To my wife Buller
“ We must take the current when it serves, or lose our ventures.” William Shakespeare ‘Julius Caesar’ (1599) act 4, sc. 3, l. 215
“Denmark has demonstrated once again - and history will show when it is written - that our efforts here have also been far, far greater than our geographical extent and our population numbers would suggest ... a good story from which much could be learned when seen in perspective.”
“The decision to establish an embassy in South Africa was taken at Asiatisk Plads in the spring of 1990 after Nelson Mandela’s release in February of that year. It was a question of defending hard-line Danish interests, including business interests. From the Danish side, we therefore had an interest in establishing contact with the new powers that could be expected to emerge during the democratisation process that had now been set in motion. This was the primary purpose of a Danish embassy.
Already during the meeting of the Nordic Foreign Ministers with Mandela in the spring of 1990 in Stockholm, I had the opportunity to tell him about the Danish support for the ANC, which - unlike the direct Swedish support - went through private organisations. But we would like to consider establishing direct relations, and it would be important for Denmark to know whether the ANC would renounce the possibility of using armed struggle to achieve its objectives.
The lifting of sanctions against South Africa, both Danish and EU sanctions, was high on the agenda. Denmark should not be the last country to lift sanctions against South Africa. It was to be a long slog; a majority in Parliament - the Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party (SF) and the Social Liberals - were long opposed. In the spring of 1991, they had forced the government to make reservations in the EU about a proposal for limited easing of EU sanctions to encourage the negotiating process in South Africa. They felt it was still too early to react positively to a process that could still go wrong.
On 17 March 1992, a significant majority of white voters voted in a referendum in favour of continuing the democratisation process, based on the conclusions of the Conference on Democratic South Africa (CODESA). At the time, Denmark was the only EU country to maintain full sanctions against South Africa. I had been in telephone contact with Mandela and told him that the government would lift sanctions if the referendum result was positive. Mandela made no secret of the fact that the ANC would be very sorry if we lifted the sanctions now. I said that from the Danish side, we had held out for a long time; but we could not be the last to maintain the sanctions. It was my impression that Mandela understood our position. The Social Democrats (S), the Socialists (SF) and the Social Liberals were still hesitant; I had said in advance that the government would lift the sanctions after a positive vote and that this would be done by royal decree, as there was no need for new legislation. A lifting of the sanctions could therefore only be prevented by a real vote of no confidence, and the three parties did not think that this was a viable option.
The government had gone through a long and tedious period of footnote politics on defence in the 1980s and was now tired of the prospect of having to drag itself through a similar process on sanctions against South Africa. At the same time, it was important not to antagonise the various political interest groups too much. There had been no real pressure from Danish business, which knew the government’s political terms. They were used to us being cowed by the majority in Parliament. There were moods that moved; there were compulsory exercises that you had to go through with the various stakeholders; all the groups concerned had to be able to say at the end that they had done what they could, in the circumstances, to defend the interests of that group.
I thought it was important to give that support to the de Klerk government as well. During a personal meeting some months later at his holiday home near Cape Town, I got the clear impression that de Klerk wanted to appear as a credible political leader. He was determined to take the process forward based on the mandate he had received in the referendum. Already in 1991, de Klerk’s government had sent the first non-white ambassador, Conrad Sidego, to Copenhagen; this appointment had not caused any problems with the ANC, and Ambassador Sidego was allowed to remain in his post for over a year after Mandela took over as president in 1994.
It was easier to conduct foreign policy then. Some might say that our initiative in South Africa was characterised by a certain hubris. Overall, it was a matter of looking after Danish interests, including establishing contacts with the expected new rulers. The fact that we could also contribute to democratic development was an additional benefit. As a small country, Denmark has the advantage that we can often fly under the radar and - combined with great flexibility in our decision-making processes - take initiatives that larger countries, often burdened by a heavy past, are not able to. We had done something similar, for example, in relation to Czechoslovakia, where the embassy was already well on the way to establishing contacts with key representatives of the expected new rulers well before the fall of the Wall in November 1989.”
1 December 2016
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Focus on the story, not the narrator. Inspired by D.H. Lawrence:
“The proper function of the critic is to save the tale from the artist who created it.”
In the wake of Nelson Mandela’s release, Denmark was one of the first countries to send an ambassador to South Africa with a clear mandate to make as many new contacts as possible. In a country with a voracious appetite for international cooperation after years of isolation, this gave me unique access. But it was also a time of difficult balancing acts and many sceptics. Were the burgeoning upheavals real or just an attempt by the white regime to buy time? We tried to leverage presence and insight for maximum courage in Denmark’s responses.
to the other three provinces as a condition of its joining.Natal had simply demanded free access for the province’s sugar
“... Since 1965 we have provided almost DKK 1 billion through the so-called anti-apartheid allocation, and in many different ways - often through difficult channels - we supported the victims of the odious apartheid regime. We paid for education and books for young black South Africans, and we paid for legal aid for blacks who were dragged before the courts or unjustly detained. It was moving to meet several of the beneficiaries, who today hold significant positions in the new South Africa, and as Nobel Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu said: “Denmark is my second home”.19 18 In the years 1985-86, all the Nordic countries introduced a series of tightened South Africa sanctions in relation to the 1978 Nordic Programme of Action. In the field of trade, Denmark took the lead in 1986 with a law banning trade with South Africa and Namibia. Similar laws were introduced by Norway, Sweden and Finland in 1987. However, none of the three countries went as far as Denmark, which even withdrew its expatriate diplomats from South Africa in the mid-1980s, see Christopher Bramsen’s book “South Africa - Fight or Dialogue” Chapter 16 ff.
“The Danish side had welcomed the fact that the ANC had found it possible in the Groote Schuur Agreement24 to agree to suspend the use of armed struggle. It was further commendable that the ANC had not succumbed to the temptation, in the ensuing waves of violence, to take up arms again. This self-restraint would undoubtedly help to strengthen the ANC’s general image, especially among those who might still have doubts about whether the ANC was seriously committed to the negotiating process.” 23 Evaluation carried out by Nordic Consulting Group DAC Sector 50.2 ref.nr. 6.U.566/17.a.
“Thank you for your words of appreciation. But first of all, I would like to express my warm thanks to Denmark for the unique Danish support in the fight against apartheid politics in South Africa. I was therefore pleased with the two visits I had the opportunity to make to Stockholm this year, where I met with your Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, and the other Nordic Foreign Ministers. I have made sure that a visit to Denmark is part of my future travel plans.”
“The ANC is bound to find a negotiated solution. At the same time, we must recognise that the negotiation process is under threat, continued violence could derail it. We are very concerned about the role of the police in the violence. Let me give you a concrete example from recent months: the ANC had provided documented information to three different police agencies in good time about the preparation for acts of violence in a certain “township” near Johannesburg. The police forces had done nothing but passively watch as 30 people were killed and even more injured in a single clash. It is events like these that make me face increasing calls for rearmament within the ANC’s own ranks.”
“It is quite clear that President de Klerk does not have control over parts of the security forces. I can understand that - especially in this transitional period. But I am deeply disappointed that, despite my repeated requests, de Klerk has not kept me regularly, and willingly in confidence, informed of these problems and consulted us on solutions. A curfew is imposed, and the police are allowed to use armoured personnel carriers equipped with machine guns, the dreaded “casspiers” of which you have probably seen pictures. The government is pursuing an iron-fist policy. And it is doing so without prior consultation with us.”
the United Nations (UN), refused to accept a proposal from South Africa for permission to annex South West Africa. The South African government refused to recognise the authority of the UN and continued to administer South West Africa directly from Pretoria, including the imposition of apartheid in the country.of the Second World War, the successor to the League of Nations,
“After President P.W. Botha had refused to cross the Rubicon in August 1985, it became clear to certain circles in the ruling National Party that not only was there no light at the end of the tunnel, but there appeared to be no tunnel. The authorities had been unable to put an end to the violence. Progressives in the National Party recognised that the government would probably have to bite the bullet and get into a negotiating position with the ANC. President Botha had already had secret contacts with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela.
What many tend to overlook is that the reform process did not start with de Klerk. It had begun much earlier under President P.W. Botha, who began to dismantle so-called “petty apartheid”, the ban on mixed marriages, racial segregation in buses and park benches. But Botha, the old crocodile, did not dare to go all the way when he delivered his Rubicon speech in 1985.
Even before that, it had been recognised right inside the National Party’s think-tank, Broederbond, that apartheid was failing politically, socially and economically. Financial rather than trade sanctions were beginning to work. By the 1990s, the South African economy was slipping into its longest recession since the Boer War (1899-1902). International loans were becoming increasingly difficult to obtain.38 hundred million kroner a year - and on the other, the government was mainly interested in the pat on the back, the positive political signal, that lifting the trade sanctions would send.the full truth - Danish coal imports alone had amounted to several
In addition, the ANC had succeeded in its international political campaign, an essential element in uniting international opposition to the apartheid regime.
A key event was the Perestroika process and finally the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The head of the South African Institute of Race Relations once said in 1991: “If Brezhnev had still been in power in Moscow, Mandela would still be in prison on Robben Island”.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact meant that the National Party government could no longer legitimise all its draconian measures against the alleged “total onslaught” from the communist world in general and from the communist-backed regimes in South Africa’s neighbouring countries in particular.
An often overlooked but no less important factor regarding the timing of de Klerk’s behaviour has been the age of Mandela and his close comrades-in-arms Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. Initial confidential contacts with Mandela in the late 1980s had left senior government officials with the impression of a principled but not dogmatic, indeed for some a surprisingly pragmatic ANC leader. A look at his age and that of his comrades-in-arms, and at the average age of the as yet unknown ANC cadres, could give Pretoria no other impression than that the alternative to Mandela was a succession of younger but far more radical ANC leaders. It was therefore a matter of exploiting the almost rational Mandela, who had come to be known while he was still in power.
It was therefore urgent to establish a negotiating position with Mandela…”39 36 Dirigism is an economic doctrine in which the state plays a strong, controlling role as opposed to a merely regulatory or non-interventionist role in a capitalist market economy. Dirigist policies often include directional planning, state-directed investment, and the use of market instruments (taxes and subsidies) to incentivize market entities to meet state economic goals.
“Both main actors, de Klerk and Mandela, found themselves in different kinds of dilemmas.
Mandela could not enter into real negotiations until the conditions laid down in various UN resolutions and Organisation of African Unity and Frontline documents had been met. One of the conditions that proved most difficult to meet was the release of political prisoners. On the other hand, he had to produce concrete results within a certain limited period, and these could only be achieved through negotiations.
One of the questions for Mandela was how to negotiate with a counterpart who was both a player and a judge. In the longer term, how would he deal with the issue of the armed struggle and the pressure from the left if no results were achieved? And the longer it dragged on, the stronger the pressure for results became. This was one of the main reasons why, when the Conference on a Democratic South Africa (CODESA II) (the second session of the negotiating forum that started as the Conference on a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I) on 20 December 1991) had broken down in the early summer of 1992, Mandela pressed de Klerk to agree on an election date of 27 April 1994.
For de Klerk, the dilemma was primarily that, for a long transitional period, he needed constant confirmation of the legitimacy, from the National Party’s point of view, of negotiating with what had hitherto been regarded as a terrorist organisation.
Since he could not be sure that the rest of the National Party’s electorate, let alone those even further to the right, were convinced of the need to negotiate with a so-called terrorist organisation like the ANC, it was necessary to act with great caution. De Klerk knew that for the National Party, the only possible outcome was a negotiated outcome that would in any case be worse than the status quo.
The main problem for de Klerk was that he had very little prospect of explaining the government’s negotiating mandate, which in reality could only mean a reduction in the National Party’s existing position of power. De Klerk was therefore very careful never to talk of surrender or relinquishment, but only of power-sharing. De Klerk’s strategy, in any case, had to involve not just a dilemma but a paradox: he was forced to follow a course of negotiation which was in effect to dissolve the constitution and the regime which were the basis of the National Party’s power. What organisation would be prepared to negotiate its own demise? Especially when, like de Klerk, it was clear that the majority of the National Party’s electorate was unaware of how bad things were. For it was by an almost Münchhausian technique that it had been agreed, under the amending provisions of the existing constitution, to adopt a new transitional constitution which would in any event reduce the National Party from a majority party to one of several minority parties.
He began by launching the idea - too much criticism from his own side - that it was all about sharing power with the other communities.
He would go down in history as the statesman who actually gave up power in favour of the new democratically elected majority. So far, though, in a nifty national coalition government model.
There was another dilemma for de Klerk: Buthelezi, the leader of the Zulu-dominated Inkatha party, was the third, key player in the negotiating process.
Buthelezi initially occupied a highly advantageous position in the process. A position which he gradually researched. Buthelezi did not want a final, new constitution to be negotiated by a democratically elected constitutional assembly. He knew in advance that he would only constitute a small minority in a national election, but that he would have something close to a veto in an unofficial negotiating forum like the Conference on a Democratic South Africa CODESA.”
In the turbulent waters between Nelson Mandela’s release and the start of negotiations on a new South Africa, the international community tried to push the process with both a stick and a carrot. It soon became clear to me that one of our most important tools was to ensure comprehensive dialogue with the many invited guests from Denmark, as well as South African re-visits by Nelson Mandela and others. In supporting the process, we were well assisted by unique access to local support for initiatives large and small that would remove any sticking points in the process.
It was during this period that the ANC, through dialogue with the outside world, moved in earnest from a freedom movement rooted in socialism to a future governing party.
“...We take this opportunity to place on record our appreciation for the position adopted by the Danish Parliament in ensuring the maintenance of these sanctions during 1991. They played a positive role in creating the conditions for the convening of CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa)”
“The position of the Danish Parliament on the sanctions issue is very much appreciated by the ANC. After talks with the Luxembourg President of the EC Council of Ministers in Brussels last spring, I had the impression that the decision to lift EC economic sanctions could be postponed. Unfortunately, this had not proved possible. That is why the ANC has appreciated so much the position of the Danish Parliament.”
met in Copenhagen to discuss foreign policy issues, including common positions on apartheid and Middle East issues, but flew to Brussels as soon as they reached the Community issues on the agenda, even if they were related, e.g. EC assistance to victims of apartheid policy.how, under Danish EC Presidencies, EC Foreign Ministers first
“I have noted the reluctance of Danish parliamentarians to fall in line with the rest of the EC. I understand the special relationship that exists between the ANC and the Nordic countries. But - as far as I know - the Danish sanctions were imposed - not to encourage the drafting of a democratic constitution - but solely to get apartheid abolished. I have had the opportunity to study carefully the reports in the Folketing (The Danish Parliament) on this matter. I myself have fought for the abolition of apartheid, and it is a long and painful process that has led to my isolation, even in my own party and even in the parents’ council of my children’s school. Denmark has moved the goalposts in the sanctions case. That was not fair. Denmark favours one side in the process. I have recently asked the Australian Foreign Minister not only to give money to the ANC but also to other organisations. I will ask Denmark to do the same.”49 45 After long and difficult negotiations, the South African government had reached an agreement with the UNHCR on 2 September 1991. The agreement provided for the establishment of an office in South Africa to assist and facilitate the process of voluntary repatriation and reintegration of South African refugees and political exiles who choose to return as civilians.
“Denmark did not facilitate the negotiation process by maintaining sanctions. They only contributed to unemployment and slowed down economic growth (Ed.; This was an assessment that did not correspond to the one we had just been told by Botha.) To achieve the necessary 4.5-5% annual growth, South Africa needed foreign investment.”
“The information and impressions we have gathered during our visit will be very useful for our further considerations in the Danish Folketing relating to Denmark’s policy concerning a gradual lifting of sanctions vis-à-vis South Africa.
Upon our return to Denmark, we will engage in a critical and impartial comprehensive assessment of the situation. We leave the country with the good hope that the peace process will soon lead to a new, non- racial democracy in South Africa.”
“But since my release I have become even more aware of the struggle that has been waged by the Danish people and the anti-apartheid movement here. We have received unparalleled support from the people of Scandinavia in general and the people of Denmark in particular”.
persons and their descendants who had been deprived of their lands since 1913 to make claims to the new authorities for the restitution of these lands. Subsequently, it has become possible to apply for the restitution of lands confiscated before 1913. This process is still far from complete.new democratic constitution in April 1994, opened the way for
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One of the greatest threats to a peaceful transition to democracy was the widespread violence, much of it carried out in murky collaboration between conservative forces in the security forces and various factions of the predominantly black freedom movements. Through bold collaboration with the controversial South African police and investigating judge Richard Goldstone, the embassy came close to the peace effort, which culminated in the escape of a renegade death squad member to Copenhagen. It was also during this period that the value of a long dining table and the opportunity to bring opponents together in informal settings really became apparent.
“ To enumerate ECOMSA’s achievements is difficult. We were certainly able to prevent much bloodshed although the numbers will never be known. Our ability to communicate with the police and persuade them to either refrain from, or take positive action, and with the public to persuade them to restrain themselves, has with certainty contributed to the avoidance of the loss of many lives. That we ourselves have frequently been in life threatening situations goes without saying “64 59 Boers, Dutch for “farmers”, is the historical name for Africans, descendants of the Dutch colonists who came to South Africa in the late 17th century.
“The negotiating situation in South Africa up to the end of September was reminiscent of the story of the young Danish naval officer Tordenskjold (Ed.:Thunderbolt) when, having frightened the commandant of the Swedish coastal fortress Marstrand with his retreating soldiers into signing the city’s surrender, he nevertheless sees the Swedes hesitate and therefore shouts the famous words: “What the hell are you waiting for?”
President de Klerk’s foot-dragging was provoking similar exclamations from many quarters here in South Africa. The ANC’s position has also made many impatient.
Someone may have told de Klerk about Thunderbolt. In any case, the 26 September summit gave the negotiating process a second chance. However, as already reported, there are enough obstacles ahead and the question is whether we can do more to support efforts to keep the negotiating process on track.
Both de Klerk and Mandela, as you know, have appealed to the international community for assistance. We have already had special Nordic contact with the ANC on mass actions involving imminent risk of violence and death. We are planning a Nordic meeting with the new Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, L.H. Evans, to explain the approach to the ANC and to recall our views on the government’s responsibility to protect lawful demonstrations.
The question is whether we in the European Community should also be inspired by the example of our famous naval hero and speak in clearer terms to the main players in the negotiating process.
Colin Coleman of the Consultative Business Movement told us the other day of a CEO of a very large South African business who had become fed up with the government’s delay, which he felt was destroying the economy of the country and his business. He declared that he was now prepared in principle to support the ANC and that the only thing preventing him from making financial contributions to the ANC’s election campaign, for example, was the ANC’s all too close links with the Communist Party, the SACP. According to Coleman, this business leader’s attitude was symptomatic of an increasing number of company directors who were both concerned with company strategy and had retained contacts at grassroots level.
Here at the embassy, we have a growing sense that de Klerk may not have a fully accurate picture of the views of the EC countries, and that he takes the EC and its member countries too much for granted as a support for government policy. This perception is probably based on the sympathy which washed over de Klerk around the March (1992) referendum. He has undoubtedly forgotten that the sympathy was primarily for the continuation of the negotiating process. As we have written before, de Klerk misled the overwhelming majority to pursue narrow NP goals.
The proverbial straw broke the camel’s back when de Klerk expressed disappointment at the reactions of some European countries to the Bisho massacre at the EC lunch on 21 September. All EC colleagues were astonished and slightly annoyed.
Prior to that, the Troika mission had raised the question of whether de Klerk was himself ill-informed or whether he underestimated the intelligence of his interlocutors. In any case, it surprised me that he presented the collapse of CODESA II as a direct result of the ANC’s prior decision. We who witnessed CODESA II know this to be untrue, and would think that de Klerk was aware that we knew better.
Another example in this vein was Pik Botha’s portrayal of the international community’s reaction to the Bisho massacre during the diplomatic briefing on 29 September. farcical to say the least.
During the Troika visit, de Klerk presented the link between the release of all political prisoners and a general amnesty as a legal imperative. Recent developments have confirmed our suspicions that this link was purely political.
Would we not be doing de Klerk and the cause a disservice if we allowed him to remain in the mistaken belief that the European Community countries were unreservedly behind him? Should we not rather say to him: “Cut the crap - if you want a fruitful dialogue with the EC countries, we must have a common basis for discussion. You must accept that we do not always feel convinced of the validity of the South African Government’s arguments and that in such cases we must say no.”
The visit of the Troika mission may not have helped to change de Klerk’s perception of EC attitudes. Both diplomatic colleagues and ANC representatives perceived the visit as an exercise in British rather than typical EC attitudes. It is true that Douglas Hurd was pulling the government’s (and to some extent the ANC’s) leg. Only our Minister dared to speak out against Pretoria.
This is not a question of moral rearmament or the introduction of Oxford meetings with the President of South Africa and his henchmen. They could do with that. For they are all very Bible-strong and fully aware that the Ten Commandments contain no prohibition against lying67 . 62 Danish translation
The crucial thing, as I have said, is that de Klerk is not misled by our inaction, or rather our diplomatic language, but that we - in the interests of both - speak out and make clear our assessment of the situation and, where appropriate, our wishes as to the government’s position. On this point, we here at the embassy agree with the French and like-minded EC partners that it is primarily the Pretoria Government that must deliver in the present situation. De Klerk was the main debtor at the 26 September Summit, but the goods have not been finally delivered.
To that end, one could envisage a revival of the idea of a closer dialogue with the government and clearer messages on our policy, as well as, for example, a new Troika mission under the Danish Presidency. This alone could increase pressure on Pretoria.”
“Sometimes one may have doubts about de Klerk’s willingness and/or ability to enter into real negotiations. Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert68 in an article in The Star on 24 September puts it as follows: 63 Danish translation.
“Whether through incompetence, collusion, arrogance, ignorance or deliberation, the government has underestimated the dynamics of transition. It thought it could control the agenda for negotiations, but the agenda refused to stay pinned down or be subject to the will of any political party. Very soon, tension, suspicion and anger emerged. Posturing, bad faith and double agendas became the order of the day.
But the worst was the violence. Like malevolent slime it oozed into every fabric and texture of society. Instead of addressing it, politicians cursed each other for it.”
“Change in South Africa means the introduction of a new system. Apartheid cannot be reformed - it must be abolished. On 2 February 1990, de Klerk crossed his so-called “first Rubicon”, which began a process of change towards a new democratic South Africa. This change is in effect to abolish the old system and introduce a new one, but all under the current South African Constitution. Can one expect a system to be so tolerant that it will consent to its own abolition? Not willingly, at any rate.
At CODESA II, de Klerk refused to cross his second Rubicon. It is now reported that he may have been instrumental in preventing his predecessor P.W. Botha from crossing the first Rubicon already in 1985/86. Indeed, Pik Botha has recently - presumably to boost his own credit for a new South Africa - had published his so-called liberal draft of the Rubicon speech P.W. Botha was to give in 1985, but which was heavily modified in the final version. Rumour has it that the penman for the restrictive changes to the speech was F.W.de Klerk.
My Swedish colleague thinks that de Klerk looks more and more like Gorbachev - the man who initiated the changes but was unable to complete them.
As shown in the study on white South Africans’ negative perceptions of the transition process, the task often seems insurmountable. The resistance of his white hinterland can hardly be overestimated. Added to this is the negative influence of the security forces in the negotiation process. In this context, clear words from us might be timely for him.
All in all, I think that in this situation we can best serve the democratisation process by helping to keep de Klerk on his toes and - preferably in private - giving him our honest opinion on developments, including having the courage to speak out: “What the hell are you waiting for?”
Pik Botha himself has said that one of the worst risks South Africa can run is to be forgotten by the northern world because development is not proceeding at a reasonable pace.
The problem, of course, is that we in the EC do not always agree on what needs to be done. Some EC partners seem as frightened by the idea of a new South Africa as de Klerk.
Under the Danish EC Presidency, we may have a chance to paint a picture of the EC which is not dominated by British views.”
In the letter I also set out the ANC’s position on the process and the role of the international community:
“The ANC’s position also gives cause for reflection on the role of the international community. Especially in the Nordic circle we have a creeping feeling that the movement takes us and our support for granted. One thing is that the Troika mission has been perceived by many as a British performance, but when senior ANC representatives felt that the EC Troika came with its index finger raised (the word was “prescriptive”), it suggests that the ANC too has been out of normal international conversation for too long. And many - not least Nordic circles - have supported the ANC in the view that the movement was by definition infallible.
The point is that in Danish communication with the ANC, it has been largely only the ANC that has made demands of us. This is very natural and understandable up to 1990/91. Now that conditions are slowly being normalised and one-way communication is being replaced by something that could be mistaken for dialogue, it comes as a shock to the ANC that the movement’s proselytes are also making suggestions, even voicing what might sound like demands. Our ANC-representative in Copenhagen, Tim Maseko, whose office in Copenhagen was partly financed through Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke, is a good example of ANC attitudes in this respect69 64 ECOMSA Final Report of 8 May, 1994. The Danish participants in the three consecutive 6-month periods of the EC observer mission (ECOMSA I, II and III) from autumn 1992 to spring 1994 were in alphabetical order. Poul E. Bentsen ECOMSA I in Johannesburg, Jørn Gravesen ECOMSA III in Johannesburg and East London, Kim Sverre Hansen ECOMSA II in Johannesburg and East London, Finn Kromose ECOMSA II and III in Johannesburg Durban and Cape Town, Henry Sørensen ECOMSA II and III in Johannesburg and Durban, Kaj Stendorf ECOMSA I in Cape Town.
It has probably come as something of a surprise, for example, that the ANC is now being told by the Swedish side that the negotiation process will not survive a new Bisho. Even my Swedish colleague was surprised by such a clear and blunt statement from Stockholm, a sign that Swedish ANC policy is under review.
Thabo Mbeki’s reaction to the message could suggest that the ANC is not fully aware that the movement could jeopardise its international image if it clings tenaciously to the Leninist concept of mass action.
The ANC leadership also knows that we know that a report on the ANC’s treatment of its own “political prisoners” in frontline states has been on Mandela’s desk for some time. Informed sources will know that the report contains material that is quite incriminating to the ANC. In fact, we should be advising the ANC to make the report public soon in order to prevent the government from using it against the ANC at a time that suits Pretoria alone.”
“We have a strong suspicion that the Government has a distorted view, to say the least, of the EC countries’ position on developments in South Africa and that we should consider, in our own interest and that of the negotiating process, how they might be corrected. For example, the idea of a more regular EC dialogue with the Government could be revived. The Danish EC Presidency offers an appropriate opportunity to test this idea, reinforced for example by a Troika mission in the first half of 1993. We have had a similar impression of a distorted ANC picture of the Nordic countries’ position. With the change of government in Sweden, there now seems to be an opportunity to correct this impression. ANC “foreign minister” Thabo Mbeki supports the idea of more regular Nordic meetings with the ANC, but even the British recognise that the Nordic countries often have more influence on the ANC than the EC. The point is that the positions of the North and the EC are converging. It is important that we increasingly establish a two-way communication with the ANC, in which demands can also be made from our side.
In the dialogue with both major players, South African business can have an increasing influence: the analysis of the worrying developments in South Africa’s economy should make an equal impression on both camps.
From an EC and a Nordic point of view, Denmark is a kind of soldier of officer Tordenskjold (Thunderbolt). The crucial thing is that we dare to say, especially to the government and the ANC: “What the hell are you waiting for?”
was a keen analyst and forward thinker, whose role during those four years far exceeded his official status as head of the European Commission’s co-ordination office for the EU’s programme for the victims of apartheid.de facto representative of the European Commission, Tim Sheehy,
“My criticism of the present system does not mean that I would like to return to the old system. I don’t think we will ever follow Zimbabwe’s path, but people are allowed to be concerned. I still have hope for a future for whites in this country too - but I’m not entirely optimistic.”
“Tonight, I am reaching out to every single South African, black and white, from the very depths of my being. A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and committed a deed so foul that our whole nation now teeters on the brink of disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we may know, and bring to justice, this assassin. The cold-blooded murder of Chris Hani has sent shockwaves throughout the country and the world. Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for – the freedom of all of us.”77 71 See his book ”The End of Apartheid” from 2015 and the following quote from Simon Jenkins’ article in The Guardian on March 5, 2015: “How significant this was to the course of events is unclear. Certainly, Renwick appears to have been operating at the limits of diplomatic courtesy. The diary entries become frenetic. Whomever he addresses, “I advised him to release detainees … I warned him against the advice of the head of the security police … I raised the issue of the abolition of the death penalty.” When the die for reform is cast, Renwick is in full proconsular mode. “I asked the ANC to consider suspending the sports boycott … I asked for the state of emergency to be restricted to Natal … I congratulated Mandela on the suspension of the armed struggle.”
Neither party is strong enough to impose a constitutional settlement on its own, nor is the ANC. The two main players, the government and the ANC, are equally weak; and neither feels a sure winner of the first elections. Both increasingly recognise that only by standing together can they achieve a negotiated settlement. Both agree on a two-phase transition process: a preparatory phase governed by a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to ensure a level playing field in the run-up to the Constituent Assembly elections; a second phase governed by a Government of National Unity for up to five years, during which the Constitution will be adopted.
The two main actors also agree in principle on most fundamental constitutional principles, including the need for a transitional constitution.
The third major player Inkatha wants a single-phase process: a new constitution should be negotiated by the current multi-party forum and put to referendum. However, if Buthelezi’s wishes for strong regional autonomy are met, at least for KwaZulu-Natal where Inkatha has its strength, he is expected to accept the two-phase process.
The disagreement over the form of state for a new democratic South Africa and the way to get there is one of the main outstanding issues.
multicoloured flag of democratic South Africaup of many groups. This is reflected, for example, in the new
“We are believed to have made contact with a person directly linked to ‘third force’ activities in the South African police”. It was Ivor Jenkins of IDASA who told Peter Lysholt in mid-March 1994, just a month before the elections, that he had just been visited by someone who wanted to talk about his and the police’s involvement in political killings.
“These new aspects may, in my opinion, serve to explain why de Klerk has hitherto treated the security forces with kid gloves. As you know, 11 police officers are now at last been suspended, while two of the highest-ranking generals, Basie Smit and le Roux, have so far successfully resisted suspension, strongly backed by the “generals’ club,” an unofficial union of active and former police generals. Their attitude may be a sign that the generals are still imbued with the arrogance with which, under apartheid, they peeled and chose as they pleased, or that they have some squeeze on de Klerk.”
South Africa’s first democratic elections and Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as president in 1994 were a moving culmination of four years as an eyewitness to the country’s transformation. But our long effort also secured unique access to the dramatic run-up, with Danish election observers and election expert Jørgen Elklit at the heart of the Electoral Commission. Afterwards, everyday life began putting the new democratic principles into practice.
“Deep down, we knew there would be another ordinary weekday after this party; but the party was so lovely while it lasted.”
“We enter a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall. a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world”
“The time for the healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come. The time to build is upon us.”
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“The data collation (the comparing and checking of the various vote tallies) first at the RCC and then manually was undertaken by IEC members, more specifically by Jørgen Elklit, the world- renowned expert on proportional representation systems, who was responsible for the review and personally supervised the conversion of the vote counts into mandates in the various legislative institutions. Was he complicit in an electoral fraud - or was he so naive that he was simply duped? “(My translation)
At the same time, reports have emerged that the apartheid regime, through ARMSCOR, the South African arms agency, supplied arms to the Unionists in Northern Ireland.refinery in Sasolburg on 1 June 1980. Kader Asmal died in June 2011.
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“Had it not been for Denmark and the other Nordic countries, the ANC would hardly have been in power in South Africa.”