ensure that the rights of marginalised groups, such as women, youth, and Indigenous communities, are protected and respected.
Promote sustainable land use	Promoting sustainable land use practices is critical to ensuring that land is used to support development while preserving its ecological integrity. This requires promoting sustainable agriculture, forestry, and environmental management practices that enhance soil fertility, reduce land degradation, and increase the resilience of land systems to climate change.
Strengthen institutional capacities	Strengthening institutional capacities is critical to ensuring effective land governance and management. This includes strengthening the capacities of government agencies responsible for land management, as well as building the capacities of civil society and traditional leaders to engage in dialogue, advocacy, and conflict resolution.
Promote regional cooperation	Land conflicts in Africa are often transboundary in nature and require a regional approach to address. It is therefore crucial to promote regional cooperation and collaboration in addressing land conflicts and promoting sustainable land use practices.

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Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Abraham Rajab Matamanda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Johannes Bhanye

African Climate and Development Initiative University of Cape Town

Cape Town, Couth Africa Ruvimbo Shayamunda

Department of Urban and Regional Planning University of the Free State

Bloemfontein, South Africa Abstract African cities are experiencing significant food insecurities attributed to multiple factors, for example, climate change, civil war, the recent COVID-19 pandemic, and disjointed food value chain systems. The situation is especially critical among the urban poor, who are disproportionately marginalised in accessing food and markets due to financial constraints, locational discrimination and perpetuated segregation from urban food systems inherited from colonial times. This chapter examines the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food security in Africa. Through a comprehensive desktop review, the chapter analyses the current food security situation, factors contributing to food insecurity in urban areas, and the impacts on urban populations. The chapter also explores the concept and principles of land use planning, presents successful case studies, and identifies implementation challenges. It provides policy implications and recommendations for improving land use planning and suggests strategies for enhancing urban food security. The findings emphasise the importance of integrating food security into planning decisions, promoting participatory approaches, and fostering stakeholder collaboration. This study also acknowledges the significance of food sovereignty, advocating for community-centred approaches that enhance local control over food systems and reinforce resilience in urban food security post-COVID-19. Acknowledging the limitations of secondary data, we suggest directions for future research, emphasising primary data collection and comparative international studies to enrich understanding and application in different urban contexts. Introduction Food security is a fundamental concern in Africa, where a significant portion of the population faces persistent challenges in accessing adequate and nutritious food (Umarjonovna & Gulomjonovna, 2022). Rapid urbanisation, population growth, and climate change have further exacerbated food security issues in urban areas across the continent (Campbell, Vermeulen, Aggarwal, Corner-Dolloff, Girvetz, Loboguerrero, Ramirez-Villegas, Rosenstock, Sebastian, Thornton & Wollenberg, 2016; Ruel, Garrett, Yosef & Olivier, 2017). As urban populations continue to expand, ensuring access to sufficient and nutritious food becomes increasingly crucial for the well-being and development of these communities. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a framework highlighting the significance of addressing the challenge of urban food insecurity. SDG 1 aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and recognise the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food systems; SDG 2 focuses on ending hunger and achieving food security; SDG 11 aims to create sustainable and inclusive cities, emphasising the need for urban populations to have consistent access to safe and nutritious food; SDG 12 promotes responsible consumption and production, emphasising sustainable agricultural practices and reducing food waste; while SDG 13 calls for urgent action on climate change, highlighting the vulnerability of African cities and the importance of integrating food security measures into urban planning. Consequently, understanding the state of food security in cities and the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food security has gained significant attention among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners. Food security in African urban areas is a pressing issue that demands immediate attention (Bhanye, 2023). Urbanisation results in significant changes in land use patterns, including converting agricultural land into residential, commercial, and industrial areas (Ruel et al., 2017). Such transformations have far-reaching implications for the availability and accessibility of food in urban settings. The rapid urban expansion, often unplanned and haphazard, has led to the loss of agricultural land, increased food prices, and limited access to fresh and nutritious food for urban residents. Multiple other factors also affect food insecurities in African cities, including climate change, civil war, the recent COVID-19 pandemic, and disjointed food value chain systems (Matamanda, Dunn, & Nel, 2022). Frayne, Crush and McLachlan (2014) outline that the African Food Urban Network (AFSUN) conducted a survey across 11 cities in southern African countries in 2008 and found that about 76% of households in low-income areas were moderately to severely food insecure. The marginalised seem to be the group that faces the challenge of accessing food and markets due to locational discrimination brought by segregated urban forms inherited from colonial times (Hermerijckx, Nakyagaba, Sseviiri, Janusz, Eichinger, Lwasa, May, Verburg, & Van Rompaey, 2023). Food security refers to the physical and economic provision of safe, nutritious, and adequate food at all times to all people for a productive and healthy life (Shushu, Swanepoel, & Mmbengwa, 2021). Food security encompasses the entire range of dimensions and their interlinked value-adding activities involved in availability, access, utilisation, and stability (Zwelendaba, 2021:34). There is an urgent need to explore the potential role of land use planning in addressing these challenges and strengthening urban food security in Africa. The primary objective of this chapter is to critically examine the role of land use planning in enhancing urban food security in Africa. To achieve this, the following research questions were addressed:

• What is the state of food security in Africa?

• What is the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food security?

• What policy recommendations can be derived from the findings to enhance African urban food security?

Understanding the nexus between land use planning and urban food security in Africa is crucial for designing effective interventions and policies to address urban populations’ persistent food security challenges. The study provides valuable insights into the potential strategies, approaches, and policy implications that can strengthen urban food security. The findings contribute to the knowledge on food security in Africa and offer practical recommendations for urban planners, policymakers, and practitioners to enhance food security outcomes in rapidly urbanising contexts. Literature Review Food systems is defined as a multifaceted framework ranging from production through to the consumption stage (Smit, 2016:1). The activities start from production, processing, distribution, and consumption, constituting the four main components of the food system (Ingram, 2011). Food is central to the health and well-being of all people residing in African cities (Battersby & Watson, 2018; Bhanye, 2024). However, it is unlikely for planning reforms and policy reviews to focus on food systems to enhance the state of food systems to attain the status of food security in African cities (Bhanye, Matooane, Matamanda, & Bhanye, 2024; Chigbu, Ntihinyurwa, de Vries, & Ngenzi, 2019). The studies show that most governments need to include food systems in their strategic planning processes in urban areas because they consider it a rural problem (Battersby, 2017; Crush, 2016; Raja, Morgan, & Hall, 2017). This calls for a sustainable food system in most African cities to ensure that people can steadily produce, process, distribute and consume food. The four components of food systems are outlined in Table 13.1, from production to consumption, to ensure food security in the urban environment. Table 13 .1: Components of Food Systems

Components	Explanation
Food Production	This involves the process of taking raw ingredients through to nutritious edible food for humans. This can be done from subsistence farming to commercial farming for sustainability in urban areas zoned for production and at home.
Food Processing	This means people have adequate income or other resources to access appropriate food domestically through home production, buying in local markets or as exchange, gifts, borrowing, or as food aid.
Food Distribution and Retailing	This is the important stage in food systems that addresses issues of moving the food from one place to another in an urban space, and marketing of such food for who and where people can access such food.
Food Consumption	This is the final stage where decisions about what to select through to preparation, eating, and digesting food come in. This should be easily accessible to everyone in an urban space.

Food security refers to when all individuals have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to consistently meet their dietary needs and food preferences for a healthy and active life (Smit, 2016:2). There are also determinants of food security, and this includes the household size, educational level, unemployment level, dependency ratio and climate shocks such as floods, landslides and drought (World Food Program [WFP], 2009). Webb, Coates, Frongillo, Rogers, Swindale and Bilinsky (2006) indicate a need to evaluate the state of all components of food security from the household level to determine the state of food security in African cities. These factors or components start from access, availability, utilisation, and stability within our communities (Saweda, 2011). Food security is a multidimensional concept encompassing the availability, accessibility, utilisation, and stability of food for individuals and communities (Bhanye et al., 2024). The key elements of food security are outlined in Table 13.2. Food security is often measured through indicators such as dietary diversity, caloric intake, and nutrition levels. In the African context, achieving food security poses unique challenges due to factors such as population growth, poverty, climate change, and limited access to resources. Table 13 .2: Key Elements of Food Security

Element	Explanation
Food availability	This means sufficient qualities of appropriate and quality food available from home-based production, commercial imports, food assistance, or food reserves on a consistent basis.
Food access	This means people have adequate income or other resources to access appropriate food domestically through home production, buying in local markets or as exchange, gifts, borrowing, or as food aid.
Food utilisation	This means people can use food properly through food storing and processing practices while having sufficient knowledge where they apply nutritional, health, sanitation, sociocultural as well as spiritual parameters to food.
Food stability	This means the availability of adequate food at all times, thus, certain that access and utilisation of appropriate food are not curtailed by any hindrance, shortages, or by emergencies, or crises.

Africa faces significant food security challenges, with a large proportion of the population experiencing chronic hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity (Bhanye, Shayamunda, Mpahlo, Matamanda & Kachena, 2023; Adeyeye, 2017). The continent’s vulnerability is exacerbated by factors such as climate change-induced droughts, conflicts, poor infrastructure, limited access to markets, and inadequate agricultural practices (Andenle, Wedig, & Azadi, 2019). Urban areas in Africa are particularly affected, as rapid urbanisation and population growth strain the capacity of cities to provide adequate food supplies and services (Satterthwaite, 2017). Urbanisation plays a crucial role in shaping food security dynamics in Africa. The rapid growth of cities leads to increased demand for food, putting pressure on existing agricultural systems (Chikanda, Crush, & Frayne, 2017). Urban areas rely heavily on food imports from rural areas or other countries, leading to supply chain disruptions and increased vulnerability to price shocks (Dodo, 2020). Urbanisation also brings about changes in dietary patterns, with a shift towards processed and less nutritious foods. Furthermore, land conversion for urban development reduces the availability of agricultural land and limits local food production (Huang, Ghazali, Azadi, Moghaddam, Viira, Janečková, Sklenička, Lopez-Carr, Köhl & Kurban, 2023). Scholarly research on the relationship between land use planning and African urban food security is limited but growing. Studies have highlighted the potential of land use planning as a tool for improving urban food security by promoting sustainable agriculture, protecting agricultural land, and ensuring equitable access to food resources (Henry, 2018; Diehl, Sweeney, Wong, Sia, Yao & Prabhudesai, 2020; Le Mouël, Lattre-Gasquest & Mora, 2018). Some scholars have explored specific aspects such as urban agriculture, peri-urban land use, zoning regulations, and the role of local governance in supporting urban food systems (Bhanye, 2024; de Visser, 2019). However, more empirical evidence and comprehensive analyses are needed to understand the effectiveness and limitations of land use planning interventions in addressing food security challenges in African cities (Meyfroidt, 2018). The literature review reveals the complex interplay between urbanisation, land use planning, and food security in Africa. It demonstrates the urgency of addressing food security issues in urban areas and highlights the potential of land use planning as a strategic approach to strengthen urban food security. Examining existing studies, the chapter bridges the gaps in knowledge and contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of land use planning in enhancing urban food security in Africa. Methodology This study employed a qualitative desktop review to synthesise existing literature on the role of land use planning in enhancing urban food security in Africa. We meticulously selected peer-reviewed articles, reports, and policy documents from Google Scholar, Scopus, and Web of Science databases. The inclusion criteria focused on works published within the last fifteen years, ensuring the relevance and timeliness of the data. Keywords like ‘urban food security,’ ‘land use planning,’ and ‘sustainable urban development’ guided our search. To manage the extensive volume of literature, we prioritised sources that directly addressed the intersections of urban planning, food systems, and policy impacts in African contexts. This approach facilitated a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter without delving into overly granular details. Our analysis distilled key themes and gaps in the current research landscape, supporting the development of informed policy recommendations. Limitations of this methodology include the reliance on secondary data, which may not capture the most recent on-the-ground impacts or unpublished policy innovations. Future research could enhance this study by incorporating primary data, such as expert interviews or case studies, to provide more direct insights into the effectiveness of land use planning in various urban contexts across Africa. The State of Food Security in Africa Overview of Current Food Security Situation in Africa Africa faces significant challenges in achieving food security, with a large portion of its population experiencing various levels of food insecurity (Frayne Moser & Ziervogel, 2012). The continent is characterised by a complex mix of factors that contribute to the precarious state of food security, including poverty, population growth, climate change, conflicts, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to resources (March & Failler, 2022:136; Widayanigsih & Barokkatuminalloh, 2011). Climate change can directly affect food security in African cities through consistent droughts, lack of rainfall, and floods that continuously affect the African region (Gitz & Meybeck, 2016). Understanding Africa’s current food security situation provides a crucial context for comprehending the urgency and importance of strengthening urban food security through land use planning interventions. Food insecurity remains pervasive in Africa, affecting millions of individuals and households. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as of the latest available data, approximately 250 million people in Africa (representing around 20% of the population) are undernourished. This high prevalence of undernourishment indicates a lack of access to sufficient and nutritious food, leading to malnutrition and negative health outcomes (Mirzabaev, Kerr, Hasegawa, Pradhan, Wreford, von der Pahlen & Gurney-Smith, 2023:2). Food insecurity in Africa exhibits significant regional disparities. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, is disproportionately affected, accounting for the majority of the continent’s food-insecure population (Militao Salvador, Uthman, Vinberg & Macassa, 2022). Within sub-Saharan Africa, countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan face severe food security challenges due to a combination of factors such as armed conflicts, political instability, and environmental degradation (Kah, 2017). Africa’s agricultural sector is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including erratic rainfall patterns, droughts, floods, and heat waves (Kogo, Kumar & Koech, 2021). These climatic disruptions often result in reduced agricultural productivity, crop failures, livestock losses, and increased food prices. Smallholder farmers, who constitute a significant portion of the population, are particularly vulnerable to these climate-related risks, as they rely heavily on rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods (Connolly-Boutin & Smit, 2015). Africa’s population is growing rapidly, further straining the continent’s ability to ensure food security. The United Nations projects that Africa’s population will double by 2050, reaching over 2 billion people (United Nations, 2014). This population growth and rapid urbanisation place immense pressure on food systems and pose unique challenges for urban areas (Frayne, Crush & McLachlan, 2014:102). The great influx of people tends to cripple the already limited resources in most African cities, leaving most people food insecure. As more people move to cities, urban food demand increases, requiring robust systems for food production, distribution, and access (Güneralp, Lwasa, Masundire, Parnell & Seto, 2017). Many African countries rely on food imports to meet their domestic consumption needs. However, this dependence on imports makes African nations vulnerable to global food price fluctuations, currency exchange rates, and trade disruptions. Limited domestic production and inefficient supply chains contribute to the reliance on imports, undermining food security and increasing the risk of food shortages in times of crisis. Table 13.3 summarises the current food security situation in Africa. Table 13 .3: Summary of the Current food Security Situation in Africa

Aspect	Explanation
Rapid Population Growth	Africa has one of the fastest-growing populations globally. The increasing demand for food places pressure on agricultural systems to produce more food, exacerbating existing challenges.
Aspect	Explanation
Hunger and Undernourishment	Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest prevalence of hunger and undernourishment globally. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 2020, nearly 246 million people in Africa suffered from chronic undernourishment.
Climate Change:	Africa is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including droughts, floods, and unpredictable weather patterns. These events can lead to reduced agricultural productivity, livestock losses, and increased food insecurity.
Poverty and Economic Challenges	High poverty rates and economic instability contribute to food insecurity. Limited access to resources, such as land, credit, and technology, hinders agricultural productivity and the ability of people to secure sufficient food.
Conflicts and Instability	Ongoing conflicts and political instability in some regions in Africa disrupt agricultural activities, displace communities, and hinder food production and distribution.
Agriculture and Infrastructure	Agricultural practices in many African countries are often characterised by low productivity due to outdated farming techniques, lack of access to modern inputs, limited infrastructure for irrigation and transportation, and inadequate storage facilities. These factors contribute to post-harvest losses and limit the potential for food production.

Factors Contributing to Food Insecurity in Urban Areas A range of interconnected factors influences food insecurity in African urban areas. While urban environments typically offer better economic opportunities and access to services than rural areas, they also present unique challenges contributing to food insecurity (Sisha, 2020). Understanding these factors is essential for developing targeted interventions to address urban food security issues. Figure 13.1 depicts the factors contributing to food insecurity in African urban areas.

Figure 13 .1: Factors contributing to food insecurity in African urban areas Rapid Urbanisation and Land Use Changes The rapid expansion of cities in Africa often occurs without proper land use planning, resulting in the conversion of agricultural land into residential, commercial, and industrial areas (Musosa, Shekede, Gwitira, Chirisa, Tevera & Matamanda, 2022). This phenomenon reduces the availability of cultivable land within urban boundaries, leading to decreased local food production and increased dependence on external food sources. Land use changes also disrupt traditional food supply chains and contribute to the loss of peri-urban agriculture, exacerbating food insecurity in urban areas (Bersamin, Loring, Johnson & Tholl, 2018). Limited Agricultural Opportunities Urban areas typically offer limited opportunities for agriculture due to space constraints, high land costs, and zoning regulations prioritising non-agricultural uses (Jayne, Chamberlin, Holden, Ghebru, Ricker-Gilbert & Place, 2021). This lack of agricultural opportunities restricts the ability of urban dwellers to produce their food or engage in urban farming activities (Matamanda, Mandebvu-Chaora & Rammile, 2022). Consequently, urban residents rely heavily on food purchased from markets, making them vulnerable to price fluctuations and disruptions in the supply chain. Poverty and Inequality Urban poverty and income inequality significantly exacerbate food insecurity in African cities (Odunitan-Wayas, Alaba, & Lambert, 2021). Many urban dwellers, particularly those in low-income communities, face economic challenges that hinder their ability to access nutritious food consistently. Limited financial resources, inadequate employment opportunities, and low wages make it difficult for urban residents to afford a balanced and diverse diet, leading to malnutrition and food insecurity (Zandi, Rehan, Hye, Mubeen, & Abbas, 2022). Informal Food Systems Informal food systems, including street vendors, informal markets, and small-scale food enterprises, are prevalent in African cities and serve as vital food sources for urban populations (Giroux et al., 2021). However, these informal systems often lack regulation, quality control, and proper infrastructure, compromising food safety and undermining efforts to ensure access to nutritious food (Skinner & Watson, 2021). Informal food systems also face challenges related to licensing, hygiene standards, and limited access to credit and resources, affecting their ability to provide reliable and affordable food options. Limited Access to Services and Infrastructure Inadequate access to essential services and infrastructure, such as clean water, sanitation facilities, and reliable energy sources, can impact food security in urban areas (Sisha, 2020). Insufficient access to clean water for irrigation, poor sanitation practices, and unreliable energy sources for food preservation can limit the production, storage, and availability of safe and nutritious food in urban environments (Chikozho, Managa & Dabata, 2020). Additionally, limited transportation infrastructure can impede the efficient distribution of food, resulting in unequal access to affordable food options across different neighbourhoods (Du, Xu, Zhou, Li, Fu, Tang, Wang, Peng, Xu & Du, 2020). Impacts of Food Insecurity on Urban Populations Food insecurity in African urban spaces profoundly impacts the well-being and livelihoods of urban populations. These impacts span various dimensions, including physical health, economic stability, social cohesion, and overall urban development. Table 13.4 presents the impacts of food insecurity on urban populations. Table 13 .4: Impacts of Food Insecurity on Urban Population

Impact	Explanation
Nutritional Health	Food insecurity in urban areas often leads to inadequate dietary intake and poor nutrition, resulting in various health problems. Insufficient access to nutritious food can lead to malnutrition, stunted growth, micronutrient deficiencies, and increased susceptibility to diseases (Drysdale, Bob & Moshabela, 2021). Urban residents’ lack of diverse and balanced diets can contribute to the prevalence of obesity, overweight, and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disorders (Battersby & Oni, 2019). The negative impact on nutritional health affects individual well-being, burdens healthcare systems, and undermines human capital development.
Impact	Explanation
Economic Productivity and Stability	Food insecurity in urban areas hampers economic productivity and stability (Garcia-Diez, 2021). When individuals and households experience food shortages or lack access to nutritious food, their physical and cognitive abilities are compromised, reducing productivity in work, education, and daily activities (Drammeh, Hamid & Rohana, 2019). Poor nutrition can also contribute to increased absenteeism, decreased work performance, and lower income-earning potential, perpetuating the cycle of poverty and limiting economic development in urban areas (Moradi, Mirzababaei, Dadfarma, Rezaei, Mohammadi, Jannat, & Mirzaei, 2019).
Social Implications	Food insecurity in urban areas can have social implications, including increased social inequalities and social unrest (Cherol, Ferreira & Salles-Costa, 2021). Limited access to food resources disproportionately affects vulnerable populations, exacerbating existing social disparities. Inadequate food access can also undermine social cohesion and contribute to social tensions, as competition for scarce resources may lead to conflicts and social unrest within urban communities (Pollard & Booth, 2019). Moreover, the stress and anxiety associated with food insecurity can negatively impact mental health and overall well-being, further straining social dynamics in urban areas.
Urban Development and Resilience	Food insecurity undermines urban areas’ overall development and resilience (Jensen & Orfilla, 2021). When urban populations lack access to sufficient and nutritious food, their ability to thrive and contribute to urban development is compromised (Gunilla & Olsson, 2018). The impacts of food insecurity can be particularly detrimental in times of crisis, such as natural disasters or health emergencies when access to food becomes even more challenging (Kianersi, Jules, Zhang, Luetke & Rosenberg, 2021). Building resilient urban food systems that ensure food security contributes to cities’ overall resilience and sustainability, enhancing their capacity to withstand shocks and stresses.

The Role of Land Use Planning in Strengthening Urban Food Security Concept and Principles of Land Use Planning Land use planning is a systematic and proactive process that guides allocating, utilising, and managing land resources within a defined geographic area (Metternicht, 2017). It involves deciding how land should be used for different purposes, such as residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and public spaces (Denoon-Stevens & Nel, 2020). Land use planning is rooted in the idea of achieving sustainable and balanced development while considering the needs and aspirations of present and future generations (Henry, Murphy & Cowie, 2018). Figure 13.2 depicts key principles of land use planning.

Figure 13 .2: Key principles of land use planning One of the key principles of land use planning is the emphasis on comprehensive approaches that consider various land uses and their interactions. This approach balances different land uses to promote efficient resource utilisation, reduce conflicts, and maximise the benefits derived from land. The holistic approach ensures that the land is used to support economic development, environmental conservation, social well-being, and cultural values (Domingo, Palka & Hersperger, 2021). Another key principle of land use planning is spatial organisation. It involves systematically arranging different land uses to optimise land utilisation, minimise conflicts, and create functional and well-designed urban environments (Metternicht, 2018). Through designating specific zones or areas for different purposes, such as residential, commercial, and agricultural, land use planning ensures the orderly development of cities and facilitates the provision of essential services and infrastructure. Land use planning also takes a long-term perspective, considering a community or region’s future needs and aspirations (Tsoraeva, Mezhyan, Kataeva, Hugaeva, & Rogova, 2020). It involves forecasting population growth, economic trends, and environmental changes to guide land use decisions that sustainably accommodate future demands (Roy, Pal, Chakrabortty, Chowdhuri, Malik & Das, 2020). Anticipating future scenarios, land use planning helps avoid ad hoc development, sprawl, and inefficient land use patterns that can hinder sustainable development and exacerbate food security challenges. Effective land use planning also encourages active engagement and participation of stakeholders, including residents, community organisations, businesses, and government agencies (Kariuki, Munishi, Courtney-Mustaphi, Capitani, Shoemaker, Lane & Marchant, 2021). Stakeholder engagement ensures that diverse perspectives, local knowledge, and aspirations are considered in decision-making (Darvill & Lindo, 2016). This participatory approach helps build consensus, increase transparency, and create a sense of ownership and responsibility among stakeholders, ultimately leading to more inclusive and sustainable land use decisions (Poku-Boansi, 2021). Land use planning also promotes environmental sustainability by considering the ecological integrity of the land and its natural resources (Pacheco, 2020). It aims to minimise environmental impacts, conserve biodiversity, protect sensitive ecosystems, and promote sustainable land management practices. Incorporating principles of ecological design, conservation, and resource efficiency, land use planning can contribute to mitigating climate change, preserving natural habitats, and enhancing the resilience of urban ecosystems (Shingirai & Happy, 2017). Furthermore, land use planning seeks to achieve social equity and inclusivity by ensuring that land resources are allocated and utilised fairly and equitably (Meerow, Pajouhesh & Miller, 2019). It involves addressing social justice issues, access to basic services, and providing affordable housing, public spaces, and amenities for all members of society (Zhao, 2016). Considering the needs of marginalised communities, vulnerable groups, and future generations, land use planning can help create more equitable and inclusive urban environments. Finally, land use planning recognises the dynamic nature of urban development and the need for adaptive management. It involves continuous monitoring, evaluating, and adapting land use plans and policies to respond to changing circumstances, emerging challenges, and evolving community needs (Chen & Olden, 2020). Adopting a flexible and adaptive approach, land use planning can accommodate new knowledge, technologies, and innovations, allowing for the ongoing optimisation of land use patterns to strengthen urban food security. Linking Land Use Planning and Food Security Land use planning is crucial in strengthening urban food security by guiding the allocation and management of land resources in urban areas (Diehl et al., 2020). It involves making strategic decisions about the use of land for various purposes, including agriculture, residential, commercial, and industrial activities (Metternicht, 2017:5). Linking land use planning with food security entails recognising the importance of integrating food production, distribution, and access considerations into urban planning processes (Zerriffi, Reyes & Maloney, 2023). It involves recognising the interdependence between land use decisions and the availability, accessibility, and stability of food in urban areas. This integration allows for the development of sustainable and resilient urban food systems that can meet the nutritional needs of urban populations. The key aspects of how land use planning can strengthen urban food security are discussed below. Optimal Use of Land Land use planning ensures the optimal allocation of land resources, considering the competing demands for various land uses (Morales & de Vries, 2021). Land use planning can support local food production and reduce dependence on external food sources by designating suitable areas for agriculture within urban or peri-urban zones. This approach maximises the use of available land, enables efficient food production systems, and enhances the self-sufficiency of urban areas in meeting their food needs (Steenkamp, Cilliers, Cillers & Lategan, 2021). Land use planning employs zoning and regulatory measures to support food security objectives. This includes designating land for agricultural use, establishing buffer zones to protect agricultural land from encroachment, and ensuring appropriate zoning regulations for food retail and distribution. Land use planning can play a significant role in advocating for food security by improving sustainable food systems to ensure food security in African cities (Chigbu et al., 2019; Mwambo, Fürst, Nyarko, Borgemeister, & Martius, 2020). This can be achieved by drawing land use plans that restrict encroachment on agricultural land, which is prominent in African cities due to the high rate of urbanisation (Hermerijckx, 2023). Land use plans can advocate for urban agriculture and include special zoning for food production in urban areas to encourage urban dwellers to take part in food production. Preservation of Agricultural Land Effective land use planning recognises the importance of preserving agricultural land from conversion to non-agricultural uses (Kassis, Bertrand & Pecqueur, 2021). Urbanisation often leads to the conversion of fertile agricultural land into built-up areas, resulting in a loss of local food production capacity. Land use planning strategies can include policies and regulations to protect agricultural land from urban encroachment, ensuring its long-term availability for food production (Samiullah, Rahman, & Mahmood, 2019). This preservation of agricultural land supports urban food security by maintaining local food production potential. Land use planning can actively promote and support urban agriculture initiatives to enhance food security in cities (Smit, 2016:84). Urban agriculture encompasses a range of practices, including rooftop gardens, community gardens, vertical farming, and aquaponics. By incorporating provisions for urban agriculture in land use plans, such as allocating space, providing infrastructure support, and addressing zoning regulations, cities can produce fresh and nutritious food within their boundaries (Amusan, 2018:158). Urban agriculture not only contributes to food security but also offers additional benefits such as improved nutrition, job creation, and community engagement. Enhancing Food Distribution and Access Land use planning can facilitate the development of efficient food distribution networks and improve access to nutritious food within urban areas. Strategically locating food markets, retail outlets and community food centres, land use planning can ensure equitable access to fresh produce and essential food items (Diehl et al., 2020). Planning for transportation infrastructure, such as roads and public transportation systems, can also enhance the efficiency of food supply chains, reducing food losses and improving access to food for all urban residents, including those in underserved neighbourhoods (Yacamán Ochoa, Ferrer Jiménez & Mata Olmo, 2020). Integration of Food Security Goals Linking land use planning with food security involves integrating food security goals, objectives, and indicators into urban planning frameworks (Flippini, Mazzocchi & Corsi, 2019). This integration requires collaboration among stakeholders, including urban planners, policymakers, agricultural experts, and community representatives (Degarege & Lovelock, 2019). Land use planning facilitates spatial integration by strategically locating food-related infrastructure and activities within urban areas. This includes designating areas for agricultural production, food processing facilities, wholesale and retail markets, and community gardens. Land use planning can promote mixed-use development, integrating various land uses within a compact urban footprint (Raman & Roy, 2019). Opportunities for urban agriculture, community gardens, and localised food production are created by encouraging a mix of residential, commercial, and agricultural activities. This approach reduces the need for long-distance food transportation, supports local economies, and fosters a sense of community engagement and food sovereignty (Ayambire, Amponsah, Peprah & Takyi, 2019). When food security considerations are incorporated into land use planning processes, cities can prioritise actions that support local food production, enhance food access, and promote sustainable food systems. Climate Resilience Land use planning can incorporate climate resilience strategies to enhance urban food security in the face of climate change (Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007). This includes considering climate-smart agricultural practices, promoting sustainable land management techniques, and prioritising the preservation of green spaces and natural ecosystems (Stevens & Senbel, 2017). By integrating climate resilience into land use planning, cities can mitigate the impacts of climate change on food production, protect agricultural land, and ensure the long-term sustainability of urban food systems. Collaboration and Stakeholder Engagement Effective land use planning for food security requires collaboration and stakeholder engagement. This involves engaging with various actors, including local communities, farmers, food retailers, policymakers, and civil society organisations (Fisher, Workman, Mulyana, Institute, Moeliono, Yuliani, Colfer & Adam, 2020). When diverse stakeholders are involved, land use planning processes can incorporate local knowledge and community needs and ensure the inclusivity of food security interventions. Collaborative approaches foster ownership, build partnerships and facilitate the implementation of context-specific and culturally appropriate strategies. The linkage between land use planning and food security highlights the importance of considering food-related aspects in urban planning decisions. By recognising the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food security, cities can take proactive measures to create sustainable, inclusive, and resilient food systems that ensure the availability, accessibility, and affordability of nutritious food for all urban residents. Case Studies of Successful Land Use Planning Strategies for Urban Food Security Several case studies and examples demonstrate the successful implementation of land use planning strategies that have strengthened urban food security. These examples highlight innovative approaches, effective policies, and collaborative efforts in integrating food-related considerations into urban planning processes. Box 1 shows some noteworthy case studies showcasing successful land use planning strategies that have strengthened urban food security.

Box 1: Case Studies Showcasing Successful Land Use Planning Strategies that have Strengthened Urban Food Security Vancouver, Canada - Urban Agriculture Zoning: Vancouver implemented a zoning bylaw that designates specific areas for urban agriculture, such as community gardens, market gardens, and rooftop gardens. The city’s land use planning policies promoted the integration of food production into urban areas, ensuring that residents have access to locally grown food. The urban agriculture zoning facilitated the establishment of numerous community gardens and commercial urban farms, fostering food self-sufficiency, community engagement, and ecological sustainability. Detroit, United States - Urban Farming and Land Reuse: Detroit faced significant urban decline and vacant land challenges. However, the city leveraged land use planning strategies to support urban farming and transform vacant lots into productive agricultural spaces. Through initiatives like the Detroit Future City Strategic Framework, the city encouraged the establishment of urban farms, community gardens, and food forests. These efforts improved residents’ food access and contributed to economic revitalisation, job creation, and community empowerment.

Malmö, Sweden - Agroecology and Sustainable Land Use: Malmö embraced agroecological principles in land use planning to enhance urban food security (Bibri & Krogstie, 2020). The city implemented policies that promote sustainable and resource-efficient agriculture, including organic farming, urban permaculture, and hydroponic systems (de Vries, 2020). Through integrating food production into urban spaces, Malmö reduced food miles, improved access to fresh and locally grown food, and fostered a sense of food sovereignty and environmental stewardship.

Rosario, Argentina - Urban Agriculture and Participatory Planning: Rosario prioritised urban agriculture as a key component of land use planning to enhance food security and community well-being (Dubbling, Bracalenti & Lagorio, 2009). The city established a comprehensive urban agriculture program that includes the provision of land, technical support, and training for urban farmers. Through participatory planning processes, Rosario engaged residents in land use and agricultural practices decision-making, ensuring that local knowledge and needs are integrated into urban planning policies (Spiaggi, 2010). The city’s efforts resulted in increased food production, improved access to fresh produce, and strengthened social cohesion. Johannesburg, South Africa - Food Sensitive Planning: Johannesburg embraced food-sensitive planning strategies to address food insecurity and promote sustainable urban development (Haysom, 2021). The city integrated food security considerations into its spatial development framework, land use policies, and development plans (de Visser, 2019). Johannesburg established urban agriculture hubs, food markets, and community food centers in underserved areas, promoting food access, job creation, and community resilience. The city’s approach emphasises partnerships with local stakeholders, including community-based organisations and farmers, to ensure the success and sustainability of food-related initiatives.

These case studies demonstrate that successful land use planning strategies for food security involve a combination of supportive policies, community engagement, and innovative approaches. Through integrating food-related considerations into urban planning processes, cities can create sustainable and resilient food systems that enhance food access, support local food production, and improve the well-being of urban populations. The following table provides a comparative overview of selected case studies to further illustrate the diverse, innovative and localised strategies employed by various African cities to integrate land use planning with urban food security initiatives. Each case study demonstrates unique approaches tailored to the city’s specific urban and socio-economic contexts, highlighting how localised strategies can effectively address the challenges of urban food insecurity. Table 13.5 summarises the initiatives, their key benefits, and the scholarly references supporting the descriptions provided. This comparative framework allows for a clearer understanding of the potential impacts of these initiatives. It offers insights into best practices that can be adapted by other urban areas facing similar challenges. Challenges and Limitations of Implementing Land Use Planning for Food Security While land use planning can be crucial in strengthening urban food security, several challenges and limitations must be considered. These challenges arise from various factors, including institutional barriers, resource constraints, conflicting priorities, and complex urban dynamics. Understanding and addressing these challenges is essential for successfully implementing land use planning strategies for food security. Box 2 summarises some of the key challenges and limitations of implementing land use planning for food security.

Box 2: Challenges and limitations of implementing land use planning for food security Limited Institutional Capacity: Many cities lack the necessary institutional capacity and expertise to effectively integrate food security considerations into land use planning processes. The absence of dedicated departments or units focused on food-related issues can hinder the coordination, collaboration, and implementation of food-sensitive planning policies. Strengthening institutional capacity through training programs, knowledge exchange, and the establishment of cross-sectoral partnerships is crucial for overcoming this limitation. Conflicting Land Use Priorities: Urban areas face competing demands for land, such as housing, industrial development, infrastructure, and open spaces. Balancing these competing priorities with food production and food access objectives can be challenging. Land use planning needs to navigate these conflicts and strike a balance between different land uses to ensure that competing development interests do not compromise food security. Limited Agricultural Land Availability: In many urban areas, the availability of suitable land for agricultural purposes is limited. Urbanisation, land fragmentation, and competing land uses have reduced the amount of land available for food production. This scarcity of agricultural land poses a challenge to implementing land use planning strategies that promote urban farming and localised food production. Innovative solutions, such as vertical farming, rooftop gardens, and community gardens, can help overcome this limitation to some extent. Socioeconomic Inequalities: Food insecurity is often closely associated with socioeconomic inequalities and marginalised communities. Land use planning interventions for food security should address these inequalities and ensure equitable access to land, resources, and opportunities for all urban residents. However, existing social disparities and unequal power relations can hinder the implementation of inclusive land use planning strategies. Addressing social inequalities and promoting inclusive participation in decision-making processes is crucial for overcoming this challenge.

Limited Financial Resources: Implementing land use planning strategies for food security requires financial resources for infrastructure development, capacity building, and program implementation. Many cities, particularly those with limited financial resources, may face constraints in allocating funds for food-related initiatives. Securing funding through public-private partnerships, seeking grants, and exploring innovative financing mechanisms can help address this limitation and support the implementation of food-sensitive land use planning. Resistance to Change: Implementing new land use planning approaches that prioritise food security may face resistance from various stakeholders, including developers, property owners, and policymakers. Resistance to change, fear of disrupting existing land use patterns, and a lack of awareness about the benefits of food-sensitive planning can hinder the adoption and implementation of innovative strategies. Raising awareness, providing evidence-based arguments, and engaging stakeholders in dialogue and collaboration are essential for overcoming resistance and building support for food-focused land use planning. Climate Change and Environmental Pressures: Climate change and environmental degradation pose significant challenges to urban food security and land use planning. Increasingly frequent extreme weather events, water scarcity, and soil degradation can impact food production and agricultural practices. Land use planning needs to incorporate climate change adaptation and mitigation measures, such as sustainable land management, water management strategies, and resilient infrastructure, to address the vulnerabilities and risks associated with climate change.

Addressing these challenges requires a multidimensional and integrated approach involving various stakeholders, including government agencies, civil society organisations, and local communities. Overcoming institutional barriers, promoting inclusive participation, securing adequate resources, and adapting to dynamic urban contexts are essential for successfully implementing land use planning strategies that strengthen urban food security. Policy Implications and Recommendations The findings of the study on the role of land use planning in strengthening urban food security in Africa have several policy implications that can guide policymakers, urban planners, and stakeholders in their efforts to address food security challenges. The policy implications are based on understanding the current food security situation in Africa, the factors contributing to food insecurity in urban areas, and the linkages between land use planning and food security. Here are some key policy implications:

• Integration of Food Security in Urban Planning Policies: The study highlights the importance of integrating food security considerations into urban planning policies. Policymakers should recognise that food security is not solely an issue of agriculture but is influenced by various land use decisions, including housing, infrastructure, and transportation. Urban planning policies should address food security by incorporating provisions supporting urban agriculture, prioritising access to fresh and nutritious food, and promoting localised food production systems.

• Strengthening Multi-sectoral Collaboration: Addressing food security challenges requires collaboration among multiple sectors, including agriculture, health, environment, and urban planning. Policymakers should promote interagency collaboration and coordination to ensure land use planning initiatives align with food security objectives. Multi-sectoral partnerships can facilitate the exchange of knowledge, resources, and expertise, leading to more effective and integrated approaches to urban food security.

• Capacity Building for Land Use Planners: The study highlights the importance of enhancing the capacity of land use planners in addressing food security issues. Policymakers should invest in training programs and capacity-building initiatives to equip planners with the necessary knowledge and skills to integrate food security considerations into their work. This includes understanding the principles of urban agriculture, sustainable land management practices, and innovative approaches to land use planning that support food production and distribution.

• Supporting Small-Scale and Urban Agriculture: Policy interventions should aim to support small-scale and urban agriculture initiatives, as they significantly enhance food security in urban areas. Policymakers can provide incentives, such as access to land, financial support, and technical assistance, to individuals and communities engaged in urban agriculture. This can include establishing community gardens, supporting rooftop farming, and facilitating the development of local food markets and distribution networks.

• Strengthening Land Tenure and Access: Secure land tenure and access to land are essential for promoting sustainable food production in urban areas. Policymakers should prioritise measures that ensure secure land tenure for urban farmers and provide mechanisms to access land for agriculture. This can include land use regulations that protect agricultural land from conversion, land leasing programs, and land banking initiatives that allocate suitable land for urban agriculture.

• Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes: Incorporating the perspectives and knowledge of local communities in the land use planning process is critical for addressing food security challenges effectively. Policymakers should promote participatory planning processes that engage residents, farmers, and other stakeholders in decision-making. This can be achieved through public consultations, community workshops, and the establishment of platforms for dialogue and collaboration, enabling the integration of diverse perspectives and local context in land use planning strategies.

Conclusion This chapter explored the critical role of land use planning in bolstering urban food security across Africa, providing a unique lens through which to view the intersection of urban development and food systems management. Through an extensive review of secondary literature complemented by detailed case studies, the chapter highlighted innovative practices from cities like Accra, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Kampala, and Harare. Each example illustrates tailored approaches to integrating food security concerns into urban planning frameworks, showcasing both successes and ongoing challenges. The analysis confirms that effective land use planning can significantly enhance urban food security by facilitating sustainable agricultural practices, supporting local food systems, and ensuring equitable access to food resources. The varied strategies employed across different urban contexts emphasise the importance of context-specific planning that considers local environmental, socio-economic, and cultural dynamics. The success stories from the case studies provide valuable lessons on the benefits of integrating urban agriculture, micro-gardening, and community food centres into urban landscapes. Moreover, the discussion highlights a crucial policy implication: the need for a cohesive strategy encompassing multi-sectoral collaboration between government entities, private sector participants, and community organisations. Such collaboration can drive the development and implementation of comprehensive land use policies that are responsive to the challenges of urban food security and adaptive to the changing urban dynamics. As urban populations continue to grow and as challenges such as climate change and economic disparity impact food systems globally, the insights gained from this study are more relevant than ever. The chapter suggests pathways for urban planners and policymakers to forge resilient urban environments that can withstand and adapt to the complexities of contemporary food security challenges. The study contributes to the academic discourse on urban planning and food security. It acts as a call to action for integrating sustainable land use strategies into the heart of urban development agendas. By doing so, cities across Africa—and indeed the world—can move towards creating more sustainable, inclusive, and food-secure urban futures. In light of the limitations inherent in a desktop review and the need for ongoing research, future studies should aim to incorporate primary data collection, engaging directly with urban planners, policymakers, and the communities they serve. 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Face to face with COVID-19: Ensuring household food security. Agriprobe, 18(2):34-37. Post-1994 Challenges of Small-Scale Farmers in Water Irrigation and its Effect on Social Well-Being in South Africa Mthabiseng P. Ngwamba

Department of Anthropology and Development Studies University of Zululand

Empangeni, South Africa Sinenhlanha B. Cele

Department of Anthropology and Development Studies University of Zululand

Empangeni, South Africa Mandla A. Mubecua

Department of Anthropology and Development Studies University of Zululand

Empangeni, South Africa Abstract Through the political ecology theory, this chapter argues that despite water governance through the policies and institutional support of small-scale farmers, South African small-scale farmers still face challenges in accessing water for irrigation. Most rural farmers rely on natural rainfall for farming since they do not have access to irrigation infrastructure. Relying on rainfall reduces the risk of food product contamination but leaves room for water shortages because of inconsistent weather patterns. Due to the rapid pace of climate change, water shortages become a prevalent problem, and droughts occur frequently. The lack of access to irrigation water tends to pose a challenge to the social well-being of South Africans. Regarding theoretical framework, this chapter uses political ecology theory, which focuses on examining the relationship between environmental issues and socioeconomic dynamics, accentuating how power, inequality and governance shape access to natural resources, particularly in marginalised communities. In relation to this chapter, access to water, especially for irrigation, is mostly dependent on political and economic elites, which exclude small-scale farmers and rural people vulnerable to irrigation water. Therefore, there are power imbalances in water distribution in different communities. As a result, small-scale farmers rely on rainwater for their farming projects. For that reason, the chapter explores the challenges of small-scale farmers in water irrigation after 1994 and how it affects the social well-being of South Africans, especially those who rely on farming for their survival. Introduction Small-scale farmers continue to deal with Apartheid-era challenges that affect their day-to-day farming operations after the year 1994. The overwhelming majority of rural farmers only depend on the rainy season to support their livelihoods because they do not have access to irrigation facilities. Rain-fed farming is defined as agriculture that relies solely on natural precipitation (Habib, Alauddin, & Cramb, 2022). Relying on rainfall lowers the possibility of tainted food products and creates space for water shortages due to erratic weather patterns. Due to the rapid pace of climate change, water shortages are becoming a prevalent problem, and droughts are occurring more frequently in South Africa. Therefore, this has become a challenge for small-scale farmers who depend on natural water for irrigation (Bakhsh & Kamran, 2019).  Except that, most small-scale farmers rely on agriculture for their livelihoods and depend on rainfall for irrigation. Furthermore, there is a discrepancy in how this dynamic affects total household income and the various responsibilities different institutions play in African irrigation schemes. This raises questions such as what has been done to assist those small-scale farmers who depend on natural rainfall for irrigation. The study outlines the institutional assistance and policies designed to aid these small-scale farmers. Furthermore, the chapter explores the challenges of water accessibility and how it affects social well-being. This chapter adopts a political ecology theory as the aim of the theoretical framework of this study. The work of Raef (2016) argues that a theoretical framework is viewed as a required philosophical foundation for connecting the theoretical aspects of a phenomenon to its practical components.  Political ecology is a field that seeks to unravel the political forces at work in environmental access, management, and transformation. It further focuses on processes, players, and dynamics that are at work politicising the natural environment. Political ecology aims to conduct environmental politics without using prior definitions and explanations of ecological degradation. Researching alternative framings of environmental change may also produce new insights or surprising refutations of orthodox explanations. Such insights may be forms of democratisation because they indicate how hegemonic environmental explanations reflect culturally specific framings of problems (Forsyth, 2004). Against this background, the present study unpacks the post-1994 challenges of small-scale farmers in water irrigation and its effect on social well-being in South Africa. Regarding methodology, the chapter relies on secondary data, where published works (articles, journals, and books) are reviewed. Apart from the introduction, the chapter comprises different sections. First is the overview of small-scale farmers in South Africa, followed by the policies and institutional support of small-scale farmers. It further discusses small-scale farmers, water accessibility, and social well-being. Lastly, the chapter provides a conclusion summarising the whole chapter and makes some recommendations.  Overview of small-scale farmers in South Africa   In 1948, the International Declaration of Human Rights revealed that everyone has a right to sufficient food. However, access to natural resources, including water, is necessary for food production. In South Africa, the farming sector is known for its duality; first, it is commercial farming, and second, it is smallholder (small-scale farmers). White farmers mostly dominate the commercial sector, the main driver of the agricultural economy. This sector is successful compared to the small-scale farming sector. According to Tshuma (2014), the commercial farming sector is successful because of the support it received from the Apartheid government. Thamaga-Chitja and Morojele (2014) argue that the post-1994 government gained much interest in supporting small-scale farmers in South Africa. Of the same view, Pienaar (2013) states that one priority of the National Development Plan (NDP) was capacitating and building smallholder farmers. The democratic government intended to achieve the food security goal and to ensure social well-being. Moreover, Mvelase (2016) reveals that the NDP intends to build a rural economy by supporting small-scale farmers.  Despite the interest of the post-apartheid government in small-scale farmers, there is a problem of weak governance, which fails to execute the formulated policies (Osabohien, Matthew, Gershon, Ogunbiyi & Nwosu, 2019). The failure of the democratic government to implement the policies and the proposed institutional support continues to affect small-scale farmers’ access to services, including water. The scarcity of water irrigation makes these farmers rely on natural rainfall. However, natural rainfall is unreliable because of climate change, which affects the rainfall pattern.  However, subsistence agriculture remains one of the important sectors in South Africa as rural households negotiate their lives by producing their food (Siphesihle & Lelethu, 2020). Subsistence agriculture provides better living and thus evolves rural communities (Department of Forestry and Fisheries, 2016). Hence, subsistence farming is more viable in rural areas as it is less labour intensive, requires less educational knowledge, and is practised using ‘Indigenous’ knowledge (World Bank, 2018; Khapayi & Celliers, 2016). The following section focuses on the policies and institutional support of small-scale farmers.  Policies and institutional support  In the field of political ecology, the governance of water irrigation is very important. There are many ways to govern water. The first is formulating policies that help govern water and establish institutions that support small-scale farmers. For that reason, this section intends to focus on the policies and institutional support put in place to ensure proper governance of water. It is important to note that subsistence farmers, who account for the majority of the world’s poor and hungry, are a vulnerable population frequently ignored by development strategies despite their crucial role in reaching global food production. Hence, it is argued that functional institutions and sufficient funding can raise the incomes of the poor and improve the living conditions of farmers (Sidibe, Totin, Thompson-Hall, Traoré, Traoré, Schmitt & Olabi 2018; Corral, Díaz, Monagas, M. del C, & García, 2017). Although innovation platforms have provided insightful information about institutional change, it needs to be understood whether and how the position, interests, and commitments of enabling actors may conflict with the goals and results of those institutions (Turner, Klerkx, Rijswijk, Williams & Barnard, 2016). This has led to institutional change which gave rise to numerous research institutions that tend to focus on how organisational processes shape and reinforce reward conformity.  The existing institutions are a response to policy to enable subsistence farmers to redress the issues of irrigation water scarcity. We will look closely at the water policies and institutional reforms implemented in South Africa since 1994. What informed the reform was political and economic fronts. The political and economic fronts were centred around water governance and distribution. This was also supported by new water laws that exhibited and encouraged fairness, sustainability, representation, and efficiency by implementing decentralised water management. Through regional and municipal agencies, the registration and licensing of water users and the development of markets for water rights were also established. This was functional through institutions such as irrigation boards, commercial and cooperative schemes, and other entities that help manage 96% of the irrigation water (Kirsten, Perret, & Van Zyl, 2000). Yet, some smallholder irrigation schemes risk collapsing soon after the state stops funding them, despite significant government investments in their construction and upkeep (Cousins, 2013). This has proven that, unlike commercial farms that are more financially independent, most subsistence farmers rely more on state support for water irrigation. This is not just a problem for South Africa but in the rest of the world since many nations have started a process to hand over control of state-run irrigation systems to water users by implementing irrigation management transfer (IMT) and participatory irrigation management (PIM) policies (Gomo, Mudhara & Senzanje, 2014). Smallholder rainfed-dependent subsistence farmers are considered the most vulnerable to climate variability and change and need interventions to adapt their livelihood systems to changing climatic conditions. According to Eriksen, Nightingale & Eakin, (2015), the development of these institutions as adaptation strategies is said to result in the formulation of sensible policy interventions and planned reactions to real or anticipated biophysical changes brought on by climate change. This interpretation of adaptation is limited because it conceptualises it as a process, which makes people passive recipients of adaptation rather than active participants (Eriksen et al., 2015). Hence, people’s participation in the design, implementation, and evaluation of local climate policies now prioritises climate change adaptation through new technologies and alternative farming methods (Hossain, Qian, Zhao, Mehmood, & Kächele, 2019; Khanal, Wilson, Lee, & Hoang, 2018). A typical example is drawn from Southeast Asia, where national irrigation systems deteriorated after the withdrawal of state agencies. This was due to the costs of operation and maintenance from their farming activities. Similarly, South African smallholder irrigation schemes were built and planned to use a centralised state design approach (Fanadzo, 2010). According to policymakers, the expansion of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (SIS) and the revitalisation of already existing and defunct ones could boost food output (Van Averbeke, Denison & Mnkeni, 2011). Even though smallholder irrigation farmers in South Africa frequently experience issues with high levels of reliance on government assistance, weak local institutions, and a need for more knowledge about farmers’ production strategies are some of the additional challenges that farmers face (Reinders, van der Stoep, & Backeberg, 2013). Another challenge subsistence farmers face in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly South Africa, is that Smallholder Irrigation Systems (SISs) need better market access (Mdemu, Mziray, Bjornlund, & Kashaigili, 2016). The scale of production is an issue. Hence, financial support through public funding may play a massive role, especially in assisting the farmers with input. Paradoxically limited public funding for the agricultural sector has also made it difficult to create an atmosphere conducive to doing business and providing enough institutional support, which has hampered private sector engagement and investment in agriculture. The government is required to allocate 10% of its national budget to agriculture under the terms of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which aims to reduce the continent’s reliance on rain-fed support water management, agriculture and increase resilience to climate change (Shimeles, Verdier-Chouchane, & Boly, 2018).  The study suggests that understanding farmers’ perspectives on climate change, agriculture, and adaptation measures is crucial for effective adaptation policy. Hence, pro-poor growth strategies in the context of developing nations call for risk mitigation and adaptation tools that can assist farmers in offsetting the negative effects of climate change and boosting productivity (Ali, Egbendewe, Abdoulaye, & Sarpong, 2020). Although water scarcity is the main obstacle to sub-Saharan African agriculture, enhancing smallholder farmers’ access to irrigation can boost agricultural outputs and rural livelihoods (Burney & Naylor, 2012). Despite water governance through the policies and institutional support the post-apartheid government formulated, small-scale farmers still face some challenges to water accessibility. This limits the number of farmers who rely on farming to generate their livelihood.  Small-scale farming and water accessibility The challenge of water accessibility is neither only a South African issue nor an African one, but global. Although the study is based in South Africa, it is fundamental to explore the challenges of water on a global level. The study by Eman, Meško, Segato & Migliorini (2020) estimates that water covers almost 70% of the planet; the scholars further note that 97 % of the water is salty, making it difficult to use for agricultural purposes. Moreover, 2% of the water is found in the snow, like glaciers, which small-scale farmers cannot use. Meanwhile, humans only have 1% of water to be distributed equally and used for farming. Nine countries all over the world share 60% of clean water, for instance, China, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, Colombia, the United States, Peru, India, and Brazil (Miaschi, 2018). It was noticed by Eman & Meško (2020) that the international consumption of water is increasing, and human activities are likewise growing. Furthermore, it is predicted that within the next three decades, the demand for water in agriculture is estimated to increase by 50 %. On a global level, water accessibility can be seen through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Historically, the SDGs succeeded the Millennium Development Goals, which also had similar goals to the SDGs. Scholars like Ismail and Go (2021) and Huang, Liu, Sun, Tang, Yuan and Tang (2021) recognise water scarcity as the main threat to attaining the SDGs by 20230.  In South Africa, agricultural activities rely on the rain, which becomes a challenge during droughts and dry seasons. Of the same view, Holtz & Golubski (2021) believe that 90 per cent of rural residents rely on farming as their primary source of income and generation of livelihood. Moreover, 95 per cent of the people in the region rely on rain in their farms. Hence, this shows that if there is no rain, 95 per cent of the people in the region will not be able to farm properly. Due to global warming, the rainfall is unpredictable; as a result, the region is facing rising temperatures and extreme drought, which has a high impact on the poorest communities (Holtz & Golubski, 2021). In most cases, the continent suffers from the lack of economic water scarcity. Generally, investing in water resources and relevant human capacity is not sustainable. Climate change is a central factor driving water stress in Africa and around the world. African countries face poor management of water resources scarcity, and water management is the continent’s biggest challenge (Mason, Nalamalapu & Corfee-Morlot, 2019). It is further estimated that by 2030, the challenges of climate change will force 100 million people into absolute poverty. As a result, 90% of sub-Saharan Africa will be affected (Mason et al, 2019). One of the elements of political ecology is access to water irrigation. The theory holds that access to water irrigation is always a challenge, especially for small-scale farmers (Oseji, Fan & Chigbu, 2019). It is undeniable that since 1994 South Africa has faced challenges with water irrigation, regardless of the promises made by the ruling party (African National Congress). The majority of the underprivileged rural people live without that water, which makes their lives difficult for irrigation on their small farms (Jackson, Quist, Downing & Larscheid, 2010). The political ecology theory considers the lack of access to water irrigation as an injustice that exposes its victims to poverty and destitution, among other ills (Nelson, 2012; Elmhirst, 2016).  In relation to the present book chapter, the theory (political ecology theory) is of the view that the challenges of water irrigation are not simply the result of what nature has to offer but always involve power relations and political decisions. The crisis of water irrigation is not only about who is granted access to water irrigation (when, where, and why) but also about the extent to which the shrinking of available water irrigation influences people’s everyday lives at the national and subnational scales (Pect, Robbins & Watts, 2010). Political ecology was chosen for various reasons for this study. The following section discusses how the lack or shortage of water for irrigation affects social well-being. The section helps to understand how lack of access to irrigation water results in food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment.  Farming for Social Well-being In this section, it is important to focus on how the unavailability of water for irrigation affects farmers’ social well-being since most rely on natural rainfall for irrigation. Increased production from subsistence farming can improve the food security of poor households, while some subsistence farmers may gain income from the crops they sell to other local households (Sibhatu & Qaim, 2017). Likewise, Praveen & Sharma (2019) connote a need to significantly increase the productivity of subsistence agriculture to ensure long-term food security. The work of Sally (2023) shows that subsistence agriculture remains a substantial sector in improving the livelihood of rural people as it can provide nutrition and improve social status. Scholars, like Sithole, Ncama, Magwaza, Motsa, and Mashilo (2023), also maintain that subsistence agriculture can reduce poverty and food security, as indicated before.  Even though this sector has the potential to ensure food security as well as the availability of food in general, it faces the challenge of a lack of water irrigation. Tengberg (2020) estimated that 3.2 billion people, or nearly one-sixth of the world’s population, live in agricultural areas with very high water shortages, and 1.2 billion of them in severely water-constrained agricultural areas. There are significant consequences for food security because many of these regions are underdeveloped nations. Almost 11.7 per cent of the world’s population is food insecure (Okoth, 2022). The challenge of water irrigation disturbs the farming process, as it relies mostly on natural rainfall. Praveen & Sharma (2019) state that rainfall patterns are distracted by the effects of climate change. Of the same view, Tengberg (2020) notes that the water cycle has already been and will continue to be impacted by the effects of climate change: droughts, unpredictable or variable rainfall for farming or herding, pollution, contamination, floods, or extreme weather can all have disastrous repercussions.  Furthermore, Praveen & Sharma (2019) note that climate change is a major concern not only for South Africa but also for Africa at large and Asian countries. In developing countries, it is worse due to poor adaptive capacity and lack of technology (Praveen & Sharma, 2019). Therefore, although other patterns disturb small-scale farmers, climate change is the main cause. Compared to men, women are mostly dominant in subsistence farming in Africa. Women are increasingly in charge of running the farm as men look for employment in the cities.  Moreover, Mwale (2022) reveals that because of the unequal distribution of labour among men and women, women frequently work in domestic and non-domestic contexts. In poor nations, women are frequently in charge of gathering water for domestic usage and irrigation. The challenge for rural farmers remains, especially for females who rely on farming for survival because of the unavailability of water. In other countries like Kenya, women farm crops that require daily irrigation, while men participate in ploughing crops that do not require too much water (Williams, 2022). Conclusion and recommendation Water stress is mostly caused by climate change in Africa and globally. Although small-scale farming has the potential to increase food security and lower poverty, subsistence farming struggles due to a shortage of irrigation water. These struggles are interlinked with farming operations and function and have social and economic implications. The chapter unveiled that effective institutions and sufficient funding can improve farmers’ living conditions. Even if innovation platforms have given us crucial knowledge about institutional change, farmers continue to be in the crosshairs of the outside interests and motivations of these institutions. The main issue facing African nations is the continent’s poor management of the region’s limited water resources. Political ecology theory asserts that power dynamics and political choices are constantly present in water irrigation issues rather than only the outcome of what nature must provide. Therefore, water shortage may be a natural or a human-manifested problem. Water availability for irrigation is in crisis, affecting not only those with access but also people’s daily lives at the national and sub-national levels. Water scarcity is a triple threat to the social well-being of people, health, and farmer operational issues. Hence, the chapter recommends further research on the role of climate-smart technologies as a strategy to reduce water dependency on rainfall water. Policies on what to consider in terms of the climate and seasonal changes are needed. The study further suggests more studies should be conducted on indigenous small-scale farming coping strategies.  References Ali, E., Egbendewe, A.Y.G., Abdoulaye, T. & Sarpong, D.B. 2020. Willingness to pay for weather index-based insurance in semi-subsistence agriculture: Evidence from northern Togo, Climate Policy, 20(5):534-547. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1745742 Bakhsh, K, & Kamran, M.A. 2019. Adaptation to climate change in rain-fed farming system in Punjab, Pakistan. International Journal of the Commons, 13(2). https://doi.org/10.5334/ijc.887 Burney, J.A. & Naylor, R.L. 2012. 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Criminal Justice Department Namibia University of Science and Technology

Windhoek, Namibia Abstract Food security remains a pressing concern in sub-Saharan Africa, with insufficient focus on the comprehensive study of its four dimensions: availability, accessibility, stability, and utilisation. This study investigates the obstacles impeding food security in the region, particularly in Southern Africa, such as poor harvests, limited access to agri-loans, human-wildlife conflicts impacting food availability, and inadequate road infrastructure affecting food accessibility. The lack of nutritious food and water also contributes to suboptimal food utilisation. Addressing these challenges is essential to achieve Agenda 2063’s primary aspiration of modernising agriculture and increasing productivity. However, there is a noticeable lack of effort from African governments to fulfil the food security goals outlined in Agenda 2063. The continent’s commitment to tackling these issues is evident in adopting Agenda 2063, focusing on improved food security. This chapter assesses the extent to which Agenda 2063’s aspirations address food insecurity, considering accessibility, availability, utilisation, and stability. The study delves into the contextualisation of food security concepts, policies, and initiatives at the continental level. It discusses challenges affecting food security and future directions in attaining it in sub-Saharan Africa to realise Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Data were meticulously gathered through an extensive literature review, official reports and interviews with experts, thereby contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the subject. The study underscores the urgent need for attention from the African Union to address food security challenges and work towards achieving The Africa We Want. The 21 Africa Agriculture Africa Status Report emphasises the persistent food insecurity in Africa, necessitating a collective effort to combat poverty and malnutrition and improve the lives of millions of Africans. Introduction In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis is conducted on food availability, accessibility, utilisation and stability in sub-Saharan Africa about the realisation of Agenda 2063. The paper is organised as follows: First, the introduction provides a general overview of food security in Africa. Section 2 introduces the contextualisation of the key concepts. Section 3 focuses on the food security and insecurity determinants in sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, an outline of policies and initiatives undertaken to address food insecurity at the continental level is provided in Section 4. On the other hand, challenges that affect food security future directions in sub-Saharan countries are well discussed in relation to Agenda 2063 in Section 5. This is followed by continental initiatives to attain food security and future directions for achieving food security in sub-Saharan Africa, presented in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Finally, Section 8 concludes the chapter with key takeaways and recommendations. For this chapter, data were obtained by conducting an extensive literature review in the form of official reports and written publications from academic journals and reputable sources, as well as interviews with food security and agriculture experts, aiming to create a comprehensive understanding of the subject. While several studies have been undertaken on food security in general, studying food security premised on the four dimensions of food security (availability, accessibility, stability and utilisation) has hardly received much attention from researchers. In Southern Africa, several factors are cited for hindering the populace from being food secure, posing a considerable challenge to realising Agenda 2026 (The Africa We Want). Poor harvest due to drought, flood, inability to access agri-loans due to a lack of collateral and persisting human-wildlife conflicts are recurring and uncontrolled phenomena, consequently affecting food availability. On the other hand, the majority find it hard to access commercial markets mainly due to a lack of proper road infrastructures, particularly in connecting rural residents to urban areas, which affects food accessibility. Finally, a lack of adequate food utilisation is commonly observed in sub-Saharan Africa, given insufficient nutritious, contaminated food and water (Auma & Radeny, 2022). While it can be acknowledged that the food supply chain disruption affects food stability, most inhabitants suffer from acute food insecurity since not all have physical and economic access to readily accessible, sufficient and suitable food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. If these notable challenges are unaddressed, there is a likelihood that attaining modern agriculture for increased proactivity and production, as enshrined in Agenda 2063 first aspiration, will be an unrealised ambition. This realisation demonstrates that little effort has been made by the African governments, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, to realise the ‘Africa We Want’ in terms of food security. Sub-Saharan Africa has faced several challenges hampering food security that need the attention of the continental body (African Union). These challenges include poor trade, economic hardship, poverty, unemployment, and conflicts. To reduce the effects of those challenges, the African countries adopted 2013 Africa’s long-term blueprint ‘Agenda 2063’ (Africa We Want). One area that needs special attention is food insecurity experienced in Africa since millions of Africans that are born and raised, die of poverty and malnutrition (Barrett, 2021). This is also acknowledged in the 21 Africa Agriculture Africa Status Report [AASR] (2021), in which it was noted that Africa remains food insecure, consequently accounting for 256 million of the world’s 795 million people suffering from hunger. Therefore, this chapter deals with the extent to which the agenda of 2063’s first aspiration, particularly the theme that deals with improved food security. To comprehensively evaluate this phenomenon, the study’s focus covers four food security dimensions: accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Conceptualizing Key Concepts Food availability concept Food availability is achieved when sufficient food quantities are consistently available to individuals within a country (Manyullei & Arundhana, 2021). In brief, food availability means such food can be supplied through household production, other domestic output, commercial imports, or food assistance (FAO, 2019:5). It has been shown that food availability is obtained from agricultural production. These products are not limited to livestock, cash crops, fishing and forestry farming. It is achievable by employing food cultivation, ideally sustainable use of natural resources and donations from charity organisations. Important to note from the above sentiment is that food availability is closely intertwined with food supply by the production and distribution of food. At the same time, the study shows that several factors determine food production. These factors may include land ownership and use, soil management, crop selection, breeding management, livestock breeding and management and harvesting time. Given such empirical underpinnings, crop production can be affected by changes in rainfall, temperature, resources, and personnel for agricultural purposes. In this context, one contentious implication of high rainfall is that it may cause floods, thus negatively impacting food security. It is worth mentioning here that food availability is necessary to ensure food security, but availability alone is insufficient for food access. This underpins food access as an essential pillar to consider when assessing the impact of floods on human security. Food accessibility concept Food access refers to securing food from the market and accessing the means of production (Ghosh & Ghosal, 2021:2570). On the contrary, the inability to access an adequate quantity of a variety of food resulting from market access challenges and production means is food insecurity (Alabi & Ngwenyama, 2023). Food access will be ensured when sub-Saharan African citizens have enough means to obtain food through readily available marketplaces. Conversely, Ahmed, Ying, Bashir, Abid & Zulfiqar (2017) infer that household income available, income distribution, and food prices are major determinants of food accessibility globally. Therefore, food access comprises substantial purchasing power and affordability in the local, community and national markets. In this context, own production with access to inputs, land, credit for purchasing and food technology are essential in determining food accessibility (Mabuku, 2022). It is with the critical realisation that sub-Saharan African countries cannot achieve food accessibility if other countries still find it challenging to access food. This is mainly because all households in their respective countries should have access to food stores and strong purchasing power to obtain nutritious food in adequate quantities. Food utilisation concept Food utilisation refers to food preferences influenced by culture, food safety, food quality, health status, and consumption patterns (FAO, 2019). Murray, Gale, Adams and Dalton (2023), associated food utilisation with how well citizens are empowered to exercise their discretion in choosing what sort of food they produce, eat, and what the body utilises for nourishment for healthy living. As seen in the preceding case, food utilisation concentrates on the proper biological use of food through a balanced diet that provides essential nutrients for sufficient energy. In this regard, attaining NDPs and agenda 2063 in terms of food security requires that citizens possess knowledge of the role of proper food processing techniques and storage to avoid contamination that results in disease and, eventually, death. A further explanation may be that various factors affect the quantity and quality of food at the household level, for instance, a lack of access to improved water sources and sanitation facilities. This implies that one of the other important considerations for sub-Saharan countries’ leadership if the long-term continental version is to be achieved, is to ensure that the food ingested is safe and enough to meet each individual’s physiological requirements. Food stability concept Food stability refers to the ability of households to obtain food over time (FAO, 2019; Zulkarnain, Dessy, Dedy, Irma, Yarmaidi & Sugeng, 2023). The forgoing suggests that food security should be applicable not only during specific periods but at all times. While the SDGs and Agenda 2063 aim to achieve this, several notable reasons hinder this realisation in sub-Saharan Africa. These incorporate natural disasters, for instance, cyclones, e.g. Idai: Mozambique (Petricola, Reinmuth, Lautenbach, Hatfield & Zipf, 2022), Freddy: Malawi (Aderinto, 2023), and floods, e.g. in Zambia (Bwalya, 2023). Primary food production level is affected by droughts, e.g. Ethiopia (Asefawu, 2022), Tanzania (Randell, Gray & Shayo (2022) and Uganda (Sunday, Kahunde, Atwine, Adelaja & George, 2023). Ongoing crop destruction is caused by wild animals, e.g. in Ethiopia (Jaleta & Tekalign, 2022), Kenya (Mwadime & Mbataru, 2022), and Namibia (Luetkemeier, Kraus, Mbidzo, Hauptfleisch, Liehr & Blaum, 2023). Low food production is seen as a major setback worsened by poor rainfall patterns experienced over the years. Furthermore, constant civil conflicts in some sub-Saharan African countries are cited to have been caused by various factors affecting food stability over time. As a result, these countries are likely to continue to experience food insecurity for a prolonged time, defeating the goal that the African blueprint intends to attain (Iddrisu, 2020). This endorses the general view that reinforcing endurable food systems becomes intricate when mated with a natural disaster such as drought and flood. For Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2022), food insecurity in Africa could be challenging to address, mainly because the government and other stakeholders do not prioritise improving the agricultural sector. This implies that the per capita start-up funds for the power community are not considered. Ultimately, not all people have food at all times, a worrisome trend that requires immediate intervention by African leaders. Determinants of Food Security and Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa To unpack the determinants of food security and insecurity, spatial and non-spatial factors are explained as their role in affecting and aiding in gaining food security in sub-Saharan Africa. First, spatial factors influence food accessibility globally, continentally, and nationally (Pakravan-Charvadeh, Khan & Flora, 2020). For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, poor access to stores that shelve fresh produce may significantly limit residents’ opportunities to purchase and consume fresh fruits and vegetables, affecting food security. While only a countable number of the population have access to food stores, the majority, particularly the rural population, find it hard to access stores that shelve a variety of food. This may be attributed to what Battersby and Njogu (2023) cited: most of the development undertaken in African countries is urban and cities concentrated while rural areas are less prioritised. Informed by this reality, it becomes fair enough to pinpoint that realising the Africa We Want’s first aspiration will be daunting since little progress has been made in addressing food insecurity, as evidenced by the developmental trend. The unbearable experience of food insecurity is even more disconcerting in areas that suffer seasonal floods where the likelihood of stores being closed during the flood season is high. This observation is substantiated by the persistent transport challenges brought by flood plains, which affect purchasing much-needed stocks (Mabuku, 2022). Shops that sell vegetables are usually affected during floods, restraining the populace’s intake of a balanced diet. Another factor is land ownership in sub-Saharan Africa, which has been cited as contributing to food insecurity. For instance, several studies conducted in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the unfair distribution of land and ancestral land affects people’s ability to have a portion of for planting (Owoicho, Sennuga, Bamidele, Osho-Lagunju & Alabuja, 2023). In addition, there are some instances where farming and grazing land for some African communities and families become scarce, exacerbating already existing poverty. While the above is the case, the study by Owoicho et al. (2023) noted that ownership of fertile ancestral land alone might not necessarily determine food security and easy access to markets to sell produce, but buying other essential food items for a balanced body is equally important (Anderson & Martin, 2021). This assertion is substantiated by Munzhedzi (2017), who relates income inequality for urban and rural people as a plausible factor affecting food accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability. Urban residents are more likely to receive agricultural loans than rural residents (Mapanje, Karuaihe, Machethe & Amis, 2023). While it is uncontested that this could be due to the inability of these residents to repay the loans, there is no doubt that those in positions of power need to assist the rural population if the African blueprint is to be well realised. Conversely, non-spatial factors relate to a country’s socio-economic features affecting food accessibility (Pakravan-Charvadeh, Khan & Flora, 2020). From the present view, non-spatial factors in a country’s socio-economic challenges affect not only food accessibility but also food availability, utilisation and stability. These factors are not limited to income, age, access to agricultural loans, dependency ratio, ethnicity, gender, education of farming practices, geographical location, society social status and unemployment rate (Aboaba, Fadiji & Hussayn, 2020). The authors’ views represent the current situation in sub-Saharan Africa concerning the extent to which non-spatial factors have affected food security. For instance, in terms of age, the senior citizens who had depended most of their lives on agricultural practices, suffer the most when acquiring food for daily survival. The above is mainly due to strained energy and reduced agricultural activities. Undoubtedly, the situation normally worsens since senior citizens produce less during their active years, affecting their future savings. For this reason, animal and crop farming in sub-Saharan Africa is more practised (Tabo, 2023). Premised within the preceding realisation, caution must be made when explaining these aspects. Since these agricultural practices are the immediate reference to many livelihoods, persistent frontage to spatial and non-spatial factors aggregates their exposure to food insecurity. Sipho and Nolwazi (2021)’s study found that several households in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in rural areas, experience low-income levels due to family status and are primarily affected by food insecurity. To this point, it is more apparent that family status as a non-spatial factor specifies how much food can be secured since low-income families may find it hard to access markets, loans, agricultural education or fertile land. Consequently, food insecurity has become chronic, halting the acceleration of Africa’s biggest blueprint, the ‘Africa We Want,’ in terms of achieving food security for all Africans. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Progression Towards Agenda 2063’s Aspiration on food security In its first aspiration of Agenda 2023, Africa has acknowledged the need to transform Africa’s economies by raising productivity and competitiveness. It is more achievable through modern agriculture methods to increase productivity. Despite this realisation, the implementation towards attaining this has not been pleasing in many sub-Saharan African countries; few efforts are geared towards radically transforming agriculture for the possibility of food self-reliance (Tabo, 2023). When critically analysing the role of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, there is no denying that other aspirations of the ‘Africa We Want’ are more affected by the failure to address food insecurity by African countries. For instance, Aspiration 4 looks at attaining a peaceful and secure Africa. Therefore, additional uncertainty arises from the fact that one of the contributing factors to conflict is a poorly developed economy and the desire for people to be food secure. When these essential services are not met by increased agriculture productivity, which directly impacts the economy, citizens resort to conflict, particularly targeting the ruling government, causing accelerated insecurity. This was also acknowledged in the recent study by Mabuku and Olutola (2022). It noted that neglected groups that feel the government neglects them in providing food and other necessities are likely to resort to unpeaceful means. The Zambezi case (the former Caprivi region) offers a practical example in Namibia. Some residents of this region claimed to have been neglected by the government in effectively addressing the human security index. They believed their plight could only be addressed if they became an independent country from Namibia (Mabuku & Olutola, 2022). The dissatisfaction of a particular ethnic group, mainly individuals presuming that the region is marginalised, led to mobilising an armed group (Mabuku & Olutola, 2022). In addition, they attacked some vital government installations and buildings and killed several people in the process. The above causes a substantial security threat to the national state. Even today, the group still exists and puts pressure on the government to free the Zambezi region to be an independent state for possible self-determination. This on its own demonstrates that food insecurity, if not adequately addressed, the anticipated culture of peace and tolerance, as well as addressing emerging threats to Africa’s peace and security and stable and peaceful Africa goals, will be impossible to achieve. On the other hand, food insecurity threatens aspirations 6 and 7 of the ‘Africa We Want’, an Africa whose development is people-driven and a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner. There is an unceasing observation thus far in most African countries, including sub-Saharan Africa: people driving conflict are mostly unsatisfied youths. This attests to the fact that history has it that most revolutions in the world that ever happened were staged by youth. For instance, for Africa’s citizens to be actively involved in decision-making in all aspects and become major partners in global affairs and peaceful co-existence, improving Africa’s partnerships is impossible without food security. Of all these aspirations of Agenda 2063, one of the most important goals that needs to be achieved first is Aspiration 1, which calls for a creation of an Africa that is prosperous, inclusive and with sustainable development. When adequately achieved, the African populace would become satisfied and is more likely to be actively involved in attaining other aspirations the continent aims to achieve. In Eswatini, agriculture is viewed as the source of the country’s economy due to its strong linkages to different sectors of the economy (Mhlanga-Ndlovu, 2022). In 2022, it was believed that the country would record an increase in maise production and citrus fruits by 100% between 2013 and 2020. However, beef production declined by 63%, and sugar production declined by 2.5% (Mhlanga-Ndlovu, 2022). In 2021, Namibia implemented the Zero Hunger Strategy to improve food and nutrition security. It established Food Banks to address urban food poverty, reducing undernourishment prevalence from 21.6% in 2013 to 14.6% in 2019. This was noted in a country’s state of food security and initiatives towards realising Agenda 2063 ministerial report (Mulonda, 2022). This was mainly influenced by the prevailing pandemic (COVID-19) by then. In addition, a NAD 560 million Emergency Income Grant was channelled to assist 769,000 Namibians. While the above are essential measures to address food insecurity in Namibia, it should be noted that these measures are unsustainable (Mulonda, 2022:142). The preceding denotes that they were put in place on a temporary basis and failed to address chronic food insecurity in Namibia. It must be noted that with these interventions food insecurity challenges in Africa, as in Namibia, will not be addressed come 2036. Equally problematic is that measures taken were reactive to reduce the pandemic’s impacts on food insecurity temporarily. This observation is also true in most sub-Saharan African countries (Tabo, 2023). Subsequently, this poses substantive drawbacks in improving the state of food in the countries in the long run since more emphasis is put on reactive and short-term strategies. Notably, in most sub-Saharan countries in 2022, it was observed that they had not embraced modern agriculture methods to improve food security (Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2021). This was evident, for instance, in countries like Mauritius, Mauritania, Nigeria, Namibia, Seychelles, South Sudan, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Seychelles. By 2022, they had zero per cent improvement in agricultural products through modern means. Meanwhile, Uganda (15%), Tunisia (25%), Rwanda (84%), Togo (100%) and Senegal (100%) recorded an improvement in their agricultural produce through the adoption of modern technology. This demonstrates that the attainment of food security as Agenda 2063 dictates is still a far-fetched reality, and the need for a responsible government to take up measures cannot be overemphasised if the African Blueprint is to be achieved. Smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe who adopted agroecological practices were able to improve their food security and reduce their poverty levels. The producers implemented strategies such as crop rotation, intercropping, and using natural pesticides and fertilisers, which resulted in increased crop yields and improved soil health (Paracchini, Justes, Wezel, Zingari, Kahane, Madsen, Scopel, Hérault, Bhérer-Breton, Buckley & Colbert, 2020). A similar situation was observed in Ethiopia, where farmers in the Tigray region adopted agroecological practices, including crop diversification, intercropping, and using natural fertilisers and pesticides (Gebru, Ichoku & Phil-Eze, 2020). These practices enhanced soil fertility, higher yields, and greater food security. Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has developed the Soil Health Program to encourage smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa to implement agroecological practices, including conservation agriculture (Sinyangwe, Mwamakamba, Mkandawire, Madzivhandila, 2023). There are opportunities and challenges for promoting transitions to agroecological practices for sustainable food production in sub-Saharan Africa. While some sub-Saharan African countries have devised national policies and plans to encourage the use of agroecology, not all countries have specifically mentioned agroecology in their policies (Tabo, 2023). However, this does not inherently imply that agroecological practices are not implemented in these nations. For instance, Nigeria has no explicit national policy promoting agroecology (Fadairo, Olajuyigbe, Adelakun, & Osayomi, 2023). However, some Nigerian farmers, primarily in northern regions, have been practising agroecology for decades. These producers have been using traditional farming methods that promote soil health, biodiversity, and ecological balance. In addition, they employ agroecology’s fundamental principles, such as intercropping and crop rotation, which are low-input and climate-smart agricultural practices (Fadairo et al., 2023). Similarly, agroecology practices are not explicitly stated in Kenya’s national policies, but many smallholder farmers have been practising them. Traditional practices such as intercropping, crop rotation, and natural insect management have been utilised by these farmers to produce healthy and nutritious crops while conserving the environment (Leippert, Darmaun, Bernoux, Mpheshea, Müller, Geck, Herren, Irung, Nyasimi, Sene & Sow, 2020). Despite a lack of clear legislation, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali are among the other sub-Saharan African countries where agroecology methods are being adopted (Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2021). Smallholder farmers in these nations are implementing agroecology practices to increase crop yields, improve soil health, and conserve natural resources (Leippert et al., 2020; Bottazzi, Boillat, Marfurt & Seck, 2020). Continental initiatives to attain food security Several bodies initiated by the United Nations and still continuing such as the Agriculture and Food Security Department, oversee the effective implementation of AU agricultural transformation decisions in Africa. This is in collaboration with the African Union Development Agency, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Planning and Coordinating Commissions, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Notably, these institutions have emphasised common positions on fisheries and aquaculture and their role in strengthening food security in Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (Shilomboleni, 2017). Further, these bodies promote organic agriculture in partnership with the African Seed and Biotechnology Programme in Africa and other partners. As a result, the African Union Commission has established and chaired the Continental Steering Committee for the Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Initiative for Africa. Furthermore, regional training workshops on organic standards, certification systems, modern organic production, and marketing for farmers have been facilitated (Shilomboleni, 2017). The department commenced with the implementation of the Africa-Arab Joint Action Plan (JAP) on Agricultural Development and Food Security. This move is geared towards strengthened cooperation between Africa and the Arab region in the area of agricultural development and food security (Abdelmagid, & El Shibly, 2020). Last but not least, the department has facilitated the application of the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer, intending to increase fertiliser use in Africa to 50kg/ha. Market access is facilitated to enhance trade in agricultural commodities on the continent. For instance, the African Union has launched the Africa Agroecology Initiative to encourage smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa to employ agroecological practices (Bottazzi et al., 2020). In addition, the number of organisations and initiatives promoting agroecological practices in sub-Saharan Africa has increased. For instance, the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) is a network of organisations promoting agroecology and food sovereignty. In sub-Saharan Africa, AFSA has been involved in capacity building. Challenges experienced towards attaining food security in Sub-Saharan Africa Even though in some regions of the world, agricultural expansion has been a key factor in reducing poverty, much of Africa has experienced dismal agricultural growth over the past 40 years or so, with poor or even negative per capita growth (Diao, Hazell, Kolavalli & Resnick, 2019). Because policymakers have disregarded agriculture, this situation has not improved. Using new technologies and imported inputs, sustainable intensification is a widely accepted goal for agricultural growth in Africa. Kenya found that farmers who adopted agroecological practices faced challenges such as low access to credit, high cost of inputs, and limited access to markets (Sinyangwe et al., 2023). In Nigeria, smallholder farmers who adopted agroecological practices faced challenges such as limited access to land, inadequate extension services, and inadequate storage facilities. For these reasons, building resilient and sustainable food systems is crucial for ensuring sustainable economies and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063 Goals. This provides evidence and insights into the prospects of achieving resilience and sustainability in Africa’s food systems (Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2021). Other studies have noted that climate change and extreme weather events affect the full realisation of food security in Africa (Adedoyin, Bekun, Hossain, Kwame, Gyamfi & Haseki, 2023). This is more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa which is highly vulnerable to climate change and has increased the frequency and intensity of droughts. Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that sub-Sahara Africa does not embrace new drought coping strategies, particularly given that humankind has less influence on preventing drought. With this, in addition to floods in these areas, it is evident that achieving food security in sub-Saharan Africa in relation to Agenda 2063 is a blind roadmap and a doubtful task. Persistent floods and unusual rain patterns have been a challenge that poses a significant threat to the realisation of food security in the sub-Saharan countries. These events affect agricultural productivity, leading to crop failures, livestock losses, and reduced food production. Notably, the problem of floods is expected to intensify in the region due to climate change, for instance, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (Adelekan, 2011; Alicia, 2012; Mashebe, 2015). In addition, soil erosion, deforestation, and improper land management practices contribute to land degradation and declining soil fertility. As a result, agricultural yields decrease, making it difficult to achieve food security. From this, one should accept that land degradation and soil fertility are determinants of food security to a more marginal extent. Limited infrastructure and poor market access: Inadequate rural infrastructure, including roads, storage facilities and market access, hinders farmers’ ability to bring their products to markets. Therefore, this leads to post-harvest losses and reduces farmers’ income, making food security a challenge. There is now a relatively large consensus among some scholars, for instance, Mabuku (2022) supports the general view that strengthening sustainable food systems becomes complex, even harder, when coupled with a natural disaster such as a flood or drought. Ultimately, most of the populace suffers from transitory food insecurity brought about by reduced food distribution, supplies and market access. Therefore, acknowledging these challenges highlights the distance that sub-Saharan Africa needs to go to attain the ‘Africa We Want’ aspiration and SDGs for achieving sustainable food security. The other challenge is chronic poverty, which lingers within sub-Saharan society. What has been established and is now generally accepted in sub-Saharan Africa is that poverty is prevalent in most of the population. This prevents those social groups from accessing agricultural credits and loans (Lawal, 2023). High poverty levels and limited access to credit prevent smallholder farmers from investing in improved farming practices and technologies. The foregoing perpetuates the cycle of low productivity and limited food security. With unaddressed poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, it may be accepted that food security through accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability will still be a blind roadmap in relation to Agenda 2063 and SDGs aspirations. Political instability and conflicts: Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced political instability and conflicts, which disrupt agricultural activities, displace farmers, and disrupt food supply chains. These situations exacerbate food insecurity and hinder progress towards the SDGs. It is evident now that countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan are still characterised by unceasing political instability. Therefore, since political instability has been identified as a major contributing factor in the decline in food production, leading to direct acute food insecurity, expecting these countries to attain food security by 2063 is a blind ambition. In particular, given that there is an undeniable relationship between peace and high food production, this becomes a determinant of how a nation may be food secure or insecure. The worrisome observation is that politically stable sub-Saharan countries are also indirectly affected by countries with conflicts. These may include harbouring displaced people and providing support, which increases and strains those countries’ feeding capacity. Therefore, it is encouraging to retaliate my earlier observation that to attain Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063: a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, in particular, Goal 3 of this aspiration, food security, requires fulfilling other aspirations. For instance, note Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa by ensuring that mechanisms for conflict resolution are enhanced to realise modern agricultural practices which could improve food security. Importantly, without nurturing a culture of peace and tolerance in sub-Saharan Africa, improved economy and food security seem to be a random road map. Weak policy implementation is a plausible hindrance to sustained food security in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no doubt that several internal and local policy initiatives have been crafted regarding agricultural practices. Nonetheless, inadequate agricultural policy implementations and effective strategies hinder progress towards attaining food accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability in sub-Southern Africa. Future Directions for Attaining Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa While persistent challenges that affect the realisation of food security in sub-Saharan Africa can be acknowledged, the contingent relook into the future is essential in attaining food security. First, promote and invest in climate-smart agricultural practices resilient to climate change (Ajibade, Simon, Gulyas & Balint, 2023). This includes promoting drought-tolerant and disease-resistant crop varieties, agroforestry, conservation agriculture, and efficient water management techniques. These aspects are fundamental to withstand the impact of climate change that seems to affect food sustainability in the sub-Saharan countries negatively. It is vital for the international community, political officer bearers, and agricultural officers to ensure efforts are geared to mitigate climate change and that coping strategies are aligned to the geography setting. The need to strengthen policy frameworks and governance must be considered in future undertakings for food sustainability. The existing national and international policies need to be implemented effectively. This may be done by strengthening governance structures and promoting transparency and accountability in the agricultural sector. However, other possible explanations exist for why strengthening policy frameworks in sub-Saharan Africa is essential. Notably, frameworks facilitate the adoption and expansion of agroecological techniques. Moreover, the policies align with a sound understanding of foreseeable agroecology benefits and challenges resulting from inputs from farmers, civil society, government and private agencies. Equally important is fostering regional cooperation and collaboration to address common challenges and promote knowledge and technology transfer, paramount to realising sufficient food security within the four dimensions. There is a need for accelerated partnerships between governments, civil society organisations, research institutions, and the private sector to leverage resources and expertise in sub-Saharan Africa. In this way, digital technologies, such as mobile applications, remote sensing, and data analytics, can be embraced to improve agricultural productivity, market access, and information dissemination. Research in agricultural practices must be intensified to promote contemporary sustainable farming practices based on informed policy and implementation strategies. In this way, sub-Saharan African countries may develop long-term monitoring systems to assess the environmental impact on agroecological practices and social and economic impact on food accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability. The observed correlation between research and improved agricultural yield might be further explained in this way: research assists farmers in making agricultural decisions not on what worked previously but on what works currently and would seem relevant in the future. This will mean that achieving food security as envisaged by the African blueprint becomes practical. While it can be confirmed that some international and national policies partially promote agricultural practices based on research, it is also true that funding and support from both the government and private sectors have been disappointing thus far. On the other hand, research on agroecological practices in sub-Saharan Africa is increasing; most of the research is founded on experiences from other regions and may not immediately apply to the region’s diverse agroecological conditions. This is the case despite the growing research on agroecological practices in sub-Saharan Africa. Analysed within the premises above, we cannot exclude the possibility that when agroecological techniques adopted are not regionalised, the research role in improving agricultural sectors becomes less useful. These future directions require a holistic and coordinated approach involving governments, international organisations, civil society, and the private sector. By addressing these areas, sub-Saharan Africa can make significant progress towards achieving food security and ensuring sustainable development. Conclusion This chapter, ‘Food accessibility, availability, utilisation, and stability in sub-Saharan Africa: A blind roadmap to Agenda 2063’, sheds light on the pressing issue of food security in the region and highlights the need for a comprehensive and sustainable approach to address this challenge. Sub-Saharan Africa faces significant hurdles to ensure food accessibility, availability, utilisation and stability. While the region possesses abundant natural resources and agricultural potential, numerous factors hinder its ability to meet the nutritional needs of its population. These factors include inadequate infrastructure, climate change, political instability, limited access to resources and technologies and how these seem to affect the realisation of the ‘Africa We Want.’ The chapter underscores the significant link between food availability, accessibility, utilisation, and stability. It highlights that achieving food security can be viewed not only by food availability but also by the presence of all four dimensions of food security. To this end, the chapter emphasises the importance of a multifaceted approach to tackle these challenges. It calls for implementing comprehensive national and regional policies and strategies that integrate short-term and long-term food security solutions. Moreover, it highlights the significance of regional cooperation, knowledge sharing, and capacity building to address common challenges collectively. 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Centre for Security, Peace and Conflict Resolution Nelson Mandela University

Gift Mwonzora

Willy Brandt School of Public Policy University of Erfurt

Erfurt, Germany Abstract Over the past decade, several countries in Africa and elsewhere have recorded high numbers of human mortalities and injuries owing to wildlife attacks. Due to climate change characterised by high temperatures, incessant drought, and water holes being drained, most wild animals migrate or encroach into human settlements throughout most parts of Zimbabwe. Also, urban sprawl and urbanisation result in the growth and expansion of cities and towns encroaching into areas formerly inhabited by wildlife animals. The search for food by wildlife animals and their mobility have resulted in clashes between humans and wildlife in some towns like Kariba and Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. This chapter analyses how animal mobility has engendered human-wildlife conflict (HWC), an area that has not yet elicited intense academic scrutiny. Researching this contributes to a nuanced and granular perspective on how human-wildlife conflict affects human security among communities adjacent to conservancies and wildlife zones. Such an inquiry is timely considering the pervasiveness of such a trend in Zimbabwe’s (peri)urban and rural communities. Through a qualitative research approach, we seek to provide an in-depth understanding of human-wildlife conflict (HWC) and how this affects human security and livelihoods of communities living adjacent to conservancies, national parks or game parks. The data was gathered through qualitative interviews, field observations, desktop review, and Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) with residents from Victoria Falls and Kariba. Introduction Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) is one of the major challenges in places that border protected areas, wildlife corridors, and wildlife zones in Zimbabwe (Gandiwa, Heitkönig, Lokhorst, Prins & Leeuwis, 2013; Marecha, 2017). Such conflicts are exacerbated by the population increase of wildlife species, recurring droughts and human encroachment into wildlife habitats (Jeke, 2014). As of today, the interaction between wildlife animals and human beings continues to trigger violence and human insecurity in areas adjacent to national parks and wildlife habitats. The impact of HWC in such communities is evident in crop raids, destruction of property, human fatalities and livestock predation. Although challenges of human-wildlife conflict are prevalent in Zimbabwe, not much has been written on human (in)security in areas bordering wildlife habitats. Such a phenomenon, therefore, warrants scholarly analysis. This chapter specifically focuses on examining human insecurity and the loss of livelihoods of residents of Kariba and Victoria Falls towns. Wildlife animals cause this loss of livelihoods, and insecurity in these communities. Data for this study were gathered through qualitative interviews with key informants and Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) with residents from the two towns used as case studies. Desktop review and field observations were also utilised to collect data. The chapter is structured as follows:  In the following section, we engage with the concept of human security to understand how human-wildlife conflict (HWC) affects the personal, health, physical, and environmental security and safety of residents living in areas infested by wildlife. We review the global, regional and Zimbabwean literature on human-wildlife conflict. We then present the empirical discussion on human-wildlife conflict and coping mechanisms, followed by concluding remarks. Human Security and Wildlife The discussion draws on the concept of human security and conflict. Scholars argue that human security has become a major referent to human development (Gasper & Gómez, 2023; UNDP, 2022). It is a concept that places salience on the security of people (human beings). It is significant to note that human security has only gained traction in the past few decades. Thanks to the work of policy experts and academics, such as Mahbub ul Haq, who is credited for conceptualising what has come to be referred to as human security (Gasper & Gómez, 2023:2). Haq has gained global acclaim for his pioneering work and prolific conceptual and analytic articulations as well as grounded policy insights that fed into in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Human Development Reports (HDRs) (Haq, 1999; Gasper & Truong, 2005). Linked to human security is human development, which offers an expansive view of human flourishing (Alkire, 2002:182). However, scholars argue there is a reason why the concept of human security is linked to human development or vice versa. This is simply because human security, broadly conceived as freedom from fear and freedom from want, is paramount in making one’s life flourish to the fullest (Gómez & Gasper, 2016; UNDP, 1994). During the Treaty of Westphalia era in 1648, societies were preoccupied with state security (Hassan, 2006). It is to this end that societies were concerned with state-centric security. Such a focus placed much salience on the security of states. However, major developments occurred at the end of the Cold War and also owing to the articulations on social and human development. Presumably, after the emphasis on sustainable development, the aspect of human development started to elicit sustained policy attention. This followed the publication of the Human Development Report of 1994 and much wider use in 2012 in the wake of the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of the concept (Gómez & Gasper, 2016:2). The 1994 global HDR articulated the seven pillars of human security, which are food, personal, economic, environmental, health, community, and political (UNDP, 1994:24-25). However, even in all these articulations, the personal security of humans is also featured as one of the crucial aspects. It then came as no surprise that human beings have become a central focus in development planning and policy since then. To this end, securitisation has shifted from the state to the human being. Within this prism, we can locate the concept of human security, which places the human being at the epicentre of human development. Scholars opine that human security places salience on human beings’ personal, community and political security (Gómez & Gasper, 2016). We argue in the context of raging and variegated attacks on human beings by animals that communities living adjacent to wildlife parks, conservancies, and wildlife corridors are susceptible to, causing loss of life. Hence, their security is in danger and not guaranteed. Yet, as the duty bearer, it is the duty of the state to guarantee its citizens’ rights. However, this does not suggest that community members (right holders) abrogate the right to protect themselves. For instance, one must walk on paths where one is unlikely to encounter wild animals. Not only that, but one must also walk/travel during daylight to guarantee security by avoiding direct contact with wild animals. From this perspective, to guarantee security, it is noted that rights (freedom of movement) come with responsibilities and consequences. But in the same vein, the government must strive to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards to communities because wildlife animals encroach into communities. Here, it is essential to refer to the conceptualisation and articulations of human security as advanced by Gasper and Gómez, an analysis which is worth quoting at length as it is illustrative: Human security analysis looks at threats to fulfilment of basic values in people’s lives. It seeks to reorient use of the prioritizing concept ‘security,’ towards securing basic needs of ordinary people. So, it answers the question ‘whose security?’ with: ‘each of us and all of us.’ In addressing the question ‘security of what?,’ some forms of human security analysis have adopted compartmentalization, trying to separately discuss ‘personal security,’ ‘economic security,’ ‘environmental security’ and so on. This can be helpful, and fits established bureaucratic and disciplinary convenience. It is also often unhelpful (Gasper & Gómez, 2015:1). They further go on to articulate emphatically that: Many important threats arise out of the interconnections between different aspects and forces in particular situations, so that much of the value-added from human security analysis comes not from putting a new name on topics already considered under existing bureaucratic and disciplinary arrangements but from functioning as a boundary concept to transcend those divisions, flexibly according to the nature of particular situations. A focus on how people live and can live, and the function of looking at priority values and priority threats, require a transdisciplinary holistic perspective (Gasper & Gómez, 2015:1-2). We agree with this generous articulation of the conceptual and analytic challenges that come with a parsimonious view of human security as charged by Gasper and Gómez (2015) and others. In the context of human-wildlife conflict, we see that several risks, vulnerabilities and insecurities intersect to the extent that one has to view the different typologies that holistically construct human (in)security. In what follows, we turn to a discussion on human-wildlife conflict on a global and regional level. Scholarship on Human-Wildlife Conflict Through academic and policy articulations, it has become clear that human-wildlife conflicts have become a global phenomenon (Seoraj-Pillai & Pillay, 2017; Gandiwa et al., 2013; Shanko et al., 2021). Zimbabwe is also not spared from this type of conflict, like the rest of Africa. HWC has gained prominence and has attracted the attention of researchers, conservationists, policymakers and social scientists who have been pondering strategies to mitigate the effects of the phenomena. One early scholar of HWC, Madden posits that: Human-wildlife conflict is increasing in both frequency and severity worldwide and will likely continue to escalate. Protected areas are increasingly becoming islands of habitat surrounded by seas of cultivation and development (Madden, 2004:249). Without delving much into the local, global, and regional literature, it is important to first understand what human-wildlife conflict entails. In conceptualising human-wildlife conflict, scholars like Madden posit that, it occurs: when the needs and behaviour of wildlife impact negatively on the goals of humans or when the goals of humans negatively impact the needs of wildlife. These conflicts may result when wildlife damage crops, injure or kill domestic animals, threaten or kill people (Madden, 2004:248). There is no gainsaying that human-wildlife conflict is escalating and becoming a pressing global issue. Such developments require urgent action to reduce the loss of lives and household food security and to eliminate the phenomenon of livestock predation and crop raids by wildlife (Mekonen, 2020).  Scholars agree that HWC continues to afflict societies in developing and developed countries (Distefano, 2005; Madden, 2004; Woodroffe, Thirgood & Rabinowitz, 2005; Hodgson, Redpath, Sandstrom & Biggs, 2020; Göttert & Starik, 2022). It is thus unsurprising that a rich corpus of global scholarship on HWC now exists through adopting varied thematic and methodological foci. It seems several existing studies have focused on human-wildlife conflict (HWC), specifically on livestock predation and crop raids (Parker & Osborn, 2006; Mekonen, 2020; Gemeda & Meles, 2018) without giving much attention to human security and urban mobility aspects. In light of such gaps, this study is an addition to the literature on human-wildlife conflict, with new nuances, peering into human (in)security in urban areas. On this count, this set of literature has grown in leaps and bounds owing to the escalation of human-wildlife conflict, high mortality rate, crop raids and livestock predation on all continents. This is evident in the research that has been conducted in sub-Saharan Africa (Mashalla & Ringo, 2015; Ladan, 2014), West Africa (Larson, Conway, Hernandez & Carroll, 2016); East Africa (Mnzava & Sirima, 2022) and Southern Africa (Le Bel, Murwira, Mukamuri, Czudek, Taylor & La Grange, 2011), focusing on human-wildlife conflict. HWC has become more prevalent over the past two decades. Scholarship on HWC underscores that such a conflict occurs in all areas where human beings and wildlife coexist partly due to competition over limited resources (Distefano, 2005). This scholarship on HWC has also been evident in Zimbabwe, a country experiencing high rates of conflicts between humans and wildlife (Marowa, Matanzima & Nhiwatiwa 2021; Musiwa & Mhlanga, 2020). In fact, much of the existing strands of the Zimbabwean scholarship focuses on how communities living adjacent to wildlife zones have been grappling with multiple challenges in guarding and averting crop raiding, livestock predation and guaranteeing human safety (Matseketsa, Muboko, Gandiwa, Kombora & Chibememe, 2019; Pisa & Katsande, 2021). The trend is also mimicked in other contexts elsewhere in Africa (Mekonen, 2020). What seems to be missing in this extant literature are discussions on HWC intersecting with the human security of residents in urban areas. Contextualising Human-Wildlife Conflict in Zimbabwe The issue of human-wildlife conflict is a complex environmental subject that has gained prominence in the past few years in Zimbabwe. This is in part owing to the increase in the population of wildlife species (Gandiwa et al, 2013; Musiwa & Mhlanga, 2020), especially elephants (Loxodonta Africana) in Mbire, Kariba, Nyaminyami, Victoria Falls, Hwange, Chiredzi and Kwekwe. Further, the continuous increase in the human population in Zimbabwe is undoubtedly leading to conflict over limited resources for humans and wildlife species. Additionally, the current climate changes experienced worldwide have also resulted in negative consequences for human inhabitants and animals (Matanzima, 2022). As such, erratic and unpredictable rainfall is causing recurring droughts. This, in turn, engenders the depletion of natural resources across Southern Africa. Consequently, this has stoked competition for food among wildlife species and human beings. Drivers of Human-Wildlife Conflict in Kariba and Victoria Falls Research has established that varied and interlinked factors lead to HWC in many parts of the world. In Zimbabwe, there are major drivers of human-wildlife conflict, which include—but are not limited to—the proximity of communities to wildlife areas such as national parks, and conservancy areas, human encroachment onto wildlife corridors and protected areas, infrastructure development, and human and wildlife population growth. They include illegal hunting and poaching, climate change, successive droughts and the associated food scarcity, and limited grazing areas and livestock water sources, to mention a few (Marecha, 2017; Matseketsa et al., 2019). In the two study sites, Victoria Falls and Kariba, the major drivers of HWC are the proximity of these towns to wildlife corridors. As such, residents noted that wildlife species like baboons and elephants encroach into suburbs on their way to the water sources. This situation is more prevalent during the dry season. As such, the frequency of HWC and human killings is seasonal and more pronounced during the dry season as compared to the summer period. The expansion and increased demand for land in these towns further exacerbate the HWC situation. As such, the continued increase in human population and change in land use remain the major drivers of human-wildlife conflict since it leads to fragmentation and degradation of the natural habitat. To this end, destroying natural habitats is forcing wildlife and other species to encroach into human settlements in Kariba and Victoria Falls in search of food and grazing land. As such, these two sites, just like any other HWC hotspots in Zimbabwe, experience regularity in human and wildlife interactions, a trend which heightens conflict susceptibility. Policies and Legislative approaches to mitigating HWC In Zimbabwe, several legislative frameworks and policies govern the interaction of human beings and wildlife. The question, however, is whether they are effective. Not only that, but whether they are being implemented and to what effect. These regulatory frameworks are crucial in the conservation, management, and sustainable exploitation of wildlife and natural resources in Zimbabwe. Such laws include the Parks and Wildlife Act [Chapter 20:14], which governs wildlife conservation and sustainable utilisation in Zimbabwe. Other legal frameworks that protect and preserve natural habitats and the environment include the Wildlife Policy, which was promulgated in 1996, and the Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29:17). We argue that residents in the two study sites are aware of and conversant with the wildlife and legislative policies that protect, preserve and conserve natural resources and habitats. However, besides wielding such knowledge, research participants in the two study sites underscored the need to review the current wildlife policies. Their reasoning was inspired by local communities not benefiting from natural resources within their locality. In communities where governments seek to conserve wildlife, animal contestations always arise. Zimbabwe is not unique. This is evident in Kariba and Victoria Falls, where residents harbour negative perceptions regarding the conservation of crocodile species (Crocodylus niloticus) and elephants (Loxodonta africana). This entails that communities are more concerned with human security than wildlife and environmental considerations. No wonder residents in such areas loathe the criminalisation of cutting down of firewood in nearby forests, the killing of wildlife animals and fishing in Lake Kariba. Communities living adjacent to national parks, including those in Kariba and Victoria Falls specifically, believe that the Zimparks (which is responsible for wildlife animals) should at least offer fishing licences and permits to cut firewood for cooking to the residents. In such and other contexts, citizens are at the forefront of advocating for equitable distribution and benefits deriving from wildlife through shares, community ownership, and conservancies such as the Nyangambe Conservancy in Chiredzi and Midlands Black Rhino in Kwekwe. In their view, such benefits to local communities will help reduce the escalation of HWC, improve the conservation of natural habitats, guarantee the protection of endangered species and wildlife, and enhance human-wildlife co-existence. Such concerns are also being raised by the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association and other non-state actors who advocate for wildlife conservation. In 2020, a top official—Dhliwayo, from the ZELA—argued that “the Parks and Wildlife Act must be reformed through the development of a new and comprehensive Parks and Wildlife Act that is anchored on the principles of sustainable wildlife management that includes transparency, participation and accountability in line with the constitution” (Dhliwayo, 2020). His was a call for programmatic action in implementing issues of social justice, namely the inclusion of affected communities in the governance of natural wildlife. However, challenges with such civic-driven efforts relate to the background of issues relating to human security. Whilst there is an ever-growing need to mitigate HWC, there is also a strong need to ensure and guarantee human security, which has since become a major referent of human development in contemporary societies. This particularly applies to people living in areas bordering national parks and game areas in Zimbabwe and beyond.  The impact of HWC on local communities in Kariba and Victoria Falls As of today, there is no denying that human-wildlife conflict has become a major threat to human life in most communities living along wildlife zones. Such a problem has been witnessed globally. This is a claim that needs not to be rehashed. In the areas under study, we witness that elephants (Loxodonta africana), crocodiles (Crocodylus niloticus), hippopotamuses (Hippopotamus amphibius), and lions (Panthera leo) are the main wildlife species that injure or kill people. This phenomenon is widespread to the extent that in 2021, the spokesperson of the ZimParks, Mr Farawo, stated that elephants (Loxodonta africana) and crocodiles (Crocodylus niloticus) account for 90 per cent of human fatalities, followed by buffaloes and lions (Dzinduwa, 2022). In 2021, Mr Farawo further acknowledged this trend in the following words: “This year alone we recorded 71 deaths while wild animals injured 50 people compared to about 60 deaths and 40 injuries last year” (Michael Magoronga, The Chronicle, 23 December 2021). From such evidence, it is clear that these attacks continue to affect the human security of citizens staying adjacent to national parks.  Further empirical research combined with national trends in incidents of human attacks point to a drastic increase in frequency since 2000. This shows the poor policy implementation in stalling these attacks at the level of government. However, this does not come as a surprise considering the seeming importance accorded to animals at the expense of humans. Throughout different eras, the Zimbabwean government has shown a penchant for prioritising wildlife, as evident in passing laws and policies on endangered species and regulated hunting. While such laws and regulations are welcome as they guarantee the rights of animals and the sustainable conservation of wildlife, they are largely viewed as falling short of safeguarding the rights of community members. Evidence abounds in areas infested with wildlife where one can attract a hefty sentence for killing wildlife even in circumstances of attack. We argue such restraining legislation coupled with poor policy implementation to halt HWC has intensified the attacks of human beings by wildlife animals. This affects not only their mobility as these attacks also endanger their lives. Consistent with scholars who write on human security, such attacks will amount to challenges that hinder the realisation of personal, human, health and environmental security (Gómez & Gasper, 2016). Not only that, but the danger posed by wildlife in Victoria Falls and Kariba and elsewhere hinders the exercise of human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2007). What is worrying, though, is that even in light of such evidence, the trend of HWC continues to spike, triggering questions around what needs to be done or what must be done. In the era spanning from 2002 to 2006, statistics reveal that Zimbabwe recorded more than 5,000 cases of Human-Elephant Conflicts (HEC). As a result, 774 elephants (Loxodonta africana) were killed under the problem animal control operations (Campfire Programme, 2007). Such prevalence in cases of HWC shows how the security of human beings is endangered not only in Kariba and Victoria Falls but across various Zimbabwean communities. To contextualise the study of HWC, looking at the real-life challenges and realities communities face at risk of wildlife attacks is pertinent. Societies reeling from wildlife attacks have always witnessed variegated vulnerabilities. This is because they are prone to attacks that may leave people nursing permanent injuries. In Victoria Falls and Kariba, the community is not in short supply of incidents that have resulted in the loss of lives, while it may be convenient to dismiss such acts as isolated. Doing so amounts to being economic with the truth. Research and public disclosures have shown how several victims of human-wildlife conflicts have lost their lives in Victoria Falls and Kariba, with the National Parks officials ignoring the public calls to fence off the sanctuaries of wildlife. Cumulatively, such inconsiderate approaches to HWC have engendered human insecurity in the Kariba and Victoria Falls communities. Given such evidence, what should nudge scholarly and policy interest amongst researchers is why the responsible officials continue to pay lip service to human security. In this regard, one can legitimately question whether the loss of life is a ‘necessary’ occurrence that should be tolerated and permitted only for the sake of the conservation of wildlife. This question relates to striking a balance between human life (human security) and environmental and animal considerations. As established by the research, residents in Chinotimba Township in Victoria Falls also feel the effects of HWC, as encapsulated in the quotation below. People are affected in terms of income, and food security as the gardens are destroyed by baboons. The baboons are a daily problem, they empty bins, thus causing pollution on the environment. We are tired of this situation, something should be done, otherwise, we will put poison in our gardens to kill them (FGD participant, 19 July 2022). In societies experiencing human-wildlife conflict, research has shown that people’s livelihoods have been negatively affected. Their mobility is also equally constrained. This is particularly evident in the curtailment of the freedom of movement in fear of wild animals. The magnitude of the effect of HWC is heavily felt on the socio-economic front. Just like most, if not all parts of Zimbabwe, the Victoria Falls and Kariba communities heavily rely on informal activities to earn a livelihood. To this end, the danger posed by wild animals affects their social and economic activities. It is not far-fetched to concur with Kariba residents who lament how the human-wildlife conflict has adversely affected their livelihoods. In areas like Kariba, residents rely mainly on fishing, buying, and selling (informal trading). The fact that elephants are close affects their economic activities. Residents stay indoors when darkness falls as going out after 6 pm is risking one’s life. In such and several other communities, residents then resort to staying indoors by 6 pm as a precautionary and safety measure. In placing human and personal safety first, we see that the residents are deprived of their freedom of movement, which is one basic, fundamental, and inalienable right. Notably, in Zimbabwean communities, residents who stay in areas adjacent to wildlife corridors are vulnerable to wildlife attacks. Kariba residents are but an example of a community concerned about the increase in crocodiles in Lake Kariba. Through interaction with such a community, it was reiterated that these crocodiles pose a threat not only to their livelihoods. Many have suffered physical attacks from crocodiles. No one puts it across better than one resident of the Nyamhunga suburb in Kariba who had the following to say: We often meet wild animals in the forests on our way to fishing at Lake Kariba. There is no free movement, we move around searching for sweeping material for selling. The existence of wild animals like elephants limits us from our fishing activities and our search for sweeping material in the nearby forest. We also risk being attacked by crocodiles at the lake because we do not have proper boats and nets (Participant of FGD, 6 July 2022). These findings confirm that the existence of different wildlife species in the two study sites has posed threats to food security, caused loss of livelihoods, and endangered the security of human beings. Coping Mechanisms and Elusive Solutions for HWC Taking from the above, communities living in wildlife-infested areas ranging from Kariba, Chiredzi, Victoria Falls and Mbire have consistently called for government interventions. The reason for this is the need to cull and securitise communities through erecting fences and installing bomas. 1 1 Bomas are enclosures used to surround kraals to prevent livestock predation from wild animals like lions and hyenas. They are physical structures/ enclosures made from the same material that makes camping tents. In areas like Mola in Nyaminyami, this practice is already in use as attested by the installation of bomas to minimize livestock predation. Most of these efforts are donor-driven, they aim to secure the safety of humans who are at risk of attack by wildlife animals. While such efforts are externally driven, it should also be noted that when left to themselves with little if any government intervention, most communities have resorted to using Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKSs) to ward off wild animals. These include beating drums to scare wildlife animals like elephants (Loxodonta Africana) and erecting scarecrows to wade off baboons and monkeys. Whilst these IKSs might prove useful in some communities, it was established in the context of Kariba and Victoria Falls that they have since become less effective (Interview with Ward 1 Councillor in Victoria Falls, 20 July 2022). This is considering the fact that wildlife animals in such areas have become accustomed to human beings to the extent that they are no longer easily frightened by the common scare tactics. On the other hand, others still opine that the planting of pepper (chilli) around the yard as part of IKSs still works in warding off wild animals like elephants (Loxodonta africana) (Parker & Osborn, 2006; Nokuthaba Dlamini, The Independent, 21 February 2023). Whether these approaches work in effectively guaranteeing the human security of communities living in wildlife-infested areas in Zimbabwe is a subject that may attract mixed responses. Cognisant of these differing views, one could argue that these are only self-help local initiatives that must be done to complement government efforts. But what happens without a permanent, and solid, state intervention in guaranteeing the human security of affected communities? Humans have to do what they can do. This assertion resonates with the dictum that ‘invention is the mother of all necessity.’ Having stated the above, it needs no emphasis that community members have been left to the vagaries of the roaming and marauding wild animals owing to the complete inconsiderate or lethargic implementation of policies. Things have not been helped by the fact that the rigid legal framework also ensnares and limits the intervention of community members. One illustrative example is how community members are criminalised for killing wildlife animals, even for meat to consume at the household level. In the towns of Kariba and Victoria Falls, residents direct the blame for the raging human-wildlife attacks to the responsible agencies like Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWMA) and Campfire for the lethargic response, reluctance and inefficiency. This pertains to reporting cases of HWC within their communities. The charges are that Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority and Campfire do not react swiftly in a case where human beings are killed or attacked by a wildlife species. This behaviour is also evident in the thinking of the officials. This is a clear testament that residents are on their own faced with the daunting challenge of warding off wild animals without government support. Nowhere has this been made more evident than in an interview with one key informant from the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority who posited that to mitigate HWC, residents of Kariba were supposed to learn to cohabit with wildlife since they were allocated residential stands in wildlife corridors and game areas (Interview with Zimparks official, 7 July 2022). He further stated that humans should desist from moving around at night, using small boats, and practising illegal fishing on the shores of Lake Kariba. In the wake of such a depressing reality, residents often resort to using other reporting channels, though as a desperate measure. According to councillors from the two case study sites, as a desperate plea for help residents report cases of HWC to them. These desperate pleas fail to usher in human security because the council remains under-resourced and incapacitated in swiftly responding to incidents of HWC. Affected communities in Zimbabwe also lament the failure of the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority to provide compensation for the injured victims. In the wake of government failure to guarantee human security, Victoria Falls and Kariba communities opine that the least the state can do is provide compensation to the injured victims. Not only that but the government is also supposed to provide funeral assistance and meet the cost of medical bills in the event one is injured. This is considering that the buck ends with the state which fails to prioritise the personal security of humans at the expense of wild animals. As established in this study, one respondent narrated the fateful event in which an elephant killed his son whilst he was on his way from fishing in Lake Kariba. That the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority did not offer any meaningful assistance speaks to the neglect of the victims of HWC even at the national level. Risks, Vulnerabilities and Challenges Facing Kariba and Victoria Falls Residents Nuancing the debate further, the risks posed by wildlife animals in the selected case studies include permanent injuries, damage to property and loss of livelihoods. Although baboons and monkeys are not a direct threat to human life, residents in Kariba and Victoria Falls live in perpetual fear as these species encroach into communities daily. In doing so, they grab foodstuffs and destroy property, vegetable gardens and fruit trees. Such acts pose a danger to the daily lives of young people and children who are always at the receiving end of confrontations with baboons and monkeys. Residents in Kariba, in particular, bear testimony to these attacks as school-going kids, pregnant women and elderly people always fall prey to baboon attacks. Such evidence underscores the human security challenges that Zimbabwean communities live adjacent to wildlife areas face.  Looking at the behaviour traits of wild animals like elephants, one notices that they stray into the communities from 4 pm onwards. In the interactions with community members, the first researcher established that Kariba businesses close around 3.30 pm, so people get home safely. Again, to guarantee their security and as part of the precautionary measures, residents avoid moving around from 6 pm to 6 am. Employing the intersectionality approach, we also argue that some specific age groups are at the receiving end of the HWC. In Kariba, for example, school-going children are the most vulnerable to the presence of elephants within communities. This is because they delay going to school when marauding elephants roam their communities. In these areas, residents often get in contact with elephants when coming from work. To revellers, they also cannot risk life by going back home on foot due to the presence of elephants. The trend in such communities is that revellers without cars always stay out at night and only return home the following morning. All such evidence points to a context where residents’ freedoms and rights have been curtailed owing to the government’s failure to address issues of HWC by taking practical policy and administrative measures to address this enduring phenomenon. To complicate the situation, the families of victims of HWC are not compensated (Mhlanga, 2001). Whilst this is evident in Victoria Falls and Kariba, it is a problem that is also common in other countries. In attacks, families do not receive compensation from the responsible authorities. Considering that humans are the victims, the residents would expect to be compensated for their relatives who had been injured or killed by wildlife species. This is also logical, considering that the government is the duty bearer responsible for guaranteeing the human security of the residents. This, however, is not to take away the individual responsibility and duty to safeguard personal security without passing the buck to the state. In an interview with a survivor of a crocodile attack in Mahombekombe, Kariba, the victim, who was miffed and who could not mince his words, narrated the sorrowful event of how he was attacked by a crocodile while fishing at the shores of the lake. The victim suffered double if not multiple, attacks. In the sense that a crocodile attacked him but was also ‘attacked’ by Zimparks’ inefficiency, as expressed in how the institution respects, protects and accords rights to wildlife more than human beings. This stems from the fact that when a snare catches a wild animal, they tend to react faster than when residents report incidents of HWC. The unfortunate incident of the victim mentioned above reverberates with victims of HWC in Victoria Falls and areas elsewhere where they receive no compensation (Leonard Ncube, The Chronicle, 10 June 2022). In the case of the victim mentioned above, he had to seek medical attention in Zambia and was hospitalised for a period spanning three months. That he sustained injuries on the leg and arm speaks volumes to the multiple human, health, physical, and socio-economic vulnerabilities that stand in the path of residents of Kariba and Victoria Falls, where human security is not a guarantee owing to the marauding wildlife that pounces on humans. Conclusion The study finds evidence that communities living adjacent to wildlife areas face multiple vulnerabilities, including attacks, destruction of property, livelihoods and physical harm, including injuries and loss of life. This then affects their safety. It was established that residents in Kariba and Victoria Falls live in fear due to wildlife animals like elephants, crocodiles, hippos, buffalos, lions, monkeys and baboons. It was established that in such communities, residents self-organise and make up self-help remedies and initiatives, including using scarecrows to scare away animals like baboons from their gardens, beating tins or other noise-making devices to scare away elephants. Residents also resorted to initiating and observing curfews and walking in safe paths to guarantee their survival and safety. Though they implement such local efforts that are twinned with indigenous knowledge systems (IKS), it is apparent that such efforts are just desperate efforts of communities that feel abandoned by the government. It is from this perspective that other members had suggestions that the responsible authorities, including Zim Parks, should practise culling to reduce the population of elephants (Loxodonta africana), crocodiles (Crocodylus niloticus) and other dangerous wildlife species. Others even suggest decongesting national parks by relocating wildlife species to other areas. In light of the available evidence, we also reason that securing national parks (game areas) and communities with electrified and solar-powered fences also help mitigate HWC in Kariba and Victoria Falls areas and other hot spots throughout Zimbabwe. The study offers significant academic and policy insights that can be utilised by not only the Zimbabwean government but also by communities, animal rights advocates, rangers, and donor agencies, among other stakeholders, in better managing HWC. We posit that future research should attend to the ongoing quest to realise the personal (human) security of communities living in wildlife-populated areas. Such a research endeavour will help articulate how communities can co-exist with wild animals or live in peace without fear and trepidation owing to their susceptibility to animal attacks. References Alkire, S. 2002. Dimensions of human development. World Development, 30(2):181-205. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00109-7 Campfire Programme 2007. PAC statistics 2002-2006. Harare, Zimbabwe: Campfire Association. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(01)00109-7 Distefano, E. 2005. 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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614774 Siphumelele Duma is a Senior Postdoctoral Research Fellow and the head of the Global Africa Unit at the University of Johannesburg’s Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of Pretoria. He has published multiple peer-reviewed scholarly works. His most recent book is Developmental Integration and Industrialisation in Southern Africa, published by UJ Press in 2023. His research interests include intra-BRICS cooperation, South-South Cooperation, and Regional Integration in Africa. Rich Mashimbye is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation. His research interests include political and security developments in the SADC region, as well as conflict resolution and mediation. His recent publication is a book that is titled The Southern African Development Community: Non-intervention and Non-indifference. Mashimbye frequently provides commentary on political and security issues in the SADC region. Dr Mthabiseng Pertunia Ngwamba is a lecturer in the faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Anthropology and Development Studies. She possesses a B Consumer Science (Extension and Rural Development), honours, Master’s and PhD in Development Studies. Her research interests include food security, rural development, water, and gender studies. She focuses on sustainable agriculture and food systems that address local, regional, national and global food security and rural development. She also considers cutting-edge contributions across relevant academic disciplines, including agricultural, nutritional, socio-economic sciences, public health and policy. Including systems ecology, global change, and economics and information sciences. Sinenhlanhla Beryl Cele holds a Master’s degree from the University of Zululand, with her research focus on water scarcity and its economic-social consequence(s), sanitation and sustainable development. Her research focus seeks to improve access to water whilst addressing the barriers to clean water and sanitation in low-income communities with a particular emphasis on rural areas. Mr. Collin Olebogeng Mongale is a PhD candidate in Social Sciences with Political Studies in the Department of Political Studies and International Relations at the North-West University, South Africa. He is a PhD Research Trainee at the Human Sciences Research Council division of Developmental, Capable and Ethical State (DCES), Pretoria, South Africa. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Studies, an Honours Degree in Political Studies, and a Bachelor of Social Sciences with Political Sciences and International Relations (cum laude), all qualifications were attained from the North-West University. Mr Mongale is an emerging scholar with peer-reviewed publications and has presented papers at local and international academic conferences which includes but are not limited to the 17th Africa Young Graduates and Scholars (AYGS) hosted by the Human Sciences and Research Council (HSRC), the 15th Biennial Conference by the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), the annual general meeting of African Association of Political Science (AAPS) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Emerging Researchers Conference. His research focus cuts across issues of geopolitics, conflict and security studies, political violence, governance, protest action and migration. His Doctoral Degree is funded by the South African National Research Foundation (NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS). Mr. Boikanyo Collins Nkwatle is an emerging researcher and postgraduate student at the North West University Vanderbijlpark Campus pursuing a Master of Arts Degree in Political Studies with a dissertation titled: “The Impact of Coalition Governments on Selected Metropolitan Municipalities in South Africa” under Afrocentric Governance of Public Affairs (AGoPA) research entity. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences Honours in Political Studies from the North West University (Mafikeng) Campus and a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from Saint John Vianney Seminary. Mr. Nkwatle has presented papers at academic conferences, which include the 15th Southern Africa Development Community Organization of Public Accounts Committees’ Annual Conference and the 17th Africa Young Graduates and Scholars (AYGS) hosted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Political Studies (SAAPS), and he is currently working as a Research Intern within the Coalitions in Africa Research Project at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Kyle Bester is a registered research psychologist and senior psychology lecturer at the University of South Africa (Unisa). He obtained an M.A. in Psychology (Master’s in Research Psychology) from the University of the Western Cape in 2017. He specialises in cybersecurity awareness in the context of SA armed forces. He completed his PhD in Military Science at Stellenbosch University in 2023. He serves as an executive committee member in the division for research and methodology at the Psychological Society of South Africa. His research interests include military science, data colonialism, cybersecurity awareness, securitisation of cyberspace, and online security behaviour. He has published and presented papers both locally and internationally. Torque Mude is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds a PhD in International Politics, an MA in International Affairs, a BA (Honours) in History and Development Studies and a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) Degree. His research engages international law, African politics, international relations, peacebuilding and development. Dr Kennedy Kaumba Mabuku holds a doctoral degree in Policing from Stadio Higher Education in South Africa and is a Chief Inspector in the Namibian Police Force. He supervises policing students at Stadio Higher Education and moderates at the Namibia University of Science and Technology. Dr. Mabuku is also a Journal Peer Article Reviewer for Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies and tutors at the Institute of Open Learning in Namibia. In addition to his academic roles, Dr Mabuku is a seasoned police facilitator within the Namibian Police Force and a lecturer at the SARPCCO School of Excellence in Harare. He is an Editorial Board Member of the Journal Humanities and Social Sciences and has published several articles. Dr. Mabuku is deeply passionate about advancing security and policing practices. Johannes Bhanye is an Urban Planner and Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the African Climate and Development Initiative (ACDI) https://acdi.uct.ac.za/ , University of Cape Town. He holds a PhD in Social Sciences, an M.Sc . in Social Ecology, and a B.Sc . in Urban and Regional Planning, both from the University of Zimbabwe. He is a former Research Fellow at the University of the Free State [teaching Masters Modules on Research Methods for Urban Planners], the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe. Dr Bhanye is very passionate about Southern and Postcolonial Urbanism with a particular focus on Spatial Justice, Urban Informality, Vulnerabilities in African Cities, Urban Health, Urban Governance, Complexity and Systems Thinking, Climate Risk and Urban Resilience, and Migration and Statelessness. He has practically conducted research projects in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Lesotho using Innovative Participatory and Ethnographic Methodologies to understand the lived experiences of people surviving on the margins in African cities. Ruvimbo Hazel Shayamunda is a Researcher and Conflict Peace and Governance expert. She holds a Master of Arts in Conflict Peace and Governance from the University of Zimbabwe and a Bachelor of Science (Honors) in Peace and Governance from Bindura University of Science Education. Her research interests cut across migration and migrants on the margins, conflicts and peacebuilding, Climate change, leadership, media and society, gender and promotion of women’s rights, civil society strengthening, and community capacity building. She recently spoke at the Workshop on Democracy and Governance in Africa, organised by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in SENEGAL, Dakar, from 29 November – 03 December 2023. Abraham R. Matamanda is an NRF Y2-rated Urban and Regional Planner. Abraham lectures at the University of Free State (UFS). He is the Deputy Chair of the SARChI Chair on City Region Economies in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at UFS. Currently, he serves as the editor of the Town Planning Journal published by UFS and serves on the academic editorial board of the Plos Water Journal. Abraham is also the current Chairperson of the Free State Chapter of the South African Planning Institute (SAPI). He is a fellow of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) Future Professorate Programme Phase 1, third Cohort. Abraham is the South African PI for a global collaborative research project exploring how children and young people from monetary poor households have adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on food, education and play/leisure ( https://panexyouth.com/ ). His research focuses on urban governance and planning, climate change adaptation and resilience, informal Global South urbanism, urban land markets and housing studies. Abraham has authored and edited several books published with Springer Nature. Leemisa Simon Matooane is a PhD candidate exploring the nexus between Food Systems and Urban Planning and Management. He is a published scholar whose research aims to address critical challenges in urban food security, sustainability, and climate change. With a solid foundation in planning principles, he has honed his skills through diverse experiences in corporate and consulting environments. He contributed to projects that integrated cutting-edge technology into resilient urban planning strategies. He leverages advanced mapping and spatial analysis techniques to support data-driven decision-making in urban planning. He is dedicated to creating resilient and equitable communities through his work. Tebello Putsoane is a PhD candidate at the University of the Free State, where she has focused her research interests on urban dynamics and disaster management. Tebello has published on extreme weather events, health inequalities in southern Africa, and the lived experiences of energy consumers in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Bloemfontein. She has presented her research on the environmental planning strategies in eco-sensitive zones (ESZs) of Lesotho at the 5th Annual Philanthropy Conference. As a registered Candidate Planner with SACPLAN, her vast knowledge as an emerging climate change researcher, her experience as a site acquisition specialist at Rise International NGO in Lesotho, and her GIS background have allowed her to design innovative land-use management approaches. Mareli Hugo is a PhD student at the University of the Free State in South Africa, specialising in Urban and Regional Planning. Her research interests encompass diverse topics, including mobility and transport planning, eco-industrial parks, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS). With her dedication to the Urban and Regional Planning Research field, Mareli has been recognised as an exceptional emerging researcher and scholar, earning invitations to speak at numerous local and international academic conferences. Dr Daniel N. Mlambo is a senior lecturer in the Department of Public Management at the Tshwane University of Technology (Soshanguve South Campus), where he lectures undergraduate and postgraduate students and supervises both Master’s and PhD candidates. He holds a Postgraduate Diploma in Teacher Education from the Haaga-Helia University of Applied Sciences School of Vocational Teacher Education, a PhD and Master’s degree in Public Administration, honours in International Relations, and a junior degree in Development Studies all from the University of Zululand. His research focuses on African Political Economy, Regional Integration, Governance and Democracy, Migration, and Security Studies. Makinde Mayowa Babatunde obtained his bachelor’s degree in political science and international Relations from Osun State University in Nigeria. He was awarded the African Union scholarship to study Master of Science in Governance and Regional Integration at the Pan African University, Institute for Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences in Cameroon. His areas of interest include governance, migration, and regional integration in Africa. Prof. Oluyemi Fayomi is an astute multidisciplinary researcher and International Relations pundit. She is a versatile scholar and administrator with functional teaching, research, and community development activities. She is a Professor of International Relations at the Nigerian Army University Biu, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Biu, Borno State, Nigeria. She is a member of the Knowledge Network on Climate Assemblies (KNOCA) and a fellow member of the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL) Community. Her areas of research expertise include Migration-Diaspora, Environmental and Developmental Issues, Regional Integration, e-governance (Global and Regional Health Governance), Gender, Peace, and Security. She is a recipient of several academic and leadership Awards, Grants and Fellowships. She is a member of several academic and professional bodies. She has several publications in scholarly peer-reviewed Journals, Conference Proceedings, Books, Policy Briefs, Technical Reports and magazines. She concluded an International Volunteering Service in March 2024 under the auspices of the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps Programme (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria) at the Islamic University in Uganda (IUIU), Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), Mbale, Uganda (East Africa). She was inducted on the 6th of May 2024 as a Charter member of the National Association of Artificial Intelligence Practitioners (NAAIP). Dr Mandla A. Mubecua is an academic researcher and a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Durban University of Technology. He is a former lecturer (Development Studies) at the University of Zululand and a former postdoctoral researcher affiliated with the University of Johannesburg. His research interest is on gender, land reform and Sustainable Development Goals. Aaram Gwiza is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Public Management and Governance, College of Business and Economics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Vain DB Jarbandhan is a Professor and Director of the Centre for Public Management and Governance, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa. Moira Tambaoga is a lecturer in the Department of Development Sciences at Marondera University of Agricultural Sciences, Zimbabwe. Daglous Makumbe is a Research Associate in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Western Cape. His research interests include International Criminal Law, International Relations, Democracy and Human Rights, and International Conflict Management. To date, he has published books, book Chapters, journal articles, and presented at local, regional, and international conferences. Noah Ariel Mutongoreni is the Director of Quality Assurance at Manicaland State University of Applied Sciences, Zimbabwe. Knowledge Mwonzora is a Post Doctoral Researcher at the Centre for Security, Peace and Conflict Resolution and Centre for the Advancement of Non-racialism and Democracy, Nelson Mandela University, Gqeberha, South Africa. Gift Mwonzora is a Research Fellow at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany. Victoria Graham

Co-Series Editor: African Political Science and International Relations in Focus University of Johannesburg

Johannesburg, South Africa Africa stands at a pivotal moment in its journey toward sustainable development, peace, and prosperity. With its abundant natural resources, youthful population, and rich intellectual capital, the continent possesses immense potential to shape its own future. Yet, persistent challenges, ranging from political instability and climate-induced disasters to infrastructural deficits and governance crises, continue to hinder progress toward the aspirations outlined in the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs). As co-series editors of African Political Science and International Relations in Focus, we believe that this volume, Security-Development Nexus in Africa: Progress Towards the Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals, offers a timely and comprehensive exploration of the intricate relationship between security and development across the continent. Through rigorous analysis and diverse case studies, the contributors unpack the structural and emerging issues that shape Africa’s developmental trajectory. From the impact of military coups in West Africa and the Sahel, to the role of regional integration, human-wildlife conflict, food security, and migration governance, the chapters collectively illuminate the multifaceted nature of Africa’s challenges, and also its opportunities. Edited by Siphumelele Duma and Rich Mashimbye, this work brings together leading scholars and practitioners whose insights are not only academically robust but also policy-relevant. Their recommendations serve as a valuable resource for governments, civil society, regional bodies, and international partners committed to advancing Africa’s development agenda. As we approach key milestones in both Agenda 2063 and the 2030 UNSDGs, this book reminds us that Africa’s future depends on bold leadership, inclusive governance, and strategic collaboration.

Table 10 .1: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Ranking in 2022

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Zimbabwe	22	24	22	24	25	21	20	15	13	14	13
Mozambique	59	38	32	28	13	15	18	20	11	12	12
Cameroon	27	27	12	15	13	12	8	8	10	10	10
DRC	3	3	5	5	4	3	4	8	6	8	14
Nigeria	3	4	5	6	6	5	5	5	5	6	6
Sudan	2	2	4	4	3	6	6	6	7	5	8
Ethiopia	7	8	9	8	8	8	11	11	6	4	20
C.A.R	5	3	0	7	7	5	4	4	3	4	6
Mali	3	6	7	8	9	6	5	3	4	3	5
Somalia	0	0	2	2	2	4	3	3	1	0	1

(*Percentile rank ranges from 0=lowest to 100=highest). Source: Author, Compiled from World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2022).

Table 13 .5: Summary of Localized Case Studies on Urban Food Security in Africa

City	Country	Initiative Description	Key Benefits	Reference
Accra	Ghana	Urban Food Plus project focuses on improving nutrient recycling to boost crop yields through biochar and fortified compost.	Enhances soil fertility and increases local food production, directly addressing food security.	Lydecker & Drechsel (2011)
Cape Town	South Africa	Urban Agriculture Policy supports urban farming through seed distribution, technical training, and marketing assistance.	Stabilizes local food markets, provides fresh produce, and strengthens urban resilience to food shortages.	Crush Frayne & McLachlan (2011)
Dar es Salaam	Tanzania	Introduction of micro-gardening practices using small containers, vertical gardens, and rooftop spaces to grow vegetables and herbs.	Optimizes limited urban space for food production, enhances food access and urban greening.	Bryld (2003)
Kampala	Uganda	Establishment of community food centers as hubs for food distribution and nutritional education, in collaboration with local NGOs.	Ensures consistent access to affordable and nutritious food, particularly for vulnerable urban populations.	Maxwell (2001)
Harare	Zimbabwe	Implementation of policies to protect and promote green belts for agricultural activities, balancing urban expansion with food production.	Maintains ecological balance and local food production capacity, despite urban pressures.	Gondo, Madigele, Mogomotsi, Tokwe, Jeremiah & Chirefu (2017)